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Raj Narain v. Ahmadi Jan
Iqbal Ahmad and Verma, JJ.:— This is an appeal by a creditor against an order passed by a Special Judge, first grade, exercising jurisdiction under the Encumbered Estates Act (XXV of 1934) and arises under the following circumstances. Ahmadi Jan, who is respondent in the present appeal, filed an application under section 4 of the Act on the 17th of October, 1936. Her application was, in due course, transmitted by the Collector to the Special Judge and thereafter Ahmadi Jan filed a written statement in accordance with section 8 of the Act. One of the debts shown in the written statement was the debt due on the basis of a mortgage deed, dated the 22nd of November, 1928, executed by Ahmadi Jan in favour of Mst. Morni, the wife of Raj Narain appellant. The allegation contained in the written statement with respect to this debt was that the debt was, as a matter of fact, advanced by one Ram Ghulam and that Mst. Morni was a mere benamidar for him (Ram Ghulam). It was also alleged that, Ram Ghulam having died, his legal representatives were Raj Narain and Pirbhu Narain, and that the last two named persons were the real mortgagees under the said mortgage deed. The names of Raj Narain and Pirbhu Narain were shown in the array of the creditors mentioned in the written statement, with the result that the notices prescribed by section 9 were issued to these two persons. The notices were served personally on Raj Narain and Pirbhu Narain in January, 1937. The notice in the Gazette was published on the 1st of May, 1937. But, before the publication of the notice in the Gazette, Morni filed a written statement of her claim with respect to the mortgage debt on the 31st of March, 1937. It is not disputed that the written statement of Morni was within the time prescribed by section 9 of the Act. It is also a fact that neither Raj Narain nor Pirbhu Narain filed a written statement, within the time allowed by section 9, claiming to be entitled to the mortgage debt.
Morni died on the 7th of August, 1937, and thereafter, on the 6th of October, 1937, Raj Narain filed an application praying that, as he was the real mortgagee, his name be substituted for Mst. Morni. Pirbhu Narain also filed an application on the 4th of December, 1937, alleging that the mortgage debt was advanced by a joint family of which Ram Ghulm, Pirbhu Narain and Raj Narain were members and that, on the death of Ram Ghulam, both Pirbhu Narain and Raj Narain were entitled to the mortgage debt. On this allegation Pirbhu Narain also prayed to be substituted as a legal representative of Mst. Morni. These applications of Raj Narain and Pirbhu Narain were opposed by Ahmadi Jan, the landlord applicant, on the ground that the applications, in fact and in substance, were written statements of claim within the meaning of section 9 of the Act and as they were filed after the expiry of the period prescribed by that section they were time barred.
In view of the respective contention of the parties the learned Judge framed the following issues: (1) Whether the claim of Raj Narain is or is not time barred or (2) Whether the mortgage debt due under the mortgage deed dated the 22nd of November, 1928, executed by Mst. Ahmadi Jan in favour of Mst. Morni deceased belongs to Raj Narain alone or to him and Pirbhu Narain jointly?
On the first issue the learned Judge held that the application of Raj Narain dated the 6th of October, 1937, was tantamount to a written statement of claim under section 9, and as it was filed more than five months after the publication of the notice in the Gazette it was barred by limitation. In this view of the matter, he concluded that the debt due on the basis of the mortgage deed must be deemed to be discharged under section 13 of the Act. Having arrived at these conclusions, he refrained from deciding issue No. 2 noted above and dismissed “the claim” of Raj Narain. In our judgment the decision of the court below cannot be supported.
It is common ground that the position of Mst. Morni was that of a benamidar, and the only dispute in the case was whether she was a benamidar for Raj Narain or was a benamidar for Pirbhu Narain also. The consideration of the case must, therefore, be approached on the assumption that Mst. Morni was not the real mortgagee and was a benamidar, either for Raj Narain alone, or both for Raj Narain and Pirbhu Narain. It is well settled that a benamidar represents the real owner, and, so far as their relative legal position is concerned, is a mere trustee for him (the real owner). It is also beyond, dispute that an action can be maintained in the name of the benamidar in respect of the property that stands in his name, although the beneficial owner is no party to it; vide Gur Narayan v. Sheolal Singh(1). That being so, it is clear that Morni had the right of putting the mortgage deed into suit, and if she had sued in her name it would have been no answer to her claim that she was not the real mortgagee and was a mere benamidar. It follows that Morni, even though a benamidar, was entitled to prefer a claim in the proper court for the realisation of the mortgage debt. Because of the enactment of the Encumbered Estates Act the right of the creditors to resort to the ordinary courts of law for the recovery of the debts due to them is, in cases coming, within the purview of the Act, barred and a substituted remedy has been provided by the Act. This substituted remedy is prescribed inter alia by sections 9 and 10 of the Act. By those sections a creditor has the right to put forward a claim in respect of the debt due from the landlord. Mst. Morni had, therefore, the right to have recourse to this substituted remedy. In other words, she had the right to file a written statement of claim in accordance with the provisions of sections 9 and 10 of the Act. This, as already stated, she did within the prescribed period of limitation. The claim preferred by her was, therefore, within time, and, if she had been alive, that claim would have had to be adjudicated upon in due course by the Special Judge in accordance with the provisions of section 14 of the Act. Morni, however, died before the claim preferred by her had been adjudicated upon. On her death her legal representative had the right to be substituted in her place and to continue the prosecution of the claim preferred by her; vide Gokaran Singh v. Brij Bhukan Singh. As observed in the case just quoted, it was the duty of the landlord applicant to have taken appropriate steps to bring upon the record the legal representatives of Morni after her death.
The question, then, arises whether Raj Narain was or was not the legal representative of Morni. In our judgment he was. A benamidar, being a trustee for the beneficial owner, has at least the trustee's estate vested in him, and, on the death of the benamidar, it is open to the beneficial owner to say that he would thenceforward represent that estate. If the beneficial owner chooses to adopt such a course the trustee's estate and the estate possessed by, the beneficial owner merge in one and the same person, viz., in the beneficial owner. In the present case Raj Narain, being admittedly one of the beneficial owners, had, therefore, the right to ask to be substituted as the legal representative of Mst. Morni after her death. This is what Raj Narain prayed for by his application dated the 6th of October, 1937. The learned Judge was therefore wrong in not acceding to that application. The true nature and effect of that application have been totally misunderstood by the learned Judge. It was not, as held by him, a written statement of claim within the meaning of section 9. It was a bare application to be substituted on the record in place of Mst. Morni who had already preferred the claim. There was, therefore, no question of the claim being barred by time.
For the reasons given above we allow this appeal, set aside the order of the court below dated the 5th of November, 1938, and remand the case to that court for decision according to law. It is needless to observe that issue No. 2 quoted above will also have to be decided by the learned Judge. The appellant is entitled to the, costs of this appeal.
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