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Nand Kishore v. Lallu

Allahabad High Court
May 14, 1930
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Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Bennet, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a Letters Patent appeal by the plaintiffs against the judgment of a learned single Judge dismissing their appeal and confirming the decrees of two lower Courts. The plaintiffs commenced two partition suits concerning family property: Suit No. 7 of 1916 (plaint filed 16 February 1916, registered 18 December 1916) by Raja Ram and Sheo Parkash, and Suit No. 3 of 1918 (filed 18 December 1917) by Nand Kishore. The two partition suits were tried together, with a preliminary decree on 6 April 1921 and a final decree on 19 September 1921.

Separate from the partition litigation, Lalta Prasad obtained a simple money decree on 22 December 1916 against Bhawani Prasad and his son Ram Kishore, and, on 28 August 1918, an attachment was made of house No. 95 (the principal property in dispute here). The plaintiffs objected to the attachment as the property was alleged to be joint ancestral family property and partition suits were pending. Their objection was overruled, and the house was put up for auction and purchased on 2 June 1919 by Kedarnath (father of the defendants), who obtained formal possession on 5 November 1919. Kedarnath had been a tenant since 1905, paying Rs. 17 per month.

In the final partition decree of 19 September 1921, the whole of house No. 95 was allotted to the four plaintiffs in equal shares (one-fourth each). The plaintiffs subsequently brought the present action for arrears of rent from 1 August 1921 to 31 August 1924. The defendants' primary defence relevant to this appeal was that they were not liable for one-third of the rent because Kedarnath had purchased the shares of Bhawani Prasad and Ram Kishore at the auction.

The key legal issue raised was whether the principle of lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act rendered Kedarnath's auction purchase ineffective against the plaintiffs' rights, given that the auction occurred while the partition suits were pending.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the rule of lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act applies to partition suits so as to render an auction-purchase made during the pendency of partition proceedings null and void as against co-partitioners.
  2. Whether the particular auction-purchase by Kedarnath of the shares of Bhawani Prasad and Ram Kishore is negated by lis pendens, thereby affecting the defendants' liability for rent.
  3. Whether there was fraud in the plaintiffs' conduct in obtaining the final partition decree (specifically, whether plaintiffs fraudulently concealed the auction-sale of the judgment-debtors' shares and obtained a decree allotting the whole house to defeat the auction-purchaser).
  4. If the partition decree is not binding on the auction-purchaser, what were the precise shares of Bhawani Prasad and Ram Kishore in house No. 95 on the date of the auction purchase?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Plaintiffs') Arguments

  • The plaintiffs (appellants) contended that the auction-purchase made while the partition suits were pending was subject to the rule of lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act and thus could not affect their rights established in the partition proceedings.
  • They relied on precedent and statutory interpretation to support the proposition that partition suits are "contentious" within the meaning of relevant provisions, so transfers or purchases during pendency cannot defeat rights being adjudicated in the partition.

Respondents' (Decree-holder / Defendants') Arguments

  • The respondents (decree-holder's representatives) argued that Section 52 did not apply because one of the partition suits (No. 3 of 1918) was not contentious: Bhawani Prasad and Ram Kishore did not contest that suit, and therefore their rights to the property were not in issue in that proceeding.
  • It was further argued that in a partition suit a right to immovable property is not directly and specifically in question (apparently on the basis that parties admitted the joint family status and the existence of the property), and therefore the rule of lis pendens should not defeat the auction-purchase.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Tara Chand v. Bachnun Singh Held that an assignment of mortgage debt during a partition suit comes under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act (treating partition proceedings as contentious for purposes of lis pendens). The Court relied on this principle to support the conclusion that partition cases fall within the meaning of "contentious suits" for Section 52 and that transfers during pendency may be negatived by lis pendens.
Faiyaz Husai Khan v. Parag Narain (Privy Council) Where a suit is contentious in its origin and nature, it is not necessary that summons should have been served to make it contentious; the character of the suit depends on its nature and origin. The Court invoked this authority to reject the argument that lack of formal contest (no appearance or defence by particular parties) removes the suit from the ambit of "contentious" proceedings under Section 52.
P. Kathir v. C. Maremadissa Held that a "contentious suit" for Section 52 means every suit other than a friendly suit. The Court relied on this definition to support the view that partition suits (which are not friendly suits) are within Section 52 and subject to lis pendens.
First Appeal No. 297 of 1924 (decision on 1 December 1927) Applied Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act to hold that an auction-purchaser did not obtain rights valid against Sheo Parkash when a grove was allotted to him in a pending partition suit. The Court discussed and distinguished that decision in the present matter; the earlier case was treated as authority that a purchaser at auction may not obtain rights against a party to a partition when Section 53 applies, but the present Court explained differences and noted procedural misunderstandings in the single Judge's reliance on that case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court focused on whether the doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act applies to partition suits and hence negates the legal effect of an auction purchase made while partition proceedings are pending.

