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Sangam Lal v. Ganga Din

Allahabad High Court
Aug 27, 1945
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Factual and Procedural Background

The suit underlying this second appeal was instituted on 19 October 1940 by the appellant in the Court of the Munsif Haveli, Cawnpore, seeking possession of a house in the city of Cawnpore and other reliefs. The trial Court decreed the suit. On appeal the lower appellate Court dismissed the suit on the ground that it was time-barred under Article 142 of the Limitation Act.

Key pleadings and factual allegations in the plaint included that the plaintiff (appellant) was the owner, had let the house to the defendants about 10 or 11 years before institution of the suit at Rs. 10 per month, and that the defendants had not paid rent since 1 June 1939. The plaintiff also alleged he had earlier brought Suit No. 652 of 1939 against the defendants for ejectment, and that in that suit the defendants had pleaded they were owners and denied tenancy.

The defendants pleaded they were the owners, denied tenancy, asserted the plaintiff had not been in possession within 12 years prior to institution of the suit (invoking Article 142), and claimed adverse possession for over 12 years.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Article 142 of the Limitation Act is the applicable article of limitation to the present suit, and whether the suit is therefore barred by time.
  2. Whether the plaintiff's pleadings and the facts found by the Courts below amount to an allegation of dispossession such that the burden of proof under Article 142 is attracted.
  3. Whether, on the findings of fact recorded by the Courts below, the question of defendants' adverse possession arises once Article 142 is held applicable.
  4. Whether the Courts below correctly admitted and acted upon secondary evidence (including a certified copy of a sale deed marked Ex. 12) in the absence of adequate compliance with Sections 64 and 65 of the Evidence Act and whether any presumption under Section 90 could properly be raised.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Plaintiff's) Allegations / Contentions

  • The appellant asserted he was the owner of the house in dispute.
  • He alleged he had let the house to the defendants 10–11 years before the suit at a monthly rent of Rs. 10.
  • He alleged the defendants had not paid rent since 1 June 1939, implying dispossession from that date.
  • He relied on an asserted sale deed dated 13 November 1911 in favour of his father (producing a certified copy marked Ex. 12 rather than the original) as primary proof of title.
  • The appellant sought to be put in possession of the house.

Respondents' (Defendants') Allegations / Contentions

  • The defendants asserted they were the owners of the house and denied that they had ever been tenants of the plaintiff.
  • They pleaded that the plaintiff had not been in possession of the house within the 12 years prior to the suit, invoking Article 142 of the Limitation Act as a bar.
  • They further alleged they had been in adverse possession of the house for over 12 years.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bindhyachal Chand v. Ram Gharib Chand ('34) 21 A.I.R. 1934 All. 993 Establishes that a plaintiff cannot avoid the burden of proof imposed by Article 142 by clever pleading; dispossession may be inferred from pleadings short of explicit words. The Court relied on this Full Bench decision to hold that the plaintiff's pleadings did amount to an allegation of dispossession and therefore Article 142 applied, barring the suit.
Basant Singh v. Brij Raj Saran Singh ('35) 22 A.I.R. 1935 P.C. 132 Shows the limited presumption that may be raised under Section 90, Evidence Act (that signatures authenticating a copy are genuine). The Court observed that even if the copy (Ex. 12) were old enough, the only presumption under Section 90 would relate to genuineness of signatures and not to the entirety of the original; cited to question the correctness of treating Ex. 12 as equivalent to an original.
Asafuddaula Beg v. Ram Ratan ('40) 27 A.I.R. 1940 All. 74 Decision by a Single Judge of the Court that lent some support to the view taken by the Courts below regarding reception of secondary evidence. The Court acknowledged this decision as lending some support to the lower Courts' view, but contrasted it with Bench decisions of greater authority that were not followed.
Mumtaz Husain v. Brahmanand ('36) 23 A.I.R. 1936 All. 298 Bench decision laying down law on reception of secondary evidence and related requirements under the Evidence Act (implicitly different from the view taken by the lower Courts). The Court noted this Bench decision laid down the law differently and should have been followed by the lower Courts; it criticized the lower Courts for not being directed to this authority.
Gopal Dass v. Sri Thakurji ('36) 23 A.I.R. 1936 All. 422 Bench decision on similar questions about secondary evidence and compliance with the Evidence Act. The Court observed this Bench decision also laid down the law differently from the lower Courts' approach and ought to have been relied upon.
Mt. Shams-un-nissa Bibi v. Ali Asghar ('36) 23 A.I.R. 1936 Oudh 87 Chief Court ruling cited by the lower Courts in relation to reception of secondary evidence. The Court noted the Chief Court ruling was relied upon but pointed out that another Oudh decision (Keolapati v. Harnam Singh) in the same volume ran counter to it, reducing the value of reliance on Mt. Shams-un-nissa.
Keolapati v. Harnam Singh ('36) 23 A.I.R. 1936 Outh [Oudh] 298 Oudh decision contrary to Mt. Shams-un-nissa Bibi v. Ali Asghar on the same volume. The Court recorded that this decision runs counter to Mt. Shams-un-nissa Bibi, undermining the latter's usefulness as supporting authority for the lower Courts.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court confined itself to the question whether the lower appellate Court's view on limitation was correct, assuming the findings on title by the Courts below were satisfactory and binding in second appeal.

