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Gobardhan Das (Judgment-Debtor) v. Dau Dayal (Decree-Holder).
Factual and Procedural Background
This judgment-debtor's appeal arises from an execution proceeding following a decree for money passed on 10th February 1915 by a revenue court. An application for execution was filed on 21st March 1923, during which a warrant for the arrest of the judgment-debtor was issued. Subsequently, on 29th August 1923, the parties entered into a compromise agreeing to payment of the decretal amount in nine instalments over four years, with the final instalment due on 10th January 1928. The court ordered cancellation of the arrest warrant based on this compromise. The judgment-debtor paid the instalments punctually until the eighth instalment. On 10th January 1928, the judgment-debtor sent a money order for Rs. 57-3-0 as the ninth instalment, which the decree-holder refused on 16th January 1928, claiming it was insufficient. The decree-holder then filed a fresh application for execution claiming Rs. 222. The judgment-debtor objected, asserting the application was barred by limitation and not according to law. The initial court found the judgment-debtor's conduct fraudulent and held limitation was saved by section 48(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The District Judge disagreed on the fraud finding but maintained that the execution file was still pending, thus overruling the limitation objection. On appeal to the High Court, it was held that the later application was not a revival of the earlier one, and that a subsequent order under section 48(1)(b) must be passed within six months of the decree under Article 175 of the Limitation Act. However, the court allowed cessation of limitation on grounds of fraud, relying on precedent. The Letters Patent appeal raised questions of law, including whether a new relief in an execution application can be treated as revival of a previous application. Additionally, a jurisdictional question arose whether an appeal lay to the High Court at all.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a new relief claimed in an application for execution can be treated as a revival of a previous application for execution.
- Whether the execution court has the power to pass a subsequent order under section 48(1)(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure directing payment of the decretal amount by instalments beyond six months from the date of the decree.
- Whether the plea of limitation bars the execution application made after twelve years from the decree or subsequent order.
- Whether the conduct of the judgment-debtor in raising a limitation plea after compromise amounts to fraud, thereby extending the limitation period under section 48(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
- Whether an appeal lies to the High Court against an order passed by the District Judge in a revenue appeal under the Tenancy Act.
- Whether the High Court has revisional jurisdiction under section 253 of the Tenancy Act or section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure over such orders.
Arguments of the Parties
Judgment-Debtor's Arguments
- The application for execution filed on 16th January 1928 was barred by limitation under section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
- The execution application was not in accordance with law.
- The compromise entered into in 1923 did not amount to a subsequent order capable of extending limitation.
- The judgment-debtor had no fraudulent intent in raising the limitation plea after the compromise.
- No appeal lay to the High Court from the District Judge's order under the Tenancy Act.
Decree-Holder's Arguments
- The application for execution of 1928 was a continuation or revival of the 1923 application.
- The compromise of 1923 constituted a subsequent order under section 48(1)(b), thus extending limitation.
- The conduct of the judgment-debtor in raising limitation was fraudulent, saving the application from limitation under section 48(2).
