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Ram Manohar v. Baboo Singh

Allahabad High Court
Sep 2, 1936
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Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion arises from a defendants' appeal in a suit concerning joint possession of a tank originally owned by Daulat. The opinion refers to the plaintiff in different passages as "Babu Singh" and as "Babu Ram" (the text itself contains both forms). The defendants are nephews of Daulat as well, though sons of another brother.

It is admitted that Daulat became owner of the tank and that the plaintiff and the defendants succeeded to the tank as collaterals in equal shares. The defendants relied on a plea of limitation and asserted adverse possession in their written statement.

Procedurally, there was a previous suit by the plaintiff for a declaration (brought before the present suit) which the plaintiff withdrew under Order 23, Rule 1 (Specific Relief Act), and then applied for liberty to bring a fresh suit. The present suit was instituted on 31 July 1929, shortly after the expiry of 12 years from a sale-deed dated 27 April 1917. The earlier suit had been within 12 years of that sale-deed.

The trial Court recorded a finding that the defendants had been in exclusive possession and had spent money on the tank within 12 years, but did not expressly find adverse possession for over 12 years against the plaintiff. The lower appellate Court treated the suit as one for ejectment on the ground of dispossession and applied Article 142 of the Limitation Act, placing the burden on the plaintiff to prove joint possession within 12 years; the plaintiff was found to have failed to discharge that burden and the suit was dismissed by the appellate Court. This Court has found the lower appellate Court's finding insufficient to dispose of the suit without a clearer finding on whether there was denial of title or ouster or an equivalent act.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the defendants have established adverse possession sufficient to bar the plaintiff's claim (i.e., whether there was a denial of title or an ouster, or something equivalent, sufficient to destroy the co-sharer's title).
  2. Whether the plaintiff must be deemed to have been in constructive possession of his moiety until the date when his title was denied (specifically until 27 April 1917) and consequently whether time began to run against him prior to that date.
  3. Whether, having withdrawn a previous suit under Order 23, Rule 1, the plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act (i.e., exclusion of the period during which the previous plaint was pending) in the subsequent suit.
  4. Whether Article 142 (and not Article 144) of the Limitation Act governs the present suit for recovery of possession based on dispossession, given the plaintiff's admissions.
  5. Whether, in the absence of a clear finding by the lower courts, an issue should be directed to determine the precise date when the defendants took exclusive possession of the tank in such an open, overt or public manner as would have put the plaintiff on inquiry.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendants' Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • The defendants' case rests entirely on a plea of limitation.
  • In their written statement the defendants (and their predecessors) asserted they had been in adverse possession for a long time and in exclusive possession of the tank.
  • The defendants' counsel urged that if the learned Judge of this Court was not satisfied with the finding of the lower appellate Court, an issue should have been sent down for determination.

Plaintiff's Position (as presented in the opinion)

  • The plaintiff had previously brought a suit for a declaration without seeking possession and admitted in court that he was not in possession at that time; that suit was withdrawn under Order 23, Rule 1 and the plaintiff applied for liberty to bring a fresh suit.
  • In the present plaint the plaintiff admitted that in Jeth 1928 the defendants denied his ownership and possession over a moiety share, and also admitted that the defendants entered into possession of the plaintiff's share during the pendency of the previous suit; accordingly he brought the present suit for possession.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kanhaiya Lal v. Girwar, A.I.R. 1929 All. 753 Used to support the view that when a plaintiff admits he is out of possession the burden lies on him to prove joint possession within the relevant period. The Court noted the lower appellate Judge was partially fortified by this ruling when placing the burden on the plaintiff, but held the lower appellate finding was not sufficient to dismiss the suit outright.
Bindhyachal Chand v. Ram Gharib Chand, A.I.R. 1934 All. 993 Establishes a presumption of constructive possession in favour of a co-sharer up to the time his title is denied. The Court relied on this authority to hold that up to 27 April 1917 (the date of the sale-deed) the plaintiff must be deemed to have remained in constructive possession unless there was a clear denial of title earlier.
Charles E.V.S. Corea v. Appuhamy, (1912) A.C. 230 (Privy Council) States that to destroy a co-sharer's title more than mere exclusive possession must be shown: there must be a denial of title and an ouster or something equivalent. The Court invoked this Privy Council principle to explain that mere exclusive possession by one co-sharer does not, by itself, destroy another co-sharer's title.
Secretary of State v. Debendra Lal Khan, A.I.R. 1934 P.C. 23 (p.155) Defines when adverse possession is established: possession must be continuous, public, and of an extent to show it is adverse and overt so that the true owner with due diligence would be aware. The Court applied this rule to the facts, stating that once the defendants' possession was continuous, public and overt, it would operate as adverse possession against the plaintiff unless there was proof to the contrary.
Sadayatan Pande v. Ram Chandra Gopal, A.I.R. 1934 All. 688 Holds that a plaintiff who withdraws his suit under Order 23, Rule 1 is not entitled to the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act in a subsequent suit founded on the same cause of action. The Court applied this Full Bench authority to hold that the plaintiff was not entitled to exclude the period during which the previous plaint was pending; thus that period counts in computing limitation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in several analytical steps, applying statutory provisions and precedent authorities as follows:

