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Bam Jassa Kunwar And Another v. Sahu Narain Das And Others

Allahabad High Court
May 8, 1945
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Malik, J.) — Encumbered Estates Act Appeal

Factual and Procedural Background

Rani Jassa Kunwar was the widow of Raja Sheoraj Singh whose estate included zamindari property. The Raja had executed two mortgages while alive: one on 25th September 1920 for Rs. 40,000 (interest eight annas per cent per mensem, compoundable half-yearly) and a second on 17th August 1923 for Rs. 12,000 (interest one rupee per cent per mensem with six monthly rests). After the Raja's death his widow inherited the properties. Creditors (Sahu Gulab Das and others) sued for realisation and obtained a preliminary decree on 28th April 1931 (preliminary decree for Rs. 64,160-0-3 originally; final decree later prepared for Rs. 53,761 on 5th January 1933 after payments were made).

Having failed to obtain further postponement of the final decree, a mortgage dated 12th January 1933 was executed by the Rani for Rs. 53,761 (matching the decretal amount as prepared on 5th January 1933) carrying interest at ten annas per cent per mensem with half-yearly rests. The Rani subsequently applied under Section 4 of the Encumbered Estates Act (application filed 5th September 1936) alleging that the mortgage had been obtained by the exercise of undue influence. Proceedings went to the Special Judge, First Grade, Aligarh; parties filed written statements; the Special Judge heard evidence and delivered judgment on 14th July 1941.

Appeals were filed against the lower court's decree by Rani Jassa Kunwar and two co-appellants (Subedar Singh and Ganesh Singh; Ganesh Singh died and his sons were substituted). The appeal contested the validity and proof of execution of the 12th January 1933 mortgage and raised points on priority among secured creditors under the Encumbered Estates Act.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the mortgage bond dated 12th January 1933 was duly executed for consideration and was binding on Rani Jassa Kunwar, especially having regard to her status as a purdahnashin woman and her allegation of undue influence.
  2. Whether any undue influence was exercised on Rani Jassa Kunwar by the principal creditors (Sahu Narain Das and others) in regard to the execution of the mortgage deed dated 12th January 1933.
  3. What debts, if any, are due to each set of creditors and how those debts are to be ranked for priority under the Encumbered Estates Act (including whether the claim of Subedar Singh and Ganesh Singh was time-barred).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant — Rani Jassa Kunwar (and her counsel Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru)

  • Contended that the mortgage dated 12th January 1933 had been obtained by undue influence and therefore was not binding on her.
  • Asserted that she executed the mortgage out of fear of forced sale in execution of the decree; she had no opportunity to obtain independent advice; she rejected advice given by her manager and executed the deed because she was frightened by creditors' threats to sell the property.
  • Relied on authorities (Privy Council and others) establishing that where a document is executed by a purdahnashin woman it is for the creditor to prove that she fully understood the transaction and her rights before being bound.
  • Noted evidence (purchase of stamps on two different days and testimony) suggesting an initial attempt to negotiate a lower figure (claim that stamps for Rs. 370 bought one day and additional stamps next day), presented as context for the execution circumstances.

Respondent Creditors — Sahu Narain Das and others (representatives of Gulab Das)

  • Maintained that the mortgage of 12th January 1933 was duly executed after mature deliberation and after consultation with the Rani's well-wishers; the Rani was not entitled to go behind the mortgage.
  • Asserted that the proposal for the fresh mortgage came from the Rani (so that she might have an opportunity to pay the decree from the income of the property) rather than the creditors forcing it upon her.
  • Claimed specific sums due up to dates of filings and sought pendente lite and future interest on those sums.
  • Challenged the time-bar plea against other creditor-claimants where relevant and raised objections to late claims by other creditors (e.g., objected to Subedar and Ganesh Singh's late claim as time-barred).

