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Ghassu v. Babu Ram
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This is an application in revision against a judgment and decree dated 26th September 1942 of the District Judge, Mainpuri, which affirmed a judgment and decree dated 17th June 1942 of a Revenue Officer, Mainpuri. The lower courts had decided a suit for redemption under Section 12 of the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act (27 of 1934).
Relevant facts as stated in the opinion:
- On 7 April 1920, Ganga Ram, an occupancy tenant of village Nagla Khujaria Mazra Bajhera, made a usufructuary mortgage of his occupancy holding in favour of Har Sahai for Rs. 300.
- Both the original mortgagor and the mortgagee are deceased at the time of this litigation; the plaintiffs allege they are the legal representatives of the mortgagor and that the mortgage has been satisfied out of the usufruct.
- The plaintiffs instituted an action under Section 12, Agriculturists' Relief Act, seeking redemption of the mortgage against the legal representatives of the mortgagee.
- One defensive plea was that the mortgage, being of an occupancy holding, was wholly void and that Section 12 permitted redemption only of valid mortgages.
- The trial Judge overruled this plea, held that the mortgage had been satisfied out of the usufruct, and decreed redemption in favour of the plaintiffs. The District Judge affirmed that decree.
- The revision raises a pure question of law — whether an action for redemption under Section 12 in respect of a mortgage of an occupancy holding is maintainable — and was referred to the Bench because of conflicting authorities on the legal effect of such mortgages and the relief available to mortgagors.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether an action for redemption of a mortgage of an occupancy holding under Section 12 of the Agriculturists' Relief Act is maintainable.
- Whether a mortgagor can call upon a mortgagee to render accounts in a redemption suit where (a) there was a contractual liability on the mortgagee to render accounts, or (b) a statutory liability arises under recent debt legislation — this question being relevant both for mortgages more than 12 years old and for those less than 12 years old.
- What is the proper form of action (possession or redemption) in cases where possession passed under a transaction that is void or voidable under tenancy legislation, and whether Section 12 can be applied to transactions that are not strictly legal mortgages but are analogous to them.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiffs' Contentions
- The plaintiffs alleged that they are the legal representatives of the mortgagor (Ganga Ram) and that the mortgage had been satisfied out of the usufruct of the property.
- They sought redemption under Section 12, Agriculturists' Relief Act.
Defence Contentions (as expressly recorded)
- One of the defence pleas was that the mortgage in question, being of an occupancy holding, was wholly void in law and that Section 12 permits redemption of valid mortgages only, hence the plaintiffs could not maintain the action under that section.
Counsel Argument (Mr. Jagdish Sarup)
- It was contended that, under Section 28 of the Limitation Act (9 of 1908), title by prescription results in extinguishment of the original title and the acquisition of a new title in favour of the wrong-doer; the original title is not transferred.
- The submission continued that a void transaction cannot be converted into a valid transaction by mere lapse of time, and that a mortgage of an occupancy holding prohibited by law does not become valid by prescription or long possession.
