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Abdul Haq v. Muhammad Hashim

Allahabad High Court
Mar 29, 1945
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Factual and Procedural Background

The matter arises from a suit for possession of a house standing on plot No. 146 in the abadi of mauza Chail. The plaintiff alleged he was one of the zamindars (co-sharers) of the plot by virtue of a deed of exchange dated 6 July 1934 obtained from Muhammad Arkan, that the original occupiers (Mst. Latifan and Jamal) abandoned the house, and that the defendants' possession (having purchased from Ali Abbas) was illegal; alternatively, the plaintiff sought possession of the site after demolition and removal of materials.

The defendants' pleaded history traced the title of plot No. 146 to an earlier private partition (1905) among the sons of Abdul Ghani in which the disputed plot was allotted to Muhammad Ghaus; subsequent sales and successions led to Ali Abbas purchasing the house shares in 1932 and then selling the house to the defendants (Abdul Haq and Siraj-ul Haq) in 1936, who rebuilt the house with permission of Mst. Salam-un-nissa (said to be sole zamindar by virtue of sale to Muhammad Baqar and succession).

The trial court (court of first instance) found (1) Muhammad Arkan had no interest in plot No. 146 and thus plaintiff was not a co-sharer; (2) the village was agricultural and there was no custom to transfer houses with sites so defendants acquired only the materials; and (3) the plaintiff was estopped; the suit was dismissed with costs.

The lower appellate court reversed: it found the abadi remained joint, the plaintiff became a co-sharer by transfer from Muhammad Arkan and could maintain the suit, the defendants could not lawfully remain in possession, and estoppel did not bar the claim — decree for possession and removal of materials (six months) was granted.

The defendants appealed to this Court. A single Judge of this Court concluded that partition chitthas (partition lists) had been wrongly excluded at an earlier stage and remitted three issues to the lower appellate court for fresh findings (parties allowed to adduce further evidence). After remand the lower appellate court made findings (including that plot No. 146 was allotted to Muhammad Ghaus in the 1905 private partition), objections under Order XLI Rule 26 CPC were filed, and the case was referred to a Bench of two Judges for final hearing.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether plot No. 146 was privately partitioned in 1905 and allotted exclusively to Muhammad Ghaus, thereby extinguishing any interest of Muhammad Arkan or other co-sharers.
  2. Whether, by virtue of the deed of exchange dated 6 July 1934 from Muhammad Arkan, the plaintiff became a co-sharer in the patti and thus had locus standi to sue for possession of plot No. 146.
  3. Whether the partition chitthas (phatbandi/partition lists) were admissible in evidence despite not being registered and, if inadmissible for proving partition, whether they could be used as collateral evidence or to explain possession (in light of the proviso to section 49 Registration Act and section 53A Transfer of Property Act).
  4. Whether the defendants, having purchased the house from Ali Abbas and reconstructed it with permission of Mst. Salam-un-nissa, had lawful possession of the house/site.
  5. Whether the plaintiff's suit was barred by estoppel.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Defendants') Arguments

  • Plot No. 146 originally belonged to patti Abdul Ghani (now patti Ikram Ullah) and in 1905 the abadi was partitioned among Abdul Ghani's five sons; plot No. 146 was allotted to Muhammad Ghaus.
  • As a result, Muhammad Jan or his son Muhammad Arkan had no concern with plot No. 146 and therefore could not lawfully effect an exchange in favour of the plaintiff.
  • On 20 January 1917 execution sale transferred property (including plot No. 146) to Muhammad Baqar; upon his death his widow Mst. Salam-un-nissa became owner — she was the sole zamindar of plot No. 146.
  • The house had passed, by succession and sales, to Ali Abbas who sold it to the defendants in November 1936; the defendants rebuilt the house with Salam-un-nissa's permission and thus had a right to maintain it on the plot.
  • The lower appellate court erred legally in holding (a) the abadi was not privately partitioned or (b) that Muhammad Arkan retained any interest in plot No. 146; the partition chitthas that proved private partition had been wrongly excluded at an earlier stage and should be admitted.
  • The defendants relied on case law (Uddab Nath; Kshetra Mohan; Nur Mohammad; Ganesh Das) to support that partition lists may be mere memoranda not requiring registration and therefore admissible.
  • Estoppel and the absence of any customary right to transfer houses with sites in the village were asserted in earlier stages (trial court findings), supporting defendants' position that plaintiff's claim should fail.