- An appeal lay to the High Court against the District Judge's order.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Jurawan Pasi v. Mahabir | Definition of "subsequent order" under section 48(1)(b) as an order passed by the original court within six months of decree. | The court relied on this to hold that the subsequent order must be by the original court within six months and not by the execution court later. |
| Lalta Prasad v. Suraj Kumar | Interpretation of fraud under section 48(2) to include any act by judgment-debtor that delays execution and bars decree within twelve years. | Initially accepted by lower courts to find fraud saving limitation, but ultimately rejected by this court as too broad. |
| Gobardhan Das v. Dau Dayal | This case itself; related to the present appeal. | Referenced as the subject case involving the execution and limitation issues. |
| Zohra v. Mangu Lal | Appeals from orders passed by revenue courts are not decrees under section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. | Used to establish that no appeal lies from execution orders of revenue courts to District Judge under old law. |
| Jagdeo Singh v. Kesho Prasad Singh | Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is inapplicable to proceedings under the Tenancy Act. | Supported the conclusion that High Court has no revisional jurisdiction over District Judge's orders in revenue appeals under Tenancy Act. |
| Badami Kuar v. Dinu Rai | Revisional jurisdiction over orders affirmed on appeal. | Illustrated the anomaly of revising trial court orders but not appellate orders, relevant to Tenancy Act jurisdiction issues. |
| Vuppuluri Atchayya v. Sri Seetharamachandra Rao | Similar to Badami Kuar regarding revisional powers. | Reinforced the reasoning on revisional jurisdiction limitations. |
| D.S Apte v. Tirmal Hanmant Savnur | Whether execution court orders can be subsequent orders under section 48. | The Bombay High Court dissented from Jurawan Pasi, but this court found the reasoning unconvincing. |
| Hridaymohan Sanyal v. Khagendranath | Whether execution court can substitute original decree by compromise. | Rejected by this court as untenable; execution court cannot alter or vary original decree. |
| Debi Rai v. Gokal Prasad | Effect of altered decree by agreement and estoppel. | Held that altered decree by agreement cannot be executed as new decree; supports no substitution of decree by compromise. |
| Thakur Prasad v. Fakir-ullah | Interpretation of execution and compromise provisions under old Code. | Referenced to show deletion of Explanation to section 647 and current inapplicability of old provisions. |
| Choudhwry Jagadish Misir v. Choudhury Sureshwar Misir | Scope of "suit" in order XXIII, rule 3 including execution proceedings. | Rejected as incorrect to treat execution proceedings as suits for compromise recording. |
| Muhammad Sulaiman v. Jhukki Lal | Compromise in execution proceedings and application of old Code sections. | Considered obiter dictum and not binding under new Code. |
| Nawab Shuja-ul-mulk v. Umir-ul-umra Bahadur | Whether subsequent occurrence of contingency justifies fresh executable order. | Held that a fresh declaratory order is not necessary; execution court executes original decree on occurrence. |
| Kristo Komul Singh v. Huree Sirdar (quoted in Raghunath Prosad v. Kashi Prosad) | Effect of estoppel and limitation on execution of decree. | Established that one cannot contract out of statute of limitation or extend execution time by private agreement. |
| Banarsi Das v. Ramzan | Effect of time-barred applications under order XX, rule 11 and limitation. | Order passed on time-barred application is binding unless set aside; limitation is procedural and does not oust jurisdiction. |
| Nathu Ram v. Kalian Das | Limitation as a procedural question and its effect on jurisdiction. | Supported that wrong decision on limitation does not oust jurisdiction of court. |
| East India Company v. Oditchurn Paul | Effect of compromise extending limitation period. | Held that parties cannot extend limitation period by compromise; limitation bars execution. |
| Bhagwat Das v. Chhedi Koeri | Inapplicability of section 115 of the CPC to Tenancy Act proceedings. | Supported the limitation of revisional jurisdiction under Tenancy Act. |
| Ram Adhin v. Ram Bharose | Revisional powers of High Court over revenue courts. | Held that High Court can revise orders of subordinate revenue courts under section 253 of Tenancy Act. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court analyzed the nature of the 1923 compromise and the subsequent execution application of 1928 in the context of limitation under section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Tenancy Act's appellate and revisional provisions. It held that the 1923 compromise was not a "subsequent order" under section 48(1)(b) because it was not a formal order directing payment by instalments passed by the original decree court within six months of the decree, but rather a recorded compromise in execution proceedings. The execution court is functus officio after passing the decree and cannot alter or vary the decree by substituting a new one or passing orders that extend the limitation period beyond prescribed limits.
The court rejected the broad interpretation of fraud under section 48(2) that any act delaying execution is fraud, finding no evidence that the judgment-debtor intended to defraud the decree-holder. The judgment-debtor's payment of instalments after twelve years and attempt to pay the final instalment negated fraudulent intent.
Regarding jurisdiction, the court held that no second appeal lay to the High Court from the District Judge's order under the Tenancy Act, as appeals from revenue courts are limited and section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code is inapplicable. The High Court's revisional jurisdiction is confined to section 253 of the Tenancy Act and does not extend to revising District Judge's orders in revenue appeals. However, the High Court can revise orders of subordinate revenue courts even if affirmed by the District Judge, though it cannot interfere with the District Judge's order itself.
