Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Emperor v. Faujdar And Others

Allahabad High Court
Feb 11, 1933
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Judgment Summary — Young and Bennet, JJ.

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal concerns the criminal charge of dacoity. The Government appealed against the acquittal of three persons described as doms — Faujdar, Sita, and Balli. Separately, four persons who had been convicted by the Sessions Judge of Ghazipur — Ishri Kurmi, Shiva Gobind Ahir, Damri Gond, and Dudhnath Dusadh — had appealed their convictions. The Sessions Judge had sentenced the four convicted persons to six years' rigorous imprisonment. The trial record included (1) pointing out of property by the doms, which the Court stated was "not... clearly proved" and (2) evidence of a Sub-Inspector (Rafiullah Khan) describing that "Sita took us to the house of Jebodh and he asked Jebodh to hand over the clothes which he had given to him." The judgment resolves both questions of admissibility of such police-related statements and the sufficiency of evidence against individual accused persons.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a statement made to a police officer (specifically an accused's pointing out of property or information given to a Sub-Inspector) is admissible in evidence under section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act notwithstanding the wording of section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code as amended by Act XVIII of 1923.
  2. Whether the wording of section 162, Criminal Procedure Code, as amended, was intended to alter or exclude the operation of section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act in respect of statements made to police officers by accused persons.
  3. On the merits, whether the evidence (confessions, production of property, identification) was sufficient to sustain convictions for dacoity under section 395 of the Indian Penal Code in respect of the individual appellants (Ishri Kurmi, Shiva Gobind Ahir, Damri Gond, and Dudhnath Dusadh), and whether the acquittals of Faujdar, Sita, and Balli should be disturbed.

Arguments of the Parties

Defence (as argued by learned counsel Mr. Jawahir Lal)

  • Contended that the Sub-Inspector's evidence about the pointing out of property was inadmissible under the provisions of section 162, Criminal Procedure Code (as amended), because "no statement made by any person to a police officer" may be used for any purpose at a trial.
  • Argued that the amended section 162 therefore excludes the use in evidence of material which would otherwise be admissible under section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, unless the information was given to a person other than a police officer.

Prosecution / Respondent Position

  • Contended that the evidence in question was admissible under section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, which allows proof of facts discovered as a consequence of information received from an accused in custody, to the extent that the information relates distinctly to the fact discovered.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Queen-Empress v. Babu Lal (Full Bench) Held that section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act covers evidence of facts discovered as a consequence of information received from an accused person (including information given to police), i.e., such information is admissible to the extent that it relates distinctly to the fact discovered. The Court relied on this Full Bench decision as authority that section 27 does cover evidence of this nature; it treated the Full Bench holding as supporting admissibility subject to the interpretive analysis of section 162 CrPC.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court undertook a statutory-interpretive analysis focusing on the interaction between section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act and section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code (as amended by Act XVIII of 1923).

  1. The Court began by acknowledging that section 27 of the Evidence Act plainly covers evidence of facts discovered as a consequence of information received from an accused person; it noted the Full Bench decision in Queen-Empress v. Babu Lal as support for that proposition.
  2. The defence argument rested on the amended wording of section 162 CrPC, which generally bars the use at trial of "any statement made by any person to a police officer" in the course of investigation. The defence contended that this general prohibition would exclude material admissible under section 27.
  3. The Court identified two distinct defects in the defence argument:
    1. Statutory scheme and context: the Court observed that section 161 CrPC deals with examination by a Sub-Inspector of persons acquainted with facts, and the subsequent provisions are concerned with the use of those statements; statements of accused persons are governed by section 164 CrPC and by sections 24–27 of the Evidence Act. The Court reasoned that if the legislature had intended to alter the operation of section 27 of the Evidence Act it would have done so explicitly (for example, by repealing or amending section 27). Reading section 162 as not intended to apply to statements by accused persons avoids a contradiction between the two statutes.
    2. General saving and special law principle: the Court relied on section 1(2) of the CrPC (the saving which preserves special or local laws in force unless a specific provision to the contrary exists) and characterized the Evidence Act as a "special law" applicable to evidence. The Court also referred to provisions indicating that, in the absence of specific contradictory provision in the CrPC, nothing in the CrPC should be taken to affect the Evidence Act. Because section 162 does not contain a specific provision expressly intended to alter section 27, the Court concluded the legislature did not intend to modify section 27 by the amended section 162.
  4. On this basis the Court concluded that evidence of the type at issue (facts discovered as a consequence of information received from an accused) is admissible in cases like the present, i.e., section 27 still applies and the amended section 162 does not obliterate section 27's operation in respect of accused persons' information which leads to discovery.
  5. The Court then turned to merits. It found that for three accused — Ishri, Shiva Gobind, and Damri — there was their own confession and evidence that they had given up property; those facts supported convictions for dacoity under section 395 IPC, and their appeals were dismissed. In contrast, Dudhnath had made no confession, no property was shown to have been produced by him or on his behalf, and his identification rested on evidence the Court found to be of no weight (identification by Mst. Sukharani and a court pointing out). Being named in three retracted confessions alone was insufficient for conviction; the Court therefore allowed Dudhnath's appeal and acquitted him.
  6. Finally, as to the Government's appeal against the acquittal of the three doms (Faujdar, Sita, and Balli), the Court held that the evidence against them was insufficient for conviction and agreed with the Sessions Judge; the appeals against those acquittals were dismissed and those persons were ordered to be released.