Other appellants / creditor parties — Subedar Singh and Ganesh Singh (and their counsel Mr. Pears Lal Banerji)

  • Claimed to be secured creditors under a mortgage dated 20th June 1931 and sought ranking as secured creditors under the Encumbered Estates Act.
  • Argued that the execution of the 12th January 1933 mortgage had not been proved according to law as against them and therefore those mortgagees should not be treated as secured creditors in priority to them.
  • Asked the court to reject the respondents' secured status if the respondents failed to prove attestation/execution properly; pointed to potential re-ranking consequences among secured creditors.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
47 ALL. 7031 Authority cited for the proposition that a creditor relying on a document executed by a purdahnashin woman must prove that she clearly understood the nature of the transaction and her rights. The court treated this line of authority as supporting the settled law that the creditor must satisfy the court that a purdahnashin woman comprehended the transaction; applied the principle to the facts and found the Rani fully aware.
67 I.A 3772 Same general proposition concerning the burden on a creditor to prove the voluntariness and comprehension of a purdahnashin woman's execution of a document. Court cited this as part of the established law and concluded the requisite proof was present in this case.
1940 A.L.J 7333 Cited in support of the rule that execution by a purdahnashin woman requires proof that she understood and consented to the transaction. Regarded as part of settled precedent; helped justify the application of the purdahnashin standard to the evidence before the court.
1939 A.L.J 4734 Another authority cited on the creditor's burden to prove that a purdahnashin woman comprehended and voluntarily executed a document. Used by the court as part of the body of authorities establishing the applicable legal test; court applied the test and found the deed validly executed.
A.I.R. 1938 P.C. 2765 Privy Council authority cited for the principle that execution by a purdahnashin woman must be shown to have been the product of her understanding and volition. The court treated this and the other cited authorities collectively as establishing a settled rule and applied it to conclude that the Rani understood the nature of the transaction and was bound.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court’s analysis proceeded from the facts recorded in the lower court and the written record, and then applied legal principles relating to undue influence, proof of execution and attestation, and the procedure under the Encumbered Estates Act:

  1. Factual synthesis: The court reviewed the sequence — preliminary decree (28th April 1931), postponements and payments by the Rani, final decree prepared (5th January 1933) for Rs. 53,761, and a mortgage executed on 12th January 1933 for that amount. The Rani had stated she executed the mortgage to protect the estate and with the expectation of paying from estate income.
  2. Who proposed the mortgage: The court considered competing narratives (Rani's claim that creditors threatened sale vs. creditors' claim that the Rani proposed the arrangement). The court concluded, on the facts, that the proposal for a fresh mortgage came from the Rani's side.
  3. Terms and reasonableness of the mortgage: The court compared the mortgage interest rate (ten annas per cent per mensem with half-yearly rests) to the decree rate (6% per annum simple) and found the mortgage rate reasonable in the context of 1933 rates; the mortgage did not materially worsen the Rani's position vis-à-vis the property covered by prior mortgages and the decree.
  4. Purdahnashin doctrine and burden of proof: The court accepted the line of authorities cited that require a creditor relying on a document executed by a purdahnashin woman to prove that she clearly understood the transaction. The court summarized this as a settled rule and applied it to the evidence.
  5. Evidence Act and proof of execution/attestation: The court examined relevant Evidence Act provisions (Sections 63, 67, 68, 69, 70 as discussed in the opinion). It noted two exceptions to the general attestation-proof rule: (a) where execution is admitted by the executant (Section 70), and (b) where attesting witnesses cannot be found or where prescribed conditions under Section 69 apply. The court also observed that a registered document whose execution is not specifically denied need not have attesting witnesses called.
  6. Admission and proof: Rani Jassa Kunwar had, in her Section 4 application and Section 8 written statement, admitted the mortgage; thus as against her it was not necessary to prove attestation. The deed was registered and not specifically denied. Nevertheless, attesting witnesses (Tika Ram and Ram Lal) were examined and identified the Rani's thumb-mark and their own signatures. The deed on its face bore attestation of three witnesses.
  7. Procedural posture of co-creditor appellants: The court reviewed the litigation history and found that Subedar Singh and Ganesh Singh had not raised objections or contested the respondents' claim in the trial court; their claim had been registered late but condoned; they had not produced evidence to prove their own deed. Given their failure to object or present evidence below, the court was unwilling to permit them to raise now a fresh objection that the respondents had not proved their mortgage.
  8. Fairness and mutuality: The court reasoned that, had it entertained Subedar and Ganesh Singh's late objection to proof by respondents, fairness would require permitting respondents to challenge the proof of Subedar/Ganesh's deed as well — a course that would have led to both sides being placed similarly. Given the record and admissions, the court preferred to treat the respondents' mortgage as duly proved.
  9. Conclusion of analysis: On the totality of evidence — the Rani's admission, the deed's registration, attesting-witness testimony, and surrounding circumstances — the court was satisfied that the Rani understood the transaction, that the mortgage deed had been properly proved, and that the decree below should be affirmed.

