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Gorakpur Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. R.E Nariman And Co.

Allahabad High Court
Aug 1, 1946
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Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff, the Gorakhpur Electric Supply Co., Ltd., Gorakhpur, acting through the Official Liquidator, instituted a suit in the court of the Munsif of Gorakhpur for realisation of Rs. 2,860-10-0. The defendants, a firm of general merchants, had earlier supplied lubricants to the company before the winding up and obtained a decree in Suit No. 361 of 1932 for recovery of that amount. The defendants executed that decree and realised the amount by attachment of third parties' electricity bills between 18th February, 1935 and 5th August, 1935.

An application to wind up the company was filed in this Court on 31st August, 1934; the winding up order was made on 2nd September, 1936. On 3rd August, 1939 the Official Liquidator applied under section 227 to the Company Judge for an order for refund of the amounts realised; the defendants applied under the same section for validation of their receipts. By order dated 19th August, 1940 the Company Judge dismissed both applications, indicating that the Official Liquidator should file a suit. The Official Liquidator filed the present suit on 24th August, 1940. The defendants contended that the suit was barred by limitation.

The trial court and the lower appellate court both treated article 49 of the Indian Limitation Act as applicable. The trial court held limitation began when provisional liquidators were appointed (April, 1936), while the lower appellate court held limitation began on the dates when the allegedly invalid payments were made (between 18th February, 1935 and 5th August, 1935). The lower appellate court also considered exclusion of the period during which the Official Liquidator's application under section 227 was pending (invoking section 14 of the Limitation Act) but concluded the suit would remain time-barred. The plaintiff appealed to this Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Which article of the Indian Limitation Act applies to the Official Liquidator's suit for recovery of amounts realised by a judgment-creditor during the pendency of a winding up petition (contentions focused on article 49, article 112, article 62, and article 120)?
  2. When does the cause of action for refund accrue in the context of a winding up petition: on the dates of the payments/realisation, on the appointment of provisional liquidators, on the date of the winding up order, or on the date of an order refusing to validate payments?
  3. Whether exclusion of the period during which the Official Liquidator's application under section 227 was pending before the Company Judge (under section 14 of the Limitation Act) affects the limitation position.
  4. Whether, on the facts of this case, the plaintiff's suit is barred by limitation.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Plaintiff's) Arguments

  • Article 49 of the Limitation Act does not apply to this case; the proper article applicable is article 112 of the Limitation Act.
  • The cause of action for refund did not arise until the winding up order was made; therefore the suit filed on 24th August, 1940 was within time (especially if the period during which proceedings under section 227 were pursued in good faith is excluded).

Respondents' (Defendants') Arguments

  • The defendants relied primarily on article 49 of the Limitation Act as the applicable article; alternatively they relied on article 62.
  • The defendants urged that the suit was barred by limitation, asserting that limitation began to run from the dates when the allegedly invalid payments were made (between 18th February, 1935 and 5th August, 1935).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Rameshar Chaubey v. Mata Bhikh Held that article 48 of the Limitation Act was applicable to a claim to recover money alleged to have been kept by the defendant (treated as specific movable property). The Court noted the earlier Bench's conclusion but observed that the point was not argued before that Bench and expressed difficulty following that decision. The Court nevertheless acknowledged that later decisions had treated it as binding.
Ram Lal v. Ghulam Husain Considered the applicability of article 48 (doubted correctness of Rameshar Chaubey but noted binding effect); held that even if article 48 did not apply, article 49 would be applicable with the same result. The Court cited this decision as an example where a Bench doubted earlier authority yet felt bound; it relied on the conclusion that article 49 could apply in such line of authorities, but ultimately did not rely solely on these precedents to decide the case because it found the suit timely on alternative reasoning.
The Benares Bank, Limited v. Ram Prasad Addressed whether article 48 applies to suits for money; the judgment (Niamatullah, J.) appeared inclined to hold article 48 applicable, but the Bench felt bound by prior decisions. The Court recorded that this case did not express doubt about applicability of article 48 and that the Court felt itself constrained by prior decisions; nevertheless the present Court avoided resolving the larger question because it concluded the suit was within time even if article 49 were applied.
Jaganji v. Bandan Observed that it might be arguable whether a suit for money could properly be considered a suit for specific movable property, but felt bound by earlier decisions applying article 48/49. The decision was cited to show the existing line of authority; the present Court acknowledged these constraints but, as with other authorities, proceeded on grounds that rendered resolution of that specific point unnecessary for the outcome.
Saiyed Jawad Ali Shah v. The Gorakhpur Electric Supply Co., Ltd. Held in a similar factual matrix that the cause of action for refund did not commence until the date of the winding up order (2nd September, 1936) where the Official Liquidator applied for refund within three years thereafter. The Court relied on this analogous decision to support the view that the cause of action for refund accrues upon the winding up order (or at least does not necessarily accrue on the date of the earlier realisations), reinforcing the conclusion that the present suit was within time.
Hoti Lal v. The Lower Ganges Jumna Electricity Company Limited In a case where a decree was executed and payments were made during the pendency of a winding up petition, the Court held the Official Liquidator's suit was within time because the cause of action for recovery did not arise until an order refusing to validate payments was passed (26th September, 1940 in that case). The Court compared the facts and found Hoti Lal to be very similar; although the lower court sought to distinguish Hoti Lal on the basis that payments there were in execution whereas in the present case payments were said to be voluntary, this Court concluded the two cases were not distinguishable on the facts and used Hoti Lal to support the conclusion that the suit in the present case was within time.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first examined whether article 49 of the Limitation Act applied. It explained that article 49 contemplates suits akin to those under sections 10 and 11 of the Specific Relief Act (recovery/delivery of specific movable property). A claim for realisation of money, where specific coins or notes are not claimed and cannot be claimed under the Specific Relief Act, is not ordinarily of the nature contemplated by article 49. The Court observed that prior decisions of this Court had applied articles 48/49 to certain money claims, but those authorities were either not fully reasoned on the specific point or were treated as binding by subsequent Benches; the present Court expressed difficulty with that earlier reasoning but did not overrule it.

