- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
State Of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohd. Iqram And Another
Factual and Procedural Background
Rashmi (about 30 years old) lived separately from her ex-husband Suresh Kumar after a divorce decree dated 30-1-1980, which allowed her to occupy one room of the matrimonial house and entitled her to maintenance. On the night of 15-5-1980, a police patrol heard screams from that house and saw three men scaling the western wall. Two of them—later identified as the present respondents—were apprehended immediately; the third, allegedly Suresh Kumar, escaped.
Inside Rashmi’s room the police found her unconscious on a cot. She was taken to SBD Hospital by Mahesh Kumar (PW-3) and was declared dead. Post-mortem revealed multiple abrasions and contusions consistent with manual strangulation.
A charge under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC was registered against the two respondents and Suresh Kumar. After trial, the Sessions Court (20-12-1980) convicted the respondents and sentenced them to life imprisonment but acquitted Suresh Kumar. The respondents’ appeals (Criminal Appeals Nos. 14 and 60 of 1981) were allowed by the Allahabad High Court on 25-4-2003, resulting in their acquittal. The State of Uttar Pradesh appealed to the Supreme Court, leading to the present judgment.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the High Court erred in reversing the respondents’ conviction when the circumstantial evidence, according to the trial court, formed a complete chain pointing to their guilt.
- Whether the High Court relied on inadmissible material—specifically certain observations in the post-mortem report—contrary to Section 313 CrPC requirements.
- Whether the High Court’s findings on non-recovery of a weapon, lack of identification, and alleged sexual assault were sustainable in light of the trial record.
- Under what circumstances the Supreme Court may interfere with an order of acquittal.
Arguments of the Parties
State of U.P. (Appellant)
- The trial court rightly found an unbroken chain of circumstances: respondents were strangers to the locality, apprehended at the scene, and no other motive (theft/rape) was evident except murder.
- The High Court wrongly stressed non-recovery of a weapon even though manual strangulation required none.
- Reliance on post-mortem remarks suggesting rape, without supporting testimony or putting the point to the accused under Section 313 CrPC, rendered the High Court judgment legally flawed.
- The High Court’s view on doubtful identification ignored concurrent torchlight evidence from multiple witnesses.
Respondents (represented by Amicus Curiae)
- The High Court’s acquittal rested on cogent appreciation of evidence: absence of motive, doubtful identification without electric light, and possibility that Suresh Kumar was the real culprit.
- Interference with an acquittal is permissible only on limited grounds; none exist here.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116 | Inculpatory material not put to the accused under Section 313 CrPC cannot be used against him. | Used to hold that post-mortem comments on alleged rape could not be relied on because that circumstance was never put to any accused. |
| State of Maharashtra v. Sukhdev Singh (1992) 3 SCC 700 | Same Section 313 CrPC principle of fair opportunity. | Cited alongside Sharad Sarda to invalidate High Court reliance on un-put circumstances. |
| Paramjeet Singh v. State of Uttarakhand (2010) 10 SCC 439 | Mandatory duty of court to confront accused with incriminating evidence. | Reinforced inadmissibility of un-put post-mortem observations. |
| State of Bihar v. Radha Krishna Singh (1983) 3 SCC 118 | Distinction between admissibility of a document and its probative value. | Used to emphasise that mere exhibition of the post-mortem report does not prove every statement in it. |
| Madan Mohan Singh v. Rajni Kant (2010) 9 SCC 209 | Same proposition on limited probative value of documents. | Applied to reduce weight of post-mortem remarks. |
| Babu v. State of Kerala (2010) 9 SCC 189 | Principles governing appellate interference with acquittal. | Relied on to justify Supreme Court intervention because High Court findings were termed perverse. |
| Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta v. State of Maharashtra (2010) 13 SCC 657 | Guidelines on overturning acquittal; presumption of innocence vs. compelling reasons. | Cited for standard of review. |
| Brahm Swaroop v. State of U.P. (2011) 6 SCC 288 | Same as above. | Cited to clarify when appellate interference is warranted. |
| S. Ganesan v. Rama Raghuraman (2011) 2 SCC 83 | Appellate interference with acquittal. | Referenced in support of overturning High Court view. |
| V.S. Achuthanandan v. R. Balakrishna Pillai (2011) 3 SCC 317 | Appellate standards for reversing acquittal. | Same application. |
| State of M.P. v. Ramesh (2011) 4 SCC 786 | Appellate interference principles. | Cited for completeness of chain of circumstances. |
| Abrar v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2011) 2 SCC 750 | Guidelines on perverse acquittals. | Used to show High Court approach was unreasonable. |
| Rukia Begum v. State of Karnataka (2011) 4 SCC 779 | Same category of precedents on acquittal review. | Strengthened basis for intervention. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court scrutinised the High Court’s acquittal and found its conclusions “perverse” for several reasons:
- Non-recovery of weapon immaterial: Medical evidence showed death by manual strangulation; therefore absence of a weapon had no evidentiary value.
