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Lakhmi Chand v. Madho Rao
Appellate Judgment Summary — Mukerji and Bennet, JJ.
Factual and Procedural Background
This judgment concerns a First Appeal by the defendants (Lakhmi Chand, Parshotam Das and Parbhu Lal) against a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Agra, together with a cross-objection by the plaintiff Madho Rao (a minor). The plaintiff's suit sought a declaration that the decree in Suit No. 18 of 1914 was null and void and that (a) the muafi rights specified in list A and (b) the ancestral property specified in list B could not be sold in execution of that decree.
The Subordinate Judge granted relief with respect to the muafi rights in list A but dismissed the plaintiff's claim as regards the ancestral property in list B. The plaintiff's case rested on a sanad said to have been granted by Maharaja Scindhia to the plaintiff's ancestor and on allegations that Madho Rao I (the plaintiff's paternal grandfather) executed, on 26 October 1905, a hypothecation bond for Rs. 15,000 hypothecating both categories of property for immoral or unnecessary purposes. The defendants had obtained a decree in Suit No. 18 of 1914 on that hypothecation bond against the widow (Mt. Chaubai) and the plaintiff's father (Aba Sahib). The plaintiff's father subsequently instituted Suit No. 36 of 1916 alleging collusion and fraud in obtaining the 1914 decree; that suit was struck off in default and was also alleged to be void for absence of a Collector's certificate.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Pensions Act (Act XXIII of 1871), particularly sections 4 and 6 (and the related provisions in sections 11 and 12), applies to the plaintiff's muafi/assigned land revenue rights — i.e., whether the assignment of land revenue is a "pension" and thus subject to the certificate requirement and transfer restrictions in the Act.
- Whether the plaintiff's suit is barred by res judicata because the plaintiff's father had previously contested the mortgage and decree (Suit No. 18 of 1914 and proceedings in 1916) and thus had, as head of the family, represented the plaintiff's interests.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments (Defendants)
- The sanad and related documents should be characterised as a grant of zamindari rights rather than an assignment of land revenue or pension; accordingly, the Pensions Act should not apply to render the muafi untransferable.
- The plaintiff (the minor) was represented by his father in the earlier suits and the present suit is barred by res judicata (and under provisions such as section 11 and Order IX, rule 9 of the Civil Procedure Code as pleaded in the written statement).
- The muaft hypothecated in the bond was not a non-transferable pension and no certificate from the Collector was required for the earlier suits or for the mortgage to be validly adjudicated.
Respondent's Arguments (Plaintiff)
- The sanad granted by Maharaja Scindhia made the family assignees of the land revenue (a muafi/pension). Such assigned revenue is not transferable and could not lawfully be hypothecated in 1905.
- The decrees obtained in 1914 and the proceedings in 1916, so far as they affected the assigned revenue/pension, are void because the prior suits proceeded without the Collector's certificate required by the Pensions Act; therefore those decrees cannot be pleaded as res judicata.