- Reliance was placed on Tichborne v. Weir (1893) 67 L.T. 735 and Bhukhan Mian v. Radhika Kumari Devi ('38) 25 A.I.R. 1938 Pat. 479 for the proposition that prescription cannot create contractual rights or convert a void contractual interest into a valid one.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Khiali Ram v. Nathu Mal ('93) 15 All. 219 | Earlier distinction between "right of occupancy in" and "right to occupy"; held usufructuary mortgage of occupancy holding permissible (pre-1901). | Used to show historical development of law prior to the 1901 Tenancy Act and the change in treatment of such transactions. |
| Ram Sarup v. Kishen Lal ('07) 29 All. 327 | After N.W. Tenancy Act, 1901, a usufructuary mortgage of an occupancy holding is void. | Taken as establishing the settled law in this Court that usufructuary mortgages of occupancy holdings are void under subsequent tenancy legislation. |
| Rup Singh v. Mt. Beera ('18) 2 R.D. 305 (B.R.) | Board of Revenue view that a usufructuary mortgage by a tenant is voidable against the landlord but valid between mortgagor and mortgagee to an extent. | Cited as illustrating the conflicting view of the Board of Revenue contrasted with this Court's position. |
| Pitai v. Karedin Singh ('33) 17 R.D. 370 (B.R.) | Similar Board of Revenue view on usufructuary mortgages of occupancy holdings. | Again cited to record conflicting administrative/Board authorities. |
| Harsaran Pathak v. Abdullah Khan ('37) 1937 R.D. 58 (B.R.) | Board of Revenue precedent aligned with view that such mortgages are voidable as to landlord but valid inter se. | Noted as part of the line of Board of Revenue decisions differing from this Court. |
| Thakur Das v. Nathu Ram ('38) 1938 R.D. 249 (B.R.) | Another Board of Revenue decision on the same issue. | Recorded to show continued divergence of views in administrative jurisprudence. |
| Jhurraoo v. Ram Kunwar ('41) 1941 R.D. 585 (B.R.) | Board of Revenue line on validity/voidability between parties. | Included in catalogue of Board of Revenue authorities presenting an alternative approach. |
| Fasih Uddin v. Karamat Ullah ('88) 1888 A.W.N. 128 | Equity principle: a seller (or transferor) who agreed not to claim occupancy cannot reclaim without tendering the portion of purchase money that was the price; it would violate equity to allow claim without such payment. | Applied as foundational equitable principle to the rule that mortgagors who put mortgagees in possession cannot recover possession without refunding the consideration. |
| Bahoran Upadhya v. Uttamgir ('11) 33 All. 779 | Applied Fasih Uddin principle to usufructuary mortgages of occupancy holdings. | Used to show earlier application of the equity principle to cases analogous to the present facts. |
| Bisheshar Pathak v. Rup Narain Singh ('28) 15 A.I.R. 1928 All. 286 | Application of the equitable rule to void leases: insistence on tender/return of consideration before restoring possession. | Recorded as precedent where the equitable principle was applied to void transfers. |
| Kuber Singh v. Ram Chandra Bhunja ('36) 23 A.I.R. 1936 All. 215 | Similar application in cases of void leases/transfers. | Noted as another instance of the equitable approach. |
| Ramzan v. Bhukhal Rai ('18) 5 A.I.R. 1918 All. 226 | Example of allowing mortgagors to redeem on payment of the principal sum when possession had passed. | Used to demonstrate historical practice of allowing redemption on tender/repayment. |
| Durga Chaudhary v. Jagroop ('23) 10 A.I.R. 1923 All. 191 | Similar practice permitting redemption on payment. | Included among cases showing consistent judicial relief by redemption with repayment. |
| Mt. Raj Rani v. Gulab ('28) 15 A.I.R. 1928 All. 552 | Another instance of allowing redemption on repayment. | Demonstrated the Court's prior disposition to permit redemption subject to equitable repayment. |
| Mt. Dukhi v. Inderman Ahir ('34) 21 A.I.R. 1934 All. 656 | Further example where mortgagors were allowed to redeem on payment. | Recorded as part of the line of All-India/All-Provincial authorities supporting the practice. |
| Annada Hait v. Khudiram Hait ('14) 1 A.I.R. 1914 Cal. 894 | Holding that an action for redemption in essence is an action for possession and form of action is immaterial. | Relied on to support that the form of action need not be strict and that possession-based relief can be sought by a mortgagor. |
| Appanna v. Venkatasami ('24) 11 A.I.R. 1924 Mad. 292 | Held that a redemption action is essentially an action for possession; also cited for examining documents to ascertain quantum of adverse interest. | Used to justify examining the terms of the purported mortgage to determine the quantum of interest and liabilities (including accounts). |
