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Emperor v. Brahmanand Misra

Allahabad High Court
Aug 11, 1939
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Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Mulla, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The applicant, Brahmanand Misra, applied in revision against an order forfeiting a portion of a bond under section 514 of the Criminal Procedure Code following events at a municipal election in December 1936.

At the polling station a man, accompanied by an identifier named Ganga Kishan, sought a ballot paper in the name of Madan Kahar. An objection of false personation was upheld by the Presiding Officer, who was a First-Class Magistrate, Mr. Niaz Muhammad. Mr. Niaz Muhammad arrested Ganga Kishan (apparently for an offence under section 171D of the Indian Penal Code) and subsequently released him after noting an undertaking by Brahmanand Misra that read: “Mr. Brahmanand undertakes and stands surety of Rs. 500 for B. Ganga Kishan identifier in case he is prosecuted and required by court.”

No bond was executed by Ganga Kishan himself. Ganga Kishan later absconded and the applicant failed to produce him when required for trial on the section 171D charge. A notice to show cause was issued to the applicant, and ultimately a First-Class Magistrate, Mr. Altaf Husain, ordered the applicant’s bond forfeited to the extent of Rs. 125. The applicant sought revision of that forfeiture in this Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Mr. Niaz Muhammad (the Magistrate who acted as Presiding Officer) had jurisdiction to arrest Ganga Kishan and to demand security from the applicant for his production, given the contention that an offence under section 171D of the Indian Penal Code could not be taken cognizance of without prior sanction of the Local Government.
  2. Whether the undertaking given by the applicant — treated by the prosecution as a bond under Section 499 of the Criminal Procedure Code — satisfied the mandatory requirements of Section 499 (in particular, whether it fixed any time or place for the accused's appearance) and was therefore legally enforceable.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments

  • First, that Mr. Niaz Muhammad lacked jurisdiction to take cognizance of an offence under section 171D without previous sanction of the Local Government, and consequently had no power to arrest Ganga Kishan or to demand security from the applicant.
  • Second, that the undertaking relied upon by the prosecution (treated as a bond under Section 499 CrPC) failed to satisfy the mandatory requirements of Section 499 because it did not fix any time or place for the accused's appearance, and therefore was not legally enforceable.

Prosecution / Lower Courts' Position (as reflected in the opinion)

  • The prosecution treated the written undertaking by the applicant as a bond within the meaning of Section 499 of the Criminal Procedure Code and proceeded to forfeit it (in part) when the accused was not produced.
  • A Magistrate below (Mr. Altaf Husain) passed an order forfeiting the applicant's bond to the extent of Rs. 125; the prosecution relied on that forfeiture in resisting the applicant's challenge.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Emperor v. Chintaram Holds that bail proceedings are special proceedings governed by specific Code provisions; Section 499 requires that the time and place at which the accused is to appear must be mentioned in the bond, and the court cannot depart from those provisions. The Court expressly agreed with this interpretation and applied it to hold that the undertaking in the present case was defective because it failed to specify time and place as required by Section 499, thus upholding the applicant's objection.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court followed a two-part analysis corresponding to the two main contentions raised by the applicant.

1. Jurisdiction to Arrest and Release on Bail

- The Court found that Mr. Niaz Muhammad, when he arrested Ganga Kishan, was acting under section 64 of the Criminal Procedure Code (which permits a Magistrate present at the commission of an offence to arrest the offender). The term "offence" in section 64 was read broadly and held to include an offence under section 171D of the Indian Penal Code. Therefore Mr. Niaz Muhammad was authorized to arrest Ganga Kishan and to release him on bail.

- The Court distinguished those powers from the operation of section 196 of the Code, noting section 196 does not control a Magistrate's powers of arrest and release on bail but instead concerns limitations on courts taking cognizance of certain offences without specified prior authority. Consequently, the applicant's first contention (that Mr. Niaz Muhammad had no jurisdiction to arrest or to release on bail because of section 171D) was rejected as having no force.

2. Validity of the Undertaking as a Bond under Section 499 CrPC

- The Court held that Section 499's requirements are imperative and must be strictly complied with. The text of Section 499 (quoted in the opinion) requires that before release on bail a bond be executed by the person released and by sureties, and that such bond be conditioned that the person "shall attend at the time and place mentioned in the bond."

- Applying Emperor v. Chintaram, the Court agreed that the time and place of appearance must be specified in the bond and that the court cannot depart from these provisions. The undertaking in the present case was "extremely vague" and did not fix any time or place for appearance, so it failed this mandatory requirement.

- The Court further reasoned that Section 499 contemplates that the person released on bail must execute a bond himself; a bond by a surety alone is inadequate except under a specific statutory exception (section 514B, which permits acceptance of a surety's bond only when the person required to execute a bond is a minor). In the present matter no bond was taken from Ganga Kishan; only the applicant's undertaking existed. Thus it was not legally open to the Magistrate to accept an undertaking by a surety without a principal bond by the accused.