  1. On the issue of limitation, the Court agreed with the lower appellate Judge that Article 142 of the Limitation Act applied on the facts as found by the Munsif and affirmed on appeal. The Court rejected the Munsif's narrower view that Article 142 applies only where dispossession is pleaded in so many words.
  2. Relying on the Full Bench decision in Bindhyachal Chand v. Ram Gharib Chand, the Court held that pleadings which alleged that the defendants occupied the house as the plaintiff's tenants, that rent had not been paid since 1 June 1939, and that the defendants had asserted ownership in a prior suit, cumulatively amounted to an allegation that the plaintiff had been dispossessed while in possession. Thus the burden under Article 142 was attracted.
  3. Given that Article 142 was applicable, the suit was held to be barred by limitation. The Court observed that Article 144 (residuary article) is applicable only if no other article applies, and therefore Article 144 had no place in this case.
  4. Because the suit was time-barred under Article 142, the Court held the question of defendants' adverse possession did not arise for determination in the context of saving the plaintiff's suit.
  5. Separately, the Court expressed reservations about the sufficiency of the Courts below in dealing with the evidence on title. It noted the plaintiff did not produce the original sale deed allegedly dated 13 November 1911, but only a certified copy marked Ex. 12. The lower appellate Judge's statement that "the original sale deed, Ex. 12 has not been proved. But this document is more than 30 years old" was criticized as confused because the original had not been produced and the copy did not indicate when it was certified.
  6. The Court analyzed the limited scope of presumptions under Section 90 of the Evidence Act and observed that even if the copy were old, the only permissible presumption would concern the genuineness of signatures authenticating the copy (citing Basant Singh v. Brij Raj Saran Singh). The learned Judge had not properly considered whether requirements of Section 65 (admissibility of secondary evidence) and Section 64 (proof of loss of original) had been complied with.
  7. The Court criticized the wholesale admission of secondary evidence without clear findings as to loss of originals and noted the lower Courts' inadequate engagement with relevant Bench decisions on the point (Mumtaz Husain and Gopal Dass). The Court recommended greater attention to the provisions of the Evidence Act by the lower Courts.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The appeal is dismissed. The Court upheld the decree of the lower appellate Court dismissing the plaintiff's suit on the ground that it was barred by time under Article 142 of the Limitation Act.

Implications:

  • The direct legal effect is that the plaintiff's suit for possession is rejected as time-barred and the lower appellate Court's decree dismissing the suit is affirmed; the appeal was dismissed with costs.
  • Because the Court found the suit barred under Article 142, it held that the question of the defendants' adverse possession did not arise for purposes of defeating the plaintiff's claim.
  • The Court did not treat its decision as laying down a new precedent beyond applying existing authority (notably the Full Bench in Bindhyachal Chand). It also strongly criticized the lower Courts' handling of secondary evidence and recommended closer adherence to Sections 64 and 65 and Section 90 of the Evidence Act, but the ultimate outcome turned on limitation rather than on re-determination of title.
Show all summary ...

