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Emperor v. Mohru Lal
Summary of Opinion: Reference by Sessions Judge of Cawnpore in King-Emperor v. Mohru Lal (Jurisdiction under sections 408/409 IPC)
Factual and Procedural Background
This matter is a reference made by the learned Sessions Judge of Cawnpore in the case of King-Emperor v. Mohru Lal under sections 408/409 of the Indian Penal Code, on the ground that the Magistrate of Cawnpore had no jurisdiction to try the case. The Magistrate had framed a charge that Mohru Lal, between 10 May and 18 December 1934, being a factor, broker, servant or agent of Matadin Bhagwan Das (sugar merchants of Cawnpore), committed criminal breach of trust in respect of Rs. 19,013-5-9 under sections 408/409 IPC. The place of occurrence was omitted in the charge.
The complaint alleged that the accused, engaged in Cawnpore as an agent, was sent to Bengal to effect deliveries and to realise prices from customers and either personally bring proceeds to Cawnpore or remit the money to Cawnpore. It was alleged he remitted sums (last remittance on 7 December 1934) and subsequently withheld moneys collected and embezzled them. Paragraph 7 listed nine purchasers and a total of Rs. 19,099 said to have been realised and embezzled. Evidence for the complainant showed the accused had realised those sums and subsequently absconded. There was no evidence or specific allegation of a positive act of misappropriation at a particular place; the case was presented on evidence that the accused collected money and failed to send it to Cawnpore within a reasonable time.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Magistrate at Cawnpore had jurisdiction to try an offence of criminal breach of trust (sections 408/409 IPC) where the accused collected money in Bengal but was alleged to have failed to remit or bring the proceeds to Cawnpore.
- How the place where the offence is "committed" for offences under section 405 IPC (criminal breach of trust) is to be determined — whether jurisdiction lies where a positive misappropriation/conversion occurred (first part of section 405) or where the accused was bound to account/was required to deliver or remit the property (second/negative part of section 405 and related provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, esp. sections 177–189, 179 and 181(2)).
Arguments of the Parties
Accused's Arguments
- The allegations of the complainant amount to a charge that the offence was committed somewhere in Bengal (i.e., where the accused collected the money), and therefore the Cawnpore court lacks jurisdiction to try the case.
- Implicit in the argument: venue could be laid at any place in Bengal where collection occurred, since the collection was the principal act relied upon.
Complainant's Arguments
- The offence can be inquired into in Cawnpore because the accused had a duty to remit or bring the proceeds to Cawnpore and allegedly failed to do so; therefore the place where the accused ought to have accounted or delivered the money (Cawnpore) is the appropriate venue.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Gunananda Dhone v. Santi Prakash Nandy | Two propositions: (1) where an accused is bound to render accounts, the court where accounts were to be rendered has jurisdiction; (2) such jurisdiction exists even where there is clear evidence of embezzlement elsewhere. | The court noted this decision but observed later rulings doubted the second proposition; it treated the decision as part of the Calcutta High Court jurisprudence relevant to the "render accounts" principle. |
| Pascal v. Raj Kishore Mathur | Doubts cast on the correctness of Gunananda Dhone (esp. the proposition that jurisdiction exists despite clear evidence of embezzlement elsewhere). | Noted as a later ruling that dissented from the second proposition in Gunananda Dhone; the Bench in Pascal did not however stop a trial in Calcutta in that instance. |
| Paul de Flondor v. Emperor | Quoted English authority: where no evidence of fraudulent embezzlement except non-accounting, venue may be where non-accounting occurred; but if distinct evidence of misappropriation elsewhere, this cannot apply. | The court relied on this ruling to state the proposition that where there is evidence apart from non-accounting showing misappropriation elsewhere, venue must be that place or where property was received/retained; if no such evidence, venue may be where accused failed to account. |
| Reg. v. Davison (Baron Alderson) | Where non-accounting is the only evidence, venue may be the place where non-accounting occurred because jury may presume misappropriation there; but not where distinct evidence of misappropriation elsewhere. | Quoted in Paul de Flondor and applied as an English common-law principle the court considered when determining how to locate the place of offence under section 405 IPC. |