- The mortgage of 1905 was for immoral purposes and/or without necessity (allegation in the plaint), rendering the transfer invalid as regards the muafi rights.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Harnam Das v. Faiyazi Begam | Recognition that an assignment of land revenue made for past services or analogous considerations may be a "pension" within section 11 of the Pensions Act and therefore subject to section 12 (non-transferability). | The Court found the present case similar to Harnam Das and relied on that reasoning to treat the assignment of land revenue in this case as a pension within section 11, supporting the conclusion that assigned revenue was not transferable. |
| Karar Hassan v. Mustafa Hassan | Held that a pension does not cease to be a pension merely because it has taken the shape of an assignment of land revenue. | The Court referred to this decision to support the proposition that an assignment of land revenue can remain a pension for purposes of the Pensions Act and therefore be non-transferable under section 12. |
| Balkrishna Bhau v. Govind Rao | Case cited but described in the opinion as not involving assignment of land revenue for services (i.e., materially different facts). | The Court observed that this decision did not govern the present factual situation and therefore did not support the defendants' case. |
| Lalla Babu v. Lal Bahadur | Illustration that where zamindari rights and assignee rights become coextensive (e.g., zamindars died out and assignees became zamindars), distinct treatment is possible: assignee rights may be non-transferable while zamindari rights could be transferred. | The Court held that Lalla Babu did not assist the defendants; it confirmed the distinction drawn there — assigned revenue (pension) may be non-transferable while separate zamindari rights may be transferable. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in a series of analytic steps, applying documentary evidence, historical/regulatory background and statutory interpretation:
-
Characterisation of the Sanad and Nature of Rights:
- The Court examined the original sanad and contemporaneous records (treaty extracts, khewat entries, a Collectorate "certificate of rent-free tenure" dated 20 March 1863, sale deeds and wills). Internal evidence and the 1803 treaty indicated that what was granted by Maharaja Scindhia to Manaji (and thereafter held by his descendants) was an assignment of the land revenue of mauza Rauta rather than mere zamindari rights.
- Historical and regulatory material (concerning jagir grants and regulations of the late 18th/early 19th centuries) supported the inference that jagir grants were assignments of revenue and that such grants were tantamount to remunerative pensions payable by assignment of revenue.
-
Application of the Pensions Act (Act XXIII of 1871), especially sections 4 and 6:
- Section 4 bars civil courts from entertaining suits relating to any pension or grant of money or land revenue conferred by former Governments, except as provided.
- Section 6 permits civil courts to take cognizance of such claims only upon receiving a certificate from the Collector or other authorised officer.
- Because the Court concluded that the plaintiff's rights were as assignee of land revenue, the Court held such rights fall within the scope of section 4 and therefore required a Collector's certificate under section 6 before civil courts could entertain disputes concerning them. The plaintiff had obtained such a certificate for the present suit; earlier suits had lacked the certificate and so those courts lacked jurisdiction over the assigned revenue.
-
Res judicata and Jurisdictional Consequences:
- The Court invoked section 40 of the Evidence Act (relevance of judgments that by law prevent a court taking cognizance) and section 44 (permitting a party to show that a judgment relevant under sections 40–42 was delivered by a court not competent to do so or was obtained by fraud/collusion).
- Applying section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code (courts have jurisdiction to try suits of civil nature except where cognizance is barred), the Court concluded the civil courts which decided cases in 1914 and 1916 had no jurisdiction to try matters concerning the assigned land revenue because of the Pensions Act bar. Consequently the decrees of those earlier courts were invalid as regards the assigned revenue and could not be pleaded as res judicata in relation to that portion of the plaintiff's claim.
-
Distinction between Assigned Revenue (muafi/pension) and Zamindari Rights:
- The Court drew a clear legal distinction: the Pensions Act bar applied to the assigned revenue (muafi), but it did not apply to the zamindari property or mortgagee rights derived from purchase or mortgage dealings with Jat zamindars. For the zamindari portion (list B), there was no statutory bar from the Pensions Act and the Subordinate Judge's findings (that the plaintiff's claim in respect of zamindari was barred by res judicata) were accepted insofar as section 11 assisted the contesting defendants with respect to zamindari-related pleas.
-
Transferability and Section 11/12 Analysis:
- The Court analyzed whether the assignment of land revenue in this case constituted a "pension" within section 11 so as to attract the non-transferability provision of section 12. It noted that section 4 is broader than section 11 but held, on the authorities and the facts (including treaty language that the grant was for Manaji "as a principal Sirdar … for his maintenance"), that the assignment was in the nature of a pension under section 11.
- Relying on the precedents cited (especially Harnam Das and Karar Hassan), the Court held that the assigned revenue amounted to a pension and therefore, under section 12, was not transferable. Consequently, the 1905 hypothecation could not validly affect the assigned revenue/pension.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
The appeal is dismissed with costs; the cross-objection is also dismissed with costs.