The court found material irregularity in the Assistant Collector's order, as it failed to record any finding of fraud within twelve years and incorrectly applied section 48(2)(a). The execution application of 1928 was a new proceeding, not a revival of the 1923 application, and the decree-holder could not change the nature of the earlier application after the fact.
Consequently, the court exercised its revisional jurisdiction to set aside the Assistant Collector's order and dismissed the execution application filed in 1928.
Holding and Implications
The appeal is dismissed.
In exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the court sets aside the Assistant Collector's order dated 24th February 1928 and dismisses the execution application filed on 16th January 1928. The parties are directed to bear their own costs. The court holds that execution courts cannot alter or vary original decrees by compromises entered during execution proceedings to extend limitation periods. The judgment-debtor's conduct did not amount to fraud sufficient to extend limitation under section 48(2). Furthermore, no second appeal lies to the High Court against District Judge's orders under the Tenancy Act, limiting appellate jurisdiction. The High Court's revisional jurisdiction is confined to subordinate revenue courts and does not extend to District Judge's appellate orders. No new precedent was set beyond clarifying these jurisdictional and procedural principles and reinforcing the finality of original decrees in execution proceedings.
Sulaiman, J.:— This is a judgment-debtor's appeal arising out of an execution proceeding. A decree for money was passed on the 10th of February, 1915. While an application for execution dated 21st of March, 1923, was pending and a warrant for the arrest of the judgment-debtor had been issued, the parties entered into a compromise and a written application was filed in court on the 29th of August, 1923, signed both by the judgment-debtor and the decree-holder. They agreed that the decretal amount should be paid in nine instalments, spread over four years. The eighth instalment was to be paid on the 15th of July, 1927, and the whole of the balance due under the decree was to be paid as the ninth instalment on the 10th of January, 1928. The court ordered that the parties had come to a compromise and the warrant be cancelled. The judgment-debtor paid all the first instalments in due time. On the 10th of January, 1928, he sent a money order for Rs. 57-3-0 which was refused by the decree-holder on the 16th of January, 1928, with the endorsement that it was short. On the same date the decree-holder filed the present application for execution claiming Rs. 222. The judgment-debtor objected that the application was not according to law and that it was time barred. The first court held that the conduct of the judgment-debtor amounted to fraud and the limitation was saved by section 48(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The District Judge was inclined to the view that the judgment-debtor honestly intended to pay the money and had proved his bona fides by paying eight instalments. He, however, held that the execution file had not been completed in 1923 and was still pending and must have been pending until the amount was paid off in full. He accordingly overruled the objection. On appeal to the High Court, a learned Judge of this Court held that the present application could not be treated as a revival of the previous application because the earlier application was based on the original decree and was for the arrest of the judgment-debtor, while the latter one was based on the agreement of 1923 and was for execution by attachment. Relying on the authority of Jurawan Pasi v. Mahabir (1) he further held that a subsequent order within the meaning of section 48(1)(b) can be passed by the court only within six months of the passing of the decree, under Article 175 of the Limitation Act, and not after. He, however, held that the decree-holder was entitled to a cessation of the period of limitation on the ground of fraud. He relied on Lalta Prasad v. Suraj Kumar for the view that fraud in section 48 should not be interpreted in a narrow sense, and held that any action of the judgment-debtor which puts off the decree-holder from executing his decree at once should be taken as fraud if the result thereof is to bar the execution of the decree under the twelve years' rule. On this finding he dismissed the appeal; Gobardhan Das v. Dau Dayal (2). The Letters Patent appeal came up for disposal before a Bench of which I was a member. The case was referred to a larger Bench because it involved questions of law of some importance. One of the questions mentioned in the referring order was whether when a new relief is claimed in an application for execution, it can be treated as one for the revival of a previous application.
The appeal as an appeal must fail on a ground which was neither brought to the notice of the learned single Judge of this Court, nor was it suggested before the Bench which referred the case to us, nor has it been pressed before us on behalf of the respondent. That ground is that no appeal lay to the High Court at all, and consequently we cannot interfere with the decree of the District Judge in this Letters Patent appeal. As the point involves a question of jurisdiction it can be taken up in the Letters Patent appeal even for the first time.
