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Ram Kinkar Rai v. Tufani Ahir

Allahabad High Court
Jun 27, 1930
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Summary — Full Bench Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The Full Bench was convened to decide whether a point of law not raised in either the trial Court or the lower appellate Court can be taken in a second appeal. The underlying suit was an ejectment action by plaintiffs against eight defendants (grouped into tenants and cosharers) and for damages. The principal factual dispute concerned whether the defendants were trespassers and whether a widow, Mt. Batasi, had the power to grant a lease to defendant 1. The Munsif found that Mt. Batasi's husband Baldeo died as a member of a joint Hindu family and decreed the suit. On appeal, Mr. Krishna Das found Baldeo to be separate, reversed the Munsif, and held that Mt. Batasi could grant the lease, dismissing the suit. Counsel for the plaintiffs did not raise in the pleadings certain alternative legal points they later sought to argue in this Court — namely, that even if Baldeo was separate, Mt. Batasi could not grant the lease, and that the plaintiffs' suit should have been partly decreed. Young, J. had earlier declined to receive those points as not having been taken in the lower Courts, observed that the matter frequently arose, and considered it fit for authoritative settlement by a Full Bench.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a point of law which was not taken in the trial Court or the lower appellate Court can be raised for the first time in a second appeal.
  2. If new points may be permitted in a second appeal, in what circumstances (i.e., what exceptions or conditions) should the appellate Court allow them to be raised?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Plaintiffs') Arguments — as presented by Dr. Agarwala

  • Collected authorities can be grouped under five heads, supporting that certain types of points can be taken in second appeal: (1) res judicata; (2) limitation; (3) cases where the pleadings disclose no cause of action or no ground of defence; (4) jurisdiction; and (5) points which, if decided, would prevent further litigation.
  • On res judicata: cited authorities (e.g., Md. Ismail v. Chhatter Singh and others) to show that a plea of res judicata, even if not raised earlier, can be entertained in second appeal and the Bench has options to decide on the record or remand for findings of fact.
  • On limitation: relied on Full Bench and High Court decisions (e.g., Bechi v. Ahsanullah; Ranga Charya) that when limitation arises on the facts before the Court, it must be heard and determined even if not directly raised in pleadings.
  • On plaint disclosing no cause of action: cited Secy. of State for India in Council v. Sukhdeo and similar authorities to argue that the Court can examine and decide such points though first taken in second appeal.
  • On preventing future litigation and amendments: cited decisions (e.g., Skinner v. Nihal Singh; Chhote Lal v. Chandrabhan; Brij Lal Singh v. Bhawani Singh) permitting fresh points/amendments where deciding them avoids further suits or expense.
  • Also acknowledged the existence of contrary authorities (Kanhia v. Mahin Lal; Balkaran Singh v. Mt. Dulari Bai) but nonetheless advanced the grouped categories above.