Direct consequences and legal effects on the parties:
- The Court held that the plaintiff's rights as assignee of the land revenue (the muafi/pension rights in list A) amount to a pension under section 11 of the Pensions Act and are therefore non-transferable under section 12. The 1905 mortgage/hypothecation is therefore ineffective so far as it purported to affect those assigned revenue rights.
- The decrees/orders of 1914 and 1916, insofar as they purported to adjudicate rights in the assigned revenue without the Collector's certificate required by the Pensions Act, were held to be invalid for want of jurisdiction and cannot be relied upon as res judicata with respect to the assigned revenue.
- As regards the zamindari rights and mortgagee interests (list B), the Pensions Act does not bar adjudication and the Subordinate Judge's findings against the plaintiff on those heads stand insofar as they were sustained by the Court (the Court agreed with the Subordinate Judge that the plaintiff could not raise certain pleas with respect to zamindari under section 11 as the contesting defendants were aided by that provision in that context).
The opinion does not purport to announce broader novel propositions of law beyond the application of existing provisions of the Pensions Act and the cited authorities to the facts of this family, sanad and mortgage history; the Court's decision rests on statutory interpretation, documentary history and the cited precedents.
Mukerji and Bennet, JJ.:— This is a First Appeal by the defendants Lakhmi Chand, Parshotam Das and Parbhu Lal against a decree of the learned Subordinate Judge of Agra, and a cross-objection by the plaintiff Madho Rao, minor. The suit of the plaintiff Madho Rao, aged 10 years, is brought for a declaration that the decree of the court of the Subordinate Judge of Agra in suit No. 18 of 1914 is null and void and that the muafi rights specified in list A and the ancestral property specified in list B are not sale able in execution of the aforesaid decree. The Subordinate Judge has granted the relief in regard to the muafi rights in list A and has dismissed the suit in regard to the ancestral property in list B. The pedigree of the plaintiff is as follows:—
The plaint sets forth that in mauza Rauta in Agra district the plaintiff and his ancestors had been muafidars for over a century under a sanad granted by Maharaja Scindhia; that the muafi was recognized by the British Government and the name of Abaji, son of Bogaji, was entered in the papers; that Madho Rao, the paternal grandfather of the plaintiff, whom we shall call for convenience Madho Rao I, was immoral and a spendthrift, and he executed for immoral purposes a hypothecation bond for Rs. 15,000 on the 26th of October, 1905, in favour of the defendants appellants, hypothecating the property both in list A and list B. The plaint alleged that the muafi was untransferable, and that the ancestral property of the joint family could not be transferred by Madho Rao I, and that the transfer was without necessity and for immoral purposes, and void because Madho Rao I previously made a family settlement. The plaint further sets forth that the defendants appellants obtained a decree in suit No. 18 of 1914 on the hypothecation bond against Mt. Chaubai, the widow of Madho Rao, and Aba Sahib, the father of the plaintiff, and that they did not make the plaintiff a party, and further that suit No. 36 of 1916 was instituted by the father of the plaintiff with the allegation that the decree in suit No. 18 of 1914 had been obtained collusively and fraudulently, but that on account of collusion and fraud suit No. 36 of 1916 was struck off in default. Further that suit No. 36 of 1916 was null and void in the absence of a certificate of the Collector. The written statement admitted that Madho Rao, the mortagor of the defendants, was a muafidar in mauza Rauta, and that the muafidars realized money from the zamindar, and that Madho Rao was owner of the zamindari rights by virtue of purchase. The allegations in the plaint were otherwise denied, and it was pleaded that the present suit was barred under section 11 and order IX, rule 9, of the Civil Procedure Code and that the present plaintiff had been fully represented through his father Aba Sahib in suit No. 18 of 1914, which was contested by Aba Sahib, and that the muaft hypothecated in the bond was by no means a non-transferable pension, nor was it necessary to obtain a certificate from the Collector for it. The learned Subordinate Judge framed a number of issues and held that the muaft in suit was untransferable; that the plaintiff had failed to prove that the mortgage of 1905 was for immoral consideration; that as regards the zamindari in that mortgage the suit of the plaintiff was barred by res judicata; but as regards the muaft. the suit of the plaintiff was not barred by res judicata because a certificate was required from the Collector under the Pensions Act (Act XXIII of 1871), and that certificate not having been granted, the decree in suit No. 18 of 1914 was void.