The original decree was one for profits passed by a revenue court. Under section 177 of the old Tenancy Act of 3901 appeals were allowed from decrees only and not from orders. The controversy was set at rest by the pronouncement of the Full Bench in Zohra v. Mangu Lal , where it was held that an order passed in execution by a revenue court was not a decree within the meaning of section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and that no appeal lay from it to the District Judge.
Although the decree in this case was passed in 1915, the present application for execution and the order there on were made after the coming into force of the new Tenancy Act. A right of appeal from an order in execution has been conferred by section 248(3) and the appeal lies to the court which can hear an appeal from the decree in the suit. But that section is under the heading “Appeals from orders” and its language also makes it clear that the order under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure is merely an order and not a decree. Whether it be treated as laying down a rule of procedure or conferring a substantive right of appeal, the new Act applied. The appeal accordingly lay to the District Judge. But section 249 provides that no appeal shall lie from any order passed in appeal. Accordingly no second appeal lay to the High Court from the order passed by the District Judge in the execution appeal before him. The single Judge of this Court could not but dismiss the appeal before him. Accordingly we have no power to interfere with the order passed by the District Judge on appeal.
It is, however, urged before us that the appeal should be treated as a revision. There was room for argument under the old Tenancy Act that a civil revision could be entertained from an order passed by the District Judge even in a revenue appeal. Such a view is not now possible under the new Tenancy Act. It was pointed out by a, Bench of which I was a member in Jagdeo Singh v. Kesho Prasad Singh , that under section 264 of the Tenancy Act only selected provisions of the Civil Procedure Code are made applicable to cases under this Act, and list I of the second schedule clearly excludes the provisions of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Both section 264 and the heading in list I of the second schedule show that section 115 is not applicable to suits and other proceedings under this Act. As provisions for appeals are to be found in the Act itself, there can be no doubt that the appeal before the District. Judge was a proceeding under the Act. This conclusion is further strengthened by the language of section 230 under which the exception is confined to “appeal or revision as provided in this Act”. It is therefore quite clear that section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is wholly inapplicable to revenue cases, and has been entirely replaced by section 253 of the Act. The High Court has no power of revision outside the scope of the latter section.
As pointed out in Jagdeo Singh's case the High Court can call for the record of only a subordinate revenue court, and revise the order of such subordinate revenue court. According to the definition of “revenue court” in section 3(12) of the Act read with section 4(8) of the Land Revenue Act, the District Judge cannot be a revenue court. It follows that the High Court has no power to revise orders passed by a District Judge, howsoever ultra vires, irregular or illegal they may be. This is an unfortunate result calling for the attention of the legislature. There seems to be no good reason why the legislature should not allow a revision from an order of the District Judge passed in a revenue appeal. It was observed in Jagdeo Singh's case that if the order passed by the trial court is open to objection it can be revised. The learned advocate for the respondent contends that it would be anomalous to allow revision from the order of the original revenue court which has been affirmed by the District Judge, when the High Court has no power to interfere with the order of the District-Judge. But such an anomaly has not stood in the way of permitting revisions under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure: Badami Kuar v. Dinu Rai and Vuppuluri Atchayya v. Sri Seetharamachandra Rao . Section 253 allows a revision from an original revenue court only where an appeal lies to the District Judge, and therefore contemplates a case where an appeal might have been actually filed. Indeed, if the contrary view were upheld, the result for all practical purposes may be to nullify the provisions of the section, for the High Court may very well decline to entertain a revision when a remedy by way of appeal to the District Judge is open, and may feel helpless when such an appeal has been filed and disposed of. In cases where the first court acted with illegality or material irregularity, and the District Judge in appeal rectified that mistake, the High Court would in the exercise of its discretion refuse to interfere. If the order of the District Judge proceeds on grounds which do not appeal to the High Court, it may, in spite of that order, set aside the order of the first court if it is open to any one of the three objections mentioned in the section. It therefore seems to me that a revision from the order of the Assistant Collector lies if there has been a want of jurisdiction, a failure to exercise jurisdiction, or illegality or material irregularity, irrespective of the question whether an appeal has been filed before the District Judge.