Respondents' Arguments — as presented by Mr. Gour

  • Referred to many authorities (including cases cited by Dr. Agarwala and additional ones) emphasizing established practice against permitting new points in second appeal when they should have been taken earlier.
  • Argued that the plaintiffs' proposed new points could not be decided on the record and would require sending down issues and evidence — e.g., the defendants would assert Mt. Batasi's exclusive possession, a matter entailing factual inquiry about any private arrangement among cosharers — and therefore the points should not be entertained in second appeal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Md. Ismail v. Chhatter Singh [1881] 4 All. 69 Plea of res judicata may be taken for the first time in second appeal. Cited as authority that res judicata can be entertained in second appeal, with the Bench having options to decide on record or remand for factual findings.
Tek Narain Rai v. Dhondh Bahadur [1898] A.W.N. 104 Support for allowing res judicata in second appeal. Referred to as consistent authority on res judicata being entertainable in second appeal.
Chhadami Lal v. Shyama Charan [1914] 22 I.C. 12 Support for allowing res judicata in second appeal. Included among decisions confirming that res judicata may be raised in second appeal.
Bibi Wasilan v. Mir Syed Hussain A.I.R. 1929 Pat. 173 Support for allowing res judicata in second appeal. Also cited as a decision to the same effect regarding res judicata.
Bechi v. Ahsanullah [1890] 12 All. 461 Question of limitation arising on the facts must be heard and determined even if not directly raised in pleadings or grounds of appeal. Referred to in support of allowing a plea of limitation that arises on the record to be considered in second appeal.
Ranga Charya v. Guru Reoti Banian Acharya A.I.R. 1928 All. 689 Where facts supporting limitation are admitted or apparent on record, High Court should hear plea even if first raised in second appeal. Quoted for the principle that admitted or apparent facts permitting a limitation plea justify entertaining it in second appeal.
Mitthu Lal v. Deojit A.I.R. 1927 All. 589 Plea of limitation can be raised at any moment prior to the decision of the appeal. Cited for the timing principle regarding pleas of limitation.
Secy. of State for India in Council v. Sukhdeo [1899] 21 All. 341 Duty of the Court where plaint discloses no cause of action — Court may examine and uphold that contention even when first raised in second appeal. Used to show that a plaint disclosing no cause of action can be grounds for decision in second appeal.
Sheodayal v. Jagernath [1919] 8 A.L.J. 922 Similar principle to Sukhdeo regarding plaint disclosing no cause of action. Cited as further authority upholding the same principle.
Kamlaput Moti Lal v. Union Sugar Mills Co. A.I.R. 1929 P.C. 256 Example where omission affecting jurisdiction was given effect by the Privy Council though not pressed earlier. Referred to as an example of allowing a jurisdictional point taken in appeal.
Skinner v. Nihal Singh [1913] 35 All. 211 (p.226) Allowing a fresh point where decision would prevent further litigation. Cited in support of permitting fresh points when deciding them avoids further suits.
Chhote Lal v. Chandrabhan A.I.R. 1923 All. 176 Allowing fresh points to prevent further litigation. Referred to among authorities permitting such fresh points.
Brij Lal Singh v. Bhawani Singh [1910] 32 All. 651 Amendment allowed enabling plaintiffs to redeem both mortgages and thereby avoid a fresh suit. Cited as an instance where amendment/new point was permitted to save expense of another suit.
Kanhia v. Mahin Lal [1888] 10 All. 495 Contrary authority: courts should not entertain points not alleged in pleadings. Cited by Dr. Agarwala as an authority adverse to his contention.
Balkaran Singh v. Mt. Dulari Bai A.I.R. 1927 All. 231 Courts ought not to entertain points that should have been alleged in pleadings and argued in lower courts; unfair to upset appeals on grounds never submitted. Quoted as an authority cautioning against entertaining new points in appellate stages; relied upon by both sides as illustrating established practice.
Partap v. Ram Sewak [1926] 96 I.C. 304 Cited among cases supporting refusal to allow new points in second appeal. Relied upon by Mr. Gour in opposition to permitting fresh points.
Jai Ram Das v. Rajnarain A.I.R. 1922 All. 493 Cited among cases supporting refusal to allow new points in second appeal. Relied upon by Mr. Gour in opposition to permitting fresh points.
Sadho Kandu v. Mt. Jhinka Kuer A.I.R. 1929 All. 456 Cited among cases supporting refusal to allow new points in second appeal. Relied upon by Mr. Gour in opposition to permitting fresh points.
Iqbal Haidar Khan v. Mt. Wasi Fatima Bibi A.I.R. 1923 All. 358 Cited among cases supporting refusal to allow new points in second appeal. Relied upon by Mr. Gour in opposition to permitting fresh points.
Subramanian Pattar v. Kishakhara Uthamanthil Raman A.I.R. 1922 Mad. 519 Cited among cases supporting refusal to allow new points in second appeal. Relied upon by Mr. Gour in opposition to permitting fresh points.
Girish Chandra Choudhury v. Gopal Chandra Poddar A.I.R. 1925 Cal. 1184 Cited among cases supporting refusal to allow new points in second appeal. Relied upon by Mr. Gour in opposition to permitting fresh points.
Manindra Chandra Nandi v. Durga Parsad Singh A.I.R. 1917 P.C. 23 Privy Council enunciated that absent exceptional conditions an appellant cannot raise as a fresh point in appeal an issue not raised earlier. Quoted to support the established practice against admitting fresh points in appellate proceedings except in exceptional circumstances.
Baldeo Prasad v. Sukhdeo Prasad A.I.R. 1929 All. 485 Decision to be contrasted with Bechi on the matter of limitation. Referred to as a decision that requires future authoritative consideration alongside Bechi; the Court excluded limitation from the special classes pending further decision.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Full Bench reviewed numerous authorities cited by both parties and distilled principles from them. The Court framed the central question as whether a fresh point not taken below should ever be permitted in a second appeal and, if so, in what circumstances.