Step-by-step, the Court's analysis proceeded as follows:

  1. The Court observed that the auction-sale of house No. 95 occurred during the pendency of both partition suits. The lower Courts had held Section 52 inapplicable on the ground that one partition suit was not "contentious" because certain parties (Bhawani Prasad and Ram Kishore) did not contest that suit.
  2. The Court reviewed precedent (notably Tara Chand v. Bachnun Singh) and statutory meaning, concluding that partition suits are to be regarded as contentious suits within the meaning of Section 52. The Court expressly accepted the principle that partition cases fall within the description of contentious suits under Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act.
  3. The Court rejected the respondent's contention that absence of contest by particular parties removes a partition suit from the ambit of "contentious" proceedings. It relied on the Privy Council decision in Faiyaz Husai Khan v. Parag Narain (that a suit contentious in origin and nature does not require service of summons to be so regarded) and on P. Kathir v. C. Maremadissa (defining "contentious suit" as every suit other than a friendly suit).
  4. The Court reasoned that in a partition suit the question is how immovable property is to be divided and thereby the rights in that property are directly in issue; therefore the partition suit engages the lis pendens rule.
  5. Having concluded that Section 52 applies to partition suits, the Court held that the plaintiffs are entitled to contend that lis pendens negatives the effect of the auction purchase made during the pendency of the partition proceedings.
  6. The Court identified factual issues that required remand rather than final determination by it: (a) allegations of fraud in the plaintiffs' obtaining of the partition decree (pleaded in paragraphs 19, 21 and 22), and (b) the precise amount of the shares of Bhawani Prasad and Ram Kishore in the house on the date of the auction (a dispute whether their combined share was one-third or one-sixth).
  7. The Court set out procedural directions for remand: the two specified issues were to be returned to the lower appellate Court for decision within two months; no evidence need be taken on these issues (though the Court could call for the partition records if required); ten days were allowed for objections in the findings.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Letters Patent appeal was allowed. The Court held that partition suits fall within the ambit of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act (i.e., they are "contentious" for purposes of lis pendens) and that the plaintiffs are entitled to claim that lis pendens negates the legal effect of an auction-purchase made during the pendency of a partition suit.

Implications and immediate consequences:

  • The appeal was allowed and the matter was not finally disposed of on all issues: the Court remanded two factual issues to the lower appellate Court for determination within two months — (1) whether the plaintiffs fraudulently concealed the auction-sale and obtained the final partition decree to defeat the auction-purchaser, and (2) if the partition is not binding on the auction-purchaser, what the shares of Bhawani Prasad and Ram Kishore in house No. 95 were on the date of the auction purchase.
  • The Court directed that no fresh evidence needed to be taken on the remanded issues, but the lower appellate Court could call for the partition records if necessary; ten days were allowed for objections to the findings, and upon receiving the findings the Court indicated the appeal was warranted and allowed.
  • Direct legal effect for the parties: plaintiffs may pursue their lis pendens claim and the legal validity of Kedarnath's auction-purchase is subject to the outcome of the remanded factual inquiries (fraud and accurate share calculation). The decision establishes, within the context of this opinion, that Section 52 applies to partition suits and can negative an auction purchase made during their pendency.

Note: This summary is strictly confined to information contained in the provided opinion and does not add facts or inferences not present in that text.