- Inadmissible reliance on post-mortem remarks: The High Court’s inference of rape by Suresh Kumar was based solely on comments in the post-mortem report that were neither proved through the doctor’s testimony nor put to any accused under Section 313 CrPC, violating settled law.
- Identification supported by torch-light witnesses: Four prosecution witnesses (PW-3, PW-6, PW-7, PW-8) consistently testified that multiple torches illuminated the fleeing men, making identification reliable despite power failure.
- Unexplained presence of respondents: They were strangers to the locality, caught immediately inside the compound at night. Once presence was proved, the burden shifted to them to offer a plausible explanation, which they failed to do.
- Circumstantial chain intact: No sign of theft or sexual assault; purse and cash were intact; nature of injuries corresponded only to manual strangulation. The trial court’s chain of circumstances therefore remained unbroken.
- Failure to consider defence evidence: The High Court ignored DW-1’s testimony, which the trial court had already found unreliable.
- Applying the highlighted precedents, the Court held that compelling circumstances existed to overturn the acquittal because the High Court had relied on irrelevant and inadmissible material and disregarded critical prosecution evidence.
Holding and Implications
Appeals Allowed. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s judgment dated 25-4-2003 and restored the Sessions Court conviction and life sentences imposed on the two respondents.
Implications: The respondents are to be apprehended to serve the remaining portion of their life sentences. The judgment reinforces that appellate courts must not rely on inadmissible evidence and that non-recovery of a weapon is irrelevant where medical evidence shows none was required. No new legal doctrine was created, but the decision underscores established principles on Section 313 CrPC and limits of appellate review of acquittals.
Dr. B.S Chauhan, J.— These appeals have been preferred by the State of U.P against the judgment and order dated 25-4-2003 passed by the High Court of Judicature of Allahabad in Criminal Appeals Nos. 14 and 60 of 1981, reversing the judgment and order of the Sessions Court dated 20-12-1980 in Sessions Trial No. 382 of 1980 passed by the learned District Judge, Saharanpur, by which both the respondents stood convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter called as “IPC”) and had been awarded life imprisonment.
2. The brief résumé of the facts as emerging from the FIR and the evidence adduced by the parties is set forth: one Rashmi, deceased, aged about 30 years had been married to Suresh Kumar (the accused, acquitted by the Sessions Court), but her relations with him and her mother-in-law always remained strained. They had no child. Suresh Kumar obtained a decree of divorce on 30-1-1980 under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and as per the decree, Rashmi, the deceased, was permitted to reside in a room with an enclosed open area towards its west, apart from the rest of the house, and she was granted maintenance @ Rs 150 per month till her lifetime or remarriage, whichever was earlier. Being aggrieved, Rashmi, the deceased, had preferred an appeal against the said decree of divorce dated 30-1-1980 and the same was pending before the District Judge, Saharanpur.