Respondent's (Plaintiff's) Arguments

  • The plaintiff claimed to be a co-sharer in plot No. 146 by virtue of the deed of exchange dated 6 July 1934 from Muhammad Arkan, and therefore entitled to sue for possession.
  • The plaintiff challenged the admissibility of the partition chitthas, relying on Nepal Rai v. Paras Ram Dube where a phatbandi which was a formal document purporting to declare rights was held to require registration under section 17(b) Registration Act and, being unregistered, inadmissible.
  • The plaintiff contended the lower appellate court's finding recognizing Muhammad Arkan's right (even if "shadowy") and thereby the plaintiff's title to sue was vitiated in law and should not stand.
  • More generally, the respondent sought to re-open the question of admissibility of partition chitthas despite the single Judge's remand ruling that they were wrongly excluded.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Hawal Rai v. Har Prasad Private partition effected by agreement is valid; it ends joint ownership though it may be difficult to prove; difference from court partition is evidentiary (village records may differ). The Court relied on this authority to hold that a private partition of 1905 which allotted plot No. 146 to Muhammad Ghaus extinguished any interest of other co-sharers in that plot.
Nepal Rai v. Paras Ram Dube Where a phatbandi is a formal document purporting to declare rights in specific plots and signed by parties, it requires registration under section 17(b) Registration Act and, if unregistered, is inadmissible. The respondent invoked this case to challenge admissibility of partition chitthas; the Court examined and distinguished the phatbandi in that case from the present chitthas and did not follow Nepal Rai on the facts here.
Uddab Nath v. Gokul Chandra A butwara chittha that is merely a list of shares and not itself a deed of partition is only a memorandum and does not require registration to be admissible. The appellants relied on this decision to support admissibility; the Court cited it among the authorities showing that whether a partition list requires registration depends on its character.
Kshetra Mohan v. Tufani Talukdar A mere partition list is a memorandum and does not require registration; whether a document is a deed of partition must be decided by perusal of the document itself. The Court used the principle to emphasize that admissibility depends on the contents and nature of each partition chittha; the present chitthas were found to be memoranda.
Nur Mohammad v. Amir Where an application to a Revenue Officer recited compromise terms and asked partition to be given effect, the document was not an instrument effecting partition and did not require registration. Cited to support the proposition that not all partition-related documents are deeds requiring registration; used to justify admissibility of the present chitthas if they are of similar character.
Ganesh Das v. Kanthu Whether a document falls within section 17(1)(b) Registration Act must be decided by perusal of the document; rulings on other documents not identical in character are not a safe guide. Applied to underline that admissibility of the partition chitthas must be decided by examining their specific wording and nature; the Court examined the chitthas and concluded they were memoranda.
Varada Pillai v. Jeevarathnammal (Privy Council) Documents not admissible to prove a particular transaction (e.g., gift) may nevertheless be referred to as explaining the nature and character of subsequent possession; supports collateral use of unregistered documents. The Court invoked this authority to justify that even if partition chitthas required registration and were inadmissible to prove partition formally, they could still be used as collateral evidence to explain the title and possession of Salam-un-nissa and Muhammad Arkan.
Secretary of State v. Debendra Lal Khan; Shankri v. Milkha Singh; Vishwanath Haibatrao Deshpande v. Ranganath Dhondo High Courts have held that documents requiring registration but unregistered may nevertheless be admissible to prove the character of possession of the person who holds under them (collateral evidence principle). The Court cited these High Court authorities to support the use of partition chitthas as evidence of the character of possession, reinforcing the view that the chitthas could be considered even if unregistered.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by (i) assessing the remand findings and (ii) applying legal principles about private partition and admissibility of partition documents to the facts.

