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Nawab Singh v. Daljit Singh
Judgment Summary — Nawab Singh v. Daljit Singh (Sulaiman, C.J. and Bennet, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal arises from a suit for recovery of possession brought by Nawab Singh (the plaintiff) against Daljit Singh (the defendant). The plaintiff's right was founded on a registered sale deed dated 21 April 1921, executed by Daljit Singh in favour of Gajraj Singh, who was the plaintiff's uncle. The defendant alleged that the sale deed was fictitious and that no title had passed to Gajraj Singh. The defendant's pleaded factual basis was that previously Mst. Phul Kunwar had sold the property to Daljit Singh (who was not a co-sharer) and, because of an apprehension of a suit for pre-emption, Daljit executed a fictitious sale deed in favour of Gajraj Singh (a co-sharer) to defeat pre-emption.
It is recorded that a pre-emptor, Narain Singh, instituted a suit for pre-emption on 21 June 1921 against the vendee Gajraj Singh; that suit was dismissed on the ground that the property had passed to a co-sharer and was no longer liable to be pre-empted — in other words, the alleged fraud succeeded to defeat pre-emption. It is further noted that Gajraj Singh did not obtain mutation of names, whereas Daljit later obtained mutation based on an earlier sale deed dated 28 June 1920. It is an admitted fact that Daljit Singh is in possession of the property and the plaintiff is not.
Procedurally, the court of first instance upheld the sale deed and decreed the plaintiff's claim. The appellate court found the sale deed to be fictitious, held that Daljit and Gajraj committed a joint fraud which succeeded, and dismissed the suit. A learned Judge of this Court affirmed the appellate decree, holding that the plaintiff could not obtain relief where the person from whom he derived title was a party to the fraud. The present judgment considers the plaintiff's appeal against that outcome.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a plaintiff (Nawab Singh) can obtain relief for possession when the transferor (Gajraj Singh) — from whom he derives title — was a party to a fraudulent, benami transaction.
- Whether a defendant in possession (Daljit Singh) can be prevented from exposing the true, fraudulent character of a sale deed relied upon by the plaintiff.
- What principle should govern courts when both parties are in pari delicto (equally guilty) in relation to a fraudulent conveyance that has in fact succeeded.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's (Plaintiff's) Arguments
- The plaintiff relied on authorities (including Sidlingappa v. Hirasa, Vodiana Kamayya v. Gudisa Mamayya, and Shiva Narain Ram v. Mst. Phuljharia) where courts denied relief to persons seeking to set up an owner's fraud and, in some circumstances, allowed recovery by the plaintiff where the benami transaction had not effectively been used to accomplish the fraud.
- The plaintiff's counsel also relied on a remark of the Privy Council in Petherpermal Chetty v. Muniandy Servai that prior authorities on benami transactions had been correctly stated in Mayne's Hindu Law, and noted that in that Privy Council case the fraud had not actually been carried out and the true owner was allowed to recover possession.
Respondent's (Defendant's) Arguments
- The defendant pleaded that the sale deed of 21 April 1921 was a fictitious transaction prepared to defeat a pre-emption suit and that no title passed to Gajraj Singh.
- The defendant relied on the fact that the pre-emption suit brought by Narain Singh succeeded in being dismissed on the ground that the property had passed to a co-sharer, demonstrating that the alleged fraudulent transaction had in fact achieved its purpose.