Holding and Implications

Final Holding: The appellate court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decree of the lower court. The opinion concludes that the mortgage deed dated 12th January 1933 was duly proved and that the decree passed by the lower Court must be affirmed; the appeal was dismissed with costs (para. 12–14).

Implications:

  • The mortgage dated 12th January 1933 was held to be validly executed and proved, and it stands for purposes of the Encumbered Estates Act proceedings recorded in this case.
  • The outcome confirms that, where a purdahnashin woman admits execution and the document is registered and attested (or attesting witnesses are produced), the creditor may satisfy the court of the requisite proof and the mortgage may be held binding.
  • The court declined to entertain a collateral/late challenge by other creditor-appellants who had not objected or produced evidence in the trial court; procedural default and absence from earlier stages affected their ability to raise the execution/attestation point on appeal.
  • No broad new legal principle or precedent was announced beyond the application of established authorities and established principles of proof and the Evidence Act to the facts of this case; the direct effect is to uphold the rights of the mortgagees and confirm the priority/ranking outcomes under the Encumbered Estates Act as decided below.

Notes on Statutory and Evidential Provisions Discussed

While not a separate precedent table entry, the court explicitly discussed and applied provisions of the Indian Evidence Act (Sections 63, 67, 68, 69, 70 as referenced in the opinion) in relation to proof of execution and attestation of documents. The opinion describes how those sections operate in practice (admissions, exceptions where attesting witnesses cannot be produced, and registered documents whose execution is not denied).

End of summary — all information above is drawn exclusively from the provided opinion text.

Show all summary ...

Malik, J.:— This appeal has been filed against the decree passed by the learned Special Judge, First Grade, Aligarh, under Section 14 of the U.P Encumbered Estates Act. Rani Jassa Kunwar is the widow of Raja Sheoraj Singh who had considerable zamindari property in the district of Moradabad. Tha Raja had died indebted. He had executed a mortgage for a sum of Rs. 40,000 on 25th September, 1920 in favour of Sahu Gulab Das and others. This mortgage carried interest at eight annas per cent, per mensem compoundable six monthly. On 17th August, 1923 he had executed a second mortgage for Rs. 12,000 in favour of the same creditors. The interest reserved in the second mortgage was rupee one per cent, per mensem with six monthly rests. After the death of the Raja, the properties left by him were inherited by Rani Jassa Kunwar, as a Hindu widow. On 18th March, 1931 Sahu Gulab Das and others filed a suit (No. 21 of 1931 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Moradabad), for the realisation of the amount due under the mortgage. The total claim was for Rs. 58,626-6-0. The Rani contested the suit on various grounds, which it is not necessary to set out here, but the suit was ultimately decreed on 28th April, 1931 and a preliminary decree for Rs. 64,160-0-3 was passed in favour of the plaintiffs. Under the decree this amount was payable by 28th day of October 1931 and in default the decree-holder was entitled to apply for a final decree for sale. The decree carried, future interest at the rate of six per cent per annum until realisation. The Rani made certain payments and from time to time filed applications for postponement of the preparation of the final decree on the ground that she was arranging to pay the decretal amount. Only one of such applications dated 9th April, 1932, has been included in our printed record at p. 51. In this application she mentioned that she was prepared to pay a sum of Rs. 6000 by the month of June 1932 and prayed that further time be granted taller for payment of the balance by instalments. The reason given, for her inability to pay, was the slump in prices of grain and scanty produce. Ultimately, however; no further extension was granted and the final decree was prepared on 5th January 1933. This final decree was for only Rs. 53,761 as some payments had been made after the preliminary decree. Having failed to gain any further time from Court, the case of the creditors is, that the Rani approached the creditors through her manager, Tika Earn, and on 12th January, 1933 the mortgage deed, now in question, was executed for Rs. 53,761. It would be noticed that it was for the exact amount due under the decree which had been passed on 5th January, 1933. The mortgage carried interest at ten annas per cent, per mensem with half yearly rests. The Rani in her deposition admitted that she had expected that she would be able to pay up this bond from the income of the property and it was therefore that she executed this fresh mortgage. It is clear that the Rani was doing her best to save the property from being sold and after she had failed to get further time from the Court she executed this mortgage so that her property might be saved and in the meantime it might be possible for her to pay up the amount from the income of the property.

