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Emperor v. Nisar Ahmad
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Malik, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
This revision was filed by Nisar Ahmad against orders made under section 514 of the Criminal Procedure Code by the Sub‑Divisional Magistrate, Sadar, Gorakhpur. The original criminal proceedings concerned Karam Ali, his wife Shams‑un‑nissa, and Sita Ram, who were sent up for trial on charges of theft and of having received stolen property. The precise court originally hearing the case is uncertain in the record; it was probably before the Sub‑Divisional Magistrate in Gorakhpur.
Karam Ali had been released on bail. Tilak and Sudama were sureties for Karam Ali; Abdul Razzaq was surety for Shams‑un‑nissa. On 22 September 1943 Tilak and Sudama applied for cancellation of their surety bond. That cancellation was recorded by a Magistrate other than the Magistrate apparently seized of the case by the order “Submitted Cancelled” without following the procedure in section 502 CrPC. On 26–29 September 1943 an application was obtained from Nisar Ahmad to stand as surety for Karam Ali in place of Tilak and Sudama; the Magistrate passed the order “Shamil misil rahe” on that application.
The case was transferred on 9 October 1943 to another Magistrate. On 27 October 1943 a notice was issued requiring Nisar Ahmad to produce the accused on 4 November; the accused did not appear and proceedings to show cause for forfeiture of the bond followed. On 22 December 1943 the Sub‑Divisional Magistrate ordered Nisar Ahmad to pay Rs. 250 as penalty under section 514 CrPC and threatened warrants of attachment if not paid. Nisar Ahmad's revision to the Sessions Judge of Gorakhpur was dismissed on 9 August 1944. This is the further revision brought to the High Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a bond executed by a surety is invalid or unenforceable if the accused has not executed the corresponding personal bond required by section 499 CrPC.
- Whether the formal deficiencies in the surety bond (absence of clear mention in favour of His Majesty the King‑Emperor, lack of an explicit court designation, and absence of a fixed date) render the bond invalid.
- Whether a bond that purports only to create security over immovable property (a house) without a personal undertaking by the surety is effective, particularly in light of registration requirements under section 17 of the Indian Registration Act and the requirements of section 514(2) CrPC.
- Whether the procedural irregularities in discharging former sureties (order “Submitted Cancelled” without compliance with section 502 CrPC) and the superficial acceptance of the new bond (order “Shamil misil rahe”) defeated acceptance of the bond and liability of the surety.
Arguments of the Parties
Applicant's (Nisar Ahmad) Arguments
- The bond executed by the surety (Nisar Ahmad) is invalid because no corresponding bond was executed by the accused as required by section 499 CrPC; reliance was placed on Emperor v. Brahmanand Misra and Wadhawa Singh v. Emperor for the proposition that a surety's bond is not enforceable if the accused did not execute a bond.
- The bond did not explicitly state it was in favour of His Majesty the King‑Emperor nor did it state the court before which the accused was to be produced, nor a specific date; these defects undermine validity.
- The bond contained no personal liability; it purported only to pledge the accused's house in security up to Rs. 250. An unregistered instrument cannot affect immovable property (citing section 17 Indian Registration Act), so the purported security is ineffective and the bond is invalid.
- Procedural defects: the earlier sureties were discharged by a Magistrate other than the Magistrate seized of the case without following section 502 CrPC; the new bond was merely noted “Shamil misil rahe” and there is nothing to show the bond was formally accepted or that the accused was released on this surety.
Respondent / Crown Arguments (as reflected in the opinion)
- The Deputy Government Advocate argued that the form and heading suggested the intention to produce the accused in the court where the application was filed, and that where no specific hearing date was fixed the surety's promise to produce the accused “on all dates” or when required may be acceptable.