  1. Assessment of lower courts' findings: The trial Court had recorded exclusive possession by the defendants and expenditure on the tank but did not expressly find adverse possession for over 12 years; the appellate Court concluded Article 142 applied because the plaintiff admitted non-possession. This Court found the appellate Court's finding inadequate to dispose of the suit because mere proof of exclusive possession by co-sharers does not, without more, destroy a co-sharer's title.
  2. Constructive possession presumption: Relying on Bindhyachal Chand and the Privy Council decision in Charles E.V.S. Corea v. Appuhamy, the Court explained that where parties are co-sharers a presumption of constructive possession exists in favour of an absent co-sharer until there is a clear denial of title or an ouster (or equivalent). Therefore, up to 27 April 1917 (the date of the sale-deed), time would not run against the plaintiff unless there was evidence of a denial of title or ouster earlier.
  3. Effect of the previous withdrawn suit: The Court applied the Full Bench decision in Sadayatan Pande to hold that because the plaintiff withdrew a previous suit under Order 23, Rule 1, he cannot claim the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. Consequently, the period during which the earlier plaint was pending cannot be excluded in computing limitation for the present suit.
  4. Application of Limitation Act articles and burden of proof: Given the plaintiff's admissions that defendants denied his ownership and had entered into possession in Jeth 1928, the Court treated the present suit as being governed by Article 142 (suit for possession on ground of dispossession). The Court emphasized the rule from Secretary of State v. Debendra Lal Khan that adverse possession requires possession that is continuous, public and of such extent as to be overt and to put the owner on enquiry.
  5. Necessity for a specific factual finding: The Court concluded that before finally deciding whether limitation defeated the plaintiff's claim, there needed to be a clear finding on the precise date when the defendants obtained exclusive possession in an open, overt or public manner sufficient to put the plaintiff on enquiry. The Court therefore directed that an issue be framed/tried on that question and allowed the parties liberty to produce fresh evidence, with the plaintiff to lead.
  6. Practical observations about the subject-matter: The Court rejected the notion that the tank was wholly incapable of exclusive physical possession, noting evidence that fish were produced and other manners of exclusive control over a tank existed; hence physical exclusivity was possible and relevant to the assessment of adverse possession.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The Court did not finally uphold the dismissal below; instead it held that a clear factual finding is required on when the defendants took exclusive, open and adverse possession. The Court therefore directed that an issue be framed/tried on that precise question, allowed fresh evidence (plaintiff to lead), and ordered that the finding be returned to this Court within three months if practicable, with ten days thereafter for objections.

The Court also held, applying Sadayatan Pande, that the plaintiff is not entitled to exclude the period during which the previous plaint was pending under Section 14 of the Limitation Act because he had withdrawn the previous suit under Order 23, Rule 1.

Consequences for the parties

  • The case is remitted for determination of the specific issue: "When did the defendants take exclusive possession of the entire tank in such an open, overt or public manner as would have put the plaintiff on enquiry, if he had exercised due diligence?"
  • The parties may produce fresh evidence with the plaintiff leading; the trial finding must be returned to this Court within three months if practicable; ten days will be allowed for objections after receipt.
  • The plaintiff cannot rely on exclusion of the earlier suit period under Section 14 Limitation Act due to the prior withdrawal under Order 23, Rule 1.

The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel legal principle beyond applying existing authority to these facts; it remits the case for factual determination necessary to apply those principles.

Show all summary ...