2. On 5th September, 1936, Rani Jassa Kunwar filed an application under Section 4 of the Encumbered Estates Act, before the Collector of Aligarh. In that application she mentioned the amounts due under the mortgages executed by her husband, and then added a note that the creditors had on the basis of those mortgages, filed a suit and obtained a decree and that they had on 12th January, 1933 obtained a mortgage from her, a purdahnashin woman, by exercise of undue influence. The case was in due course sent to the learned Special Judge, First Grade, Aligarh, and the applicant, Rani Jassa Kunwar, filed a written statement before him under Section 8 of the Encumbered Estates Act, on 21st October 1936. In this written statement she followed the same procedure, that is, she mentioned the mortgage deeds executed by her husband, and then added a note that on the basis of those mortgages the creditors had obtained a decree against her and then, by exercise of undue influence, had obtained from her the mortgage dated 12th January, 1933. Sahu Gulab Das, the mortgagee, died on 19th December, 1936, leaving four sons and a widow. A written statement was filed on their behalf on 2nd February, 1937 in which they claimed that the mortgage dated 12th January, 1933 was duly executed after mature deliberation and after consultation with her well wishers and Rani Jassa Kunwar was not entitled to go behind the same. They claimed that a sum of Rs. 70,331-12-9 was due to them up to 5th September, 1936, on which date the Rani had filed her application under Section 4 of the Encumbered Estates Act, before the Collector of Aligarh. They also claimed pendente lite and future interest on this sum from 5th September, 1936. The learned Special Judge on 14th July, 1941 held against the applicant that the deed was obtained from her by undue influence and decreed the claim of Sahu Narain Das and others for Rupees 70,360-18-6, with pendente lite and future interest at 3 per cent, per annum till realisation.