In first appeal in this Court the following points were argued. Firstly, whether the Pensions Act applies to the present case. Under this head sections 4 and 6 as well as 11 and 12 have been considered. Secondly, whether the plaintiff is barred by res judicata as his father had brought a suit No. 36 of 1916 as head of the family to contest the mortgage and decree on the mortgage, and his father should have taken all possible pleas.
We may first of all set forth the details in regard to the muaft property. This muafi was obtained by a sanad granted by Maharaja Scindhia to Manaji, the ancestor of the plaintiff, in the year Samvat 1842 which corresponds to 1785 A.D The original sanad was produced before the Subordinate Judge from the custody of the other branch of the family, and a copy was taken. The sanad may be translated as follows:—“Sanad granted by Maharaj Dhiraj Sri Maharaja Alijah Subedarji Sri Madho Raoji Scindhia Bahadur. Be it known to zamindar, chaudhri and kanungo of pargana Karahra, Subah Akbarabad that mauza Rauta, a village in the aforesaid pargana, has been granted to Sri Manaji, son of Sivaji, as altamgha (paper torn). Be it acted upon.”
The argument has been advanced before us by the learned counsel for the appellants that this sanad is a grant of zamindari rights, and on the other hand it is contended for the respondent plaintiff that it is a grant or assignment of the revenue. It is to be noted that internal evidence from the sanad itself shows that it is addressed among other persons to the zamindar and the zamindar is directed to take note that this village mauza Rauta has been granted to Manaji. It is clear that what was granted must be something of which the zamindar was not in possession, otherwise he would be dispossessed.
The next mention we have of this property is contained in “Treaties, Engagements and Sanads, India”, vol. IV, by Aitchison; page 42 and onwards give the treaty, dated the 30th of December, 1803, signed by Sir Arthur Wellesley on behalf of the Hon'ble East India Company and on behalf of Maharaja Scindhia of Gwalior. Article 7 states:—“Whereas …. lands in Hindustan ceded by the second article of this treaty to the Honourable Company and their allies are held in jaghire by persons of the family of the late Madhajee Sindia, and others by principal Sirdars in his service, all of whom would suffer distress if deprived of the advantages they enjoy in those countries: it is agreed …. that …. Boogaji Jamdah …. shall continue to hold their lands in jaghire under the protection of the Honourable Company.”
Accordingly, this article 7 of the Treaty recognized the rights of Boogaji Jamdah to hold this village as jagir. In the khewat of the year 1263F. there are the names of number of Jats who owned the zamindari in this village of Rauta. In each case these jats have mortgaged their zamindari to Tantia Sahib and Bhau Sahib, sons of Abaji, members of the family of the plaintiff, and the remarks in the last column for various years between 1860 and 1864 show that these mortgages were made by the jat zamindars to the family of the plaintiff. On the record there is a “certificate of rent-free tenure” dated Agra Collectorate, the 20th of March, 1863. This states that the entire mauza of Rauta is released in perpetuity in favour of Abaji, son of Bogaji Jamadar, by order of the Special Commissioner dated the 12th of June, 1838, and confirmed by the final order of Government accepting the award through the Resident of Gwalior, dated the 18th of September, 1842. There is a similar extract from the list of muafidars and this states that the muafi was under the sanad of Maharaja Madho Rao. Scindhia for maintenance. We have a sale deed by Deojit, one of the Jat zamindars, dated the 12th of June,. 1862, to Bhau Sahib, son of Abaji muafidar of mauza Rauta. We have the will of Madho Bao, and he sets forth that his property consists of firstly, a moiety muafi share in the entire 20 biswas of mauza Rauta, and secondly his share in the zamindari property of mauza Rauta. Further, we have the hypothecation bond by Madho Rao, dated the 26th of October, 1905, in favour of the appellants. This bond sets forth that he holds his maufi property under a certificate dated the 26th of March, 1863, granted by the Collector of Agra and under order of the Resident of Gwalior dated the 18th of September, 1842, and he holds zamindari property in the said mauza which he purchased. The detail of the property hypothecated in mauza Rauta of which the mortgagor is both muafidar and zamindar is given firstly as his moiety share in the 20 biswas muafi property which comprises an area of 2,098 bighas, 5 biswas, and of which the jama of Rs. 3,460 has been made a muafi grant by the Government, and secondly all shares of zamindari held, as mortgagee and thirdly there was a further share of zamindari partly owned and partly held as mortgagee. Taking these details and also taking into consideration the admission paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of the written statement, it appears to us clear that there is no doubt whatever that what was granted by Maharaja Scindhia to Manaji was the revenue of the village of Rauta. That in fact was what the Maharaja Scindhia owned at that time.