| Niwasilal Modi v. Routhmull | Mere inability to explain accounts in a place where there was no duty to pay does not confer jurisdiction on that place. | The court distinguished that case as unlike the present facts because in the present case there was a duty to pay the money at Cawnpore. |
| Prokash Chandra Sircar v. Mohim Chand Haldar | Where there is no definite allegation of misappropriation at a particular place, but the accused had a duty to remit money to a particular place and failed, the court at that place has jurisdiction. | Adopted as authority supportive of jurisdiction where the duty to remit existed (parallel to the present case where the duty to remit to Cawnpore was alleged). |
| In re Jivandas Savchand | Where there is no duty to remit money to a place (only to send statements), that place lacks jurisdiction to try criminal breach of trust. | Distinguished by the court because the accused in that case had no duty to remit to Bombay; unlike the present case where remittance to Cawnpore was alleged to be required. |
| Re Rambilas | Discussion of section 179 CrPC; obiter that offense under first part of section 405 is committed where dishonest misappropriation occurred, not where contract should have been performed. | The court regarded the obiter dicta in Rambilas as of no weight for the present issue. |
| Aya Ram v. Gobind Lal Verma | Observations remitting case for further evidence to determine where jurisdiction lay. | The court stated little weight could be assigned to the observations of the single Judge in that case. |
| Mahtab Din v. Emperor | Retention of sale proceeds at the place where they were known to be retained led the case to fall under the first part of section 405. | Used as an example of a case that fell under the first part of section 405 (positive misappropriation at the place of retention) rather than the second/omission-based part. |
| Ali Mohamed Kassim v. King-Emperor | Where money was misappropriated by gambling at a particular place (first part of section 405), rendering accounts elsewhere did not give that place jurisdiction. | Illustrates that where positive misappropriation occurred at a place, the place where accounts were to be rendered does not necessarily gain jurisdiction. |
| Queen-Empress v. O'Brien | Case in which Cawnpore court was held to have jurisdiction where accused, employed by a Cawnpore company, failed to return goods or sale proceeds; earlier reasoning partly rested on loss to employers at Cawnpore. | Noted, but the court observed that the previous emphasis on consequential loss to employers at the head office as a basis for jurisdiction is not now good law. |
| Langridge v. Atkins | Similar view to O'Brien that connected jurisdiction to consequences of loss to employers. | Mentioned as reflecting an older line of authority which the present court regards as not authoritative on the particular point. |
| Emperor v. Mahadeo | Accused employed to sell goods and remit proceeds to Mirzapur; failure to furnish accounts held to give Mirzapur jurisdiction. | Followed as an instance where duty to remit to a particular place supported jurisdiction at that place. |
| Ganeshi Lal v. Nand Kishore Karamat Husain | Held Cawnpore court did not have jurisdiction where misappropriation was definitely committed at a branch shop (i.e., first part of section 405 applied). | The court treated that decision as emphasizing that where positive misappropriation occurred at a branch, jurisdiction lies there; but it noted the principle that section 179 is not to be invoked simply because wrongful loss was caused elsewhere. |
| Emperor v. Kashi Ram Mehta | Full Bench ruling emphasizing that where duty is to account or return goods, misappropriation may not be committed until a refusal to render account or pay balance — which may occur at the place where accounts are to be rendered. | Quoted approvingly to show that misappropriation (first part) may not arise until the refusal to account, and that this refusal can occur at the place of employment or where the master resides. |
| Sheo Shankar v. Mohan Sarup | Full Bench holding that a servant sent to collect money in villages who failed to bring money to Mirzapur could be tried in Mirzapur where he had a duty to account. | Relied upon as authority supporting jurisdiction at the place where the accused had been bound to account (Mirzapur in that case), analogous to Cawnpore here. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court approached the jurisdiction question by analysing the nature of the offence under section 405 IPC and the venue provisions in the Criminal Procedure Code (sections 177–189, with particular reference to sections 179 and 181(2)).
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Distinction in section 405 IPC: the court emphasised that section 405 comprises two analytically distinct parts:
- The first (positive) part: dishonest misappropriation or conversion to one's own use — this requires an allegation and proof that the dishonest misappropriation or conversion occurred at a particular time and place; jurisdiction lies where that misappropriation/ conversion took place.