3. Against that decree this appeal was filed by Rani Jassa Kunwar and by her two nephews (brother's sons), Subedar Singh and Ganesh Singh. Ganesh Singh having died during the pendency of this appeal the names of his sons were substituted. Subedar Singh and Ganesh Singh claimed that they were secured creditors under a mortgage dated 20th June, 1931. Their names were included in the list of creditors in the application filed on behalf of the Rani under S. 4 as well as under Section 8 of the Encumbered Estates Act. They, however, did not put in their claim under Section 10 of the Encumbered Estates Act, till 23rd March, 1938, long after the time for making such claims had expired. They claimed a sum of Rs. 13,548 as due to them under the mortgage deed dated 20th June, 1931. Sahu Narain Das and others representatives of Gulab, deceased, filed an objection, on 22nd September, 1938, that the claim not having been filed within time must now he rejected. On 9th August, 1940 the learned Special Judge passed an order condoning the delay, conditional on payment of Rs. 100 as damages to the pleader for the opposite party. This amount was paid on 24th August, 1940 and it must be held that it was on that date that the claim of these creditors was actually registered. On 19th October, 1940 the learned Special Judge recorded the statement of the pleaders for Subedar Singh and Ganesh Singh on one side and the pleader for Rani Jassa Kunwar on the other, and on the basis of those statements passed a decree for Rs. 12,756 in favour of Subedar Singh and Ganesh Singh with pendente lite and future interest at 3 per cent, per annum till the date of realisation. On behalf of the Rani the only plea urged by her counsel, Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, is that the mortgage deed was executed under undue influence and was, therefore, not binding on her. Subedar Singh and Ganesh Singh's legal representatives were represented before us by Mr. Pears Lal Banerji who raised the point on their behalf that the execution of the mortgage deed was not proved according to law as against them. The case of Rani Jassa Kunwar was that the suggestion for the execution of the mortgage dated 12th January, 1933 came from the creditors and they threatened her that in case she did not care to execute a fresh mortgage they would sell up the property in execution of the mortgage decree. It is said that the Rani got frightened by this threat and she had no opportunity of taking independent advice and the advice given by Tika Ram was also rejected by her and she insisted on executing the mortgage by reason of the fear that she had of the forced sale. On behalf of the creditors, Narain Das and others, it has been suggested that the proposal for the mortgage came from the Rani and they consented to the mortgage, so that she might have an opportunity of paying up the decree from the income of the property. I have carefully considered all the facts and circumstances and have come to the conclusion that the proposal for the fresh mortgage came from the side of the Rani. From the recital of facts made above, it would appear that the preliminary decree for Rs. 64,000 and odd was passed on 28th April, 1931 and the amount due under the decree was payable by 28th October, 1931. It is admitted that the Rani made certain payments from time to time and got the preparation of the final decree postponed till about 5th January, 1933. By that time she had paid about Rs. 13,000. Not being able to get further adjournment from Court, it was but natural that the creditors Should be approached with the proposal for a fresh arrangement. Looking at the contents of the deed dated 12th January, 1933 I find that the position of the Rani was not much altered by this mortgage. The mortgagees were getting as security the same property which was included in the previous mortgages executed by Raja Sheoraj Singh and which was included in the decree for sale under O. 34, R. 5 of the CPC. Under the decree the rate of future interest was 6 per cent, per annum simple, while under the mortgage deed the rate was 10 annas per cent, per mensem with six monthly rests. According to the rate of interest prevailing in this country in the year 1933, this rate of interest must be considered to be quite reasonable and was only slightly higher than the interest payable under the decree.

4. Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru has cited before us several cases of the Privy Council in support of the proposition that it is for the creditor to prove to the satisfaction of the Court that a mortgage executed by a purdahnashin woman was executed by her after fully understanding its contents and after being fully aware of her rights. The first case cited by him was the case in 47 ALL. 7031 and he relied on a passage at pp. 710 and 711. The next case was 67 I.A 3772. The other cases were 1940 A.L.J 7333, 1939 A.L.J 4734 and A.I.R 1938 P.C 2765. It is not necessary for us to consider these cases in detail. The law must now be deemed to be well settled that it is for a creditor who relies on a document executed by a purdalmashin woman to prove, to the satisfaction of the Court, that she clearly understood the nature of the transaction; it must be her mental act, as its execution is her physical act. If the Court from all the facts and circumstances is satisfied that the document was executed by a purdahnashin woman after fully understanding her rights, then she must be deemed to be bound by the same. After having carefully considered the contents of the deed, the circumstances under which it was executed and the evidence given by Rani Jassa Kunwar and the other evidence on the record, I have come to the conclusion that the Rani was fully aware of her rights and it was in the best interest and for the protection of the estate that she executed the mortgage dated 12th January, 1938. She had the advice of her manager, Tika Earn, who is an attesting witness to the deed, and the deed is also signed by Lal Singh, son of Ganesh Singh, her brother.