3. On 15-5-1980 at about 9.00 p.m, SI Brahm Pal Singh (PW 6) of Police Station Sadar Bazar accompanied by Head Constable Balvir Singh (PW 7) and two other constables were on a routine check-up and general patrolling. On reaching the west of Adarsh School in the close vicinity of the house of Rashmi the deceased, he and his companions heard shrieks emanating from the house of Suresh Kumar, the accused known as “Jagadhari walon ki kothi”. The police party saw three persons scaling down the wall of the sehan towards west of the room under the occupation of Rashmi, the deceased.
4. On being challenged and flashing of torchlight, two of them ran towards north-west and the third towards south. On a chase, the present two respondents who were running towards north-west, were caught hold by Samay Singh (PW 8) and one Sharif who was present there. The other accused who ran towards south, managed to escape. He was named as Suresh Kumar by the present two respondents after they had been apprehended. The respondents led the police party inside the sehan of the said house. The lock inside the door opening in the sehan was broken by SI Brahm Pal Singh (PW 6) and a woman was seen lying unconscious on the floor in the room on a cot. In the meanwhile, Mahesh Kumar (PW 3) (brother of Suresh Kumar), also came down from the upper storey besides other persons. Mahesh Kumar (PW 3) took Rashmi, the deceased, by car to SBD Hospital, Saharanpur. The respondents had been taken to Police Station Sadar Bazar where FIR was lodged by SI Brahm Pal Singh (PW 6). However, on receiving the information of death of Rashmi, the deceased, at about 11.00 p.m from Mahesh Kumar (PW 3), the case was converted under Section 302 IPC and investigation ensued.
5. The post-mortem of the dead body was conducted by Dr. G.R Sharma (PW 1) on 16-5-1980, according to which the deceased was about 30 years of age and had died about 18 hours from the time of conducting post-mortem. The doctor found the following ante-mortem injuries on her person:
(1) Lacerated wound 1½ cm × 1½ cm × ¼ cm on the left eyelid with contusion 7.5 cm × 2 cm extending from the left eyelid to the left temple region.
(2) Abrasion 4 cm × ½ cm on the left cheek.
(3) Abrasion 1½ cm × ¾ cm on left side neck, 2 cm below the angle of mandible.
(4) Abrasion ½ cm × ½ cm with contusion 1½ cm × 1 cm on the right side of neck, 4 cm below the angle of mandible.
(5) Abrasion 1½ cm × 1 cm on back of left shoulder joint top.
(6) Abrasion 1 cm × 1 cm on back of left elbow joint.
(7) Contusion 5 cm × 3 cm on right forearm upper 1/3rd medial side.
(8) Contusion 4 cm × 2 cm on back of inner angle of scapula.
6. Suresh Kumar was also arrested on 23-5-1980 and he was kept bapurdah. He was subjected to test identification parade on 6-6-1980 and was identified by SI Brahm Pal Singh (PW 6), Head Constable Balvir Singh (PW 7) and Samay Singh (PW 8) besides Babu Ram and Surendra Pal. As all the three accused pleaded not guilty, they were put to trial. The prosecution, in all, examined 13 witnesses. The respondent Mohd. Iqram also examined one Bhugan (DW 1), the Pradhan of Village Taharpur in his defence.
7. On consideration of the evidence on record, the learned trial court convicted and sentenced the two respondents as mentioned hereinabove, but acquitted Suresh Kumar (husband of deceased Rashmi) giving him benefit of doubt entirely on the premise that he might have been known to the identifying witnesses from before, and he was shown to the witnesses before being put to test identification. Being aggrieved, the two respondents filed Criminal Appeals Nos. 14 and 60 of 1981 before the Allahabad High Court which have been allowed by the judgment and order dated 25-4-2003. Hence, these appeals.
8. Shri R.K Gupta, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State of U.P, has submitted that the High Court committed an error in acquitting the respondents without appreciating the facts on record. The trial court had convicted the respondents on circumstantial evidence making clear-cut observations that the chain of circumstances was complete; the said respondents had been arrested from the place of occurrence; their presence was not likely to be there as they were not the residents of the area; there had been no theft or dacoity in the area. Rashmi, the deceased, was strangulated with hands without the aid of any weapon. The High Court ordered acquittal on the basis that no weapon had been recovered and probably Suresh Kumar, who had been acquitted by the trial court had committed the murder after committing rape on the deceased, though the trial court had recorded a finding that there had been no violence with the body of the deceased even prior to her strangulation. The High Court has placed reliance on inadmissible evidence which is not permissible in law. The judgment and order of the High Court is liable to be set aside and the appeals deserve to be allowed.