| Baijnath Prasad Singh v. Muneshwar Singh ('36) 23 A.I.R. 1936 Pat. 63 | Held that possession by a mortgagee for over 12 years does not extinguish the mortgagor's right to redeem; mortgagee's possession only prescribes for mortgagee rights. Also cited (per Wort J.) that a mortgagee's position remains that of a mortgagee unless adverse title is asserted. | Cited to support that long possession results in mortgagee rights, not complete proprietary title, and that mortgagor's right to redeem subsists. |
| Mahamangal Rai v. Kishun Kandu ('27) 14 A.I.R. 1927 All. 311 | Establishes that mortgagee's possession for over 12 years does not extinguish the mortgagor's right to redeem. | Applied in the Court's summary of the law regarding prescription and redemption rights. |
| Halka v. Nannhon ('32) 19 A.I.R. 1932 All. 259 | Similar holding regarding prescription not extinguishing right to redeem. | Included in the Court's supporting authorities on prescription and mortgagor's rights. |
| Mt. Shamrati Koer v. Kalika Singh ('35) 22 A.I.R. 1935 All. 578 | Another authority that long possession does not oust mortgagor's right to redeem. | Relied on in the exposition of existing law. |
| Tichborne v. Weir (1893) 67 L.T. 735 | Authority for the proposition that by prescription the original title is not transferred and covenants between original parties are not enforceable against the wrong-doer who prescribes. | Cited by counsel (Mr. Jagdish Sarup) in support of the submission that prescription cannot create contractual rights or validate void transactions. |
| Bhukhan Mian v. Radhika Kumari Devi ('38) 25 A.I.R. 1938 Pat. 479 | Held that prescription cannot create limited contractual interests like a tenancy or mortgage, since they are creatures of contract. | Cited by counsel to argue that prescription cannot create a mortgage where none validly existed. |
| Dip Narain Singh v. Nageshar Prasad ('30) 17 A.I.R. 1930 All. 1 | Statement (Sir Shah Sulaiman) that prohibition against transfer of occupancy holding is declared void due to incompetency of the tenant, not as a prohibition in the public interest. | Quoted to demonstrate that the statutory prohibition is grounded in the tenant's incompetency rather than in a broad public or State interest. |
| Sundara Gurukkal v. Subramania Archakar ('12) 16 I.C. 960 (Mad.) | Authority that even unalienable property can be subject to adverse possession and that transferees in possession may acquire the status of mortgagee after long possession. | Included as part of Indian authorities supporting adverse possession even over unalienable holdings. |
| Budankayala Balakrishnamma Subudhi v. Vinayaka Rama Singi ('03) 26 Mad. 72 | Illustrates adverse possession principles applied to unalienable property. | Used to show the existence of a line of authorities supporting acquisition of certain rights by adverse possession. |
| Sayyapureddi Abbaya v. Sayam Appanna ('30) 123 I.C. 195 (Mad.) | Same theme: adverse possession over unalienable property can give rise to rights. | Relied on as part of the supporting Madras and other precedents. |
| Sontayana Gopala Dasee v. Rami ('21) 8 A.I.R. 1921 Mad. 410 | Held that a mortgagee was liable to render accounts even where the underlying transfer was void and adverse possession/possession had passed. | Used to support the proposition that terms of the purported mortgage or the asserted interest may be examined to determine quantum and whether accounting is due. |
| Javerbhai Jorabhai v. Gordhan Narsi ('15) 2 A.I.R. 1915 Bom. 102 | Authority consistent with adverse-possession principles over unalienable property. | Cited among precedents supportive of adverse-possession consequences. |
| Abdul Jabbar Khan v. Gulab Khan ('33) 20 A.I.R. 1933 Pat. 288 | Similar supporting authority on adverse possession and the status acquired thereby. | Included in the list of authorities demonstrating the legal consequences of possession under void transactions. |
| Sant Ram v. Putti Lal ('40) 27 A.I.R. 1940 Oudh 263 | Oudh Court's strict view that Section 12 is confined to legal mortgages and excludes redemption of occupancy holdings. | Cited to note that another High Court (Oudh) has taken an opposite, stricter view which the present Court chose not to follow. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded by reviewing statutory and precedential background and then applying equitable principles and prior authorities to the facts. The reasoning can be set out in the following steps as recorded in the opinion:
- Statutory and historic context: The Court summarized successive Rent and Tenancy Acts (No.12 of 1881, No.2 of 1901, No.3 of 1926 and No.17 of 1939) and noted how the law evolved from allowing certain transfers (as understood before 1901) to, after the 1901 Tenancy Act, treating usufructuary mortgages of occupancy holdings as void under this Court's decisions.