1. (19/20th August 1936) - This is a defendants' appeal arising out of a suit for joint possession. The plaintiff is Babu Singh, a nephew of Daulat, and the defendants are also nephews of Daulat, though they are the sons of another brother of Daulat. It is not mow disputed that Daulat became the owner of the tank in dispute. It cannot also be denied, and has not been denied, that both the plaintiff Babu Ram and the defendants being nephews of Daulat succeeded to the tank after his death in equal shares as collaterals. The defendants' case rests entirely on the plea of limitation. In the written statement it was certainly asserted that the defendants and their predecessors had been in adverse possession at the4ime for a long time. But the Courts below did not record a distinct finding that there was actually adverse possession for over 12 years against the plaintiff. All that the finding recorded by the trial Court came to, was that the defendants had been in exclusive possession of this tank, which was joint property and that within 12 years they had spent some money to get the tank dug up. The appellate Court did not go even as far as that. It merely held that as the plaintiff admitted that he had not been in possession for some time before the suit, the suit was one for ejectment on the ground of dispossession and Article 142, Lim. Act, applied to this case.

2. The learned Judge therefore held that the burden was on the plaintiff to prove that he was in joint possession within 12 years of the suit and, having recorded a finding that the plaintiff had failed to discharge that burden, dismissed the suit. In this view he was fortified to some extent by the ruling in Kanhaiya Lal v. Girwar A.I.R. 1929 All. 753. On appeal a learned Judge of this Court has come to the conclusion that the finding recorded by the lower appellate Court was in no way sufficient for the dismissal of the suit. In this view he is perfectly right. When it was admitted that the parties were co-sharers, then the mere proof of exclusive possession on the part of defendants would not destroy the title and rights of the plaintiff. No doubt when the plaintiff admitted that he was out of possession at the time of the suit Article 142 applied, but having also established that the parties were co-sharers up to 1917, when the defendants purported to transfer the whole tank to the contesting defendants, there would be a presumption of constructive possession in favour of the plaintiff up to the time this title was denied : see Bindhyachal Chand v. Ram Gharib Chand A.I.R. 1934 All. 993. It has been laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Charles E.V.S. Corea v. Appuhamy (1912) A.C. 230. that in order to destroy a co-sharer's title it must not only be shown that the other co-sharer was in exclusive possession of the joint property, but that there was a denial of title and an ouster of the former co-sharer or something equivalent to it. The mere fact that in a village one co-sharer is in execlusive possession of a joint property would not amount to a denial of title or an ouster so as to destroy his title.

3. Indeed in many cases co-sharers are in separate possession of joint plots and the state of affairs continues until one of them objects. The learned Judge of this Court seems to have thought that there was no denial, express or by necessary implication, of the plaintiff's title till 27th April 1917. The learned Counsel for the defendants urges before us that if the learned Judge was not satisfied with the finding of the lower appellate Court, then there should have been an issue sent down for determination. We would be prepared to order an issue to be sent down for determination if there were at least some evidence showing a denial of title or ouster of the plaintiff earlier than 12 years prior to the suit. We accordingly allow this case to stand out for one week.

JUDGMENT

1. The facts of this case are given in our order dated 19th August 1936. It is now made clear that the plaintiff had brought a suit for a declaration previously without asking for possession, and when examined by the Court he admitted that he was not in possession. The result was that his suit was defective in view of the provisions of Section 42, Specific Belief Act. The plaintiff accordingly applied to the Court for permission to withdraw the suit with liberty to bring a fresh suit. Accordingly the present suit was instituted on 31st July 1929, shortly after the expiry of 12 years from the date when the sale deed of 27th April 1917 was executed. The previous suit, however, had been within 12 years of that sale-deed.

2. It has been held by a Full Bench of this Court in Sadayatan Pande v. Ram Chandra Gopal A.I.R. 1934 All. 688 that where la plaintiff chooses to withdraw his suit under Order 23, Rule 1 he is not entitled to the benefit of Section 14, Lim. Act, in a subsequent suit founded on the same cause of action, because it cannot be considered that the previous suit failed on account of a defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature. It is, therefore, clear that the plaintiff is not entitled to the exclusion of the period during which the plaint in the previous suit was pending. We have already held that up to the 27th April 1917, there being nothing to show that the defendant's predecessor, who was the plaintiff's co-owner, had denied the plaintiffs title or was in exclusive possession to such an extent as to show by overt acts that he was claiming adverse possession against the plaintiff, the plaintiff' must be deemed to have remained in constructive possession of his share, and accordingly time did not begin to run against him up to that date.