Holding and Implications

The Court's core rulings (direct outcomes) are as follows:

  • On admissibility: The Court held that evidence of facts discovered as a consequence of information received from an accused person is admissible under section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act and that the amended section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code was not intended to, and does not, operate so as to displace section 27 in this context.
  • On convictions: The appeals of Ishri Kurmi, Shiva Gobind Ahir, and Damri Gond were dismissed; their convictions and the sentences imposed by the Sessions Judge for the offence under section 395, Indian Penal Code, were upheld.
  • On acquittal and release: The appeal of Dudhnath Dusadh was allowed; he was acquitted of the offence under section 395, his sentence set aside, and he was directed to be set at liberty. The Government's appeal against the acquittal of Faujdar, Sita, and Balli was dismissed; their acquittals were upheld and they were directed to be released forthwith.

Implications: The decision resolves, for the facts of this case, that section 27 Evidence Act remains operative to admit evidence of facts discovered from an accused even where section 162 CrPC (as amended) generally bars the use of statements made to police — the Court interpreted the statutory scheme and the saving for special laws to reach that conclusion. The opinion does not state that it is expressly creating a new legislative amendment; it interprets the existing interaction of CrPC and the Evidence Act and applies that interpretation to the present appeals.

Show all summary ...

Young and Bennet, JJ.:— This is an appeal by Government against the acquittal of three doms Faujdar, Sita, and Balli, of the offence of dacoity, and also the appeal of four persons who have been convicted of the offence of dacoity, Ishri Kurmi, Shiva Gobind Ahir, Damri Gond, and Dudhnath Dusadh. These four persons have been sentenced to six years' rigorous imprisonment by the Sessions Judge of Ghazipur.

