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Buttan Singh v. Sakalraj Singh

Allahabad High Court
Jan 12, 1945
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent (plaintiff in the suit) obtained a preliminary decree on a mortgage executed on 13 November 1927 for Rs. 426. The Munsif granted the preliminary decree on 1 September 1936, reducing interest under the Agriculturists' Relief Act and allowing payment by eight instalments (due January and July of each year), with the "usual law in case of default" (set out in Sub‑section (4) of Section 3, U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act). No instalments were paid.

The decree-holder did not apply for a final decree for sale under Order 3, Rule 4, Civil P.C. until 28 July 1941. The Munsif dismissed that application as barred by the three‑year limitation from the date when the money became recoverable (the third instalment became due in January 1938). On first appeal, the Additional Civil Judge set aside the Munsif's order and granted a final decree in respect of the last five instalments (those falling due July 1938 and subsequently), holding that the decree‑holder could waive the right to a final decree for the entire amount and seek decree for instalments within limitation.

This appeal raises the single question of limitation: whether the decree-holder's right to apply for a final decree accrues only once (on the first qualifying default) or anew on each subsequent default, and which Article of the Limitation Act governs the period of limitation.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the period of limitation governing an application for a final decree in a mortgage suit is governed by Article 181 of the Limitation Act (three years from the date when the right to apply accrues) or by Clause (7) of Article 182 (three years from the date when the payment directed is to be made, where the application is to enforce payment directed to be made at a certain date).
  2. Whether the decree-holder's right to apply for a final decree (on default of instalments as provided by the decree and the Agriculturists' Relief Act) accrues only once (on the first occasion when the qualifying number of instalments are in arrears) or accrues afresh on every subsequent default.
  3. Whether the Temporary Postponement of Execution of Decrees Act, 1937, protects the decree-holder and thereby saves his application from the bar of limitation.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Judgment‑Debtors') Arguments

  • Learned Counsel for the appellants relied on the provisions of Article 181 of the Limitation Act, which prescribes a period of three years for applications for which no period is provided elsewhere, running from the date when the right to apply accrues. They contended that the right to apply for a final decree accrued as soon as default was made in payment of the third instalment, and therefore limitation began then.
  • They also relied on authorities (some of which were decisions in execution applications) to support the proposition that limitation runs from the earliest date the right to apply arose.

Respondent's (Decree‑Holder's) Arguments

  • Learned Counsel for the respondent contended that Clause (7) of Article 182 applied. Under that provision, where the application is to enforce payment which the decree directs to be made at a certain date, the three‑year period runs from such specific due date(s). Thus, limitation for each instalment should be calculated from the respective dates when those instalments fell due (July 1938, January 1939, etc.), and the application of 28 July 1941 would be in time for instalments that fell due within three years of that application.

Additional Civil Judge's View (as noted in the opinion)

  • The Additional Civil Judge held that the decree‑holder could waive his right to a final decree for the entire amount and apply for a final decree only in respect of those instalments which were within the period of limitation; he treated the question as one permitting the decree‑holder to seek a final decree in respect of instalments as and when they fell due.
  • The Additional Civil Judge relied on two earlier decisions (Badri Narain v. Kunj Behari Lal and Ram Prasad Ram v. Jadunandan Upadhia) that he considered supportive of this approach, though the Bench in the present opinion observed those cases concerned execution rather than applications for final decree.