The Court rejected article 62 as inapplicable because article 62 pertains to cases in which money payable to the plaintiff is paid to the defendant in contexts such as payments to servants or agents. The Court indicated that the only article that could, in principle, apply if none of the specific articles fit would be article 120 of the Limitation Act.

On accrual of cause of action, the Court applied the standard principle that a cause of action accrues when there exists a person who can sue and another who can be sued and when all material facts necessary to entitle the plaintiff to relief have occurred. The Court held that the Company could not claim a refund of sums realised by the defendant before the winding up order was made. Reading sections 232, 227 and 168 of the Indian Companies Act together, the Court concluded that payments or realisations during the pendency of a winding up petition do not become automatically void merely because the petition is pending; rather, only after the winding up order is made can such payments, if they contravene the statutory provisions, be treated as invalid and actionable.

Therefore, the Court held that the cause of action for refund accrued on the date of the winding up order (2nd September, 1936). The Court further considered the period during which the Official Liquidator prosecuted proceedings under section 227 before the Company Judge in good faith (from 23rd August, 1939 to 19th August, 1940) and reasoned that, if that period were excluded under section 14 of the Limitation Act, the suit would clearly lie within three years. The payments having been realised between February and August 1935, the defendants' contention that limitation began to run from those earlier dates was rejected for the stated reasons.

The Court also discussed and relied upon analogous decisions (including Saiyed Jawad Ali Shah and Hoti Lal) which supported the proposition that the cause of action for refund in similar circumstances did not arise until the winding up order (or, in some treatments, until an order refusing to validate payments). The Court did not decisively resolve the broader doctrinal controversy about whether article 49/48 applies to suits for money, because it concluded that even accepting the respondents' contention (i.e., even applying article 49), the plaintiff's suit would still be within time on the facts and legal analysis provided.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The plaintiff's suit is decreed with costs in all courts.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the Official Liquidator's suit for recovery of the amounts realised by the defendants is successful and the plaintiff obtains the decree (with costs) in respect of the claim described in the opinion.
  • The Court concluded that the cause of action for refund did not arise until the winding up order of 2nd September, 1936, and that, excluding the period during which the Official Liquidator pursued proceedings under section 227 in good faith, the suit filed on 24th August, 1940 was within the applicable limitation period.
  • The Court did not definitively resolve the broader recurring question whether article 48/49 should apply generally to suits for money (it noted earlier conflicting decisions, expressed reservations about some precedents, and observed that a larger Bench could be directed if necessary). Consequently, no final new precedent resolving that doctrinal point was established by this opinion; the decision rests on the limitation analysis set out above and the application of company law provisions to the accrual of cause of action in the winding up context.

All content in this summary is drawn exclusively from the provided opinion and avoids any inference or information not present in the text.

Show all summary ...