- The Crown cited Reoti Prasad v. Emperor (Bajpai, J.), which held that even if there was no bond executed by the accused, the surety was not discharged and the surety's bond remained enforceable.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Emperor v. Brahmanand Misra | Held (Mulla, J.) that section 499 CrPC contemplates a bond executed by the accused and that where the accused did not execute a bond the surety's bond was not a valid or enforceable bond. | The court acknowledged this authority but expressly disagreed with its reasoning. Although Malik, J. felt bound by the earlier decision, he explained why he could not accept its conclusion and would have referred the matter to a larger Bench if not deciding for the applicant on other grounds. Ultimately he did not follow this ruling on the point of invalidity. |
| Wadhawa Singh v. Emperor | Zafar Ali, J., held that there can be no surety without a principal — i.e., without an undertaking by the accused — and so a surety's undertaking is ineffective if the accused did not give an undertaking. | The court referred to this view but rejected it as a principle of automatic invalidity; Malik, J. considered the surety's obligation to be independent and did not adopt Zafar Ali, J.'s reasoning. |
| Indar v. Emperor | Skemp, J., dissented from the view that a surety is discharged where there is no principal bond by the accused. | The court noted this dissent as part of the jurisprudential landscape; Malik, J.'s view aligns with the dissenting position that a surety's liability can be independent of a formal bond by the accused. |
| Reoti Prasad v. Emperor | Bajpai, J., held that even if there was no bond executed by the accused, the surety was not discharged and the surety's bond was not invalid on that account. | Malik, J. expressly adopts the approach of Bajpai, J., and holds that the bond executed by Nisar Ahmad was not invalid merely because there was no similar bond executed by the accused. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded through the contested points sequentially:
- On the point whether a surety's bond is void if the accused did not execute a bond: the court analysed section 499 CrPC and the printed form (Schedule V, Form No. 42), acknowledging that both envisage two bonds (one by the accused and one by the surety). Despite that textual expectation, the court held the surety's obligation is "entirely independent" of any bond by the accused. The court reasoned that although failure to require the accused to give a bond may be irregular and an error by the court or officer, that irregularity does not affect the surety's independent liability. The court observed historical practice (for example bonds for minors being taken only from sureties) and referred to the later addition of section 514B in 1923 permitting surety bonds in lieu of a minor's bond. Having considered precedent, the court favoured the view in Reoti Prasad v. Emperor and concluded the surety's bond executed by Nisar Ahmad was not invalid for lack of a bond by the accused.
- On formal defects (not expressly stating it was in favour of the King‑Emperor, not naming the court, and not specifying a date): the court accepted that the bond was slovenly drafted but found it possible to imply that “Sarkar Bahadur” stood for His Majesty the King‑Emperor. The heading “Ba adalat faujdari” and the absence of a fixed hearing date were interpreted (as per the Deputy Government Advocate's suggestion) to indicate an intention to produce the accused before the court where the application was filed and to commit to produce him “on all dates” when required. The court nonetheless admonished magistrates to ensure compliance with section 499 CrPC.
- On the nature of the obligation and existence of personal liability: the court identified what it regarded as a fatal defect — the bond contained no personal undertaking by the surety but purported only to pledge the accused's house as security to the extent of Rs. 250. The court emphasised that section 514(2) CrPC contemplates a personal bond by the surety and that where immovable property is given as security the instrument must be registered under section 17 of the Indian Registration Act. An unregistered document cannot affect immovable property and is therefore ineffective. The court found that, so far as the record showed, there was no personal liability undertaken by the surety.
- On procedural irregularities and acceptance of the bond by the court: the court noted that the previous sureties had been discharged by an unofficial order “Submitted Cancelled” issued by a different Magistrate without following section 502 CrPC, and that the only remark on the new bond was “Shamil misil rahe”. The court considered these orders slovenly and concluded there was no evidence the bond was formally accepted by the court or that the accused was released on bail on the basis of the surety furnished by Nisar Ahmad.
- Conclusion of analysis: although the court held that the absence of a bond from the accused did not in itself invalidate the surety's bond, the court found other defects — lack of personal undertaking by the surety, reliance on purported immovable security without registration, and procedural failures in accepting and recording the bond — that were fatal to the prosecution's case against the applicant.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: THE REVISION IS ALLOWED AND THE ORDERS OF THE COURTS BELOW ARE SET ASIDE.
The court directed that any money realised from the applicant (Nisar Ahmad) pursuant to the impugned orders shall be refunded.
Implications and direct effects as stated in the opinion:
- The orders imposing penalty and threatening attachment of property on Nisar Ahmad (under section 514 CrPC) were set aside.
- If any amount had been realised from Nisar Ahmad pursuant to those orders, it must be refunded.
- On the substantive legal question whether a surety's bond is invalid merely because the accused did not execute a bond, the court adopted the position that the surety's obligation can be independent (following Reoti Prasad v. Emperor), and the absence of a bond by the accused does not automatically invalidate the surety's bond. However, despite that view, the court found other defects that required allowing the revision in this case.
The opinion further criticises the manner in which magistrates recorded orders in this matter and stresses the duty of magistrates to ensure compliance with the procedural and form requirements of the Code (notably section 499 and section 502 CrPC) and with the Registration Act where immovable property is purportedly charged.