- The second (negative) part: dishonestly using or disposing of property in violation of a direction of law or a legal contract — violation here may be established by negative evidence (i.e., non-fulfilment of the duty). If the direction or contract required disposal at a particular place, then the court where the property should have been delivered has jurisdiction for offences under this part.
- Relation to English authorities and CrPC: the court acknowledged English common-law authorities (Reg. v. Davison) and Calcutta High Court decisions which held that where no evidence of misappropriation exists except non-accounting, venue may be the place of non-accounting; but if there is distinct evidence of misappropriation elsewhere venue must be that place. The court accepted the underlying English idea but emphasised that for India the place where the offence is "committed" must be ascertained from the definition in the IPC and applied with the CrPC venue rules.
- Application to the facts: in the present case the complaint contained no charge or evidence of positive misappropriation (first part of section 405) at any particular place. The material allegations and evidence were that the accused collected money in Bengal and failed to remit certain sums to Cawnpore within a reasonable time; he absconded. Therefore the offence charged falls under the second/omission part of section 405 — that is, wrongful use/disposal in violation of a contractual or legal duty to remit or hand over the proceeds at Cawnpore.
- Legal-basis for jurisdiction at Cawnpore: where a person is bound to account or to remit in a particular place, and the offence consists of failing to perform that duty, the court at the place where performance was due has jurisdiction. The court also relied on section 43 IPC (defining “legally bound to do” as whatever it is illegal to omit) to characterise the accused's failure to remit as an illegal omission amounting to an offence within the jurisdiction of the Cawnpore Magistrate.
- Assessment of contrary authorities: the court distinguished earlier cases where (a) positive misappropriation occurred at another place (first part cases), or (b) no duty to remit to the forum existed. It rejected arguments that the mere fact of initial collection in Bengal necessarily made Bengal the sole forum; the critical inquiry is whether the charge is of misappropriation at a particular place or of an omission to account/ remit where performance was due.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The reference is refused: the Magistrate at Cawnpore had jurisdiction to try the charge.
Implications and direct consequences:
- The court concluded that the allegations and evidence placed the offence within the second (omission-based) part of section 405 IPC — i.e., the accused was bound to account or remit to Cawnpore and his failure to do so constituted the offence — and therefore the Magistrate at Cawnpore properly had jurisdiction.
- The court directed that the record be returned to the Magistrate through the learned Sessions Judge of Cawnpore for continuation of proceedings.
- The decision reaffirms the analytical approach for determining venue in criminal breach of trust cases: distinguish between positive misappropriation (venue where misappropriation occurred) and omission/non-accounting where performance was due (venue where accused was bound to account or remit).
Note: This summary is limited to and derived exclusively from the content of the provided opinion. No external facts or interpretations beyond the opinion text have been added.
Sulaiman, C.J and Bennet, J.:— This is a reference by the learned Sessions Judge of Cawnpore of the case of King-Emperor v. Mohru Lal under section 408/409 of the Indian Penal Code, on the ground that the Magistrate of Cawnpore has no jurisdiction to try this case. The charge as actually framed by the Magistrate is that Mohru Lal between the dates of the 10th of May and the 18th of December, 1934, being a factor or broker, servant or agent of Matadin Bhagwan Das did commit criminal breach of trust in respect of Rs. 19,013-5-9 and committed an offence under section 408/409 of the Indian Penal Code. The Magistrate has omitted to put the place of occurrence of the offence. For the accused it is contended that the allegations of the complainant amount to a charge of a commission of an offence somewhere in Bengal and that the Cawnpore court has no jurisdiction to try such an offence. For the complainant the allegation is that the offence can be inquired into in Cawnpore and that the Cawnpore court has jurisdiction. The allegations in the complaint are that the accused was engaged in Cawnpore as an agent of the firm of Matadin Bhagwan Das, sugar merchants of Cawnpore, and that the accused was sent to Bengal with instructions to effect deliveries of sugar bags and to realise the price of goods from customers and either personally bring the proceeds to Cawnpore or remit the money to Cawnpore, that accused did remit large sums to Cawnpore and chat the latest date of such remittance was the 7th of December, 1934, and that “subsequently he withheld the moneys collected by him and embezzled”. In paragraph 7 of the complaint the names of nine purchasers are given and the total amount paid by these purchasers Rs. 19,099, and the allegation is made that the accused realised these amounts and embezzled the sums. The evidence given on behalf of the complainant showed that these sums had been realised by the accused. It was further shown that the accused absconded and could not be traced. There was no evidence given on behalf of the complainant nor was any allegation made that the accused had actually misappropriated or converted to his own use this money by any positive act. The allegations and evidence of the complainant were that the accused had collected this money and had failed to send it to Cawnpore within 3 reasonable time. It was also shown that certain of the sums of money in question had been collected by the accused prior to his last remittance on the 7th of December, 1934, and therefore the argument was that the accused had misappropriated these sums of money.