- Finally, the Court considered the effect of Section 514 (the provision governing proceedings to determine forfeiture). It observed that a bond must mention the definite court before which the accused is to appear for any proceeding under Section 514 to be meaningfully initiated. If no court or place is specified in the bond, a court cannot properly commence a Section 514 proceeding to determine forfeiture. The vague undertaking therefore also defeated the possibility of valid forfeiture proceedings.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court allowed the application in revision and set aside the order of forfeiture passed by the lower courts. The Court directed that the money, if realised, be refunded to the applicant.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the partial forfeiture (Rs. 125) ordered against Brahmanand Misra was set aside and any amount realised pursuant to that forfeiture must be returned to him.
  • The decision rests on strict enforcement of the mandatory requirements of Section 499 (time and place in the bond and execution of a bond by the person released) and the related procedural consequences under Section 514. The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel precedent beyond applying established principles (including reliance on Emperor v. Chintaram) and thus primarily resolves the instant forfeiture as legally invalid on the grounds stated.
Show all summary ...

Mulla, J.:— This is an application in revision by one Brahmanand Misra from an order, passed against him under section 514 of the Criminal Procedure Code forfeiting a portion of a bond executed by him in the following circumstances.

The applicant was one of several candidates for a seat on the Cawnpore Municipal Board at an election held in December, 1936. A man named Ganga Kishan acted for him as well as for another candidate as an identifier of the voters who came to the polling station and asked for ballot papers. It appears that a man accompanied by Ganga Kishan came to the polling station and called for a ballot paper in the name of one Madan Kahar. He was identified in the ordinary course by Ganga Kishan, but his effort to obtain a ballot paper did not succeed because an objection was taken on behalf of another candidate to the effect that the man was falsely personating another voter whose name was entered in the list. The objection was upheld by the Presiding Officer who happened to be a Magistrate of the first class named Mr. Niaz Muhammad. The Magistrate put Ganga Kishan under arrest, apparently for having committed an offence under section 171D of the Indian Penal Code, but released him soon afterwards on the present applicant giving him an undertaking to produce Ganga Kishan if necessary fr a trial later on. The undertaking was scribed by the Magistrate himself in the following terms: “Mr. Brahmanand undertakes and stands surety of Rs. 500 for B. Ganga Kishan identifier in case he is prosecuted and required by court.”

This undertaking which is obviously couched in extremely vague language has been treated by the prosecution as a bond under Section 499 of the Criminal Procedure Code which has been forfeited. It may be mentioned here—and it is a very important fact—that no bond was taken from Ganga Kishan himself. I have seen the record of the case myself and have also asked the learned Deputy Government Advocate to do so, but there is no trace of any such bond, so that it was a curious case of a man being released on bail, without executing any bond himself, merely upon an undertaking given by another person as a surety. As might well have been expected in these circumstances Ganga Kishan who had nothing to lose absconded and the present applicant in spite of every possible effort on his part failed to produce him later on when he was required for being tried on a charge under section 171D of the Indian Penal Code. A notice was then given to the present applicant to show cause why his bond should not be forfeited and a Magistrate of the first class named Mr. Altaf Husain ultimately passed an order to the effect that the bond furnished by the applicant was forfeited to the extent of Rs. 125. It is from this order that the applicant has come up in revision to this Court.

Two points have been urged on behalf of the applicant; firstly that Mr. Niaz Muhammad could not take cognizance of an offence under section 171D of the Indian Penal Code without the previous sanction of the Local Government and hence he had no jurisdiction to arrest Ganga Kishan and to demand any security from the present applicant, and secondly that the undertaking given by the applicant which has been treated as a bond under Section 499 of the Criminal Procedure Code does not fulfil the imperative requirements of that section inasmuch as it does not fix any time or place for the appearance of the accused person and hence it is not legally enforceable. With regard to the first contention it is enough to point out that Mr. Niaz Muhammad, when he put Ganga Kishan under arrest, was not functioning as a court but only as a Magistrate acting under section 64 of the Criminal Procedure Code which runs as follows: “When any offence is committed in the presence of a Magistrate within the local limits of his jurisdiction, he may himself arrest or order any person to arrest the offender, and may thereupon, subject to the provisions herein contained as to bail, commit the offender to custody.” The word “offence” used in section 64 of the Criminal Procedure Code is obviously wide enough to include an offence under section 171D of the Indian Penal Code. Mr. Niaz Muhammad being a Magistrate and the offence having been committed in his presence he was in my opinion fully authorised to arrest the offender Ganga Kishan and to release him on bail. It has, however, to be borne in mind that the release on bail was to be governed by the provisions contained in the Code. Section 196 of the Criminal Procedure Code does not control the powers of a Magistrate under the Code, but only prevents a court from taking cognizance of certain offences without there being a complaint made by order of or under authority from the Governor-General in Council, the Local Government or some officer empowered by the Governor-General in Council in this behalf. There is consequently no force in the first contention urged on behalf of the applicant that Mr. Niaz Muhammad had no jurisdiction to arrest Ganga Kishan and to release him on bail inasmuch as he could not take cognizance of the offence under section 171D of the Indian Penal Code.