Cross‑Objection by the Plaintiff (Respondent below)

  • The plaintiff (decree-holder) cross‑objected, contending that he was protected by the Temporary Postponement of Execution of Decrees Act of 1937 and thus entitled to a final decree for the whole amount. In the course of argument, his counsel conceded that for the reasons given by the Munsif the Act did not protect him as it applies only to institutions of suits and execution applications.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Badri Narain v. Kunj Behari Lal ('12) 35 All. 178 Authority cited by the Additional Civil Judge to support non‑necessity of immediate application (case arose on execution). The Court observed this case concerned execution and that the objection to its applicability to an application for a final decree has some force; it was not treated as controlling for applications in the suit.
Ram Prasad Ram v. Jadunandan Upadhia ('34) 21 A.I.R. 1934 All. 534 Decision in execution: where a compromise decree fixed instalment dates and provided enforcement on default, Article 181 applied to instalments where right to apply first accrued outside three years, and Article 182(7) applied to instalments that fell due within three years of the execution application. The Court relied on this case to show that, had the matter been in execution, Article 182 could apply to recover instalments that fell due within three years; but it distinguished execution from an application for a final decree in the suit.
Ahmad Khan v. Mt. Caura ('18) 5 A.I.R. 1918 All. 285 Holds that an application for a final decree in a mortgage suit is an application in the suit (not an application in execution), and limitation is governed by Article 181. The Court cited this authority to support the conclusion that Article 181 governs applications for final decree and that one application made in time does not extend limitation for a subsequent application dismissed for default.
Muhammad Iltifat Husain v. Alim‑unnissa Bibi ('18) 5 A.I.R. 1918 All. 105 Holds that an application under Order 34, Rule 6, Civil P.C. is an application in the original suit for a new decree and is governed by Article 181 (not an application in execution). The Court relied on this case to reinforce that applications for new/final decrees are subject to Article 181 time‑limits.
Beeves v. Butcher (1891) 2 Q.B.D. 509 (English) English rule applied that limitation begins at the earliest time the plaintiff could have brought the action (in that case, 21 days after first instalment of interest became due). The Court considered the case but noted the Privy Council's caution about applying English decisions to Indian Acts and observed factual differences; Beeves did not determine the outcome in the present context.
Lasa Din v. Mt. Gulab Kunwar A.I.R. 1932 P.C. 207 (Privy Council) Privy Council warned against uncritical application of English decisions to construction of Indian Acts and held that a forfeiture condition in a mortgage deed was for the mortgagee's benefit, giving the option to enforce immediately or wait; English authorities not always directly applicable. The Court cited this decision to justify caution in applying Beeves and to note the different interests in the present case (where delay benefited judgment‑debtors, not the decree‑holder).
Gopal Naicker v. Alagirisami Naicker ('42) 29 A.I.R. 1942 Mad. 581 Madras High Court held that a new cause of action accrues under Article 181 on every fresh default (not only once on the first default). The Court treated this case as supporting the view that the right to apply accrues anew on each default and indicated no reason to take a different view.
Ram Dutta v. Mahpal Singh ('38) 25 A.I.R. 1938 Oudh 112 Oudh Court held that the right to apply is not limited to the first default but arises on subsequent breaches as well. The Court relied on this authority alongside the Madras decision to conclude that the right accrues on each fresh default.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court framed the determinative issue as one of limitation: whether Article 181 or Article 182 governs an application for a final decree in a mortgage suit, and whether the right to apply accrues only once (on the first qualifying default) or accrues afresh on each default.

Step-by-step analysis as reflected in the opinion:

  1. Distinction between applications in the original suit and applications in execution: The Court emphasized the legal distinction—an application for a final decree in a mortgage suit is an application in the suit (not an application in execution). It relied on Ahmad Khan v. Mt. Caura and Muhammad Iltifat Husain v. Alim‑unnissa Bibi for the proposition that such applications are governed by Article 181 of the Limitation Act.
  2. In consequence, Article 182 (which applies to applications in execution, and includes Clause (7) referring to dates when payments are directed to be made) is not the appropriate provision to govern an application for a final decree in the suit. The Court expressly held that Article 181 and not Article 182 must be considered for the present case.
  3. The Court examined the significance of authorities relied upon by the Additional Civil Judge (Badri Narain and Ram Prasad Ram) and found that, to the extent those decisions arose in execution contexts, their applicability to an in‑suit application for a final decree is limited. The Court accepted that Ram Prasad Ram settles questions in execution: under execution, Article 181 may govern claims where the right first accrued earlier than three years, while Article 182(7) can apply to instalments which fell due within three years of the execution application.
  4. The Court considered English authority (Beeves v. Butcher) and the Privy Council's view in Lasa Din. It noted caution in applying English decisions to Indian statutes and observed the factual distinction: in Lasa Din the condition was for the mortgagee's benefit, whereas in the present case delay would benefit the judgment‑debtors rather than the decree‑holder.
  5. On the key factual-legal question—whether the right to apply accrues only once or on each fresh default—the Court reviewed local precedents. It noted that the Madras High Court (Gopal Naicker) and the Oudh decision (Ram Dutta v. Mahpal Singh) supported the proposition that a new cause of action arises under Article 181 upon every fresh default. The Court saw no reason to take a different view and adopted that position.
  6. Applying these conclusions to the present facts, the Court upheld the decision of the lower appellate Court which had allowed a final decree in respect of those instalments that became due within three years of the application (i.e., the last five instalments). The Court therefore dismissed the appeal.
  7. On the cross‑objection based on the Temporary Postponement of Execution of Decrees Act, 1937, the Court adopted the view (also given by the Munsif and conceded by the cross‑objector's counsel) that the Act applies only to the institution of suits and execution applications, and does not protect an in‑suit application for a final decree; accordingly the cross‑objection failed.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is DISMISSED with costs. The cross‑objection by the plaintiff is also dismissed with costs.

Implications and direct consequences as reflected in the opinion:

  • The Court held that an application for a final decree in a mortgage suit is an application in the original suit and is governed by Article 181 of the Limitation Act (three years from the date when the right to apply accrues), not by Article 182 which relates to execution applications.
  • The Court accepted the view that a fresh cause of action (and thus a fresh right to apply governed by Article 181) arises on every subsequent default of instalments; the decree‑holder's right does not vest only once on the first qualifying default.
  • The practical effect in the present case was to sustain the lower appellate Court's order granting a final decree in respect of those instalments which fell due within three years of the decree‑holder's application (the last five instalments), and to reject the contention that the Temporary Postponement of Execution of Decrees Act, 1937, saved the claim for the whole amount.
  • The opinion applies and reconciles existing authorities on the point (citing decisions from All‑India and provincial benches) rather than purporting to lay down a novel exception; it addresses the distinction between applications in the suit and execution applications and confirms the application of Article 181 to in‑suit applications for final decree.

This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond that text.

Show all summary ...

1. The only question to be considered in this appeal is a question of limitation. The respondent, who was the plaintiff in the suit, obtained a preliminary decree on a mortgage in 1936. The mortgage was executed on 13th November 1927 for Rs. 426. The Munsif who granted the preliminary decree gave the defendants the benefit of the Agriculturists' Relief Act by reducing the interest and allowing payment by instalments. The order passed by him on 1st September 1936 was as follows:

Suit is decreed with costs for Rs. 425 as principal and interest at 12 per cent, up to 1st January 1930 and thereafter it would be reduced to 9 1/2 per cent. Pendente lite and future interest is reduced to 3 1/4 per cent. The defendants are allowed to pay the sum in eight instalments which would be due in January and July of every year. Usual law in case of default.