- Conflict of authorities: The Court acknowledged conflicting positions — this Court's consistent view that usufructuary mortgages of occupancy holdings are void, versus the Board of Revenue's view that they were only voidable against the landlord and valid inter se to prevent the mortgagor from ejecting the mortgagee as a trespasser.
- Equity principle governing possession and repayment: The Court relied on an equitable principle (traced to Fasih Uddin v. Karamat Ullah) that a transferor who has bargained away occupancy cannot reclaim possession without returning the portion of consideration that was the price; it would be inequitable to order possession restored without repayment. This principle had been applied to usufructuary mortgages and void leases in prior cases.
- Practical consequences arising from the settled view: Given the settled view of this Court that such mortgages are void but that possession by the mortgagee prevents the mortgagor from regaining possession without repayment, the Court observed that in practice mortgagors tendered the sum they had received and sued for redemption — such suits were frequently allowed by this Court.
- Prescription and the quantum of interest: The Court explained that long possession (over 12 years) by a mortgagee only prescribes for “mortgagee rights” and does not extinguish the mortgagor’s right to redeem; if the possessor claims to be holding under the terms of a mortgage, the court can examine the terms to determine the quantum of interest being claimed and, where necessary, require accounting. The Court cited authorities holding that adverse possession may give the transferee the status of a mortgagee and that the court can look at documents to determine the sum for which redemption should be allowed.
- Response to counsel's prescription argument: The opinion considered the submission that prescription cannot create a valid mortgage out of a void transaction and that the original title is not transferred by prescription. The Court rejected returning to first principles to overturn settled authorities of this Court, observing that many transactions and expectations had arisen on the basis of existing law; accordingly, where an occupancy-holding mortgage has ripened by 12 years' adverse possession, it is liable to be redeemed.
- Application to mortgages of less than 12 years' standing: The Court held that in cases where the mortgagee had been put in possession and there existed either contractual liability to account or statutory liability under debt legislation, equitable adjustment between parties requires accounting — otherwise a mortgagor might recover possession and the mortgagee might be repaid twice. Therefore, even a usufructuary mortgage of less than 12 years' standing is susceptible to redemption with necessary examination of accounts.
- Form of action and statutory interpretation: The Court analysed the form of the action, reiterated earlier authorities that a redemption suit is essentially an action for possession, and concluded that Section 12 (Agriculturists' Relief Act) can be applied to transactions that are not strictly legal mortgages but are analogous to mortgages in substance and effect. The Court acknowledged that another court (Oudh) had taken a stricter view that Section 12 applies only to legal mortgages, but declined to adopt that restrictive construction in light of this Court's established jurisprudence.
- Conclusion of analysis: On the basis of this statutory and equitable analysis and consistent with the prior practice of this Court, the Court concluded that the redemption action in the present case was properly maintainable and that the lower courts were right to decree redemption (subject to the equitable adjustments described).
Holding and Implications
Holding: The application in revision is rejected. The Court held that the suit for redemption under Section 12 of the Agriculturists' Relief Act in respect of the usufructuary mortgage of the occupancy holding was properly maintainable and that the decree of the lower courts sustaining redemption was rightly made.
Implications and direct consequences:
- The decree of the trial court and the District Judge (affirming redemption under Section 12) is upheld; the plaintiffs' redemption claim was properly entertained.
- The Court confirmed its established position that although a usufructuary mortgage of an occupancy holding is treated as void under this Court's jurisprudence, equitable considerations require that a mortgagor who seeks to recover possession after having put the mortgagee in possession must not keep the consideration; repayment or accounting is necessary before possession is restored.
- The Court held that such matters may require an examination of accounts and that Section 12 may be applied to transactions that are not strictly legal mortgages but which are analogous in substance — hence the statute can be used to obtain redemption-like relief in relation to occupancy holdings.