  1. The Court accepted the lower appellate court's post-remand factual finding that the abadi of patti Abdul Ghani (patti Ikram Ullah) was privately partitioned in 1905 and that plot No. 146 (a shikmi plot) was allotted to the share of Muhammad Ghaus. The finding also showed the partition had been acted upon by co-sharers.
  2. The Court analyzed the legal effect of a private partition: relying on Hawal Rai v. Har Prasad and its consistent followings, the Court held that a partition once effected, whether by private arrangement or court order, ends joint ownership and makes the allotted parcels absolutely distinct in law; other co-sharers retain no interest in the parcel allotted to a particular co-sharer.
  3. Given the above, the Court reasoned that if plot No. 146 fell to Muhammad Ghaus in 1905, no vestige of interest could remain in other co-sharers; hence Muhammad Arkan could not have retained any interest in plot No. 146 that would permit him to transfer it to the plaintiff in 1934. The Court found the lower Judge's contrary conclusion (that Arkan had a "shadowy" right) to be legally erroneous.
  4. The Court then addressed the admissibility of the partition chitthas. It reviewed authorities on whether partition lists/phatbandis require registration under section 17(1)(b) Registration Act. The Court observed that the question depends on the nature and wording of the particular document: some phatbandis are formal documents purporting to declare rights and thus require registration (Nepal Rai), whereas many partition lists are mere memoranda (Uddab Nath; Kshetra Mohan; Nur Mohammad; Ganesh Das).
  5. Upon examining the partition chitthas in the present case, the Court concluded they were memoranda listing shares allotted at partition, signed to authenticate the lists, but not constituting a deed of partition. Accordingly, they did not fall within section 17(1)(b) and did not require registration.
  6. The Court added that even if, arguendo, the chitthas were documents effecting partition and thus inadmissible for lack of registration, they could still be used as evidence of a collateral transaction or to explain the character of possession under the proviso to section 49 Registration Act — a principle supported by Varada Pillai (Privy Council) and various High Court decisions.
  7. Applying these conclusions, the Court held the partition chitthas were properly considered by the lower appellate court in finding that plot No. 146 belonged to Muhammad Ghaus (and ultimately that Mst. Salam-un-nissa was sole zamindar of the plot). Because Salam-un-nissa gave permission to the defendants to reconstruct their house, the defendants could lawfully maintain the house on plot No. 146; no other co-sharer had locus to object.
  8. In light of these findings, the Court found the lower appellate court's decree in favour of the plaintiff to be unsustainable and proceeded to allow the defendants' second appeal.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is allowed. The decree of the lower appellate court in favour of the plaintiff is set aside and the decree of the court of first instance (dismissing the suit) is restored, with costs throughout.

Implications:

  • The Court held that the private partition of 1905 which allotted plot No. 146 to Muhammad Ghaus extinguished any interest of other co-sharers in that plot; consequently the plaintiff had no title or interest in plot No. 146 and lacked a right to the relief granted by the lower appellate court.
  • Mst. Salam-un-nissa, as sole zamindar (by succession from Muhammad Baqar), had authority to permit reconstruction; the defendants lawfully maintain the house on plot No. 146 with her permission.
  • The partition chitthas in this case were admissible as memoranda (and, in any event, could be used collaterally to explain possession), and their consideration by the lower appellate court was proper.
  • No new broad precedent beyond application of existing principles on private partition and admissibility of partition lists was created; the decision applies those settled principles to the facts and directly affects the parties by restoring the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's suit and awarding costs to the defendants.
Show all summary ...