The other contention is, however, well founded and must prevail. The release, of an accused person on bail and the conditions under which that is permitted by the law are governed by Section 499 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and the provisions laid dawn in that section as to the nature and contents of the bail bond are in my judgment imperative and must be strictly fulfilled. The section runs as follows: “Before any person is released on bail or released on his own bond, a bond for such sum of money as the police officer or court, as the case may be, thinks sufficient shall be executed by such person, and, when he is released on bail, by one or more sufficient sureties conditioned that such person shall attend at the time and place mentioned in the bond, and shall continue so to attend until otherwise directed by the police officer or court, as the case may be.”

The objection taken on behalf of the applicant is that in view of this section it was incumbent upon Mr. Niaz Muhammad to mention a time and a place for the appearance of the accused person Ganga Kishan who was being released on bail. In my judgment this objection is obviously sound and cannot but prevail. The learned counsel for the applicant has relied upon the case of Emperor v. Chintaram(1). In that case it was held that “Bail proceedings are special proceedings about which there are specific provisions in the Code and they must be strictly followed. Section 499 of the Criminal Procedure Code states that the time and place at which the accused is to appear must be mentioned in the bond, and clause (2) of that section says that if the accused is to appear in some other court the bond must expressly say so. It is not open to the court to depart from these provisions.” I am in entire agreement with this interpretation of Section 499 of the Criminal Procedure Code and I think, therefore, that the objection raised by the learned counsel for the applicant in the present case must be upheld.

I must, however, mention two more points which in my judgment fortify the conclusion at which I have arrived. In the first place it will appear from a perusal of Section 499 of the Criminal Procedure Code that when a person is released on bail he must himself execute a bond. The law does not contemplate any person being released on bail without executing a bond himself merely upon an undertaking or security given by a surety. The only exception to this rule is to be found in section 514B of the Criminal Procedure Code which runs as follows: “When the person required by any court or officer to execute a bond is a minor, such court or officer may accept, in lieu thereof, a bond executed by a surety or sureties only.” This to my mind makes it perfectly clear that it is incumbent under Section 499 of the Criminal Procedure Code to get a bond executed by the person who is released on bail and unless that is done there can be no valid bond by a surety alone. As I have stated above, no bond was taken in the present case from Ganga Kishan who was released on bail and it is not surprising that he took advantage of that fact and made himself scarce. I have no hesitation in holding that as no bond was taken from Ganga Kishan it was not legally open to Mr. Niaz Muhammad to demand any undertaking or security from the present applicant alone. The whole proceeding was, therefore, illegal and must be set aside.

Again, it would appear from a perusal of section 514 of the Criminal Procedure Code that the mentioning of definite court before which the accused person is to appear is an essential condition of a bond under Section 499 of the Criminal Procedure Code. section 514 of the Criminal Procedure Code runs as follows: “Whenever it is proved to the satisfaction of the court by which a bond under this Code has been taken, or of the court of a Presidency Magistrate or Magistrate of the first class, or, when the bond is for appearance before a court, to the satisfaction of such court, that such bond has been forfeited, the court shall record the grounds of such proof, and may call upon any person bound by such bond to pay the penalty thereof, or to show cause why it should nor be paid.” Now it is evident that where a person is arrested by a police officer or a Magistrate and is released on executing a bond which does not fix any place where or the court in which the accused person is to appear it is not possible to take any proceeding under section 514 of the Criminal Procedure Code for determining whether the bond has been forfeited or not. When the bond has been taken by some court it is that court alone or the court of a Presidency Magistrate or of a Magistrate of the first class that can initiate a proceeding under section 514 of the Criminal Procedure Code for determining whether a bond has been forfeited. When the bond is for appearance before a particular court it is again only that court which can start a proceeding under section 514 of the Criminal Procedure Code for determining whether the bond has been forfeited. If a bond has been taken by a Magistrate or a police officer and no court is mentioned therein I fail to see how any proceeding can be taken under section 514 of the Criminal Procedure Code at all. In the present case if we attach some definite meaning to the vague terms of the undertaking scribed by Mr. Niaz Muhammad and hold that the applicant undertook to produce Ganga Kishan for trial before some court, still the point remains that no court having been specified no court can legally take any proceeding under section 514 of the Criminal Procedure Code for determining whether the undertaking or the bond given by the applicant has or has not been forfeited.

The result therefore is that I allow this application in revision and setting aside the order passed by the courts below forfeiting the applicant's bond to the extent of Rs. 125 direct that the money if realised will be refunded to him.