- The Court also held that where a mortgagee has been in possession for over 12 years, the mortgagee acquires mortgagee rights by prescription but the mortgagor's right to redeem subsists; such ripened positions remain liable to redemption subject to equitable adjustment.
The opinion notes that another High Court (Oudh) has adopted a stricter construction of Section 12 (excluding occupancy-holding mortgages), but this Court declined to follow that approach and instead applied Section 12 to transactions analogous to mortgages in substance.
Judgment Authors: Iqbal Ahmad, C.J. (delivered the opinion). Allsop, J. and another judge concurred.
1. This is an application in revision against a judgment and decree dated 26th September 1942, of the District Judge, Mainpuri, by which he affirmed a judgment and decree dated 17th June 1942, of a Revenue Officer of Mainpuri in a suit for redemption under Section 12, U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act (27 of 1934). On 7th April 1920, Ganga Ram, an occupancy tenant of village Nagla Khujaria Mazra Bajhera, made a usufructuary mortgage of his occupancy holding in favour of Har Sahai for Rs. 300. Both the original mortgagor and the mortgagee are now dead. The plaintiffs alleging that they are the legal representatives of the mortgagor and that the mortgage has been satisfied out of the usufruct, raised an action in the Court of the Assistant Collector, First Class, Mainpuri under Section 12, Agriculturists' Relief Act, for redemption of the above mortgage against the legal representatives of the mortgagee. One of the pleas in defence taken was that the mortgage in suit being of an occupancy holding was wholly void in law and the plaintiffs could not maintain an action under Section 12, Agriculturists' Relief Act, which allowed redemption of valid mortgages only. This plea as also other pleas raised by the defence were overruled by the trial Judge and holding that the mortgage had been satisfied out of the usufruct of the property, he passed a decree for redemption in favour of the plaintiffs. On appeal this decree was affirmed by the District Judge. Against these concurrent decrees this revision has been made and it raises a pure question of law, namely, whether an action for redemption of a mortgage of an occupancy holding under Section 12, Agriculturists' Relief Act, is maintainable or not, and on account of conflict of judicial authorities which exists upon the legal effect of a mortgage of an occupancy holding and the relief which, in certain circumstances, is open to the mortgagor in relation to such mortgage, this case has been referred to this Bench.
2. In successive Rent and Tenancy Acts which were enacted in these provinces, No. 12 of 1881, No. 2 of 1901, No. 3 of 1926 and No. 17 of 1939, varying restrictions had been placed upon the right of the occupancy tenants to transfer their holding. Prior to the enactment of N.W. Tenancy Act, No. 2 of 1901, a distinction was drawn in this Court between the "right of occupancy in" and the "right to occupy" the holding and in Khiali Ram v. Nathu Mal ('93) 15 All. 219, a Full Bench of this Court recognising that distinction held that a usufructuary mortgage of an occupancy holding was merely a transfer of the right to occupy which was not prohibited by the Act and was permissible. After the enactment of the N.W. Tenancy Act, No. 2 of 1901, it has been a settled law in this Court that a usufructuary mortgage of the occupancy holding is void in law, see Ram Sarup v. Kishen Lal ('07) 29 All. 327, and this view has been consistently maintained under successive Acts. The Board of Revenue, on the other hand, has consistently taken the view that a usufructuary mortgage of an occupancy holding by a tenant was only voidable against the landlord and as between the mortgagor and the mortgagee was a good transaction to the extent that the mortgagor after making the mortgage could not sue to eject the mortgagee as a trespasser : see Rup Singh v. Mt. Beera ('18) 2 R.D. 305 (B.R.); Pitai v. Karedin Singh ('33) 17 R.D. 370 (B.R.); Harsaran Pathak v. Abdullah Khan ('37) 1937 R.D. 58 (B.R.); Thakur Das v. Nathu Ram ('38) 1938 R.D. 249 (B.R.) and Jhurraoo v. Ram Kunwar ('41) 1941 R.D. 585 (B.R.).