Wali-ullah, J.:— This is a defendant's appeal arising out of a suit for possession of a house situate on a plot of land No. 146 of the abadi of mauza Chail. The plaintiff's case was that he was one of the zamindars of the plot in suit; that originally the house stood on it and it belonged to Mst. Latifan and to one Jamal; that these persons abandoned the house and left the village. The house consequently reverted to the zamindars as Chail village is an agricultural village. It was further alleged in the plaint that the defendants' possession over the house after its purchase from Ali Abbas was illegal and without any right. In the alternative, the relief sought was for possession over the site of the house after its demolition and removal of the materials thereof. The plaintiff claimed to be one of the co-sharers in the plot in question—which is situate in patti Ikram Ullah in mahal Fazila Bibi—by reason of a deed of exchange dated 6th of July, 1934, obtained by the plaintiff from one Muhammad Arkan. The defendants contested the suit on various grounds. Their case was that plot No. 146 originally stood in patti Abdul Ghani (now patti Ikram Ullah) and that the entire abadi of patti Abdul Ghani which belonged to Abdul Ghani was partitioned among his five sons including two named Muhammad Ghaus and Muhammad Jan in the year 1905 and that the disputed land was allotted to Muhammad Ghaus. Muhammad Jan or his son Muhammad Arkan had no concern whatsoever with this plot of land. On 20th January, 1917, in execution of a decree against Muhammad Ghaus some property of Muhammad Ghaus, including the disputed abadi plot No. 146, was sold to Muhammad Baqar vide sale certificate Ex. A dated 12th of December, 1918. On the death of Muhammad Baqar his widow Mst. Salam-un-nissa became owner of the plot in question. On the plot in suit one Jahangir, a riyaya in the village, had a house. Jahangir died leaving two sons, Roshan and Abdul. Roshan died leaving a son Jamal and Abdul died leaving a son Ali Raza and a daughter Mst. Latifan. Ali Raza also died leaving a daughter Mst. Soghra. The house of Jahangir came to be owned by these three persons, namely Mst. Latifan; Mst. Soghra and Jamal, and these three persons sold their shares in it to Ali Abbas in the months of April and June, 1932. Thus Ali Abbas became owner of the house which stood on the abadi plot No. 146. On 18th November, 1936, Ali Abbas sold the house in question to the two defendants, Abdul Haq and Siraj-ul Haq, who are own brothers. The defendants thereafter rebuilt the house on this site after obtaining the permission of Mst. Salam-un-nissa who was the sole zamindar of the site No. 146. In view of these facts it was contended by the defendants that the plaintiff was not a co-sharer in plot No. 146 as he claimed; that the village Chail was not an agricultural village and there was a custom in the village under which the occupiers of houses in it had a right to transfer their houses along with their sites; and that the suit was barred by estoppel. The court of first instance came to these findings:

(1) Muhammad Arkan had no interest in plot No. 146 and he had no right to effect an exchange with the plaintiff. Consequently the plaintiff was not a zamindar in plot No. 146 in patti Ikram Ullah.

(2) That the village was an agricultural one and that there was no customary right in the village under which the occupiers of houses could transfer their houses along with the sites. The defendants by reason of their purchase, therefore, became owners of the materials only.

(3) Lastly it was held that the plaintiff, was estopped from bringing the present suit.

In view of these findings the suit was dismissed with costs.

On appeal the learned Civil Judge found that the abadi of the village remained joint and that no private partition was established. He further found that the plaintiff on obtaining the transfer from Muhammad Arkan became a co-sharer in patti Ikram Ullah and he could consequently maintain the suit. He affirmed the finding of the court of first instance to the effect that the defendants as transferees of the house in question could not legally remain in possession thereof. The plaintiff's claim was not barred by estoppel. In view of these findings the appeal was allowed and the suit for possession of the site was decreed and the defendants were directed to remove the materials of the house within six months.

The defendants came up in second appeal to this Court. The appeal came on for hearing before a learned single Judge and it was strongly contended before him that the findings of the lower appellate court both on the question of the private partition of the abadi as well as on the question of plaintiff's right to sue were legally incorrect. It was strongly contended that the partition chitthas which constituted the most valuable documents in proof of private partition had been wrongly excluded as inadmissible by the lower appellate court. After hearing the matter at some length it appears that the learned Judge arrived at the conclusion that the partition chitthas had been wrongly excluded from the evidence and that the question of the partition of the abadi as well as the question of plaintiff's title to sue had not been properly tried by the lower appellate court and he remitted three issues to the lower appellate court for findings. Parties were given a chance to adduce fresh evidence if they so desired. This was on the 23rd of September, 1941. In pursuance of this order the lower appellate court submitted its findings on the three issues remitted. Parties filed objections to these findings under order XLI, rule 26 of the Code of Civil Procedure. When the matter came up finally for disposal before the learned Judge he passed an order on the 26th of October, 1942, referring the case to a Bench of two Judges.

The matter is now before us for final hearing.