As the question, however, has been raised, it may be of some interest to consider briefly the circumstances of the times and the nature of these jagir grants. The Gazetteer of Agra district, page 164, states that Maharaja Scindhia invaded Agra, which was then held on behalf, of the Moghul Emperor, in the year 1784 and acquired it. It is in the next year, 1785, that the Maharaja Scindhia made the grant in question of mauza Rauta to his Sardar, Manaji. That grant does not indeed specify that the land is held as jagir, but in the treaty of 1803, article 7, it is set out that the son of Manaji, Bogaji, holds a jagir. The nature of jagir tenure is stated by Al-Barni in his “Memoir of the Emperor Alaud-din Khilji” which gives an account of the Empire about the year 1300. This account is quoted in “The Revenue Administration of the United Provinces,” 1911, by W.H Moreland; at page 12, as follows:—“The superior officers” of the State all held military commands and were remunerated for their, services not by cash, salaries, but by the grant of lands (jagir) from which they were entitled to collect the revenue.” Similarly in Field's Regulations of the Bengal Code, page 53, paragraph 54 of the Introduction, it is stated:— “Jagirs were grants of land retafners still in service, in lieu of wages. When granted by the Emperor they were assignments, not of the land but of the revenue.” Similarly we find that in the Preamble of Regulation VII “of 1822 it is stated:— “And whereas it appears to be expedient to declare and explain the views and intentions of Government relative to the rights to be enjoyed and exercised by the Sirdars, Malguzars, or persons admitted to engage for the payment of Government revenue; and by persons collecting the rents of the land or revenue of Government; without being subject to the payment of any portion of it to the public treasury, such as jageerdars, and other owners or managers of lakhiraj lands.” These extracts show that jagirdars were persons who had grants without payment of revenue to Government. There were no doubt other jagirdars who received smaller grants, and at that particular, time of the end of the 18th century, in Regulation XLIII of 1793 provision was made that invalid sepoys and commissioned and non-commissioned officers of the Indian Army should receive grants of waste land which would be held by them rent-free for life without being subject to any tax or demand whatever; This system was further amended in Regulation I of 1804 and Regulation IX of 1808, and was finally abandoned in Regulation II of 1811 which abolished the system and substituted a scale of cask pensions. The Preamble of Regulation IX of 1808 states that land when it was held as a jagir was not included in the assets on which the jama payable by the zamindars to Government had been adjusted. Therefore we see that even in the case of the small grants of land as jagirs there was always the condition that no-revenue would be payable to Government in respect of these grants. But the grant of the entire village as a jagir was naturally the assignment of the revenue on that village. The rights which Government possessed, in a village towards the end of the 18th century were the rights to receive the assets of the village, less the sum which was usually fixed at 10 per cent., for the trouble of collecting those assets. Regulation IX of 1808 was a regulation which was issued in regard to the Provinces ceded by the Maharaja Scindhia to the East India Company and for which the treaty of 1803 was drawn up. This regulation states that the persons who were zamindars in this property should have the option of renewing the settlement for three years and that if they did not care to renew it for three years, they would receive nankar at a rate not exceeding 10 per cent, on the jama and settlement would be made with other persons (paragraph 8). This shows that the rights of a zamindar at the period in question were only to receive 10 per cent, of the jama and Government received the other 90 per cent. The gift therefore by the Maharaja Scindhia of the revenue of mauza Rauta would be a valuable gift, whereas a gift by the Maharaja Scindhia of the zamindari rights, supposing the zamindari rights had been forfeited and had been in his power to grant, would be a gift of very much less value, only amounting to one-ninth of the value of the revenue. We find therefore that the family of the plaintiff received by this sanad from the Maharaja of Gwalior assignment of the revenue of mauza Rauta and that the family of the plaintiff by subsequent deeds of mortgage and sale obtained from the Jat zamindars in mauza Rauta shares of the zamindari rights in mauza Rauta.