- The defendant asserted a right to maintain possession and urged that his possession should not be disturbed where the plaintiff's predecessor had been a party to the fraudulent transaction.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Sidlingappa v. Hirasa | Where a benami sale had been interposed and the benamidar sold to a purchaser who relied on that transaction to resist attachment, the owner who executed the benami deed could not set up his own fraud to defeat the purchaser's claim for possession. | Cited by the plaintiff as authority supporting recovery of possession; noted by the Court as part of competing authorities but ultimately not followed as precedent of this Court. |
| Vodiana Kamayya v. Gudisa Mamayya (Madras High Court) | Followed Sidlingappa: a person who conveyed property benami to effect a fraud on creditors was not allowed to set up the benami character of the transaction as a defence where the fraud had been effected. | Noted as supporting the appellant's authorities; acknowledged by the Court as part of the line of cases favouring the plaintiff's position in some jurisdictions. |
| Shiva Narain Ram v. Mst. Phuljharia (Patna High Court, single Judge) | Expressed a similar view to Sidlingappa and Vodiana Kamayya that a transferor should not be allowed to set up benami character to defeat a transferee's claim where relevant. | Recorded by the Court as another authority relied on by the plaintiff. |
| Petherpermal Chetty v. Muniandy Servai (Privy Council) | Observed that the results of the authorities on benami transactions were correctly stated in Mayne's Hindu Law; in that case the fraud had not been carried out and the true owner was allowed to recover possession. | Relied on by the plaintiff's counsel to support recovery where the fraud had not succeeded; Court recorded it but distinguished by noting the factual difference (here fraud had succeeded). |
| Raghupati Chatterjee v. Nrishingha Hori Das (Calcutta High Court) | Held that a transferee under a fictitious and fraudulent conveyance executed to defraud creditors is not entitled to recover possession from the transferor if the fraudulent purpose has in fact been accomplished; the balance of authority favoured allowing the defendant to set up the true transaction. | Cited by the Court as representing the contrary line of authority to Sidlingappa; court treated it as supporting refusal of relief to a plaintiff where the fraud had actually been effected. |
| Vilayat Husain v. Misran (This Court) | Held that where parties are in pari delicto the courts will not assist the illegal transaction; defendant can plead the circumstances of the document's creation and, if both acted together to perpetrate the fraud, the court should not assist either party ("let the estate lie where it falls"). | Treated by the Court as the binding ruling of this Court to be followed; the Court explicitly follows this precedent and applies its principle to dismiss the plaintiff's appeal. |
| Qadir Bakhsh v. Hakam (Full Bench, Lahore High Court) | After re-examination, held similarly that a benamidar's suit to recover possession could be defeated by a plea that parties were in pari delicto where fraud had succeeded. | Noted by the Court as corroborating the view in Vilayat Husain and the line of authority that refuses assistance to either party when both are culpable and the fraud has succeeded. |
| Ma Ngwe Naing v. Maung Tha Maung (Privy Council) | Observed there were conflicting decisions in India on the point; the Privy Council found it unnecessary to decide the issue in that case. | Noted by the Court as evidence of conflicting authority; court did not treat it as resolving the point but as background to the divergence of decisions. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by identifying the central factual circumstance: the pre-emption suit by Narain Singh had been instituted and dismissed on the ground that the property had passed to a co-sharer, which demonstrates that the alleged fictitious transaction had in fact succeeded to defeat the pre-emption claim. Daljit Singh is in possession and does not seek affirmative relief based on the disputed sale deed; rather, he seeks that his possession be undisturbed in the face of the plaintiff's claim founded on a deed which the defendant says was fictitious.
The Court acknowledged conflicting authority in India on whether a transferee under a benami or fictitious conveyance may be protected when the transferor seeks to set up the transaction's benami character. It identified two competing lines:
- Authorities (e.g., Sidlingappa and followers) supporting relief to the plaintiff/transferee in some circumstances.
- Authorities (e.g., Raghupati Chatterjee, Vilayat Husain and Qadir Bakhsh) holding that where parties are in pari delicto and the fraud has been perpetrated, courts should not assist either party and the defendant may set up the true transaction.
The Court stated its duty to follow the ruling of this Court (Vilayat Husain v. Misran), which had stood for over twelve years. Vilayat Husain was described as establishing that courts will not assist illegal transactions where both parties are in pari delicto, that the defendant may plead and prove the circumstances giving rise to the document, and that if the court concludes both parties acted together to perpetrate a fraud, the duty is to assist neither.
Applying these principles to the facts, the Court observed:
- There is nothing inherently illegal in a benami transaction as a form, and a registered deed is not absolutely conclusive of title.
- The plaintiff sought to have the court uphold the deed and, beyond that, to place the plaintiff in possession of property which had been left in the defendant's possession — effectively asking the court to further the fraudulent purpose by completing the transfer the parties had not consummated.
- The fraud here was "partial" in that a fictitious registered sale was executed and registered, but the property was not delivered to the ostensible vendee; nonetheless the fraudulent purpose (defeating pre-emption) had been accomplished.
- Because the plaintiff seeks affirmative relief and is relying on a deed produced by a predecessor who was a party to the fraud, the court would have to be an instrument in completing the fraud if it granted the claim.
The Court therefore applied the principle "Let the estate lie where it falls" and concluded that, following Vilayat Husain, it would not assist the plaintiff who derived title from a party to the fraud. The Court also noted that Nawab Singh, being an heir of Gajraj Singh and not a bona fide transferee for value, stands in no better position than Gajraj himself.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court DISMISSED the plaintiff's appeal and ordered costs against the plaintiff.
Immediate consequences for the parties:
- The plaintiff's claim for possession was dismissed; the defendant's possession was left undisturbed.