No instalments were paid by the defendants, but the decree-holder did not apply for a final decree for. sale under Order 3, Rule 4, Civil P.C., until 28th July 1941. The Munsif dismissed the application as being beyond three years from the date when the money became recoverable. He observed that in default of payment of three instalments the whole balance was to become due. The third instalment fell due in January 1938. He considered whether the Temporary Postponement of Execution of Decrees Act saved limitation and held that it did not because it applies only to institutions of suits and execution applications. In first appeal the Additional Civil Judge, on a consideration of certain authorities, held that the instalments which were due in July 1938 and subsequently would be within the period of limitation. The appellant (that is the decree-holder), he said, was entitled to waive his right to have a final decree for the entire amount as stated in the preliminary decree and to ask for a final decree in respect of the instalments which were within limitation. He accordingly set aside the Munsif's decree and passed a final decree in respect of those instalments which became due in July 1938 and subsequently, that is in respect of the last five instalments. The "usual law" referred by the Munsif who passed the preliminary decree is contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 3, U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act. The sub-section reads as follows:

If the decree provides for payment by instalments, the Court shall direct that, where the number of instalments allowed is four or five and any two instalments are in arrears, or where the number allowed is six or more and any three instalments are in arrears, the decree-holder may, notwithstanding the provisions of any law for the time being in force, immediately enforce payment of the whole amount then remaining due under the decree, and in the case of a decree for sale or foreclosure apply that a final decree shall be passed.

2. The view taken by the Munsif who dismissed the application for a final decree appears to have been that it was incumbent upon the decree-holder to apply for a final decree within three years of the date when,. payment of the third instalment became due and that not having done so within this period, he was barred from making a subsequent application based on later defaults. The Additional Civil Judge observed that while the decree-holder had a right to apply for a final decree in respect of the total amount decreed when three instalments remained unpaid, he could apply for a final decree in respect of each instalment as it fell due. He considered an argument that in a mortgage suit there can only be one final decree and not several and, therefore, the appellant was not entitled to have a final decree prepared in respect of each instalment, but remarked that there is nothing in law against several final decrees being prepared in a ease.

3. With regard to this, I do not think that the Additional Civil Judge's view is correct; nor do I think that the question is relevant. The question is not whether it is open to a decree-holder to have more than one final decree prepared but whether he can elect to wait until the end of the period prescribed for payment of the instalments before applying for a final decree, or must make the application as soon as it is possible for him to do so, in this case upon default of payment of the first three instalments. The Additional Civil Judge referred to two cases which he thought supported his view that it was not necessary for the decree-holder to apply as soon as it was possible. These are Badri Narain v. Kunj Behari Lal ('12) 35 All. 178 and Ram Prasad Ram v. Jadunandan Upadhia ('34) 21 A.I.R. 1934 All. 534. It has been objected that in both these cases the question arose upon an application for execution and not upon an application for a final decree. To some extent this objection seems to be valid, though not entirely so. Learned Counsel for the appellants, that is the judgment-debtors, rested his case on the provisions of Article 181, Limitation Act. This provides a period of three years in the case of applications for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere from the date when the right to apply accrues. He contends that the right to apply accrued as soon as default was made in payment of the third instalment. Learned Counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, contends that the provision applicable is that contained in Clause (7) of Article 182. This too provides a period of three years, but the date from which the period begins to run is (where the application is to enforce any payment which the decree or order directs to be made at a certain date) such date. The argument is that since the judgment-debtors were not required to pay the last five instalments until July 1938, January 1939, July 1939, January 1940 and July 1940, respectively it is these dates which have to be taken into consideration in deciding whether the application was or was not within time.

4. The objection to Article 182 is that it applies only to applications in execution. It is clear that an application for a final decree is not an application in execution. As was held by a Bench of this Court in Ahmad Khan v. Mt. Caura ('18) 5 A.I.R. 1918 All. 285 an application for a final decree in a suit on a mortgage being an application in the suit and not an application in execution, the fact that one such application has been made within the prescribed period of limitation does not operate to extend the period of limitation in favour of a second application, the first having been dismissed for default. It was also said by the same Bench in Muhammad Iltifat Husain v. Alim-unnissa Bibi ('18) 5. A.I.R. 1918 All. 105 that an application for a decree under the provisions of Order 34, Rule 6, Civil P.C. is not an application for the execution of the original decree for sale, but is an application in the original suit for a new decree. It was added that such an application is governed as to limitation by Article 181 and must be made within three years from the date when the right to apply accrued.