3. But though this Court has constantly taken the view that the usufructuary mortgage of an occupancy holding by a tenant is void and not voidable, nevertheless it has consistently laid down that if the mortgagee had been given possession of the holding and the mortgagor after giving possession seeks to eject the mortgagee as a trespasser, he cannot be allowed to recover possession of the holding without paying the money which he had taken from the mortgagee. So far back as the year 1888 it was laid down in Fasih Uddin v. Karamat Ullah ('88) 1888 A.W.N. 128, that a sir-holder who had sold his sir after stipulating that he would not claim occupancy right in the sir could not claim exproprietary rights without tendering that portion of the purchase money which was the price of the sir and
"it would be violating every principle of equity and good conscience to decree the claim without such payment,"and this rule was applied to the usufructuary mortgage of the occupancy holding in Bahoran Upadhya v. Uttamgir ( '11) 33 All. 779, by Banerji and Tudball JJ., and in the case of void leases in Bisheshar Pathak v. Rup Narain Singh ( '28) 15 A.I.R. 1928 All. 286 and in Kuber Singh v. Ram Chandra Bhunja ( '36) 23 A.I.R. 1936 All. 215. As a result of the rule laid down in Fasih Uddin v. Karamat Ullah ( '88) 1888 A.W.N. 128, the natural course of action on the part of the mortgagors who had made the usufructuary mortgage of the occupancy holding was to tender the amount which they had received from the mortgagees and to raise an action for redemption and such claims frequently came to this Court and were allowed : see Ramzan v. Bhukhal Rai ( '18) 5 A.I.R. 1918 All. 226, Durga Chaudhary v. Jagroop ('23) 10 A.I.R. 1923 All. 191, Mt. Raj Rani v. Gulab ( '28) 15 A.I.R. 1928 All. 552 and Mt. Dukhi v. Inderman Ahir ( '34) 21 A.I.R. 1934 All. 656.
4. Questions were raised at one time as to the form of action, whether it was open to a mortgagor to claim redemption when the mortgagee was holding the property under an invalid or void mortgage, but it was generally held that an action for redemption in essence is an action for possession and the form of action was immaterial: see Annada Hait v. Khudiram Hait ('14) 1 A.I.R. 1914 Cal. 894, Appanna v. Venkatasami ('24) 11 A.I.R. 1924 Mad. 292 and Baijnath Prasad Singh v. Muneshwar Singh ('36) 23 A.I.R. 1936 Pat. 63. It has also been the consistent view of this Court that a mortgagee of an occupancy holding by remaining in possession for over 12 years does not extinguish the rights of the mortgagor to redeem him and by such possession the mortgagee only prescribes for mortgagee rights : see Mahamangal Rai v. Kishun Kandu ('27) 14 A.I.R. 1927 All. 311, Halka v. Nannhon ('32) 19 A.I.R. 1932 All. 259 and Mt. Shamrati Koer v. Kalika Singh ('35) 22 A.I.R. 1935 All. 578.
5. Under the authorities of this Court the position then in brief is that a usufructuary mortgage of an occupancy holding is void, but if the mortgagee has been put in possession of the occupancy holding, the mortgagor cannot recover back possession of the holding without returning the consideration which he had received; that it is open to the mortgagor to seek possession of the holding by tendering the consideration which he had received and he may do so by a redemption suit, that the mortgagee by his possession for over 12 years of the holding acquires only the mortgagee's rights and the mortgagor's right to redeem subsists. But the question still remains whether it is open to the mortgagor to call upon the mortgagee to render accounts in cases where there was contractual liability upon him under the mortgage transaction itself to render accounts or in cases where there was. no contractual liability but a statutory liability has fallen upon him as a result of recent debt legislation in these provinces to render accounts in a redemption suit, and this question arises both with reference to mortgages which are more than 12 years' old as also with regard to the mortgages which are less than 12 years' old. In the cases mentioned above the mortgagors were allowed to redeem on payment of the principal sum due under the mortgage, and the question of accounting by the mortgagee did not arise and it was immaterial whether the action was regarded as one for possession of property on payment of a certain sum of money due in equity to the defendant or whether it was regarded as one for redemption of the mortgage on payment of the principal sum due on the mortgage.