The civil revision would have been ordinarily cognizable by a single Judge, but we also have jurisdiction to interfere in revision sua motu. The attention of Dalal, J., was not called to the fact that no appeal lay to him, and that he might interfere in revision. This is therefore not a case where a single Judge has in his discretion declined to interfere, but one where he has not at all considered the matter. There is accordingly nothing to prevent us from interfering.
As will be pointed out later the revenue court failed to record any finding that there was any fraud of the judgment-debtor which prevented the execution of the decree at some time within twelve years immediately before the present application for execution, and yet applied section 48(2)(a) to the case. The failure to apply its mind to the provisions of that section and to record a finding required by that section was a material irregularity because the section prohibits the making of any order upon the application unless the conditions laid down in it are fulfilled. The District Judge on the other hand made out a new case that the old execution proceeding was still pending.
The decree-holder in his present application admitted that the previous application of 1923 was for the arrest of the judgment-debtor and had been struck off. In the present application his prayer was for attachment and public sale of the property of the judgment-debtor, and not for his arrest. The first court did not suggest that the previous application also was for attachment and sale. Nor was there any such suggestion in the judgment of the District Judge. As a matter of fact the record of the execution proceedings of 1923 does not appear to have been sent for in the District Judge's court. Similarly that previous record was not before the single-Judge of this Court. It was taken for granted before the learned Judge that the previous application of 1923 was only for the arrest of the judgment-debtor. Indeed he emphasised this fact and made it the basis of his decision. Even before the Bench which heard this appeal first, there was no suggestion that the prayers in the earlier and the later applications were substantially the same. As mentioned above, one of the questions which the Bench considered would arise in the case was “whether, when a new relief is claimed, the present application can be treated as one for a revival of the old one”. After dictating the order, the Bench by way of precaution directed that the old execution record should be sent for. On its arrival it was discovered that the original application, dated the 21st of March, 1923, was for the attachment and public sale of the property of the judgment-debtor and, in case the decretal amount could not be realised in that way, for his arrest. But the record further disclosed that the decree-holder did not file any list of the properties of the judgment-debtor which he wanted to get attached, nor deposited the expenses for such attachment. He deposited only the expenses for the issue of a warrant which the court ordered to be issued According to his own application the occasion for arrest would have arisen only when the decretal amount could not be realised in the other way. It is possible to argue that the record gives an indication of the prayer for attachment having been abandoned by the decree-holder and the relief confined to arrest, as admitted by the decree-holder in his present application. In the present execution proceeding a list of the properties of the judgment-debtor was filed, which had not been mentioned in the proceedings of 1923. It seems to have been conceded all along that the previous application was for arrest only. I am therefore of opinion that the decree-holder should not now be allowed to raise a new question of fact that there has been no abandonment of the relief for attachment, which question had not been raised before the single Judge of this Court.
The present application for execution asks for attachment and sale of the judgment-debtor's property, and new properties have been specified which were never mentioned before. The application is not now for the arrest of the judgment-debtor. It does not purport to be an application for a revival of the previous application, and there is no suggestion in it that the previous application is still pending. On the other hand it is admitted that application was struck off. The present application is based on the fact of the compromise for the payment of instalments. Although a decree-holder need not be tied down to the form of his application, the circumstances mentioned above make it quite clear that the present application which asks for a new relief cannot be treated as an application for the revival or continuation of the previous execution proceeding. When the character of the present application is different from that of the previous one, it can hardly he treated as a continuation.
I find it most difficult to hold that the conduct of the judgment-debtor amounted to fraud. The proposition that any action of the judgment-debtor which puts off the decree-holder from executing his decree at once must be taken as fraud if the result thereof is to bar the execution of the decree under the twelve years' rule, is much too broadly stated. In the present case the terms of the compromise were known to both the parties and the decree-holder was in a position to find out their legal consequences. There was no concealment of any fact, nor any misrepresentation on the part of the judgment-debtor. Indeed, the fact that the judgment-debtor paid the eighth instalment even after the expiry of twelve years and attempted to pay the ninth instalment also shows that he had no intention in 1923 to stop payment as soon as twelve years expired. I think the District Judge was right in not accepting the first court's view that his conduct amounted to fraud. Section 48(2)(a) is therefore inapplicable.