The next question is whether the Pensions Act will apply to the property of the plaintiff. As regards the assignment of the revenue, we find that section 4 states:—“Except as hereinafter provided, no civil court shall entertain any suit relating to any pension or grant of money or land revenue conferred or made by the British or any former Government, whatever may have been the consideration for any such pension or grant, and whatever may have been the nature of the payment, claim, or right for which such pension or grant may have been substituted.” Section 6 states:—“A civil court, otherwise competent to try the same, shall take cognizance of any such claim, upon receiving a certificate from such Collector, Deputy Commissioner or other officer authorized in that behalf, that the case may be so tried.”
The question therefore is whether the rights possessed as assignee of revenue of mauza Rauta by the plaintiff can be the subject of any suit without the certificate in question. For the present suit the plaintiff has obtained a certificate. In the two previous suits there were no such certificates obtained either by the present appellant or by the father of the plaintiff. For the purpose of sections 4 and 6, it is clear at once that a grant of land revenue requires a certificate. As we have no doubt found that the plaintiff is the assignee of land revenue in mauza Rauta, it is clear that any case in regard to this land revenue would require a certificate under section 6 and, therefore, without such certificate a civil court could not take cognizance of such a claim. This has a bearing on the question of res judicata, because section 40 of the Evidence Act lays down: “The existence of any judgment, order or decree, which by law prevents any court from taking cognizance of a suit, or holding, a trial, is a relevant fact, when the question is whether such court ought to take cognizance of such suit or to hold such trial.” It is therefore under section 40 that the defendants appellants would produce their decree of 1914 and the decree of 1916 dismissing the suit of the plaintiff's father. But section 44 lays down as follows: “Any party to a suit or other proceedings may show that any judgment order or decree, which is relevant under sections 40, 41 or 42, and which has been proved by the adverse party, was delivered by a court not competent to deliver it, or was obtained by fraud or collusion.” It is therefore always open to the plaintiff to show under section 44 that the decrees of the two courts in 1914 and 1916 were decrees by courts not competent to deliver those decrees. Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code lays down: “The courts shall have jurisdiction to try suits of a civil nature, excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred.” In our opinion, the civil courts in 1914 and 1916 had no jurisdiction to try the suits in question, because their cognizance was expressly barred by sections 4 and 6, Act XXIII of 1871. Accordingly, as those courts were without jurisdiction, their decrees are invalid altogether, so far as the assigned revenue in mauza Rauta is concerned, and those decrees cannot be pleaded as res judicata. But as regards the zamindari property and the mortgagee rights in zamindari property, there is no such bar arising from the Pensions Act. In regard to this portion of the plaintiff's claim which relates to relief B we agree with the finding of the Subordinate Judge-expressed as follows: “As regards the pleas of want of legal necessity, the amount of the debt and the binding nature thereof in respect of the zamindari, I think section 11 helps the contesting defendants and the plaintiff cannot raise them.”