1. The suit out of which this second appeal has arisen was brought on 19th October 1940, by the appellant in the Court of the Munsif Haveli, Cawnpore, for possession of a house situated in the City of Cawnpore and for certain other reliefs which need not be mentioned. The trial Court decreed the suit, but the lower appellate Court dismissed it on the ground that it was barred by time under Article 142, Limitation Act. The main allegations made by the plaintiff in the plaint were that he was the owner of the house; that he had let it out to defendants 10 or 11 years before the institution of the suit on a monthly rental of Rs. 10; that the defendants had not paid any rent since 1st June 1939; that the plaintiff had brought a Suit No. 652 of 1939 in the Munsif's Court against the defendants, alleging that they were his tenants and praying for their ejectment, and that the defendants had alleged in their written statement filed in that suit that the plaintiff was not the owner of the house but that, as a matter of fact, the defendants were the owners and that there had never been any contract of tenancy between the parties. The plaintiff claimed that he was entitled to be put in possession of the house. Besides raising other pleas, the defendants alleged that they were the owners of the house; that the plaintiff was not its owner; that they had never been the plaintiff's tenants and that the plaintiff was not entitled to eject them. It was also pleaded that the plaintiff had never been in possession of the house in dispute within 12 years prior to the institution of the suit and that it was, therefore, barred under Article 142, Limitation Act. The defendants further alleged that, as a matter of fact, they had been in adverse possession of the house in dispute for over 12 years.

2. Both Courts below held that the plaintiff had succeeded in proving his title to the house. They also held that the defendants had been in uninterrupted possession of the house since 1918 and that the plaintiff's allegation that the defendants had ever paid rent to him was false. They further held as they were bound to do in view of the decision inter partes in Suit No. 652 of 1939 that the plaintiff's allegation that the house had been let out by him or by his father to the defendants and that the latter had been his tenants was not true. The Munsif held that these findings of fact were not sufficient to attract Article 142, Limitation Act, that it was-for the defendants to establish their adverse possession and that they had failed to do so. The view taken by the Munsif was that, there being no allegation in the plaint of the plaintiff having been dispossessed or having discontinued his possession while he was in possession of the property in suit, Article 142 could not apply. He accordingly, as has already been stated, decreed the suit. The learned Judge of the lower appellate Court agreed with the findings of fact recorded by the Munsif but held that on those findings the suit must be held to be barred by time under Article 142. We shall assume that the finding arrived at by the Courts below on the question of title is a satisfactory finding and is binding on this Court in second appeal, and shall confine ourselves to the question whether the view taken by the lower appellate Court on the question of limitation is correct.

3. Having heard learned Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant at considerable length, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the learned Judge of the lower appellate Court was right in holding that, on the findings of fact arrived at by the Munsif and affirmed by the learned Judge, the article of the limitation act which was applicable to the case was Article 142 and that the suit was barred. The Munsif appears to have been under the impression that Article 142 can be applied only in those cases where the plaintiff alleges in so many words in the plaint that he has been dispossessed by the defendant. As has been pointed out by the Full Bench in Bindyachal Chand v. Ram Gharib Chand ('34) 21 A.I.R. 1934 All. 993, a plaintiff cannot by cleverly drafting his plaint evade the burden of proof which Article 142 casts upon a person who is suing for possession on the ground of dispossession. As a matter of fact, the allegations made in the plaint in the present case do amount to an allegation that the plaintiff has been dispossessed while in possession of the property in dispute. The allegation that the defendants had been in occupation of the house as the plaintiff's tenants amounted to an allegation that the plaintiff was in possession of the house through his tenants. The allegation that the defendants had not paid any rent since 1st June 1989, amounted to an allegation that the defendants had dispossessed the plaintiff on that date. The allegation that the defendants had falsely asserted in Suit No. 652 of 1939 that they themselves were the owners of the house further strengthened that allegation of dispossession. That being so, the Munsif was clearly wrong in holding that Article 142 did not apply to the case because the plaintiff had not alleged that he had been dispossessed or had discontinued his possession while he had been in possession of the property. The learned Judge of the lower appellate Court was, in our opinion, right in relying on the judgments pronounced in the Full Bench case in Bindhyachal Chand v. Ram Gharib Chand ('34) 21 A.I.R. 1934 All. 993 mentioned above, and in holding that in view of the pleadings and the facts found, the article of the limitation act which was applicable to the case was Article 142. That being so, the suit was barred by the statute of limitation and the question of the defendants' adverse possession did not arise. Article 144, being a residuary article is not applicable unless it is found that no other article is applicable to the suit. The decree, dismissing the suit, passed by the lower appellate Court must, therefore, be upheld.