From the authorities the Bench deduced and approved the following principal rules:

  1. As a general rule, a point not taken in the Court below (whether omitted by the appellant or not taken by the respondent) will not be permitted to be raised in a second appeal, except possibly in limited categories.
  2. The limited categories where a fresh point may possibly be allowed are:
    • Points involving public policy, specifically: jurisdiction; and matters of res judicata.
    • Points where deciding them would prevent further litigation.
    Even in these categories, the Court will allow the point to be argued only if the point can be decided on the materials already before the Court and does not require further evidence, remand, or determination of questions of fact.
  3. The Court expressly addressed the situation where the plaint discloses no cause of action or the written statement discloses no ground of defence, holding that these circumstances are not, by themselves, sufficient grounds for permitting a new point merely because (1) it was omitted by oversight, or (2) the materials are on the record and the answer is plain.
  4. The Bench noted that authorities such as Bechi v. Ahsanullah and Baldeo Prasad v. Sukhdeo Prasad present a conflict on whether limitation should be treated as one of the classes of points that may be entertained when first raised in second appeal. The Court excluded limitation from the enumerated special classes for the present and indicated that a future authoritative decision would be required to resolve that question.
  5. The Court relied on Privy Council authority (Manindra Chandra Nandi) and multiple High Court decisions to underline the uniformity of practice in India refusing to allow new points outside the special classes mentioned.

The Court therefore balanced the competing authorities and practical considerations (including fairness to lower courts and avoidance of unnecessary remands) in formulating the tested exceptions and the conditions under which a fresh point may be entertained on second appeal.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED — the Full Bench dismissed the appeal and ordered costs against the appellants.

Implications:

  • The Court established and approved a constrained rule: ordinarily new points not taken in the lower Courts will not be allowed in second appeal; exceptions are narrowly drawn (jurisdiction, res judicata, and points whose decision would prevent future litigation), and such exceptions are permitted only when the point can be decided on the materials before the Court without further evidence or remand.
  • The Court declined to include limitation among those special classes for the present, indicating that the conflict in authorities on that matter requires a future authoritative ruling before limitation can be treated as an established exception.
  • The immediate, direct effect is that the plaintiffs' proposed fresh points were not entertained and the appeal was dismissed with costs. The Bench's approval of the enumerated principles provides guidance for future second appeals, although the Court signalled that certain aspects (notably limitation) remain open for authoritative resolution.

This summary is derived exclusively from the provided opinion and does not add information beyond the text.

Show all summary ...

1. This is a Full Bench appointed to consider the question whether, to use the language of Young, J.:

a point of law which has never been taken in either the trial Court or the lower appellate Court can be raised in second appeal.