5. Some reliance was placed on behalf of the appellant on the evidence of Rani Jassa Kunwar and Tika Ram that the creditors at first suggested that the mortgage-deed should be executed for a sum of Rs. 60,000 and the Rani had, therefore, got purchased necessary stamps for Rs. 370 on 11th January, 1933 but at the time of execution the creditors insisted on the mortgage being executed for the entire decretal amount of Rs. 53,761 and further stamps for Rs. 33-12-0 were then purchased. This fact is denied on behalf of the creditors by Ram Lal. The fact that stamps for Rs. 370 were purchased on 11th January and then stamps for Rs. 83-12-0 were purchased the next day appears from the stamps on which the mortgage-deed itself is engrossed. (It has not been shown to us, however, that for execution of a mortgage for Rs. 50,000 stamps for Rs. 870 only were needed.) It may be that the Rani at first hoped that she would be able to persuade the creditors to accept Rs. 50,000 in full payment of Rs. 53,761 due under the decree and had, therefore, purchased stamps for only Rs. 870 on 11th January and when on the next day the creditors refused to forgo any amount she had stamps for Rs. 33-12-0 more purchased, or it may be that the stamp vendor did not have the requisite amount of stamps on 11th January and therefore supplied the balance on the 12th. There is no reason, however, to suppose that the creditors ever agreed to give up Rs. 3,761. The story that the creditors had agreed to give up Rs. 3,761 goes against the case of the appellant that it was they who approached the Rani with the proposal for a fresh mortgage under a threat that if she did not agree to it, they would sell up the property in execution of the decree. I feel satisfied that the mortgage-deed was duly executed by the appellant and she is bound by the same. The question of its due execution was not raised before us on behalf of the Rani. It was, however, raised here by Subedar Singh and Ganesh Singh, the other two appellants. According to them it was necessary for the respondents to have proved the due execution of the mortgage as against them, they not having admitted the mortgage. Mr. Peare Lal Banerji on behalf of these appellants has argued that his clients are also interested, inasmuch as under the Encumbered Estates Act the Court has not only to pass a simple money-decree against the debtor but also to rank all debts for priority and a secured creditor is entitled to priority as against an unsecured creditor. According to him his clients alone are entitled to be put in the list of secured creditors, while the respondents must be deemed to be unsecured creditors as they have failed to prove their mortgage.

6. It is true that the proceedings under the Encumbered Estates Act are proceedings not only between the landlord applicant on one side and each creditor on the other, tut the creditors inter se are also interested in their claims as it may affect their rights in the final distribution of the assets by the Collector. Under the Encumbered Estates Act, after payment of certain debts which have been given special priority, the secured creditors have priority over the unsecured creditors. Irrespective of the question as to what property is included in the mortgage, all the secured creditors are put in one group and are entitled to have their claims satisfied out of the entire property of the landlord applicant and whatever is left is available to the unsecured creditors to satisfy their debts. Where property is insufficient to satisfy the claims of all the secured creditors, their rights are affected by inclusion, in their class, of creditors who are not secured and who should rightly be included in the last group in order of priority, that is, of unsecured creditors. The creditors, however, do not always dispute the claims of each other and it is only sometimes that they file objections. We have already seen that the respondents Narain Das and others filed objeetions to the claim of Subedar Singh and Ganesh Singh on the ground that the claim was time-barred. From the record, it does not appear that Subedar Singh and Ganesh Singh ever filed any objection to the claim put forward by Narain Das and others. The learned Special Judge framed the first set of issues on 22nd September, 1938. Subedar Singh and Ganesh Singh had filed their written statement on 23rd March, 1938. In their written statement, which is at p. 85, nothing is said against the claim of Narain Das and others, nor does it appear that they ever filed any objections, before the learned Special Judge, to the claim of Narain Das and others. On 9th December, 1938, for some reason which does not appear from the record, a second set of issues were again framed and a new issue which was the first issue was, whether the mortgage bond dated 12th January, 1933 was duly executed for consideration. On 10th May, 1939 the landlord applicant filed an application that the evidence of the parties may first be taken only with reference to this first issue before she was asked to produce evidence on the other issues. This application was granted and 29th May, 1939 was fixed for hearing of this issue. Before that date, however, the Presiding Officer had been transferred and the new Special Judge found on the record two sets of issues, one set framed on 22nd September, 1938 by Mr. Childayal and a Second set of issues framed on 9th Deeepiber 1938 by his successor. Mr. Hardeo Singh, Special Judge, before whom the case came up on 29th May, 1939 held that it was unnecessary to have two sets of issues and redrafted the same. On the pleadings before him he found that the issue 1 struck on 9th December, 1938 which was in these words “whether the mortgage bond dated 12th January, 1933 was duly executed for consideration” was unnecessary and struck it out and allowed only three issues to remain which were as follows:

“(1) Whether the claim of Subedar Singh and Ganesh Singh is time-barred and whether Sahu Narain Das and others (creditors No. 1) could raise this plea?