9. On the contrary, Smt K. Sarada, learned amicus curiae, has vehemently opposed the appeals contending that the High Court had given cogent reasons while acquitting the respondents. This Court should not interfere with the said order as it is based on proper appreciation of evidence. No motive could be established against the respondents, thus, appeals are liable to be dismissed.
10. We have considered the rival submissions made by both the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. As it is a case of acquittal, this Court has to be slow in interfering with the impugned judgment and order and it is permissible to reverse the judgment of acquittal only on settled principles of law. This Court will have to record conclusions that the findings of fact recorded by the High Court are perverse and, for that purpose, it is necessary for us to make reference to the evidence on record very briefly.
11. Mahesh Kumar (PW 3) is the brother of accused Suresh Kumar, husband of Rashmi, the deceased. He had deposed that on 15-5-1980 at about 9.00 p.m, he was on the roof of his house along with his another brother. He heard shrieks from the room of Rashmi, the deceased. He flashed the light of torch towards the same and found that 2-3 persons were running away from there. He immediately came downstairs and found that some persons had already gathered there. He found that these two respondents had been apprehended by the police and local persons present there. He had gone along with these respondents and police to the room of the deceased and found her lying on the cot. Mahesh Kumar (PW 3) took her to the hospital where she was declared dead.
12. SI Brahm Pal Singh (PW 6) has supported the prosecution case by stating that when he was on patrol duty on 15-5-1980 and reached near the place of occurrence, he heard some noise from the residence of Rashmi, the deceased. He immediately went towards the said house and found that three persons were scaling down the western wall of the building. The police party chased them along with other persons and apprehended them. Samay Singh (PW 8) and Sharif had also reached there. One person escaped.
13. Head Constable Balvir Singh (PW 7) who had accompanied SI Brahm Pal Singh (PW 6) deposed that they found three persons scaling down the western wall of the house and police along with other persons chased them and apprehended two persons while one escaped. Samay Singh (PW 8) has also made a similar statement supporting the case of the prosecution.
14. Om Prakash Chaudhry, a practising advocate, had deposed about the strained relationship between accused Suresh Kumar and deceased Rashmi and further deposed that Rashmi, the deceased, had told him 2-3 times that she had an apprehension of being killed by Suresh Kumar, the accused and her mother-in-law. The prosecution case stands further supported by Dr. G.R Sharma (PW 1), who had conducted the post-mortem examination and in the report opined that injuries on the person of Rashmi, the deceased, could be caused by strangulation and use of force.
15. After appreciating the aforesaid evidence including the deposition of Bhugan (DW 1), the trial court came to the conclusion that Suresh Kumar, the accused, had no motive and his identification was also not reliable and acquitted him by giving the benefit of doubt.
16. The respondents were convicted by giving cogent reasons on the basis of the following grounds:
•None of the accused persons belonged to the locality or even to the city.
•No suggestion came to be made from their side as to what could have brought them to the spot at the moment.
•They were utter strangers to the area operating under cover of darkness and seen scaling down the wall in a bid to run away.
•Upon being taken into custody they took the police party inside the western sehan and then to the apartment occupied by the deceased.
•The medical evidence did not suggest that there was rape or anything of the kind attempted on Smt Rashmi. Nor did the investigation reveal any case of theft.
•The purse of the deceased was found intact in the room besides the sum of Rs 107 and odd. None of the articles was shown to have been taken away. The object behind those who operated inside the room, therefore, could not have other than to kill Smt Rashmi.
•Death was possible in the medical opinion also, to be caused by strangulation with the hands without the application of any other instrument or weapon.