2. The plaintiffs sued eight defendants in ejectment and for damages The defence of the first group of defendants was that they were tenants, holding by virtue of an agreement with defendant 3. a widow by name Mt. Batasi, her husband being by name Baldeo. The second group of defendants were cosharers, who did not join in the action. In the year 1926 the defendants had been actually ejected from the land in dispute but they subsequently regained possession; and the principal point that was discussed before the Munsif and the lower appellate Court was, whether the defendants were trespassers, a matter which involved the right of Mt Batasi to grant a lease to defendant 1. The Munsif on the issue of joint-ness or separation held that Baldeo the husband of Mt. Batasi, died as a member of the joint Hindu family, and therefore decreed the suit. On appeal Mr. Krishna Das held that Baldeo was separate from the plaintiffs. He therefore dismissed the suit holding that Mt. Batasi had power to grant the lease. Counsel for the plaintiff omitted to raise in their pleadings the legal position which later in this Court they sought to raise, viz., that even if Baldeo was separate from the plaintiffs Mt. Batasi could not thereby grant a lease to defendant 1, and that in the further alternative, the suit of the plaintiffs ought to have been decreed in part. Nor were these alternatives discussed in the lower appellate Court. When these points were sought to betaken before Young, J., he declined to receive them upon the ground that no appellant should be allowed to raise points not taken by him in the lower Courts. He noticed, however, that this matter frequently arose, and was of opinion that the matter should be authoritatively settled. Dr. Agarwala, who appeared on behalf of the plaintiffs, called our attention to a number of cases which can be conveniently grouped under five heads: cases in which the doctrine of res judicata has. been allowed to be invoked; cases of limitation; cases in which on a study of the pleadings no cause of action has been put forward by the plaintiffs or defence shown by the written statement; jurisdiction; and points which the Courts have allowed to be taken upon the specific ground that all the material being be-fore the Court, a decision would result in the saving of further litigation. On the question of res judicata he referred us to Md. Ismail v. Chhatter Singh [1881] 4 All. 69, which; is an authority for the proposition that the plea of res judicata, though not brought forward either before the Munsif or the lower appellate Court, can be brought forward for the first time in second appeal, and must be entertained by the Bench who have two courses open to them, either to decide the question on the record as it stands, or after a remand upon findings of fact. Decisions to the same effect are to be found in Tek Narain Rai v. Dhondh Bahadur [1898] A.W.N. 104, Chhadami Lal v. Shyama Charan [1914] 22 I.C. 12 and: Bibi Wasilan v. Mir Syed Hussain A.I.R. 1929 Pat. 173.

3. On the question of limitation we were referred to Bechi v. Ahsanullah [1890] 12 All. 461, in which a Full Bench of this Court decided that a question of limitation, when it arises upon the facts before a Court, must be heard and determined whether or not it is directly raised in the pleadings or in the grounds of appeal. In Ranga Charya v. Guru Reoti Banian Acharya A.I.R. 1928 All. 689 the Court held that where the facts necessary to support a plea of limitation are either admitted or are apparent on the face of the record, the High Court will not be justified in refusing to entertain the plea even if raised for the first time in second appeal.

4. The third case is that of Mitthu Lal v. Deojit A.I.R. 1927 All. 589, in which it was held that a plea of limitation can be raised at any moment prior to the decision of the appeal. On the question as to the duty of the 'Court when the plaint discloses no cause of action, we were referred to Secy. of State for India in Council v. Sukhdeo [1899] 21 All. 341. In that case it came to the notice of the 'Court that the plaint in the suit disclosed no cause of action against the defendant. The Court examined the plaint, upheld that contention and thereupon decided that that plea must prevail though taken before the second appeal Bench for the first time.

5. To the same effect is Sheodayal v. Jagernath [1919] 8 A.L.J. 922. Dr. Agarwala also referred us to the Privy Council case of Kamlaput Moti Lal v. Union Sugar Mills Co. A.I.R. 1929 P.C. 256. In that case it was pointed oat to their Lordships of the Privy Council that a scheme, which it was essential should have been laid before the shareholders for their approval, had by omission not been so laid before them. It was " tentatively suggested " in the High Court that a decision by the shareholders should precede sanction by the Court; but the point was not pressed. When however the omission was brought to the notice of their Lordships of the Privy Council they at once gave effect to :it. This is an example of a point taken which involved the jurisdiction of the High Court.

6. On the fifth head, viz., the desirability of allowing a fresh point to be taken which if decided will prevent further litigation we were referred by Dr. Agarwala to Skinner v. Nihal Singh [1913] 35 All. 211 at p. 226; Chhote Lal v. Chandrabhan A.I.R. 1923 All. 176.

7. Three other cases lying outside these groups to which our attention was drawn by counsel for the plaintiffs are: Brij Lal Singh v. Bhawani Singh [1910] 32 All. 651, where at p. 826, a claim was allowed to be amended which enabled the plaintiffs-appellants to redeem both mortgages and thereby to save the expenses of a fresh suit. It is to be noticed that the Court held that that was not an unreasonable application and it was not objected to by the advocate for the respondents. Dr. Agarwala concluded his argument by very properly presenting to us two cases which were contrary to the contention that he was urging : Kanhia v. Mahin Lal [1888] 10 All. 495 and Balkaran Singh v. Mt. Dulari Bai A.I.R. 1927 All. 231. In the latter case the Court said:

We have repeatedly stated in this Court that lower appellate Courts and this Court, sitting either in Letters Patent or in second appeal ought not to entertain points which should have been alleged in the pleadings and made the subject of an issue and of argument and of decision by the trial Court and also stand in the grounds of appeal clearly and directly. The trial Judge does not have an opportunity of giving a decision upon a point such as this and it is not fair to a lower Court to upset an appeal on a ground never submitted to it.