The point of jurisdiction has been argued before us at great length and learned counsel has contended that the offence, if any, must be taken to have been committed in Bengal. It is contended by learned counsel that this case might be tried at any of the places in Bengal where it is shown that the accused had collected money. One objection to such an argument is that the mere collection of the money did not amount to a criminal offence. The accused may have been perfectly innocent when he collected this money and his criminal offence occurred later when he failed to remit the money or to bring it to Cawnpore. Now there are various rulings, on which learned counsel relies, of the Calcutta High Court. The earliest of these is Gunananda Dhone v. Santi Prakash Nandy(1). In that ruling a Bench, of which Mukerji, J., was a member, laid down two propositions; (1) that where there was an accused person bound to render accounts, the court which had jurisdiction at the place where the accounts were to be rendered had jurisdiction for an offence of criminal breach of trust, and (2) that such jurisdiction existed even where there was clear evidence of embezzlement in another place. Later rulings dissented from this latter proposition, and in Pascal v. Raj Kishore Mathur(2) a Bench of two Judges including the learned Chief Justice threw doubts on the correctness of the decision in Gunananda Dhone v. Santi Prakash Nandy, but in this case the Bench did not interfere with the continuance of the trial before the Magistrate in Calcutta. There is again a ruling against the applicant, in Paul de Flondor v. Emperor. The ruling proceeds on page 98 to quote a decision in Reg. v. Davison where Baron Alderson stated: “Where there is no evidence of fraudulent embezzlement, except the non-accounting, the venue may be laid in the place where the non-accounting occurred, because the jury may presume that there the fraudulent misappropriation was made, but this cannot apply where there is distinct evidence of the misappropriation elsewhere.” Further, on page 99 it was laid down: “Embezzlement, according to English common law, is committed, and can be tried in the place where the accused misappropriated the money, or if there is no evidence of embezzlement except the non-accounting, then in the place where he ought to have accounted and failed to do so, or accounted falsely or refused to account, or denied the receipt of the money.” Now the learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court went on to say: “But whatever be the effect of the English decisions and statutes, they are not in point. So far as India is concerned, the Code of Criminal Procedure, in sections 177 to 189 provides the appropriate venue. It has been settled law for many, years that section 179 does not apply to charges of misappropriation.” And reference was also made to section 181(2). Now we are of the opinion that the learned Judges in referring to these provisions of sections 179 and 181 hissed the point in regard to this particular offence. In our view the essence of the English common law is that the offence itself may involve the commission of an offence at a place where there is a failure to render accounts. Sections 179 and 181(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code are sections which in various circumstances extend die jurisdiction of the courts beyond the place where the offence is actually committed. What we have to see in regard to this offence of criminal breach of trust is where the offence was actually committed action 177 of the Criminal Procedure Code lays down a rather obvious proposition that the court where the offence is committed has jurisdiction to try the offence, but that section and the subsequent sections do not indicate which is the court where the offence is committed. That point has to be determined from the definition of the offences in the Indian Penal Code.