The learned Assistant Collector has remarked that the parties filed a compromise and on the strength of that compromise the decree-holder agreed to accept the moneys by instalments: “Now when the last date of payment is over, the judgment-debtor takes up the pica of limitation, which means a fraud on his part”. But the plea of limitation was taken after the expiry of the period of limitation, and the mere taking of such a plea cannot be a fraud. The trial court did not record any definite finding that at the time of the compromise the judgment-debtor had the dishonest intention of pleading limitation after the twelve years had expired. As pointed out above, such an inference was impossible.
The learned advocate for the decree-holder supports the decree of the learned Judge of this Court on the ground that there was a “subsequent order” for the payment of money at certain dates within the meaning of section 48(1)(b).
The learned single Judge of this Court has naturally followed the Division Bench ruling in Jurawan Pasi v. Mahabir , where it is laid down that a subsequent order directing payment of money in section 48(1)(b) means a subsequent order made by the court which made the decree and acting as that court, and not an order of a court executing the decree. The learned Judges added that in all probability the section contemplates orders made under order XX, rule 11. They could not have intended to say that a subsequent order in section 48 is confined to orders passed under the last mentioned rule. Section 48 contains the substantive provision of the Code, whereas order XX, rule 11, can be altered by High Courts, and other similar provisions can also be added in the rules. Furthermore, the last mentioned rule applies only to decrees for payment of money, whereas section 48(1)(b) covers decrees for the delivery of properties also. Section 48 is accordingly of a wider scope, and there is no reason to confine it to the particular orders passed under order XX, rule 11. The view taken in Jurawan Past's case that section 48 contemplates a subsequent order passed by the original court and not the execution court has been followed by other courts as well.
On the other hand, in numerous cases a compromise between the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor entered into in the course of execution proceedings, which was duly recorded, has been enforced, and various efforts have been made to find a legal basis for upholding it.
The Bombay High Court, in D.S Apte…Plaintiff v. Tirmal Hanmant Savnur…Defendant . , expressly dissented from the view taken in Jurawan Pasi's case and held that the expression “any subsequent order” cannot be limited to orders passed by the court which passed the decree, but means any order made by a competent court. In one sense this view is sound, because the words “subsequent order” are general in their meaning. As will be shown later, the fallacy lies in the supposition that an execution court is competent to pass every kind of order, provided it is based on a compromise between the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor.
In some cases the courts have gone so far as to hold that the original decree can be altogether superseded by a new arrangement entered into in the execution department, enabling the decree-holder to execute the substituted decree: Hridaymohan Sanyal v. Khagendranath . I would say with great respect that such a position is utterly untenable. The original decree cannot be altered or varied by the parties even with the sanction of the court. In the absence of interference in appeal, revision, review, or under section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the original decree becomes final and the court itself is functus officio. As provided in order XX, rule 3, the judgment cannot afterwards be altered or added to, and as directed in rule 6 the decree must agree with the judgment. In Debi Rai v. Gokal Prasad , a Full Bench of this Court laid down that a decree altered by agreement of parties cannot be executed as a new decree, and the acquiescence of the judgment-debtor in such execution cannot estop him from objecting to further execution of it. The function of an execution court is to execute the decree as it finds it and not to substitute a new decree therefor, even though the substitution may be with the consent of the parties. Such an agreement may be a binding contract between the parties enforceable by a separate suit, but it cannot take the place of the original decree and become itself capable of execution.
In other cases it has been suggested that a compromise can be entertained in the course of execution proceedings much in the same manner as in a regular suit, and authority for it has been sought for in Muhammad Sulaiman v. Jhukki Lal : Vide Ram Prasad v. Haridas and Hridaymohan Sanyal v. Khagendranath (3). But the Allahabad case was based on an interpretation of sections 375 and 647 of the old Code, and reference was also made to section 257A of the Code of 1882, for which there is no corresponding provision in the new Code. The general observations made by the learned Judge were in the nature of an obiter dictum. In view of the opinion expressed by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Thakur Prasad v. Fakir-ullah (4) the Explanation added by Act No. VI of 1892 to section 647 of the old Code has been deleted from the present section 141. Now order XXIII, rule 4, makes rule 3 of that order inapplicable to execution proceedings, and there is therefore no obligation on an execution court to record a compromise as it would have to do in a pending suit. It is not correct to say, as was done in Choudhwry Jagadish Misir v. Choudhury Sureshwar Misir (5), that the word “suit” in order XXIII, rule 3, was used “in a broad sense as including not only the stages of a suit to its termination by the decree of the first court but as including its appellate stage and proceedings in execution of the decree made in the suit”. In that case a compromise was entered into in the proceedings relating to the setting aside of a sale. Without holding that the word “suit” includes an execution proceeding, order XXIII, rule 3 might well have been applied with the help of section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In like manner section 107(2) would apply to proceedings in appeal.