8. In answer to these authorities Mr. Gour referred us to many cases of which these are the principal; they are in addition to the last two cases cited by Dr. Agarwala: Partap v. Ram Sewak [1926] 96 I.C. 304, Jai Ram Das v. Rajnarain A.I.R. 1922 All. 493, Sadho Kandu v. Mt. Jhinka Kuer A.I.R. 1929 All. 456; Iqbal Haidar Khan v. Mt. Wasi Fatima Bibi A.I.R.. 1923 All. 358, Subramanian Pattar v. Kishakhara Uthamanthil Raman A.I.R. 1922 Mad. 519; Girish Chandra Choudhury v. Gopal Chandra Poddar A.I.R. 1925 Gal. 1184 and Balkaran Singh v. Dulari Bai A.I.R. 1927 All. 231.

9. Further, he contended that, before the points which Dr. Agarwala sought to raise in the second appeal could be decided, it would be necessary to send down issues inasmuch as the defendants' case would be that Mt. Batasi was in exclusive possession of the property which was the subject of the lease, and that that was a matter which could only be decided by evidence as to whether there was a private arrangement by which cosharers were entitled to have exclusive possession over certain particular agreed portions of property.

10. The question then for decision is, should the raising of a new point ever be permitted, and if the answer is in the affirmative, then in what circumstances? The question is really analogous to that dealt with in Order 41, Rule 2, which lays down that the appellant shall not, except by leave of the Court, urge or be heard in support of any ground of objection not set forth in the memorandum of appeal; and the appellate Court in deciding the appeal, shall not be confined to the grounds of objection set forth in the memorandum of appeal or taken by the leave of the Court under this rule.

11. From all the very numerous cases to which we have referred, and many others, we deduce the following principles which we approve:

12. A point not taken in the Court below, whether the omission was by the appellant in that Court or whether the respondent failed to support his decree by taking the point, will not be permitted to be raised, except possibly:

I. Where the point may be described as involving a question of public policy e.g., (1) involving jurisdiction;

(2) involving the the principle of res judicata;

(3) where the decision of the point would prevent future litigation.

In the above instances the point will be allowed to be argued only if it can be decided upon the materials before the Court and does not involve the taking of further evidence, or the sending of the case, or any issue, back to the lower Court, or a decision of a question of fact.

II. Where the plaint discloses no cause of action, or the written statement, no ground of defence, it is not a ground for permitting a new point to be argued, merely:

(1) that it was omitted by oversight in the Court below; or (2) that the materials are all on the record and that the answer to the point is plain.

13. In this connexion the principles enunciated by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Manindra Chandra Nandi v. Durga Parsad Singh A.I.R. 1917 P.C. 23 are of interest.

Their Lordships said : " In the absence of any exceptional conditions, it was not open to the appellant to raise as a fresh point in appeal an issue which had not been raised before the Subordinate Judge or the High Court and might then have been raised in a convenient form and at an opportune time, and that there was no valid reason in the present case for departing from the established practice of the Privy Council.

14. A reference to the authorities given above shows the uniformity with which Courts in India have in fact refused to allow new points to be raised in second appeal, when they lie outside the area of the special classes we have mentioned.

15. It will be noticed that we have ex-eluded limitation from the type of cases in which the new point can, under certain conditions, be entertained. We have done this because we are of opinion that when next it is sought in this Court to put forward a plea of limitation which was not argued in the lower Court, the decision of Bechi v. Ahsan Ullah (supra) will have to be considered and contrasted with that of Baldeo Prasad v. Sukhdeo Prasad A.I.R. 1929 All. 485, decided on 27th March 1929. An authoritative decision can then be given on this point.

16. We therefore dismiss this appeal with costs.