Show all summary ...

Bennet, J.:— This is a Letters Patent appeal brought by the plaintiffs against the judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court dismissing their appeal and confirming the decrees of the two lower Courts. The family of the plaintiffs is as follows:

2. By a plaint filed on 16th February 1916, and registered on 18th December 1916, Raja Ram and Sheo Parkash brought a suit for partition (No. 7 of 1916) against the other members of the family. Subsequently there was a second suit for partition, No. 3 of 1918, brought by Nand Kishore which was filed on 18th December 1917. These two partition suits were tried together and a preliminary decree was passed on 6th April 1921, and a final decree on 19th September 1921. A few days after registration of the first partition suit brought by Raja Ram and Sheo Parkash, Lalta Prasad got a simple money decree against Bhawani Prasad and his son Ram Kishore on 22nd December 1916. This was in connexion with a business which was in the name of Ram Kishore alone and the name of Bhawani Prasad hrs father was subsequently added to the suit and a decree was given against both. On 28th August 1918, attachment was made of house No. 95 with which the present suit is concerned, and an objection was made by the present plaintiffs to the effect that the property attached was joint ancestral family property; that these suits for partition of the entire family property were pending, and that the attachment should be released, but if that prayer be not granted that this objection be postponed until determination of the two partition cases. When the objection came on for hearing, the vakil for the decree-holder stated that he only desired auction-sale of the right and share of the two judgment-debtors Ram Kishore and Bhawani Prasad. The vakil for the objectors admitted that the two-judgment-debtors had a share in the attached property, but he wanted the sale postponed for two months. The objections were disallowed, and the house in dispute in its entirety was put up for sale and purchased on 2nd June 1919, by Kedarnath father of the defendants who obtained formal possession on 5th November 1919. Kedarnath had been a tenant of the house since 1905 on a monthly rent of Rs. 17 to the joint family of which the plaintiffs were then members. In the final decree in the partition suit on 19th September 1921, the whole of the house in dispute was allotted to the four plaintiffs in equal shares, one-fourth to each plaintiff, that is, it was alloted to the branch of Bhawani Prasad and his sons with the exception of Bhawani Prasad and his son Ram Kishore who were judgment-debtors in the case of Lalta Prasad. The present case has been brought by the plaintiffs for arrears of rent from 1st August 1921 to 31st August 1924. Various grounds were taken in defence in the written statements, but the present ground with which we are concerned is that, as found by both the lower Courts, the defendants were not liable for the one-third of the rent owing to the purchase at the auction-sale by the father of the defendants, Kedarnath of the shares of Bhawani Prasad and Ram Kishore. The question which has been argued before us is, whether owing to the rule of lis pendens contained in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, that purchase by Kedarnath was null and void as against the rights of the plaintiffs. It is clear that the auction-sale was made while both partition suits were pending. The view taken by the two lower Courts was that Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, would not apply, because the partition suit No. 3 of 1918 was not contentious as Bhawani Prasad and Ram Kishore did not contest it, and the rights of Bhawani Prasad and Ram Kishore to a share in the house in dispute was not in question is that suit.

3. In addition to the house in dispute there wag also a grove and the same decree-holder Lalta Prasad attached and purchased that grove himself. In the partition that grove was allotted to the share of Sheo Parkash, the cousin of the present plaintiffs. A suit was brought in regard to that grove and came before this Court in First Appeal No. 297 of 1924 decided by a Bench of this Court on 1st December 1927. In that suit it was held that Sheo Parkash could recover the grove. The basis of the decision was that Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act, applied and the auction-purchaser there fore did not obtain rights which were valid against Sheo Parkash to whom the grove had been allotted in the partition suit which was pending at the time the auction-purchase. The learned Judge of this Court alludes at some length First Appeal No. 297 of 1924 and distinguishes the second appeal in 1 present case on various grounds, held that the present appeal was ??? and he went on to state:

“The appellant has not even argued in ??? appeal that the doctrine of lis pendens is plicable.”