One further question remains and that is issue No. 5, viz. was the muafi in suit transferable? This issue was framed in accordance with the pleading in paragraph 7(a) of the plaint that according to law the said muafi is untransferable. This raises a more difficult question in regard to sections 4 and 6 of the Pensions Act. For the plaintiff it is alleged that the assigned revenue is untransferable, because it amounts to a pension under section 11 of the Pensions Act, and section 12 lays down that pensions under section 11 are not transferable. The question is, does this assignment of the revenue amount to a pension within the meaning of section 11 of the Pensions Act or does it not? It is to be noted that section 11 refers merely to pensions, whereas section 4 refers not only to pension's but to grants of money or land revenue conferred, whatever may have been the consideration of any such grant, and section 3 states that the expression, “grant of money or land revenue” includes “anything payable on the part of Government in respect of any right, privilege, perquisites or office.”. Section 4 therefore is a wider section than Section 11 and section 4 will include matters which do not come under section 11. Nothing will come under section 11 except pensions. It was argued for the appellants that pensions comprise only payments in money. On the other side it was argued that pensions would also include grants made in lieu of past services. In Harnam Das v. Faiyazi Begam(1), there was a case in consideration whether the Emperor Akbar had assigned some villages for the maintenance of the descendants of a saint, Shaikh Salim Chishti, at Fatehpur Sikri in Agra district. The head note does not quote the points in the case very accurately, but on page 359 it is stated: “It is not to be doubted that the Government in 1846, came to the decision that it was just and politic to continue the grant of the land revenue which Akbar had assigned for the purposes indicated above, and we, agree with the learned District Judge that the continuance of the pensions to the descendants of the saint was based upon what may fairly be called political considerations. This being so, the pension now in dispute is one of those mentioned in section 11, and is clearly within the definition laid down by the Bombay High Court, for the grant was, without doubt, originally made either in recognition of the;past services of Sheikh Salim Chishti or in acknowledgment of his particular merits. It follows, therefore, that the assignments of the pension to the plaintiff appellant upon which he found his claim in the present suit are null and void as provided by section 12 of the Act.”
We consider that the present case is similar to this case and that in the present case the assignment of the land revenue is in the nature of a pension. The sanad does not state the exact purpose for which the pension was granted, but in the treaty of 1803 it is stated that the pension is for Manaji as a principal Sardar in the service of the Maharaja and for his maintenance. It is stated in the extract from the list of muafidars that the grant was under sanad of the Maharaja Madho Rao Scindhia for maintenance. A similar case is that of Karar Hassan v. Mustafa Hassan, where the Punjab Chief Court held that a pension does not cease to be a pension merely because it takes the shape of an assignment of land revenue. Reference for the appellant was made to Balkrishna Bhau v. Govind Rao(2), but this was not a case of an assignment of land revenue for services but an assignment for different reasons altogether. Reference has been made to Lalla Babu v. Lal Bahadur(3), to which one member of this Bench was a party. In this case there was an assignment of land revenue to certain parties. When the zamindars died out, with the same party the zamindari property was settled, with the result that the assignees of land revenue became also the zamindars. It was held that although the rights as assignees of land revenue could not be transferred, the zamindari rights conferred by the Government could be transferred. That case, therefore, does not support the defendants' appeal.
We consider, therefore, that the assignment of revenue in the present case amounts to a pension within the meaning of section 11 of the Pensions Act and therefore is not transferable as laid down by section 12 of that Act. Accordingly we hold that so far as the plaintiff has rights as an assignee of land revenue, those rights could not be mortgaged by the mortgage of 1905 in favour of the appellants, but there is no bar from the Pensions Act on the mortgage of 1905 so far as it relates to the zamindari rights and mortgagee rights of the predecessor of the plaintiff.
The result is that we dismiss this appeal with costs and we also dismiss the cross-objection with costs.
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