The line of reasoning adopted in some cases is that compromise in an execution court is in the nature of an adjustment within the meaning of order XXI, rule 2, and that, if certified, it can be enforced by the execution court. But an adjustment within the meaning of that rule should be a transaction which extinguishes the decree as such in whole or in part and results in its total or partial satisfaction. A transaction by which parties agree to vary the mode by which the beliefs granted by the decree are to be realised in execution or vary the time when the decree becomes executable would really be a transaction attempting to vary the terms of the decree: Mallamma v. Venkappa , and Ladd Govindoss v. Ramdoss , followed in Azizu Rahman v. Aliraja Choudhry . The adjustment referred to in order XXI, rule 2, is one which completely or partially extinguishes the decree and cannot mean a compromise, to give effect to the terms of which a new decree at variance with the original decree would have to be created, which will again have to be executed. An execution court has no power to alter or vary the decree under execution, and to substitute a new decree for it. A mere consent of the parties cannot confer such a jurisdiction on the execution court.
Another line of reasoning adopted in some other cases is that a compromise for the payment of the decretal amount by instalments or for delivery of property is not at all a variation of the decree for money, but merely fixes a mode of satisfaction. It has therefore been assumed that where the parties agree, the execution court has an inherent power to accept such a compromise and pass a new decree in terms of it. But the original decree which fixes no deferred date for payment or for delivery of property is executable immediately. Where the compromise fixes new dates for payment or delivery it undoubtedly alters the time of satisfaction and therefore varies the decree. It is not a mere case of postponement of execution which the court under special circumstances recognized by the Code of Civil Procedure can order. It is in effect the substitution of a new decree in place of the old decree, which new decree will itself become capable of execution.
It is quite obvious that the legislature does not contemplate the prolongation of execution proceedings by successive compromises of this type being entered into at long intervals. Authority has been conferred by order XX, rule 11, of the Code of Civil Procedure for directing payment by instalments. But unless passed at the time of the passing of the decree such an order can be passed only on the application of the judgment-debtor with the, consent of the decree-holder. Article 175 of the Limitation Act places a limitation on she period during which such an application can be made, which must be within six months of the decree. It is the duty of the execution court not to entertain any such application for the payment of the amount of the decree by instalments, if made after the expiry of that period, even though the decree-holder is agreeable to it. Had the legislature intended that the court has always an inherent power to accept a compromise of this kind entered into between the parties, the short period of limitation would not have been prescribed.
In some cases the difficulty has been attempted to be got over by the supposition that where the decree directs that money be recoverable only on some failure, it is open to the plaintiff to ask the court for a declaration that the failure has taken place and for an order directing payment in consequence: Nawab Shuja-ul-mulk v. Umir-ul-umra Bahadur . But where the decree is self-contained, the mere fact that the contingency mentioned in it has occurred subsequently would not justify the making of a fresh executable order by the court, which had become functus officio after the passing of the decree. Without such a fresh declaratory order the execution court is competent to execute the decree when such contingency has happened.
In other cases the enforcement of a compromise between the parties has been based on the principle of estoppel. No doubt a judgment-debtor can in certain circumstances be estopped from going behind his own agreement. But no one can contract himself out of the statute of limitation. Estoppel cannot be pleaded against a statutory bar of limitation. Similarly, as the Code by section 48 prohibits the court from making any order upon an application presented after the expiration of twelve years, the statutory obligation of the court cannot be got rid of on account of any private contract to the contrary. It will be the duty of the court to ignore the private agreement and to give effect to the statute. As was pointed out by the Full Bench in Debt Rai v. Gokal Prasad , the agreement may give rise to a separate suit, but cannot estop the judgment-debtor from objecting to the further execution of the decree. In the words of Sir Barnes Peacock in Kristo Komul Singh v. Huree Sirdar , quoted in Raghunath Prosad v. Kashi Prosad , “A man may bind himself not to execute a decree … within a certain period, but he cannot, by binding himself not to execute the decree for a certain period, add to the time which the law allows him to execute it.”