Considerable argument was made over certain points of law which are not really very important for the purpose of this case, but as the matter has been argued before us we may state our findings on the points. As already noted, the pointing out of property by the doms is not, in our opinion, clearly proved, but the learned counsel, Mr. Jawahir Lal, argued on the supposition that if we were to accept the evidence of the Sub-Inspector on the point, this evidence would not be admissible. The evidence of Sub-Inspector Rafiullah Khan is as follows: “Then Sita took us to the house of Jebodh and he asked Jebodh to hand over the clothes which he had given to him.” It was contended by learned counsel that this evidence was not admissible because of the provisions of section 162, Criminal Procedure Code. On the other hand, it was contended that the evidence was admissible under section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act which states as follows: “Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of 3 police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved.” There is no doubt that section 27 as it stands does cover evidence of this nature. This has been held by a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Queen-Empress v. Babu Lal(1) by a majority of four Judges against one. But the argument of learned counsel is that subsequent to that Full Bench ruling the wording of section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code has been altered and this section now runs as follows: “No statement made by any person to a police officer in the course of an investigation under this chapter shall, if reduced into writing, be signed by the person making it; nor shall any such statement or any record thereof, whether in a police diary or otherwise, or any part of such statement or record, be used for any purpose (save as hereinafter provided) at any inquiry or trial in respect of any offence under investigation at the time when such statement was made.” The argument of learned counsel is that under this section a “statement made by any person to a police officer” includes a statement by an accused person to a police officer, and that such a statement cannot be used for any purpose. Therefore he argues that a statement such as one under section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act is now barred from being given in evidence if it is made to a police officer, and he argues that the statement would only be admissible in evidence if it was given to a person other than a police officer. There are, in our opinion, two defects in the argument of learned counsel for the defence. In the first place section 161 of the Criminal Procedure Code deals with the examination by a Sub-Inspector of any person supposed to be acquainted with the facts and circumstances of a case. The next section, in our opinion, deals with the use of the statement made to the Sub-Inspector and it is not intended to include statements by accused persons. It is true that the words “no statement made by any person” are general and if they stood alone would include accused persons, but the statements of accused persons are governed by section 164 which follows, and there are also provisions in sections 24-27 of the Indian Evidence Act in regard to statements made by accused persons. Section 163 repeats certain provisions of section 24 of the Indian Evidence Act and section 164 makes provision for recording statements or confessions by witnesses or accused persons by a Magistrate. Now we have to consider whether in regard to statements made by accused persons the Criminal Procedure Code intended in section 162, as amended by Act XVIII of 1923, to alter the provisions of section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. We consider that if the legislature had intended to alter the provisions of section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, the legislature would have repealed that section or amended it. We do not think it at all probable that the legislature would have proceeded to enact provisions in section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code which would be contrary to what was laid down in section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. Learned counsel on his view argues that there is a contradiction between the two sections, but if we read section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code as not applying to the statements of accused persons there is no contradiction between the two sections. The first proviso in section 162 deals with the calling of a witness for the prosecution, and, further, section 162, sub-section (2) deals with the provision in section 32, clause (1) of the Indian Evidence Act which is a provision relating to statements by a deceased person as to the cause of his death, in cases in which the cause of the death comes into question. We note that in section 162 there is a reference to two sections of the Indian Evidence Act, sections 145 and 32, clause (1). Therefore, in enacting section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code the legislature had in mind the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act.

But there is another quite separate ground which vitiates the argument of learned counsel; that is, that in section 1, sub-section (2), Criminal Procedure Code it is provided: “but, in the absence of any specific provision to the contrary, nothing herein contained shall affect any special or local law now in force, or any special jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special form of procedure prescribed, by any other law for the time being in force.” Now a special law is defined in section 41 of the Indian Penal Code as a law applicable to a particular subject. The Indian Evidence Act, therefore, is such a special law, as it is a law specially applicable to the subject of evidence. Section 4, last paragraph, of the Criminal Procedure Code says: “All words and expressions used herein and defined in the Indian Penal Code, and not hereinbefore defined, shall be deemed to have the meanings respectively attributed to them by that Code.” Therefore the provision in the Criminal Procedure Code is that in the absence of a specific provision to the contrary in the Criminal Procedure Code nothing in that Code shall affect anything in the Evidence Act. If, therefore, the legislature had desired to modify or alter the provisions of section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act by anything provided in section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the legislature would have made a specific provision to that effect. There is no such specific provision to that effect, and, therefore, the conclusion is that the legislature did not intend to modify section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act by anything provided in section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code. We are, therefore, of opinion that evidence of the nature stated is admissible in cases like the present.

On the merits of this case we consider that Ishri, Shiva Gobind, and Damri have been properly convicted, as there is against them their own confession and evidence that they gave up property. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeals of Ishri, Shiva Gobind, and Damn and uphold the convictions and sentences passed upon them under section 395 of the Indian Penal Code. As regards the appellant Dudhnath he did not make any confession and no property is shown to have been produced by him or by any one on his behalf. He was identified by Mst. Sukharani only, but we have held that her identification evidence is of no weight. The mere fact that the complainant pointed out in court Dudhnath as having taken part in the dacoity is of no weight. There is also, no doubt, the fact that he was named in the three retracted confessions, but that alone is not sufficient for a conviction. Accordingly, we allow the appeal of Dudhnath and acquit him of the offence under section 395 and set aside the sentence and direct that he be set at liberty.

In regard to the appeal of the Local Government against the acquittals of Faujdar, Sita, and Baili we consider that the evidence against them is not sufficient for conviction and we agree with the learned Sessions Judge on this point. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeals against these three persons and we direct that they be released forthwith.