(2) Whether any undue influence was exercised on Rani Jassa Kunwar by creditor No. 1 as regards the execution of the mortgage-deed dated 12th January, 1933?

(3) What debts, if any, are due to each set of creditors and how are those debts to be ranked?”

7. On 14th September, 1939 an application was filed on behalf of Rani Jassa Kunwar that notice of her application had not been sent to Mt. Manno, widow of Gobind Das, and it was necessary to send a separate notice to her. Sahu Narain Das and others filed an objection to this application on 2nd January, 1940 in which they said that Mt. Manno had no right as her husband, Govind Das, had died as a member of a joint Hindu family. The Rani's statement was recorded on 14th April, 1940 on commission. On 6th August, 1940, another application was filed on behalf of Rani Jassa Kunwar that Mt. Manno was a necessary party to the proceedings and her name must be added. No final orders were, however, passed on this application and the evidence of Tika Ram was recorded on 19th August. While Ram Lal, a witness for the creditor-respondents, was in the witness-box, the attention of the Court was drawn to this application of 6th August, 1940 and the Court adjourned the case and gave permission to Rani Jassa Kunwar to file an amended written statement, evidently with respect to her case that Mt. Manno had also an interest in the mortgage. On 18th October, 1940, Rani Jassa Kunwar filed an amended written statement in which she alleged that Mt. Manno Kunwar was entitled to a one-sixteenth share in this mortgage and she not having put in a claim within time, the other defendants were not entitled to more than fifteen-sixteenths. She added further a plea in this written statement, that the mortgage deed was not duly executed and completed. After this amended written statement was filed, the learned Special Judge added a fourth issue in these words:

“Whether the husband of Mt. Manno Kuer died separated from his father and brothers and so Manno is entitled to a fifth share in the mortgage debt?”

8. The evidence in the case was concluded on 19th October, 1940 and the judgment was delivered on 14th July, 1941. At the trial before the learned Special Judge, the mortgage deed was put to Tika Ram, a witness for the Rani and an attesting witness to the deed, who said “Mt. Jasso Kunwar executed mortgage, Ex. A-1 dated 12th January, 1933.” The witness identified thumb-mark of the lady and his signature. Ram Lal, an attesting witness to the mortgage, who was produced on behalf of the mortgagees, said, “When the deed was complete Jassa Kunwar affixed thumb-mark and then we attested. I am a blind man for two or three years.” Mr. Peare Lal Banerji has argued that the evidence of Tika Ram and Ram Lal, even if accepted, does not prove the due attestation of the mortgage according to law. Unfortunately the system of keeping a double record has been ‘discontinued in this province, and all that we have before us is the Judge's notes of evidence. The learned Special Judge has not recorded the statement of witnesses in full but has only made brief notes of the same from which it is difficult to find out what the witnesses had actually said. The learned Special Judge had, as we have already said, struck out the issue framed by his predecessor, as regards the execution of the mortgage deed, on the ground that the issue was unnecessary. Learned counsel for the opposite party has relied on the fact that Rani Jassa Kunwar, in her application filed under S. 4 and her written statement filed under Section 8 of the Act, had admitted the mortgage and the only plea raised on her behalf was that the mortgage was executed under undue influence. It was, therefore, argued that the learned Special Judge had rightly struck out issue 1 specially as the appellants, other than Jassa Kunwar, had never entered any defence and had not contested the claim of the respondents, while Rani Jassa Kunwar had admitted the execution of the mortgage. We carefully went through not only the printed record but the manuscript record also, and Mr. Banerji appearing on behalf of the appellants was not able to point put to us any paper from which it would appear that his clients had ever filed any objection or shown any interest in these proceedings between Rani Jassa Kunwar and Narain Das and others.