Malik, J.:— This revision has been filed by one Nisar Ahmad against whom proceedings under section 514 of the Criminal Procedure Code have been taken by the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Sadar, Gorakhpur. Karam Ali, his wife Shams-un-nissa, and Sita Ram were sent Hip for trial on a charge of theft and of having received stolen property. It is difficult now to find out in which court this case was pending. It was probably before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, in the district of Gorakhpur. The accused had been released on bail. Tilak and Sudama were sureties for Karam Ali and Abdul Razzaq was surety for Shams-un-nissa. Tilak and Sudama applied on the 22nd of September, 1943, for the cancellation of the surety bond executed by them. It is mentioned in the affidavit filed by Nisar Ahmad that this application for cancellation of the surety bond was not placed before Mr. H.A Siddiqi, Sub-Divisional Magistrate, who was seized of the case, but before another Magistrate who passed the following order: “Submitted Cancelled.” The application itself was not addressed to any particular court, but the heading merely was “Ba adalat faujdari”. The provisions of section 502 of the Criminal Procedure Code were not followed and the Magistrate did not issue any warrant for the arrest of Karam Ali, nor did he call upon him to find other sufficient sureties. It is suggested that Karam Ali even before the 27th of September had absconded. Shama, the brother of Karam Ali, and Muhammad Zaki, a petition writer, are said to have approached Nisar Ahmad on the 26th of September, 1943, and his signature was obtained on an application to stand surety for Karam Ali in place of Tilak and Sudama, the previous sureties. This application was put up before the same Magistrate who had passed the previous order dated the 27th of September and he on the 29th of September, 1943, passed the following order on this application: “Shamil misil rahe”. On the 9th of October, 1943, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate transferred the case to the court of one Mr. B.B.L Mathur, Magistrate, first Class. On the 27th of October, 1943, a notice was issued to Nisar Ahmad to produce the accused in court on the 4th of November, 1943. On that date the accused did not appear and a notice was issued to the applicant to show cause why the bond, executed by him should not be forfeited. It does not appear from the record how the case came back to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, but the Sub-Divisional Magistrate passed an order on the 22nd of December, 1943, that Nisar Ahmad shall pay Rs. 250 as penalty under section 514 of the Criminal Procedure Code and if this amount was not deposited by the 29th of December “warrants of attachment of property” shall be issued. Nisar Ahmad filed a revision against the order before the learned Sessions Judge of Gorakhpur, but the revision was dismissed on the 9th of August, 1944. It is against that order that a further revision has been filed in this Court.
The first point taken on behalf of the, applicant is that he filed the application before the Magistrate offering to stand surety for Karam Ali, but his application was attached to a blank printed form prescribed by the Criminal Procedure Code (Schedule V, Form No. 42). This printed form has on one side a bond to be executed by the accused and on the other side a bond that has to be executed by the surety. It is suggested that the idea was that after the order of the Magistrate the form would be duly filled in by the accused and the surety. This blank printed form was not filled in and it is still attached to the application filed on or about the 27th of September, 1943. It is argued by learned counsel appearing for the applicant that as there was no bond taken from the accused, the bond executed by the surety was invalid and was not enforceable. Reliance is placed for that proposition on a ruling of this Court reported in Emperor v. Brahmanand Misra(1). In that case Mulla, J., held that section 499 of the Criminal Procedure Code contemplated that there should be a bond executed by the accused and the law did not contemplate any person being released on bail without executing a bond himself merely upon an undertaking or security given by a surety and that where the accused had not executed a bond, the bond executed by the surety, according to his Lordship, was not a valid bond and was not enforceable. In support of this proposition reliance is also placed on a decision of the Lahore High Court reported in Wadhawa Singh v. Emperor(2) where Zafar Ali, J., held that there could be no surety without a principal and where therefore no undertaking had been given by the person arrested to appear when called upon to do so, it was not possible for any person to declare himself surety for his appearance. This view was, however, dissented from by Skemp, J., in Indar v. Emperor(3). I am bound by the decision of this Court in the case of Brahmanand v. Emperor, and if I were not in favour of the applicant on other points, pressed by learned counsel, I would have found it necessary to refer this case to a larger Bench as with great respect and with a certain amount of diffidence, I do not feel inclined to agree with the view expressed in that case. I am aware of the fact that decision is by a learned Judge, who has great experience in criminal cases. It is no doubt true that section 499 of the Criminal Procedure Code requires that the accused should execute a bond for such sum of money as the police officer or the court, as the case may be, thinks sufficient and if he is released on bail then a bond should be executed by one or more sureties. The section clearly contemplates two bonds, one by the accused and another by the surety or sureties. The form prescribed by the Criminal Procedure Code in Schedule V, No. 42, also clearly shows that there have to be