4. Most of the grounds in the pres second appeal dealt with the question lis pendens and as the First App No. 297 of 1924 was contested on ground of lis pendens we are ??? that the learned Judge of this Court ??? under a misapprehension when he ??? that the question of lis pendens was ??? argued before him in second ??? Consequently it is open to the plaintiff to argue lis pendens before this Court the Letters Patent appeal.

5. As regards the broad question as whether Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, applies ??? partition suit, there is a ruling of to Court in Tara Chand v. Bachnun Singh (1) which states that an assignment of mortgage debt during a partition suit 1 a party comes under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. We agree with the principle of that ??? that partition cases come within ??? meaning of contentious suits under Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act. Some argument has bee made on the meaning of the word “contentious,” and the learned advocate ??? the respondent has endeavoured to ??? port the finding of the lower appellant Court that the present suit was not contentious, because Bhawani Prasad an Ram Kishore did not contest it. In the Privy Council case in Faiyaz Husai Khan v. Parag Narain (2), it was ??? down at p. 345 that where a suit is contentious in its origin and nature, it is no necessary that summons should have been served to make it contentious. Further it was held in P. Kathir v. C. Maremadissa (3) that a contentious suit ??? Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, means every suit other than a friendly suit, it was further argued by the learned counsel for the respondent that in a partition suit a right to immovable property it not directly and specifically in question, because apparently it is admitted the parties that the joint family posted the property in question. But we ??? that the question in the ??? suit is how that immovable property ??? be divided and those rights ???. Consequently we consider that partition suit does come under Section 52 of the P. Act. Accordingly, differing from ??? learned single Judge of this Court, we ??? that the plaintiffs in the present it are entitled to claim that the rule of ??? would apply to a partition it and would negative the effect of an ??? purchase made during the ??? of a partition suit.

6. One further question of fact remains ??? decision. In the written statement were were various pleas of fraud raised paras. 19, 21 and 22, and although the ??? Court did not directly ??? an sue on the subject ??? fraud, the trial court considered those pleadings under sue 1:

“Are the plaintiffs the owners of the whole ??? in dispute 7”

7. The trial Court came to this finding:

“The plaintiffs, thereafter, seem to have, taken to another course to defraud the creditor, is course being the non-allotment of the house ??? sold to fee share of the judgment-debtors on partition.”

8. Ground 3 of appeal to the District judge stated that no evidence was proceed to prove any fraud or collusion, and the lower Court was not at all justified in importing allegations ??? fraud in ts judgment quite beyond the pleadings ??? the parties. The lower appellate Court mentioned that six grounds had been taken in appeal and that the Court need not take them one by one as they seem to overlap one another, in the ??? the Lower appellate Court dismissed the appeal of the plaintiffs on different grounds and did not come to any finding on the question of fraud. As we have differed from the tower appellate Court on the ground on which it set aside the decree of the trial court, it is necessary for us to remand an issue to the lower appellate Court on the question of fraud.

9. It is also necessary to remand an issue in regard to the amount of the shares of Bhawani Prasad and Ram Kishore, because although it was found by ??? the lower Courts that the shares amounted to one-third or the house in question and before the lower appellate Court it was stated that point was not congested, still it has been contested in this Court that those two shares together will amount to one-sixth and not one-third. The reason for this is that the branch of Bhawani Prasad and the branch of his brother Raja Ram would have on partition one-half share each, and, therefore, the half-share of Bhawani Prasad divided between himself and his five sons would become one-twelfth each and not one-sixth each. Accordingly we remand the two following issues for decision by the lower appellate Court and return within the period of two months. No evidence need be taken in regard to these issues. But it will be open to the Court to send for the partition records if required.

1. Did the plaintiffs fraudulently conceal the fact that the shares of Bhawani Prasad and Ram Kishore in house No. 55 had been sold in auction-sale and did the plaintiffs fraudulently obtain a final decree in partition allotting the whole house No. 95 to the plaintiffs in order to defeat the auction-purchaser?

2. If the partition is not binding, what were the shares of Bhawani Prasad and Ram Kishore in house No. 95 on the date of the aucton purchase?

10. Ten days will he allowed for objections in the findings. (On receiving the findings the Court allowed the appeal.)

S.N/R.K

11. Appeal allowed.