17. The High Court after appreciating the evidence acquitted the respondents on the basis of the following findings:
(1) The simple fact of their running in the lane at that moment could not be sufficient to fasten the guilt on their heads. There is no corroboration of any independent witness that the accused had scaled down the western wall of the house.
(2) The deceased was a continuous source of trouble to her husband Suresh Kumar. She was not reconciled to the divorce granted in favour of her husband and she had challenged the same before the appellate court and her husband had also been burdened with the liability to pay maintenance to her till her lifetime. Further observations made by the Court read as under:
“The post-mortem report shows that seminal fluid was found in her vaginal part and several ante-mortem injuries had also been inflicted on her. The autopsy indicated as if she was subject to forcible intercourse also before her death. The greater possibility is that it was her husband who cut short her life after inflicting several injuries on her and strangulating her, but before doing that he even had forcible sexual intercourse with her exhibiting sadistic tendency. He did her to death this way, removing the thorn from his way for all times to come. After committing the crime, he managed the vanishing trick from the scene. The said feature is that the case was given a different profile relating to him, not coming up to the standard required to find him guilty.”
(3) There was no electric supply at the relevant time. Thus, identification of the accused while scaling down the wall becomes doubtful.
(4) The weapon used in the offence had not been recovered.
18. In the aforesaid fact situation, the case requires very close scrutiny.
19. Dr. G.R Sharma (PW 1) had deposed that the injuries could be caused by strangulation by hands. Thus, the question of recovering any weapon as mentioned by the High Court, is totally unwarranted and uncalled for. More so, nature of the injuries itself reveals that for causing such injuries, no weapon was required. Non-use of weapon cannot be illogical, keeping in view the findings recorded in the post-mortem report.
20. So far as the issue of rape of the deceased prior to her murder by Suresh Kumar, the accused, her ex-husband, is concerned, the trial court has recorded findings of fact on this aspect in the negative. Undoubtedly, the post-mortem report contains such observations, but Dr. G.R Sharma (PW 1) has not made any such reference either in his examination-in-chief or cross-examination. Nor had this aspect ever been put to either of the three accused in their statements recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter called “CrPC”). We fail to understand as under what circumstances it was permissible for the High Court to make such observations about the post-mortem report. Accused Suresh Kumar has been acquitted by the trial court. The State, for reasons best known to it, did not prefer any appeal against the said order of acquittal. We are of the considered opinion that it was not permissible for the High Court to castigate the accused Suresh Kumar with such observations holding him guilty of committing rape and subsequently murder of his ex-wife Rashmi.
21. Undoubtedly, the post-mortem report had been proved but that does not mean that each and every content thereof is stood proved or can be held to be admissible. Such observations cannot be termed to be a substantive piece of evidence. Dr. G.R Sharma (PW 1) did not even whisper about the same in his statement made in the court which is the only substantive piece of evidence in law. The court cannot place reliance on incriminating material against the accused, unless it is put to him during his examination under Section 313 CrPC. Thus, the High Court committed an error by taking into consideration the inadmissible evidence for the purpose of deciding the criminal appeals and holding the person guilty who had already been acquitted by the trial court. The post-mortem report had been examined at the time of framing of the charges. The trial court did not frame any charge under Section 376 IPC or Section 376 read with Section 511 IPC. More so, no witness had ever mentioned anything in this respect. Thus, it is beyond any stretch of imagination of any person, how such observations could be made by the High Court.
22. No matter how weak or scanty the prosecution evidence is in regard to certain incriminating material, it is the duty of the court to examine the accused and seek his explanation on incriminating material that has surfaced against him.
“22. Section 313 CrPC is based on the fundamental principle of fairness. The attention of the accused must specifically be brought to inculpatory pieces of evidence to give him an opportunity to offer an explanation if he chooses to do so. Therefore, the court is under a legal obligation to put the incriminating circumstances before the accused and solicit his response. This provision is mandatory in nature and casts an imperative duty on the court and confers a corresponding right on the accused to have an opportunity to offer an explanation for such incriminatory material appearing against him. Circumstances which were not put to the accused in his examination under Section 313 CrPC cannot be used against him and have to be excluded from consideration.”