- The plaintiff (an heir of the ostensible vendee) was not treated as a bona fide transferee for value and therefore could not succeed where his predecessor had been a party to the fraudulent transaction.
Broader implications and precedent:
- The Court expressly followed the ruling of this Court in Vilayat Husain v. Misran and applied the principle that courts will not assist parties who are in pari delicto to profit from an illegal or fraudulent transaction; instead the estate remains where it lies ("Let the estate lie where it falls").
- The judgment reaffirms the position of this Court rather than creating a new rule; the Court noted conflicting decisions elsewhere in India but treated Vilayat Husain as controlling and to be followed unless overruled by a superior authority (Privy Council).
This summary is prepared exclusively from the provided opinion and contains only those facts, arguments, precedents, and conclusions explicitly stated in that opinion.
Sulaiman, C.J and Bennet, J.:— This is a plaintiff's appeal arising out of a suit for recovery of possession brought by Nawab Singh against the defendant Daljit Singh on the basis of a registered sale deed dated the 21st of April, 1921, executed by Daljit Singh in favour of one Gajraj Singh, who was the uncle of the present plaintiff Nawb Singh. The defendant pleaded that the document did not represent a genuine transaction but was a fictitious one and no title under it had passed to Gajraj Singh. He supported this plea by alleging that previously one Mst. Phul Kunwar had sold this property to Daljit Singh, who was not a co-sharer in the village, and that there was an apprehension of a suit for pre-emption and in order to defeat the claim for pre-emption Daljit Singh fictitiously executed the sale deed in favour of Gajraj Singh, who was a cosharer. It has been found that a pre-emptor, Narain Singh, actually instituted a suit for pre-emption on the 21st of June, 1921, against the vendee Gajraj Singh, presumably impleading Daljit Singh also, and the suit was dismissed on the ground that the property had passed to a co-sharer and was no longer liable to be pre-empted. Thus the alleged fraud actually succeeded. It appears however that Gajraj Singh did not succeed in getting mutation of names effected, as previous to him Daljit had not got his own name mutated. Daljit Singh, however, later on got his name mutated on the strength of the previous sale deed, dated the 28th of June, 1920. It is an admitted fact in this case that Daljit Singh is in possession of the property, whereas the plaintiff No. 1 is not.
The court of first instance held that the sale deed did not represent a fictitious transaction and decreed the claim. The appellate court has however come to the conclusion that it was a fictitious document and had been executed fraudulently in order to defeat the claim of Narain Singh pre-emptor and that the fraud was committed by Daljit Singh and Gajraj Singh jointly and that the fraud actually succeeded. The court declined to help the plaintiff and dismissed the suit. On appeal a learned Judge of this Court has affirmed the decree, holding that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief from a court of law when the person from whom be has derived a title was a party to the fraud.
If Daljit Singh had come to court seeking some relief against Nawab Singh, then even if it had been found that the transaction was a fictitious one we would have certainly declined to grant any relief to Daljit Singh when the fraud committed by him had actually succeeded. The question that arises in this case is the converse one, namely whether Nawab Singh can be given some relief against Daljit Singh who is in possession; that is to say, whether Daljit Singh can be prevented from exposing the true nature of the transaction and showing that the sale deed was fraudulently executed and that Gajraj Singh was a party to that fraud.
There is some conflict of opinion on this point in India. In the case of Sidlingappa v. Hirasa(1) the owner of a property had executed a benami sale deed and the benamidar had sold the property to the plaintiff's father and the attachment of that property was successfully resisted on the strength of that benami transaction against a creditor; the court held that the defendant owner could not be allowed to set up his own fraud when the plaintiff brought a suit to claim possession of the immovable property, and the court decreed the plaintiff's claim for possession, holding that lie was entitled to succeed. This case was followed by a Bench of the Madras High Court in Vodiana Kamayya v. Gudisa Mamayya(2), where a person who had conveyed property benami to another for the purpose of effecting a fraud on his creditors was not allowed, where the fraud had been effected, to set up the benami character of the transaction by way of defence in a suit by the transferee for possession under the conveyance. A similar view was expressed by a single Judge of the Patna High Court in Shiva Narain Ram v. Mst. Phuljharia(3). The learned counsel for the plaintiff also relies on the remark of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Petherpermal Chetty v. Muniandy Servai(4) that the result of the authorities on the subject of the benami transactions had been correctly stated in Mayne's Hindu Law, seventh edition, paragraph 446, page 595. In the case before their Lordships the fraud had not actually been carried out and the plaintiff, the true owner, was allowed to recover possession of the property.