5. I am, therefore, of opinion that Article 181 and not Article 182 must be considered for the purpose of the present case. Had the matter been in execution, there would have been little difficulty, for the question may be considered to have been settled by the decision in Ram Prasad Ram v. Jadunandan Upadhia ('34) 21 A.I.R. 1934 All. 534. In that case a compromise decree was passed fixing payments of eight instalments on specified dates. The decree-holder was given the right to realise the entire balance of his decretal amount in the case of default of payment of two successive instalments. No instalments were found to have been paid. The application in execution was made more than three years after the right to apply first accrued on default of payment of the first two instalments, and it was held that in respect of these two instalments Article 181 was applicable. The decree-holder had, however, the right to receive instalments as and when they fell due and he might, therefore, recover such instalments as had fallen due within three years from his application. As regards such instalments, Article 182 (7) was held applicable.

6. Learned Counsel for the appellants cited an English ease, Beeves v. Butcher (1891) 2 Q. B. D. 509. In this case, the plaintiff lent money to the defendant for a period of five years. The defendant agreed to pay interest quarterly. It was provided in the agreement that if the defendant made default in payment of any quarterly payment of interest for 21 days, the plaintiff might call in the principal. No interest was, however, paid. The plaintiff commenced her action to recover the principal and interest within six years from the end of the term of five years. It was held that the Statute of Limitations was a good defence and that time began to run from the earliest time at which the plaintiff could have brought her action, that is 21 days after the first instalment of interest became due. For the respondents reference was made to the Privy Council case in Lasa Din v. Mt. Gulab Kunwar A.I.R. 1932 P.C. 207, where their Lordships observed that they were not greatly impressed by the authority in Beeves v. Butcher (1891) 2 Q.B.D. 509 adding,

"It is, they think, always dangerous to apply English decisions to the construction of an Indian Act."
This was a case of a mortgage, where the mortgage deed contained a provision that in default of payment of interest in any one year, the creditor would be entitled to realise the entire mortgage money with interest at once. No interest was paid. Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee held that a condition of this nature was inserted in the deed exclusively for the benefit of the mortgagees and that it purported to give them an option either to enforce their security at once, or if the security was ample, to stand by their investment for the full term of the mortgage. This would not be the position in the present case since the decree-holder would not stand to benefit by delaying his application for a final decree. Only the judgment-debtors could benefit by such delay.

7. The question really comes to this, whether there is anything in Article 181 which indicates that the decree-holder's right to apply for a final decree accrues only once, namely as soon as default is made in payment of three instalments? He certainly has a right to apply then, but does the provision mean that the right accrues only once? Supposing he does not exercise the right when it first accrues, would it not accrue again upon subsequent defaults? Learned Counsel for the respondent cited a case of the Madras High Court and a case of the Oudh Chief Court which, learned Counsel for the appellants concedes, support this view. In Gopal Naicker v. Alagirisami Naicker ('42) 29 A.I.R. 1942 Mad. 581, a learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court held, in similar circumstances, that a new cause of action accrues under Article 181 on every fresh default and not only once on the occurrence of the first default. In A.I.R. Ram Dutta v. Mahpal Singh ('38) 25 A.I.R. 1938 Oudh 112, Hamilton and Yorke JJ. took the same view, holding that the right to apply was not limited to the first default, but would arise not only on the first, but also on subsequent breaches. I see no reason to take a different view. I am of opinion that the decree of the lower appellate Court was correct and I dismiss the appeal with costs.

8. There was a cross objection by the plaintiff contending that he was protected by the Temporary Postponement of Execution of Decrees Act of 1937 and, therefore, entitled to a final decree for the whole amount. His learned Counsel concedes that for the reasons given by the Munsif this Act does not protect him, as it applies only to institutions of suits and execution applications. The cross-objection is accordingly also dismissed with costs.