two-bonds, one executed by the accused and the other by the surety, but, to my mind, in a case of this nature the obligation undertaken by the surety is entirely independent. It cannot be said, as has been said by Zafar Ali, J., that the accused is the principal and the other person is the surety. The court may require the accused and the sureties to give bonds for different sums. When, therefore, an accused person has been released on bail merely on the undertaking of the surety and a bond is executed by the surety, without the accused having been required to execute a personal bond, it may be that the officer or the court has acted in an irregular manner and the accused should not have been released on bail, but I do not see how that fact can in any way affect the liability of the surety who had undertaken to produce the accused before the court on the date or dates mentioned in the bond there may be cases where the accused person is incapable of executing a bond, and prior to the amendment of section 514 of the Criminal Procedure Code in cases where minors were accused, the bond could be taken only from the surety and I do not think that it was possible then to hold that an accused could not be released on bail either because he could not execute a bond or the surety was not liable because there was no bond from the accused. It was not till 1923 that section 514B was added to the Criminal Procedure Code which provided that any court or officer may accept, in lieu of a bond executed by a minor, a bond executed by a surety or sureties only. At this stage learned counsel appearing for the Crown cited before me a decision of Bajpai, J., In Reoti Prasad v. Emperor. This again is a decision by a learned Judge who had great experience in criminal cases, and I am relieved to find that his Lordship took the same view as I have taken above and held that even if there was no bond executed by the accused the surety was not discharged from his liability and the bond executed by him was not invalid on that account. On this point, therefore, I agree with the, decision of Bajpai, J., and hold that the bond executed by Nisar Ahmad was not invalid because there was no similar bond executed by the accused.
The next point taken by learned counsel for Nisar Ahmad is that the bond was not executed in favour of His Majesty the King-Emperor of India nor did it mention the court before which the accused was to be produced or the date on which he was to be so produced. Learned counsel has again relied on certain observations made in the case of Brahmanand referred to above. I have looked into the bond. It is drafted in a most slovenly manner, but it can be implied from it that it is in favour of “Sarkar Bahadur” which, I take it stands for His Majesty the King-Emperor of India. As regards the court all that the heading says is “Ba adalat faujdari” and as regards date it is mentioned that the accused would appear on all dates. To my mind, learned Magistrates should take a little more care and when these bonds are produced before them it is their duty to see that the bond complies with the requirements of section 499 of the Criminal Procedure Code. I am, however, inclined to agree with the learned Deputy Government Advocate that when the application was filed in the court of the Magistrate, where probably the case was pending, the intention was to produce the accused in that court, and as probably there was no date fixed for the hearing of the case the surety could not mention anything more than this that he would produce the accused on all dates or, to be more accurate, on such dates when he may be required to produce him. The fatal defects, however, to my mind, are the objections taken on behalf of the applicant that there was no personal liability in this bond and all that the accused purported to give was his house in security. Section 514, clause 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure makes it quite clear that what the law contemplates is a personal bond on behalf of the surety and when the bond is forfeited and the penalty is not paid the court may proceed to recover the amount by issuing a warrant for attachment and sale of the movable property belonging to such person. If security of immovable property is given, then the bond has to be registered under section 17 of the Indian Registration Act. An unregistered bond cannot affect any immovable property and must, therefore, be invalid. So far as I can see, there is no personal liability or undertaking given by the accused; he only purported to give his house, described in the bond, in security, to the extent of Rs. 250.
The next objection which, to my mind, is again fatal to the case for the prosecution, is that the only order passed on this bond was “Shamil misil rahe”. As I have already said above, the former sureties were discharged on the 27th of September by a Magistrate other than the Magistrate who was seized of the case by an order “Submitted Cancelled” without any regard to section 502 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Learned Magistrates who deal with these cases must be very familiar with the provisions of the Code, as such cases probably come up before them every day. It does not redound to their credit that they should pass such slovenly orders and disregard the provisions of the Code with which they have to deal almost every day of their life. The learned Magistrate in this case passed an equally slovenly order, when he said, that the application may form a part of the record. Learned counsel is justified in arguing that the bond was never accepted by the court and there is nothing to show that the accused was released on bail on the surety given by the applicant.
In this view of the matter I allow this revision, set aside the orders of the courts below and direct that the money, if realised from the applicant, shall be refunded.
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