4. We must not be taken to be of the opinion that the finding recorded by the Courts below on the question of the plaintiff's title is necessarily a satisfactory finding. We need mention only two matters in this connection. The first is this. The deed on which the plaintiff's title primarily rested was a sale deed which was alleged by the plaintiff to have been executed by one Mannu Lal in favour of the plaintiff's father, Kandhai Lal, on 13th November 1911. The plaintiff did not produce the original of this alleged sale deed but produced what purported to be a certified copy thereof. This copy was marked Ex. 12. The learned Judge of the lower appellate Court observes with regard to this document as follows: "The original sale deed, Ex. 12 has not been proved. But this document is more than 30 years old." It is difficult to understand to which document the learned Judge is referring. As we have already stated, the original had never been produced. The copy, Ex. 12, does not show the date when the copy was granted. The Munsif stated in his judgment that this copy had been taken from the Registration Department in 1919. We do not know on what basis the Munsif made this statement. Even if the copy was obtained in 1919, it was not 80 years old. It is difficult to see, in these circumstances, how and in respect of what document the presumption mentioned in Section 90, Evidence Act, could be raised. Furthermore, the learned Judge, being under a»misapprehension and being, under the impression that the original sale deed had been produced, never considered whether the requirements of Section 65, Evidence Act, had been complied with and secondary evidence had been properly admitted. Then, again, even if the copy produced had been-" 30 years old, the only presumption that could be raised under Section 90 was that the signatures authenticating the copy were genuine Basant Singh v. Brij Raj Saran Singh ('35) 22 A.I.R. 1935 P.C. 132.

5. The second matter arises out of the wholesale admission of secondary evidence of various other documents without paying any attention to the requirements of Section 65, Evidence Act, and to the mandatory nature of the provision laid down in section 64 of that act. No attempt was ever made by either the Munsif or the Judge to arrive at any clear finding, based on evidence, to the effect that the loss of the original had been satisfactorily proved. We would strongly recommend to the Courts below to pay greater attention to the law as laid down in the Evidence Act. The Courts below have referred to certain rulings. One of them, as given in the judgment of the Munsif is 1935 A.L.J. 879. There is no such ruling. The Judge only says 1935 A.L.J. without mentioning any page. If the Courts below meant the Privy Council decision in Basant Singh v. Brij Raj Saran Singh mentioned by us above, which is to be found at p. 847 of Basanta Singh v. Braj Raj Saran Singh ('35) 22 A.I.R. 1935 P.C. 132 it is difficult to see how the Courts below thought that it supported their view. Although this Court has had occasion to point out to the Courts below the desirability of giving the names of parties whenever they refer to any rulings, it is regrettable that some of them still persist in omitting to mention the names of parties. Another ruling relied upon by the Courts below in 1939 A.L.J. 1023 in other words, the case of Asafuddaula Beg v. Ram Ratan ('40) 27 A.I.R. 1940 All. 74. That is a decision by a learned Single Judge of this Court and does lend some support to the view taken by the Courts below. If it had stood by itself it would, of course, have been the duty of the Courts below to follow it. There are, however, two Bench decisions of this Court which lay down the law differently. They are the cases in Mumtaz Husain v. Brahmanand ('36) 23 A.I.R. 1936 All. 298 and Gopal Dass v. Sri Thakurji ('36) 23 A.I.R. 1936 All. 422. The attention of the Courts below was not apparently drawn, as it should have been, to these decisions. It is hardly necessary to point out that the Bench decisions are of greater authority and should have been followed. The third and last ruling mentioned by the Courts below in this connection is the one reported in Mt. Shams-un-nissa Bibi v. Ali Asghar ('36) 23 A.I.R. 1936 Oudh 87. In the same volume, however, at p. 298 is to be found the case of Keolapati v. Harnam Singh ('36) 23 A.I.R. 1936 Outh 298 and the decision in that case runs counter to the ruling in Mt. Shams-un-nissa Bibi v. Ali Asghar ('36) 23 A.I.R. 1936 Oudh 87. There was thus no point in relying on the ruling of the Chief Court in Mt. Shams-un-nissa Bibi v. Ali Asghar ('36) 23 A.I.R. 1936 Oudh 87. It is not necessary, however, to pursue this matter any further as we have held that, even if the finding on the question of title be taken to be correct, the suit was barred by limitation. For the foregoing reasons the appeal is dismissed with costs.