After the order of remand the lower appellate court recorded a definite finding that the abadi of patti Abdul Ghani (patti Ikram Ullah) in which plot No. 146 falls was divided among the co-sharers in 1905 and various partition chitthas were prepared in respect of the same and that shikmi plot No. 146 was allotted to the share of Muhammad Ghaus. He also definitely held that this partition had been acted, upon by different co-sharers in the patti. Curiously enough, however, after recording this finding the learned Judge went on and recorded another finding on the next issue remitted and it was to the effect that Muhammad Arkan had some sort of a right in the patti as a co-sharer and also some right in plot No. 146—“no doubt only shadowy”—and he could, therefore transfer it to the plaintiff by means of a deed of exchange; the plaintiff had accordingly become a co-sharer in the patti and thus he had a right to bring the present suit for ejecting the defendants and getting exclusive possession from them. As mentioned above, both the appellants as well as the respondent have filed objections against these findings. Learned counsel for the appellant has strongly contended that the finding of the lower appellate court that Muhammad Arkan retained any interest in plot No. 146 is entirely erroneous and that in any case in view of the definite finding that plot No. 146 was exclusively allotted to Muhammad Ghaus in the private partition of 1905 Muhammad Arkan could not possibly be deemed to have got any interest in plot No. 146. Accordingly, it is contended, it follows, that the plaintiff by reason of the exchange of July, 1934, could not become a co-sharer in this plot. We have heard learned counsel for the parties on this question and I am quite clear in my mind that this finding by the learned Civil Judge is entirely erroneous. The learned Judge seems to have been under the impression that inasmuch as the private partition of 1905 was not followed up by any proceedings for effecting a perfect partition through the revenue court the co-sharers in the patti in which plot No. 146 is situate would continue to have an interest in this plot jointly with Muhammad Ghaus or his successors-in-interest. This is entirely a wrong conception of the law. Partition once effected either through court or by private treaty puts an end to the joint ownership of the paries. Thenceforward the parcels of land allotted to different co-sharers are absolutely distinct in the eye of law and one has nothing whatsoever to do with the other. A Bench of the learned Judges of this Court in Hawal Rai v. Har Prasad(1) has observed:

“It will hardly be contested that the co-sharers in a mahal have a right to effect a partition by private arrangement amongst themselves, and that it may be the most convenient method of effecting such a partition to assign the entire holding of a particular tenant to a particular group of co-sharers. The only difference between a partition effected by private arrangement and one properly carried out under the orders of the court is that the incidents of the private partition are difficult to prove, and that confusion and litigation may arise afterwards owing to the preparation of village records which are at variance with the actual facts. We cannot, however, in this case allow the clear finding of the lower appellate court in favour of the plaintiffs on this question of partition to be disregarded.”

This ruling has been recently followed on several occasions by Benches of two learned Judges of this Court. It is, therefore, perfectly clear that if once it is established that by a private partition plot No. 146 fell into the qura (or lot) of Muhammad Ghaus there can be no vestige of interest left in this plot as far as the other co-sharers are concerned.

Reverting to the finding by the learned Judge chat the abadi of patti Abdul Ghani was privately partitioned among its co-sharers in 1905 as the result of which plot No. 146 fell to the share of Muhammad Ghaus, it appears to me to be obvious that in view of this finding the sole zamindar of plot No. 146 was Mst. Salam-un-nissa. The defendants having admittedly reconstructed their house with the permission of Mst. Salam-un-nissa could certainly maintain it on plot No. 146 and no other co-sharer in the patti or in the mahal could possibly have any locus standi to raise any objection to it. Realising this position learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent has attacked this finding as one vitiated in law. He has strongly urged that the partition chitthas on which the lower appellate court appears to have acted in support of its finding were legally inadmissible in evidence. He has invited us to go behind the finding of the learned single Judge in this Court that these partition chitthas were admissible in evidence and that they had been wrongly excluded by the learned Civil Judge who decided the case in the first instance. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length on this aspect of the case. In the first place I do not think that it is open to the learned counsel for the respondent to re-open this question at this stage, but assuming that he has a right to do so, it is clear to my mind that there is no substance in this contention. He has cited a ruling of a learned single Judge of this Court reported in Nepal Rai v. Paras Ram Dube in which it has been held—

“Where in a phatbandi lists are drawn up purporting to show which plots are allotted to each of the parties concerned, and it is a formal document signed by all the parties, and is in substance and intention a document which purports to declare the rights of the parties in the specific plots, the document requires to be registered under section 17(b), Registration Act, and, being unregistered, it is inadmissible in evidence.”

Learned counsel for the appellant on the other hand has placed his reliance on the following cases:

(1) Uddab Nath v. Gokul Chandra(2), where it was held by a learned single Judge that—

“A butwara chittha in a mere list of the shares which each of the parties has in the property concerned and which is signed by the parties but it is not in itself a deed of partition but is merely a note upon which the parties have to proceed at the partition. As such it does not require registration for being admissible in evidence.”