Malik, J.:— This is a plaintiff's appeal. The plaintiff, the Gorakhpur Electric Supply Co., Ltd., Gorakhpur, through the official liquidator, filed a suit in the court of the Munsif of Gorakhpur for realisation of Rs. 2,860-10-0. The defendants were a firm of general merchants, who had supplied to the company before the winding up certain lubricants and the price of the lubricants supplied was due to them. They had filed a suit, No. 361 of 1932, for recovery of this amount. That suit was decreed by the learned Temporary Civil Judge of Gorakhpur. The defendants, who were the decree-holders, applied for execution of the decree and they realised the amount due to them under that decree between the dates 18th February, 1935, and the 5th August, 1935, by attachment of the bills for electric current consumed by certain third parties, which amount was payable by them to the plaintiff company.

Before the dates of these realisations, however, an application for winding up of the company was filed in this Court on the 31st August, 1934. The winding up order was made on the 2nd September, 1936. In the year 1939, on the 3rd August, the official liquidator applied to the learned Company Judge for an order under section 227 for the refund of this amount, which they alleged the defendants had wrongfully realised from the company during the pendency of the winding up petition in this Court. The defendants also filed an application before the learned Company Judge under the same section for an order validating these payments to them. The learned Company Judge by an order dated the 19th August, 1940, dismissed both these applications and held that the official liquidator, if he had any right, should file a suit, but he was not prepared to validate these payments as requested by the defendants. The suit was filed on the 24th August, 1940. The defendants urged that the suit was barred by limitation.

Both the courts, below have held that article 49 of the Indian Limitation Act was the article applicable and, while the trial court held that limitation started to run from April, 1936 when provisional liquidators' were appointed by this Court, the lower appellate court has held that the view of the trial court that limitation began to run from April, 1936, was erroneous, and that limitation started against the plaintiff company on the dates when the invalid payments were made to the defendants, that is, according to the lower appellate court, the cause of action arose on various dates between the 18th February, 1935 and the 5th August, 1935. The lower appellate court further considered the question of giving the liquidator the benefit of the period during which his application under section 227 was pending before the learned Company Judge and came to the conclusion that even if that period were excluded under section 14 of the Limitation Act, the suit would still remain time-barred. It is against that order that the plaintiff has come up in appeal to this Court. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant has urged that article 49 of the Limitation Act does not apply to this case and the proper article applicable is article 112. Learned counsel for the defendants, on the other hand, has relied on article 49 and in the alternative on article 62. article 49 of the Limitation Act reads as follows:

“For other specific movable property (the word “other” has been used because certain specific movable properties have been mentioned in article 48), or for compensation for wrongfully taking or injuring or wrongfully detaining the same. Three years. When the property is wrongfully taken or injured or when the detainer's possession becomes unlawful.”

Obviously this article contemplates a suit provided for by sections 10 and 11 of the Specific Relief Act (Act I of 1877). Under section 10 a person entitled to the possession of specific movable property may recover the same in the manner prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure, and under section 11 any person having the possession or control of a movable property, of which he is not the owner, may be compelled to deliver it to the person entitled to its immediate possession under certain circumstances set out in the section. A claim for realisation of money, as in this case, where the specific coins or notes are not claimed or cannot be claimed under the Specific Relief Act, cannot be a claim of the nature provided for by article 49. If the matter was res integra, we would have had no hesitation in holding that article 49 of the Limitation Act had no application. Learned counsel for the appellant has however, very rightly drawn our attention to certain decisions of this Court. In Rameshar Chaubey v. Mata Bhikh(1), where the plaintiff had claimed to recover Rs. 160 from the defendant on the ground that he had given the defendant that amount to deliver to a relation of the plaintiff, but the defendant had not delivered that amount and had kept the money with himself, a Bench of this Court (Oldfield and Brodhorst, JJ.) held that article 48 of the Limitation Act was applicable. We would like to point out, however, that the point that has been argued before us in this case was not urged before the Bench as the defendant was not represented. With great respect to the learned Judges, we find it difficult to follow that decision, but we would have had no hesitation in holding that we were not bound by it as the point was not considered by this Bench, if the point had not arisen in later cases in which it was held that this decision was binding. In Ram Lal v. Ghulam Husain another Bench of this Court, while doubting the correctness of this decision, observed as follows:

“It may be open to argument whether a suit for money could be properly considered to be a suit for specific movable property but we are bound by that decision.”

They, however, went on to hold that even if article 48 did not apply, article 49 would be applicable and the result would be the same. The point arose in two other cases. The Benares Bank, Limited v. Ram Prasad(2) and Jaganji v. Bandan(3) before Sen and Niamatullah, JJ. In the case of Jaganji the judgment was delivered by Sen, J. and it was held that “it may be open to argument whether a suit for money could properly be considered to be a suit for specific movable property, but we are bound by these decisions.” In the case of The Benares Bank, Limited, where the judgment was delivered by Niamatullah, J., it appears that the Court was inclined to hold that article 48 of the Limitation Act was applicable to a suit for money; in an earlier part of the judgment their Lordships held that they were bound by the previous decisions. So far as we can see, no doubt was expressed by the Bench about the applicability of article 48. If it were necessary we would have directed that this case should go before a larger Bench so that the question may be finally settled one way or the other. There are a large number of decisions of other High Courts, that a suit for money is not a suit for specific movable property and article 49 of the Limitation Act was not applicable. It is not necessary for us to discuss those authorities since we have taken the view that even if article 49 is applied, the suit is within time.