3. In the present plaint, the plaintiff admitted that there was, dispute between the parties in Jeth 1928 when the defendants to the knowledge of the plaintiff denied the plaintiff's ownership and also denied his possession over a moiety share, and the plaintiff further admitted that he previously made an admission that the defendants entered into possession of the plaintiff's share also during the pendency of the previous suit and that accordingly it was necessary for him now to sue for possession. It is, therefore, clear that the present suit is brought for recovery of possession on the ground of the plaintiffs' dispossession. The claim must therefore be governed by Article 142, Lim. Act and not by Article 144. Now although the defendants' predecessor was a co-owner of the plaintiff, it cannot be said that the defendants, who took a sale-deed of the entire property in defiance of the plaintiff's share in it, ever recognized themselves as the plaintiff's co-owners or ever held possession for themselves and on behalf of the plaintiff. The actual possession of the defendants, if exclusive, could never be regarded as plaintiff's constructive possession. Prom the moment that the defendants' possession was adequate in continuity, is publicity and. in extent to show that it was possession adverse to the competitor and it was overt and without any attempt at concealment so that the plaintiff against whom time was to run ought, if he exercised due diligence, to have been aware of what was happening, the defendant's adverse possession would be established and the plaintiff cannot be considered to be in possession : see the rule laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Secy. of State v. Debendra Lal Khan A.I.R. 1934 P.C. 23 at p. 155. In the present case we have to see whether the plaintiff has discharged the burden of establishing his possession within 12 years of the suit. Prom the time when the defendants took exclusive possession openly and publicly it must be assumed that the plaintiff was not in possession. If, however, there was a short period after the execution of the sale-deed of 27th April 1917 during which the vendor, who had been the plaintiff's co-owner, continued in possession, then if seems to us that the. plaintiff should be considered to be still in constructive possession of the property and time should not begin to run against him.

4. No doubt, after the execution of the sale-deed the defendants' predecessor ceased to be an owner of the property, and cannot therefore be regarded as a co-owner or co-sharer of the plaintiff. But his possession having been permissive and having commenced -with the express or implied consent of the plaintiff, it must be presumed that the consent continued so long as the person who had been allowed to remain in possession continued in possession. It would only be from the moment that he discontinued his possession that the constructive possession of the plaintiff would cease. It would be unfair to hold that although the person whom the plaintiff put in possession with his consent continued in possession, adverse possession would begin to run against the plaintiff merely because such a person executed a sale-deed of the plaintiff's share as well. Of course, if the knowledge of the execution of the sale-deed is brought home to the plaintiff, then it must be considered that the possession of the previous co-owner ceased to be on behalf of the plain, tiff from the date of such knowledge. In the absence of any such proof it seems to us that time should begin to run against the plaintiff only from the time when the defendants obtained possession exclusively, overtly and publicly so that if the plaintiff had exercised due diligence he ought to have discovered that a stranger other than the person whom he had allowed to remain in possession was in sole occupation of the property. If it turns out that during this short interregnum no one was in actual possession, that is to say, neither the vendor nor the present defendants, then as possession must be deemed to be with the true owner and the plaintiff's legal title had not been destroyed, it must be presumed that possession reverted to the plaintiff during that short interregnum. The learned Judge of this Court has rightly applied Article 142 to this case, but has decreed the claim against the defendants on the supposition that there was nothing to show that the tank was capable of actual physical possession. Of course, physical possession of the tank could not be taken, but exclusive possession of the tank was possible. Indeed it is in evidence that fish is produced in this tank and used to be caught. There would also be other ways of retaining exclusive possession over a tank. The plaintiff admitted that the defendants had taken possession of his share in the tank which implies that it was not a property which was altogether incapable of being taken in exclusive possession. We are, therefore, of opinion that before deciding this point against the defendants it is necessary to have a clear finding on the following issue: When did the defendants take exclusive possession of the entire tank in such an open, overt or public manner as would have put the plaintiff on enquiry, if he had exercised due diligence? The parties will be at liberty to produce fresh evidence. The plaintiff is to lead evidence first. The finding will be returned to this Court within three months of this date, if practicable. On receipt of the finding the usual ten days' will be allowed for objections.