Now when we come to the particular offence in question we find that section 405 is as follows: “Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property, dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract, express or implied, which he has made touching the discharge of such trust, or wilfully suffers any other person so to do, commits ‘criminal breach of trust’.” This section falls into two parts. The first part is a positive part and deals with dishonest misappropriation or conversion of property. To charge a person under this part of the section there should be an allegation that at a particular time and place that person has dishonestly misappropriated or converted to his own use property which was entrusted to him. Now the second part of the section may be a negative part. It consists of dishonestly using or disposing of property in violation of (a) any direction of law, or (b) any legal contract touching the discharge of the trust. Where there is a violation of a direction of law or a legal contract, the proof of that violation may be by negative evidence that the direction of law or the contract has not been fulfilled. We are of opinion that where the direction of law or the contract requires that the accused should dispose of the property at a particular place, then the court having jurisdiction at that place will have jurisdiction to try the offence of the second part of section 405 of the Indian Penal Code where there is a charge that the accused has failed to comply with the direction of law or the legal contract and has failed to carry out his duty at that place. The first part of section 405 will apply where it is known that the accused has dishonestly misappropriated or converted to his own use certain property at a particular place, and the jurisdiction to try the accused will be at the place where that dishonest misappropriation or conversion has taken place. But where it is alleged that the accused has failed to account for the property, then the second part of section 405 will apply and jurisdiction exists at the place where the property should have been delivered by the accused. In Paul de Flondor v. Emperor the court has laid down: “If there is evidence apart from the fact of non-accounting to show where the misappropriation was committed, the venue must be laid either in that place or in the place where the property was received or retained. If there is no evidence to show where the misappropriation was committed, other than the fact of non-accounting, then the venue may be laid in the place where the accused failed to account, because that is where the offence was committed within the meaning of section 181(2): Reg. v. Davison.” The latter portion of this observation is against the applicant in revision.
In Niwasilal Modi v. Routhmull(3) there was no duty to pay the money at Calcutta. The accused was employed by a Calcutta firm to manage a branch in Behar and his duty was to write up the books of the branch in Behar and to credit the money received to the firm in Behar. The accused was called to Calcutta to explain his accounts and he was unable to explain his accounts. It was held that the mere fact of being unable to explain his accounts in Calcutta did not give the Calcutta court jurisdiction. This ruling will not help the applicant because in the present case there was a duty to pay the money at Cawnpore.
In Prokash Chandra Sircar v. Mohim Chand Haldar there was a ruling of a Bench of which Mukerji, J., was again a member and it was held that where there was no definite allegation of misappropriation at any particular place, but the accused had a duty to remit the money which he realised to Calcutta and the accused failed to remit the money to Calcutta, then the Calcutta court had jurisdiction.
In In re Jivandas Savchand the accused was employed in Rangoon and he was charged with falsifying the accounts at Rangoon. He was employed by a firm in Bombay but he had no duty to remit the money to Bombay. His duty was to send to Bombay weekly statements of the accounts of the business transacted in Rangoon. It was held that the Bombay court had no jurisdiction to try the offence of criminal breach of trust. This again was a case where there was no duty to remit money to Bombay.
In Re Rambilas there were certain brokers of Bombay charged with having committed criminal breach of trust in Bombay in respect of certain hundis sent to them at Bombay by the complainants who resided within the jurisdiction of a Magistrate of Erode in Madras. It was held that the court at Erode had no jurisdiction to try the offence and the argument centred on section 179 of the Criminal Procedure Code on the ground that the criminal breach of trust in Bombay occasioned wrongful loss to the complainants in Erode. Learned counsel bases his argument on a mere obiter dicta at the bottom of page 641 and at the top of page 642 as follows:. “In the first place the present case falls under the first, and not the second, part of the section (405); the complaint clearly charges dishonest misappropriation to accused's own use, and not use or disposal in violation of law or contract. Secondly, if it were otherwise, the offence would be committed where the dishonest use or disposal took place, not where the contract was made or should have been performed.” This mere obiter dicta is of no weight.
In Aya Ram v. Gobind Lal Verma a single Judge remitted a case for further evidence which would show where the jurisdiction lay. We do not think that any weight can be assigned to his observations.