6. Mr. Jagdish Sarup in his able argument has contended before us that under Section 28, Limitation Act (9 of 1908) the title is only extinguished and not transferred and the title which arises in favour of the wrong-doer is a new title and not the old title transferred to him; and that by mere lapse of time what was at its inception a void transaction cannot become a valid transaction in law and the mortgage of an occupancy holding being prohibited by law no length of the possession on the part of the mortgagee and no amount of assertion by him that he was holding under a mortgage would bring a valid mortgage into existence, and for these contentions reliance was placed upon the decision of the Court of Appeal in Tichborne v. Weir (1893) 67 L.T. 735 and in Bhukhan Mian v. Radhika Kumari Devi ('38) 25 A.I.R. 1938 Pat. 479. Tcihborne v. Weir (1893) 67 L.T. 735 is an authority for the proposition that by prescription the original title is not transferred and when a wrong-doer prescribes for lessee's rights, the covenants made between the lessor and the lessee are not enforcible against the wrong-doer. In Bhukhan Mian v. Radhika Kumari Devi ('38) 25 A.I.R. 1938 Pat. 479, it was held by Wort A. C. J. that a person cannot prescribe for a limited interest like tenancy or mortgage as both a tenancy and a mortgage are creatures of contract, and on fundamental principles it is difficult to hold that a contract can be brought into existence by prescription.
7. The prohibition against the transfer of an occupancy holding has not been made in the interest of the State; it has been made in the interest of the landholder and possibly also in the interest of the tenant. The transfer of an occupancy holding in the words of the late Sir Shah Sulaiman in Dip Narain Singh v. Nageshar Prasad ('30) 17 A.I.R. 1930 All. 1 at p. 341 has been merely declared to be void on the ground of the incompetency of the tenant to make the transfer and has not been actually forbidden or prohibited by law or declared to be otherwise illegal.
There is abundant authority in this country for the proposition that an unalienable property can be subject of adverse possession and that by remaining in possession for over 12 years under a void mortgage the transferee acquires the status of a mortgagee. See Sundara Gurukkal v. Subramania Archakar ('12) 16 I.C. 960 (Mad.), Budankayala Balakrishnamma Subudhi v. Vinayaka Rama Singi ('03) 26 Mad. 72, Sayyapureddi Abbaya v. Sayam Appanna ('30) 123 I.C. 195 (Mad.), Sontayana Gopala Dasee v. Rami ('21) 8 A.I.R. 1921 Mad. 410, Appanna v. Venkatasami ('24) 11 A.I.R. 1924 Mad. 292, Javerbhai Jorabhai v. Gordhan Narsi ('15) 2 A.I.R. 1915 Bom. 102, Abdul Jabbar Khan v. Gulab Khan ('33) 20 A.I.R. 1933 Pat. 288 and Baijnath Prasad Singh v. Muneshwar Singh ('36) 23 A.I.R. 1936 Pat. 63. In Baijnath Prasad Singh v. Muneshwar Singh ('36) 23 A.I.R. 1936 Pat. 63 Wort J. held that in a mortgage transaction whether the mortgage is valid or not, the position of the mortgagee is that of a mortgagee and nothing more unless adverse title is set up by him.
8. It is well settled that a wrong-doer cannot prescribe for any greater interest than that of the person against whom he has prescribed and he cannot prescribe for a greater interest than which he claims to prescribe. If a mortgagee enters into possession of a property under a void mortgage and he claims to hold the property under the terms of a void mortgage, he can only after the expiration of the period of limitation hold the property as a mortgagee under the terms of the mortgage. If the assertion of the title by the transferee can be examined to find out the quantum of interest which he was setting up in the property to the extent whether he was claiming as a proprietor or as a mortgagee, then for the same reasons in order to determine the very quantum of interest which he was setting up in the property, the terms of the mortgage on which he was claiming to hold the property could also be examined. This is the view taken in Sontayana Gopala Dasee v. Rami ('21) 8 A.I.R. 1921 Mad. 410 where the mortgagee was held liable to render accounts, and in Appanna v. Venkatasami ('24) 11 A.I.R. 1924 Mad. 292 at p. 212 where Venkatasubba Eao J. observed as follows:
When it is said that a mortgagee's interest may be prescribed for, the statement implies that the mortgagee's interest is definite and precise. If the question is, has a person prescribed for a mortgagee's interest in respect of Rs. 100 or Rs. 10,000, the document may be looked at for ascertaining the quantum of interest which the adverse possessor has been claiming or has prescribed for.
