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Secy. Of State v. Bhagwan Prasad .
Factual and Procedural Background
This is a first appeal by the Secretary of State against an order of the Subordinate Judge of Mirzapur under the Land Acquisition Act awarding further compensation to the applicant. The Land Acquisition Officer made an award on 14 June 1923. Notice was served on the applicant on 18 January 1924 and the applicant's objection was filed on 12 February 1924. The appellant contended that the application was barred by limitation under Section 18(2) of the Land Acquisition Act and that the appellant was not estopped from pleading limitation even after the Collector had referred the matter to the civil court. The Land Acquisition Officer forwarded the reference to the civil court; the civil court dismissed the government's objection based on limitation; the present appeal followed.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the application was barred by the six months' limitation in Section 18(2) of the Land Acquisition Act.
- Whether the Secretary of State (and Collector) is estopped from pleading limitation once the Collector has referred the matter to the civil court under the Act.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The application was time-barred by the proviso to Section 18(2) because it was not made within six months of the Collector's award dated 14 June 1923.
- The appellant was not estopped from raising the limitation point even though the Collector had forwarded the reference to the civil court.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Secy. of State v. Bhagwan Prasad, A.I.R. 1929 All. 769 | When a reference has been made under the Land Acquisition Act it is not open to the Collector or the Secretary of State to say that the reference was wrongly made (for example because the owner's application was belated); the court cannot go behind the Collector's reference to examine whether the Collector acted rightly or wrongly; the decision to refer is within the Collector's province. | The Court followed and applied the principles in this case, stating agreement with its law and treating it as decisive of the present appeal. |
| Ahmad Alt Khan Alawi v. Secy. of State, A.I.R. 1932 Oudh. 180 | Held that the Land Acquisition Officer cannot refuse to make a reference even if it is time-barred and that his duty is to bring the matter to the notice of the court. | The Court noted this decision but disagreed with the underlying principle as reflected in Board Circulars; it observed that the Oudh decision did not mention Secy. of State v. Bhagwan Prasad and did not follow it in the present appeal. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court set out the governing statutory time limits under Section 18(2)(b) of the Land Acquisition Act: an application must be made within six weeks of receipt of the Collector's notice under Section 12(2) or within six months of the Collector's award, whichever first expires. The facts showed the applicant filed an objection within six weeks of the notice (served 18 January 1924, objection filed 12 February 1924) but did not file within six months of the award (award dated 14 June 1923), so the application was barred by the proviso to Section 18(2).
Despite the time bar, the Land Acquisition Officer forwarded the reference to the civil court. When the government raised the limitation point before the civil court, that court dismissed the objection. On appeal, this Court relied on the prior decision in Secy. of State v. Bhagwan Prasad to hold that once a reference has been made under the Act the civil court does not have authority to go behind the Collector's decision to refer; it is not open to the Collector or Secretary of State to contend that the reference was wrongly made because the owner's application was belated. The Court considered the contrasting Oudh decision but regarded the Board Circulars and the Oudh decision as founded on a misconception of law and noted the Oudh case did not mention Bhagwan Prasad. Applying these principles, the Court dismissed the appeal.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED WITH COSTS
Holding: The Court dismissed the Secretary of State's appeal and ordered costs.
Implications: The civil court's order (which had dismissed the government's limitation objection and allowed the reference to be adjudicated) is sustained; the Court applied the principle from Secy. of State v. Bhagwan Prasad that the civil court cannot re-examine the Collector's decision to refer. The opinion also rejected the contrary view expressed in Ahmad Alt Khan Alawi and certain Board Circular directions as a misconception of law. The decision enforces the rule that once a reference under the Land Acquisition Act is made, the court will not go behind that reference; no wider change of precedent beyond the application of Secy. of State v. Bhagwan Prasad was announced in this opinion.
1. This is a first appeal by the Secretary of State against an order of the learned Subordinate Judge of Mirzapur under the Land Acquisition Act awarding a certain sum as further compensation to the applicant. The point which has been urged before us is:
that the suit as brought by the plaintiff-respondent is barred by six months' limitation as provided in Section 18(2), Land Acquisition Act and secondly that the appellant is not estopped from pleading limitation even after the reference made by the Collector to the civil Court for adjudication.
2. The language quoted is that of the appellant, but it is obvious that the matter was not a suit but an application. The facts of the present case are that the Land Acquisition Officer made an award on 14th June 1923. The applicant was absent and was not represented at the time. Accordingly, under Section 18(2)(b), Land Acquisition Act, the application should have been made within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under Section 12, Sub-section (2) or within six months from the date of the Collector's award, whichever period shall first expire.
3. Notice was served on the applicant on 18th January 1924 and his objection was filed on 12th February 1924. He therefore complied with the term of six weeks from receipt of the notice, but he did not comply with the term of six months from the date of the Collector's award. The application therefore was barred by limitation under the proviso quoted. The Land Acquisition officer did not notice this point and he forwarded the reference to the civil Court in the ordinary way. When the reference came before the civil Court, on behalf of Government the point was taken that the application was barred under Section 18(2), Land Acquisition Act. The Court dismissed this objection. It is again taken in appeal. As far as this Court is concerned, the matter has been decided by a Bench in Secy. of State v. Bhagwan Prasad A.I.R. 1929 All. 769, in which it was held by a Bench of which one of us was a member that when a reference had been made under the Land Acquisition Act it was not open to the Collector or the Secretary of State to say that the reference was wrongly made although the ground for saying so may be that the application by the owner was belated. The "Court" does not sit on appeal over the Collector and the Act does not give any authority to the "Court," either in express term or by implication, to go behind the reference and to see whether the Collector acted rightly or wrongly. It is the province of the Collector alone to decide for himself whether he should make the reference or refuse to do so. Various rulings on the subject had been considered in that case and there is no need for us to consider them again.
4. We are in agreement with the principles of law laid down in that case. The only new case that has been brought to our notice is one of the Oudh Chief Court in Ahmad Alt Khan Alawi v. Secy. of State reported in A.I.R. 1932 Oudh. 180 in which it has been held that the Land Acquisition Officer cannot refuse to make a reference, even if it is time-barred and that his duty is to bring the matter to the notice of the Court. We note that that is the principle which is laid down by Board Circulars I-VIII, para. 28 note 2. In our opinion, this direction of the Board Circulars is founded on a misconception of law. We also note that the ruling of Secy. of State v. Bhagwan Prasad A.I.R. 1929 All. 769, was not mentioned in the recent case in the Oudh Chief Court. We dismiss this appeal with costs.
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