9. If a document is filed in Court, unless it is admitted by the other side under orders 12 and 13 of the CPC, the party producing the document has to prove it according to law. In the case of documents, other than documents which the law requires to be attested, a person producing such document has, when he alleges that the document bears the signature or has been written wholly or in part by any person, to prove his allegations unless those allegations are admitted by the other side: see Section 67 of the Evidence Act. There is no special mode of proof prescribed, the signature or the handwriting may be proved by the production of persons who have means of knowing the signature or the handwriting or by production of experts or by comparison with the admitted signature or handwriting of the executant. In the case of documents required by law to be attested, not only the signature has to be proved but it has to be proved that the document was duly attested. There are, however, two exceptions to this rule. Under Section 70 of the Evidence Act, if execution is admitted by the executant of the deed it is not necessary, as against him, to prove attestation. The other exception is in Section 69 of the Evidence Act, that if no such attesting witness can be found or if the document was executed in the United Kingdom it is only necessary to prove the signature of the executant and that the attestation of at least one attesting witness is in his handwriting. If I may, with great diffidence, say so, the words “can be found” are not very appropriate and, to my mind, they must be interpreted to include not only cases where the witness cannot be produced because he cannot be traced but cases where-the witness for reasons of physical or mental disability or for other reasons, which the Court considers sufficient, is no longer a competent witness for the purpose as is provided in Section 68 of the Evidence Act. The law requires one more formality that a document required by law to be attested shall not be admitted in evidence until one attesting witness, at least, has been called for proving its execution provided there be such a witness alive and subject to the process of the Court and capable of giving evidence (Section 63 of the Evidence Act). The word “execution” must of course include attestation as required by law. If, however, the document was registered and its execution was not specifically denied it is not necessary to call an attesting witness.

10. In this case Rani Jassa Kunwar had admitted execution of the mortgage-deed and it was, therefore, not necessary to prove attestation against her. The document was a registered document, and its execution was not specifically denied by any person and so it was not necessary to call an attesting witness. Two attesting witnesses, however, Tika Ram and Ram Lal, were produced who gave evidence proving not only that the applicant signed the deed but that they had affixed their signatures by way of attestation. The deed itself on the face of it, bears the attestation of three attesting witnesses Lal Singh, Tika Ram and Hub Lal who have noted, either that the applicant signed in their presence or acknowledged her signature and they attested the deed in her presence and in the presence of each other. I feel perfectly satisfied that the deed has been duly proved.

11. If the other appellants Subedar Singh and Ganesh Singh had appeared in the trial Court and had objected to this document being taken in evidence without further proof, we have no doubt that the respondents could have given further evidence of the due execution of this document, as there were as many as nine attesting witnesses to the deed.

12. From the record it does not appear that they ever raised any such point in the Court below or appeared at any stage before the trial Court to contest the mortgage in favour of Narain Das and others. In this view of the matter we do not feel disposed to allow Subedar Singh and Ganesh Singh to raise this new point before us. Mr. Banerji on their behalf argued that he has objection to the respondents being put in the list of secured creditors along with his clients who were the only other secured creditors. From the record it appears, however, that Subedar Singh and Ganesh Singh produced no evidence to prove the deed in their favour. The decree in their favour was passed merely bn the admission of the pleader for Rani Jassa Kunwar that Rs. 12,766 were due to them up to 5th September, 1936. If we had allowed this point to be raised on behalf of the appellants, we would have been bound, in all fairness, to allow this point to be raised on behalf of Narain Das and others that the mortgage deed of Subedar Singh and Ganesh Singh was also not proved according to law and they were also not secured creditors. In that case, the position would again be the same, that both the creditor-appellants and the creditor-respondents would be placed in the same class. After considering the entire evidence and the materials in the case, I am satisfied that the mortgage-deed has been duly proved and the decree passed by the lower Court must be affirmed. I would, therefore, dismiss this appeal with costs.

13. Bennett, J.:— I agree that for the reasons given by my learned brother there is no force in this appeal and that it should be dismissed with costs.

14. Appeal dismissed.