9. If the matter had been res integra and it might have been permissible to examine the question on first principles, it could have been legitimately contended in accordance with the view of the Board of Revenue that a mortgage of an occupancy holding between the mortgagor and the mortgagee was void only against the landholder and as between the persons who made the mortgage it was a valid transaction, and when once the view was taken that the mortgage was void, as it was taken by this Court, it could have been legitimately contended that the mortgagor was entitled to eject the mortgagee and to recover possession of the holding on his title without being called upon to return the consideration. But, on the faith of the authorities of this Court, numerous transactions have taken place and it will be unsettling the law to go back to first principles and on the state of authority in this Court it must be held that a mortgage of an occupancy holding which has ripened by 12 years' adverse possession is liable to be redeemed.
10. On similar considerations I am also of opinion that a usufructuary mortgage of less than 12 years' standing is also liable to be redeemed. This Court has taken the view that a mortgagor cannot recover possession of the holding without returning the consideration which he had received under the mortgage and in a case in which the mortgagee had gone into possession and liability to account exists either on the contract or under the statute, it is not possible to find out what sum is due to the mortgagee which the mortgagor should return in equity without examining the accounts, and the same equity which demands that the mortgagor should not recover possession and keep the consideration, also demands that the mortgagee should not receive the consideration a second time when he has already received the consideration which he had advanced by the usufruct of the property. It seems to me that in order to adjust equity between them an examination of accounts would be necessary and in doing so, though in one sense the Court may be regarded as enforcing the terms of a void mortgage really and substantially the Court is not enforcing the terms of a void mortgage but is really adjusting equities between the parties having regard to the situation which has arisen on account of a transfer having taken place and possession having passed under it which has to be restored.
11. There remains now the question of the form of the action. The relationship which comes into existence as a result of a mortgage of an occupancy holding and its possession being transferred to the mortgagee, though not strictly speaking that of a mortgagor and of a mortgagee, is analogous to that relationship and the action which is raised by the mortgagor to recover possession of the holding on payment of the money due to the mortgagee, though not strictly in the nature of a redemption, is analogous to a redemption suit. This Court as also other Courts in India, have expressed the view that an action for redemption in essence is an action for possession and mortgagors in the past had frequently been allowed to recover holdings in actions which in form were in the nature of redemption suits. The action permitted by Section 12, Agriculturists' Relief Act, is in the nature of a redemption suit and it is possible to take a strict view of the section as was taken in Sant Ram v. Putti Lal ('40) 27 A.I.R. 1940 Oudh 263, and to hold that Section 12 is confined to legal mortgages and it excludes the redemption of an occupancy holding. But the Oudh Court has not taken the same view as this Court with regard to the rights of the mortgagor to recover possession of an occupancy holding if the mortgagee had been put in possession of the holding. That Court did not insist on making the mortgagor return the consideration money and it allowed the mortgagor to recover possession without making any payment. We have followed in this Court a different view of law and consistently with that view I do not think it will be straining the statute unduly if we were to permit actions under Section 12, Agriculturists' Relief Act, in relation to occupancy holdings also and to apply Section 12 to transactions which are not strictly legal mortgages but which are analogous to mortgages and in substance partake of their nature. I would therefore hold that this action was rightly raised and decreed by the Court below and this application in revision should be rejected.
Iqbal Ahmad, C.J.
12. I agree.
Allsop, J.
13. I concur.
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