(2) Kshetra Mohan v. Tufani Talukdar(3), in which a Bench of two learned Judges has held that—

“A mere partition list containing a list of properties is a memrandum and does not require registration. Whether such a document is or is not a deed of partition must be decided on perusal the document itself.”

(3) Nur Mohammad v. Amir(4)—

“Where pending partition proceedings the parties applied to the Revenue Officer reciting terms of a certain compromise and requested him to give effect to those terms, it was held by a learned single Judge that the application was either one praying that partition might be effected or it was a recital of partition which had already been effected by the parties. The document itself was, therefore, not an instrument of partition and it did not require registration.”

(4) Ganesh Das v. Kanthu(5), where two learned Judges of the Lahore High Court laid down the salutary principle that—

“The question whether a particular document is one falling within the scope of section 17(1)(b), Registration Act, is one to be decided on a perusal of that document and rulings upon other documents not shown to be of an exactly similar character are no guide to a proper decision.”

Judged in the light of the principles enunciated above, it is quite clear that the question of the admissibility of partition chitthas must be decided with reference to the contents and nature of the document and the surrounding circumstances in each particular case. The phatbandi which was considered in Nepat Rai v. Paras Ram Dube is reproduced in the judgment of that case. In view of the language used in the phatbandi the learned Judge who decided that case held that the phatbandi was much more than a mere memorandum. It was a formal document and was in substance and intention a document which purported to declare the rights of the parties in the plots in suit. In that view of the matter it was held that the phatbandi required registration. In the present case the partition chitthas are very differently worded and after examining the chitthas with care I feel quite clear in my own mind that they do not amount to anything more than mere memoranda containing the list of the shares which, each of the parties got at the time of partition. They were no doubt signed by the parties in order to authenticate the lists but they do not in themselves constitute a deed of partition. They do not, therefore, come within the purview of section 17(1)(b), Registration Act, and do not require registration. But if it be assumed for the sake of argument that they are documents which effect, a partition and therefore fall within the purview of section 17(1)(b), Registration Act, and are consequently inadmissible for want of registration, it is quite clear that they were used in this case not as documents which themselves effected partition but only to explain the title of Salam-un-nissa on the one hand and of Muhammad Arkan on the other. In view of the proviso added to section 49 of the Registration Act there can be no doubt whatsoever that these partition chitthas could be used as evidence of a collateral transaction not required to be effected by registered instrument. As long ago as 1919 it was held by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Varada Pillai v. Jeevarathnammal that documents which are not admissible to prove a gift may nevertheless be referred to as explaining the nature and character of the possession thenceforth held by the donee. The High Courts of Calcutta, Bombay, Allahabad, Madras, Patna, Lahore and Rangoon have acted upon the above mentioned principle and have held in numerous cases that a document which requires registration under section 17 and which is not admissible for want of registration to prove a gift or a mortgage or a will or lease is nevertheless admissible to prove the character of the possession of the person who holds under it. It is not necessary to refer to all these decisions on this point: (1) Secretary of State v. Debendra Lal Khan, (2), Shankri v. Milkha Singh and (3) Vishwanath Haibatrao Deshpande v. Ranganath Dhondo.

Learned counsel for the parties have also discussed the question of the admissibility of these partition chitthas with reference to the doctrine of part performance embodied in section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act read with the proviso to section 49 of the Registration Act; but in view of the above discussion on this question I do not think it at all necessary to consider this aspect of the question. In the light of the authorities mentioned above, if is quite clear that the partition chitthas were properly taken into consideration by the lower appellate court in arriving at its finding with regard to the partition effected in 1905. There can, therefore, be no doubt whatsoever that finding is a proper one and must be accepted in a second appeal. In view of this finding it is quite clear that the plaintiff has no title or interest in plot No. 146 on which the house of the defendant-appellant stands. Further more it is clear that Mst. Salam-un-nissa is the sole owner of this plot of land and as she gave permission to the defendants to reconstruct their house there can be no question that the defendants can maintain their house on this plot.

I would, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the decree of the lower appellate, court and restore that of the court of first instance with costs throughout.

Braund, J.:— I agree and have nothing to add.