In Mahtab Din v. Emperor there was a ruling of the learned Chief Justice sitting alone. It was a case of a merchant at Karachi who should have remitted accounts and sale proceeds to Lyallpur in the Punjab, but he retained the sale proceeds at Karachi. The retention at Karachi was known and the case then fell under the first part of section 405.
In Ali Mohamed Kassim v. King-Emperor there was a case where the accused misappropriated the money by gambling at a certain place in the Shan States. He had to render accounts at Mandalay, but it was held that this did not give the Mandalay court jurisdiction. This was a case falling under the first part of section 405 of the Indian Penal Code.
We now turn to the rulings of this High Court.
In Queen-Empress v. O'Brien(4) Sir John Edge, C.J, had before him a case in which the accused was employed by a company of Cawnpore to sell goods in Bengal and the company ordered him to return the goods or the sale proceeds and the accused failed to comply. The Court held that the Cawnpore court had jurisdiction. It is true that the judgment was partly based on the consequence of loss of the value of goods arising to the employers at Cawnpore and this view of the law is not now good law. A similar view was taken by Rafiq, J., in Langridge v. Atkins(5).
In Emperor v. Mahadeo(6) Tudball, J., had a case where the accused was employed by a firm in Mirzapur to take goods for sale to districts in Lower Bengal and sell the goods and remit the money to his employers in Mirzapur. When called on to furnish accounts he failed to do so. It was held that there was jurisdiction in Mirzapur.
In Ganeshi Lal v. Nand Kishore Karamat Husain, J., held that the Cawnpore court did not have jurisdiction where an agent of a Cawnpore firm was in charge of a branch shop in Sultanpur and he misappropriated money belonging to his principal which should have been sent to the head office at Cawnpore, because the offence of misappropriation was actually and definitely committed at the branch shop. “When the complainant was examined he distinctly stated that the accused misappropriated the money belonging to the branch firm at Gauriganj.” This view of the law that in these cases section 179 of the Criminal Procedure Code will entitle a court to have jurisdiction on the ground that wrongful loss is caused to the complainant and that wrongful loss is a consequence of the criminal act within the meaning of section 179 is a view which has been held to be incorrect by a Full Bench of this Court in Emperor v. Kashi Ram Mehta. In that ruling it was observed by the learned Chief Justice on page 1056: “It may also be pointed out that where it is the duty of an agent not only to return specific goods to his principal but to account for that and to render accounts, the offence of misappropriation may not be committed till he has the dishonest intention of causing wrongful loss to his master and wrongful gain to himself, and, therefore, it may not possibly come into existence till ultimately he refuses either to render account or to pay the balance due. This may happen not only at the place where he deceived money but at the place where he is employed or his master resides.”
We may also refer to a brief ruling of a Full Bench of this Court in Sheo Shankar…Applicant; v. Mohan Sarup…Opposite Party.. In that case a servant of a shop at Mirzapur was sent to collect money from two villages in Allahabad district and he failed to bring the money to Mirzapur and alleged that he had been robbed in Allahabad district. It was held that the Mirzapur court had jurisdiction to try him for criminal breach of trust. We consider that the basis of the decision is contained in the sentence: “Accused No. 1 was the servant of the complainant and had a duty to account to his master at the shop at Mirzapur.”
Having considered all these rulings we are of opinion that the propositions in regard to jurisdiction for cases falling under section 405 enunciated by us in the earlier part of this judgment are correct. On that view of the law, in the present case the Magistrate at Cawnpore had jurisdiction because the allegations in the complaint are that the accused withheld money collected by him and did not forward it to Cawnpore. There is no charge that he misappropriated or converted to his own use the money at any particular place and his offence consists in failing to carry out his contract and remit the money or bring the money to Cawnpore. He was guilty of an illegal omission. Section 43 of the Indian Penal Code lays down that a person is said to be “legally bound to do” whatever it is illegal in him to omit. He was legally bound to remit this money to Cawnpore and he failed to do so. He therefore committed an offence within the jurisdiction of the Magistrate in Cawnpore by his illegal omission to send or bring the money to Cawnpore. We consider therefore that the Magistrate at Cawnpore had jurisdiction to try this case.
We accordingly refuse this reference and direct that the record be returned to the Magistrate through the learned Sessions Judge.
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