(Vide Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116, AIR 1984 SC 1622, State of Maharashtra v. Sukhdev Singh (1992) 3 SCC 700, AIR 1992 SC 2100 and Paramjeet Singh v. State of Uttarakhand (2010) 10 SCC 439, AIR 2011 SC 200)
23. In State of Bihar v. Radha Krishna Singh (1983) 3 SCC 118, AIR 1983 SC 684 this Court dealt with the issue of prohibitive (sic probative) value of the contents of an admitted document and held as under:
“40. … Admissibility of a document is one thing and its probative value quite another—these two aspects cannot be combined. A document may be admissible and yet may not carry any conviction and weight or its probative value may be nil.”
(See also Madan Mohan Singh v. Rajni Kant (2010) 9 SCC 209, AIR 2010 SC 2933.)
24. Thus, even if the post-mortem report revealed any sexual assault on the deceased victim, such contents are not admissible, in spite of the fact that the post-mortem report had been exhibited and proved by Dr. G.R Sharma (PW 1), in view of the facts mentioned hereinabove.
25. So far as the question of the source of light and identification of the accused are concerned, the depositions of Mahesh Kumar (PW 3), brother of Suresh Kumar, the accused; Brahm Pal Singh, SI (PW 6); Balvir Singh (PW 7) and Samay Singh (PW 8) reveal that there were minimum three torches which had been flashed simultaneously on the persons who were scaling down the wall and were being chased by the police as well as by the local residents including Samay Singh (PW 8). In such a fact situation, failure of electric supply does not become fatal. Brahm Pal Singh (PW 6) and Balvir Singh (PW 7) have identified the respondents being the persons who were scaling down the wall and had been apprehended upon an immediate chase. Therefore, the High Court erred in recording the finding that identification was doubtful.
26. Once the prosecution had brought home the evidence of the presence of the accused at the scene of the crime, then the onus stood shifted on the defence to have brought forth suggestions as to what could have brought them to the spot in the dead of night. The accused were apprehended and therefore, they were under an obligation to rebut this burden discharged by the prosecution, and having failed to do so, the trial court was justified in recording its findings on this issue. The High Court committed an error by concluding that the prosecution had failed to discharge its burden. Thus, the judgment proceeds on a surmise that renders it unsustainable.
27. The trial court did not find the evidence of Bhugan (DW 1), examined by Mohd. Iqram, one of the respondents, worth acceptance. The High Court did not even make any reference to him.
28. It is a settled legal proposition that in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse i.e the conclusions of the courts below are contrary to the evidence on record or its entire approach in dealing with the evidence is patently illegal, leading to miscarriage of justice or its judgment is unreasonable based on erroneous law and facts on the record of the case, the appellate court should interfere with the order of acquittal. While doing so, the appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the acquittal by the courts below bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference. (See Babu v. State of Kerala (2010) 9 SCC 189, Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta (Dr.) v. State of Maharashtra (2010) 13 SCC 657, Brahm Swaroop v. State of U.P (2011) 6 SCC 288, AIR 2011 SC 280, S. Ganesan v. Rama Raghuraman (2011) 2 SCC 83, V.S Achuthanandan v. R. Balakrishna Pillai (2011) 3 SCC 317, State of M.P v. Ramesh (2011) 4 SCC 786, Abrar v. State of U.P (2011) 2 SCC 750 and Rukia Begum v. State of Karnataka (2011) 4 SCC 779.)
29. In the instant case, the circumstantial evidence is so strong that it points unmistakably to the guilt of the respondents and is incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of their guilt. Therefore, findings of fact recorded by the High Court are perverse, being based on irrelevant considerations and inadmissible material.
30. In view of the above, the appeals succeed and are allowed. The judgment and order of the High Court dated 25-4-2003 is hereby set aside. The judgment and order of the trial court dated 20-12-1980 in Sessions Trial No. 382 of 1980 is restored. A copy of the order be sent to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Saharanpur to ensure that the respondents be apprehended and sent to jail for serving out the unserved part of the sentence awarded by the trial court.
Alert