On the other hand in the case of Raghupati Chatterjee v. Nrishingha Hori Das a Bench of the Calcutta High Court after an examination of numerous authorities came to the conclusion that on no principle of justice, equity and good conscience is a transferee, under a fictitious and fraudulent conveyance never intended to pass title and executed without consideration to defraud the creditors of the transferor, entitled to recover from the transferor possession of the property through the court, if the fraudulent purpose has in fact been accomplished, and that the balance of authority was in favour of the view that in such cases the defendant should be permitted to set up the true transaction. In this Court there is the authority of the ruling in Vilayat Husain v. Misran, where it was definitely held that once it was established that the parties are in pari delicto the courts will not assist the illegal transaction in any respect, that is the person who asks the court to do something will fail; and that in all cases where the plaintiff is relying on the deed, the defendant is entitled to give evidence of the circumstances under which the document came into existence, and that when these circumstances include an allegation of a general fraud by both plaintiff and defendant, the particulars of that fraud can be pleaded by the defendant, and it is then the duty of the court to look into the matter and if the court comes to the conclusion that the parties were acting together with a view to perpetrating a fraud and did in fact perpetrate the fraud, and that there no difference in the degree of guilt of the plaintiff and that of the defendant, the duty of the court is not to assist either party. The earlier case of the Bombay High Court was not followed by the Bench but adversely criticised. A Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in Qadir Bakhsh v. Hakam, after a re-examination of the various authorities including the case of Vilayat Husain v. Misran decided by this Court, came to the same conclusion and held that in a suit by a benamidar to recover possession of the property from the beneficiary the latter is not precluded from pleading that both parties were in pari delicto and thus showing the real nature of the transaction, and that if the fraud had succeeded the plaintiff's claim for possession should be dismissed. The question was argued before their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Ma Ngwe Naing v. Maung Tha Maung. Their Lordships pointed out that there had been various decisions on this point in India which appear to be conflicting, but their lordships found it unnecessary in that case to decide the point.
In this state of affairs it is obviously our duty to follow the ruling of this Court, which has now stood for over twelve years, until it is overruled by their Lordships of the Privy Council.
It seems to us that in the present case the defendant is in possession of the property and does not seek any relief from the court at all. It is not necessary for him even to rely on the sale deed in dispute. All that he urges is that his possession should not be disturbed by the court for the benefit of the plaintiff whose predecessor was a party to a fraudulent transaction. There is nothing illegal in a benami transaction in itself. The mere fact that a registered deed stands in favour of the plaintiff's predecessor is not absolutely conclusive, and if the defendant can show that the deed was a fictitious one and no title really passed to the plaintiff's predecessor, the suit must fail. It is the plaintiff who has to rely on this sale deed and he wants to shut out the defendant from exposing the true nature of the transaction and showing that a joint fraud had been intended by the parties to the deed and carried out. The fraud consisted in getting a fictitious sale deed executed and registered, but not in delivering the property to the ostensible vendee. It was therefore a partial fraud that was committed by the parties. What the plaintiff now wants is that the court should help him in completing the fraud and carrying it farther still by not only upholding the sale deed as a valid document but also putting the plaintiff in possession of the property which had been allowed to remain with the defendant. The plaintiff therefore seeks to obtain relief from the court and his claim cannot be decreed unless the court allows itself to be made an instrument to help the plaintiff at the expense of the defendant. Any person who comes to seek relief from a court of law should not be a party to a fraud and if both parties are in pari delicio the court should decline to help either party and let things remain as they are and let both parties reap the consequences of their own fraud and dishonesty. There is no reason why the court should help the plaintiff in preference to the defendant and give him what he did not obtain under the fraudulent transaction. The well known principle approved of by their Lordships of the Privy Council, “Let the estate lie where it falls”, should apply to such a case and the courts ought not to help either party. Following the ruling in Vilayat Husain v. Misran, we hold that the view taken by the learned Judge of this Court is correct and that the plaintiff on the findings of the lower appellate court cannot succeed.
Nawab Singh no doubt is not the original party who joined in the fraud but he is an heir of Gajraj Singh. He is not a bona fide transferee for value but has acquired the property from Gajraj Singh as an inheritance. There is absolutely no reason why an heir of Gajraj Singh should be in any better position than Gajraj. Singh himself, and be allowed to obtain benefit of the fraud committed by Gajraj Singh which Gajraj Singh himself was not able to secure, namely possession of the property in dispute.
We accordingly dismiss this appeal with costs.
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