Article 62 of the Limitation Act is clearly not applicable. Article 62 provides for a case where money payable to the plaintiff is paid to the defendant and is recoverable on that account. It contemplates cases of payment to servants and agents. So far as we can see, the only article applicable to a case of this kind is article 120 of the Limitation Act as there is no other article which can specifically apply.

As we have already said, even if we were to accept the contention of learned counsel for the respondents, the suit must be taken to have been filed within time. The application for winding up was filed on the 31st August, 1934. The realisations were made by the defendants between the dates 18th February, 1935, and the 5th August, 1935. On the dates of the payments it was impossible to urge that the payments were void and it was not possible for the Company to have claimed a refund of these amounts. There is no provision in the Indian Companies Act, so far as we know, that after an application for winding up is made any payment or realisation becomes automatically void even though the application for winding up may be ultimately rejected. As we read sections 232, 227 and 168 of the Indian Companies Act, the only reasonable interpretation that can be placed on those sections is that after the winding up order is made any payment made during the pendency of the winding up petition or after the winding up order, if it contravenes the provisions of sections 232 or 227, is invalid. As has been said in so many cases, the cause of action accrues when there is in existence a person who can sue and another who can be sued and when all the facts have happened which are material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed. The cause of action arises when, and only when, the aggrieved party has the right to apply to the proper tribunal for relief. The company could not have claimed a refund of the amounts realised by the defendant before the order of winding up was passed by this Court. It was after the winding up order that under section 168 of the Indian Companies Act the proceedings could be deemed to have commenced from the date of the application. The cause of action for a suit for refund would, therefore, not arise till the 2nd September, 1936. The present suit was filed on the 24th August, 1940. If the period between the 23rd August, 1939, and the 19th August, 1940, when the liquidators were prosecuting in good faith certain proceedings before the learned Company Judge for an order for refund of this amount are excluded, the suit was clearly filed within a period of three years. The suit could not, therefore, be barred by limitation. In another very similar case that came before a learned single Judge of this Court, Saiyed Jawad Ali Shah v. The Gorakhpur Electric Supply Co., Ltd. it was held as follows:

“On the 2nd September, 1936, the High Court made an order for the winding up of the company. Thereafter, before the expiry of three years from that date, on the 23rd August, 1939, the Official Liquidator made an application to the High Court for an order for refund of this sum of Rs. 662-0-9.”

It was there clearly understood that the cause of action for refund did not commence till the date of the winding up order.

The case before us is very similar to the case of Hoti Lal v. The Lower Ganges Jumna Electricity Company Limited. In that case there was a decree for Rs. 9,680 against the Company. The decree was put under execution. During the pendency of the winding up petition in this Court certain payments were made towards the decree. It is not clear whether the judgment-debtor deposited the money in the executing court or the money was realised by sale of some property, but the fact remains that it was not a payment out of court but was a payment in part satisfaction of the decree which was under execution. This Court held that the suit of the Official Liquidators was within time as the cause of action for recovery of the amount realised from the defendant did not arise till the order of this Court was passed on the 26th September, 1940, refusing to validate the payments made to the appellants. The lower court distinguished this case on the ground that the payments made were voluntary payments and in that case there was no application for execution while in the case before us the money was paid in the execution proceedings. The lower court did not have the judgment in Hotilal's case of the trial court before it, but from that judgment it is clear that in that case also the decree was put in execution and the amount was paid to the executing court or was realised by the executing court from the assets of the company. On the facts, therefore, the two cases were not in any respect distinguishable. As we have already held that even taking the date of the winding up order to be the date on which the cause of action arose the suit is within time, it is not necessary for us to express any opinion as to whether the cause of action should be deemed to arise on the date when the order, is passed refusing to validate the payments. If we may say so with great respect, one result of following that view may be that in a case where the defendant has not applied for validating the payments, no cause of action would accrue till the application is filed and the Company Judge has refused to validate the payments.

In the view that we have taken, therefore, the suit was clearly within time. All other issues have been decided in favour of the plaintiff. The result, therefore, is that the plaintiff's suit is decreed with costs in all courts.