On the contrary, in some cases it has been suggested that if an order purporting to have been passed under section 210, corresponding to order XX, rule 11, has been passed on an application filed more than six months after the decree it cannot be treated as an order under that section, “inasmuch as the court on that date had no jurisdiction to pass an order under that section, more than six months having elapsed from the date of the decree”: Banarsi Das v. Ramzan . I am not sure whether the learned single Judge of this Court has not taken the same view when remarking that “a subsequent order for payment by instalments can be passed by the court which gave the decree within six months and not after”.
The correct position appears to be that although the court should not entertain an application for payment of the decretal money by instalments under order XX, rule 11, if made after the expiry of six months from the date of the decree (article 175), the order if actually passed on such a time barred application is not a nullity. Just as a decree passed in a suit which was time barred is binding on the parties, and the question of limitation is by implication deemed to have been decided against the defendant, so an order for payment by instalments is binding on the judgment-debtor. It must be assumed that the court by oversight decided the question of limitation wrongly. But a wrong decision, whether express or implied, on a question of limitation does not oust the jurisdiction. Limitation is a question of procedure and not one of jurisdiction: Nathu Ram v. Kalian Das . The court was seised of the case and was competent to pass orders on the application. The mere fact that it overlooked the bar of limitation or acted wrongly in not applying it would not make the order without jurisdiction. So long as it has not been set aside, the order is binding on the judgment-debtor, and cannot be challenged by him on the ground that it was passed on a time barred application. When the court prevents the judgment-debtor from impugning such an order it is not giving effect to any contract to get out of the law of limitation, but is enforcing the principle of res judicata against him. When the decree-holder takes advantage of such an order he is not trying to extend the period fixed in section 48 by any contract between the parties, but he is merely urging that there is in existence a subsequent order binding on the parties, although it so happens that order had been passed on a time barred application without any objection. A somewhat similar, though not exactly the same, view was expressed in Banarsi Das v. Ramzan , when reversing the judgment of the single Judge mentioned above. It is no doubt the duty of the court to see that no such order is passed when the application is beyond time. But when such an order has been passed and remains unreversed, the judgment-debtor cannot be allowed to ignore it.
Although the words in section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure are more general, the order under order XX, rule 11, of the Code of Civil Procedure can be passed by the original court only. Where the execution court happens to be the same court which made the decree, one need not be too technical in insisting that the order must have been passed by the original court acting as such and not acting in the execution department. What is essential is that the intention must have been to pass an order under order XX, rule 11 on the application of the judgment-debtor and with the consent of the decree-holder. Where the courts are not different, it would hardly matter how the court actually describes itself, but the order must be intended to be an order under that rule. On the other hand, if an execution court merely records a compromise entered into between the parties, it does not necessarily pass an order of its own. “Order” is defined in section 2(14) of the Code of Civil Procedure as the formal expression of any decision by a civil court which is not a decree. It must therefore be the formal expression of a decision, i.e, an adjudication between the parties and not merely a mechanical recording of something which the parties want to be noted. The order must be intended to be one passed by the court imposing an obligation capable of enforcement by that court.
We have therefore to see whether the court intended to make any order under order XX, rule 11, and made one.
As pointed out above, when the compromise was filed in 1923, the court merely ordered that the warrant should be cancelled. The record appears to have been consigned to the record room. If the decree-holder's relief had by that time been confined to one for arrest only, that prayer was obviously disallowed, at any rate for the time being. There can also be no doubt that the court took cognizance of the original compromise which had been held and allowed it to be placed on the record. In that sense it tacitly accepted it and even acted upon it; but in my opinion such an order was not made under order XX, rule 11, and cannot be treated as a subsequent order made by the court itself directing the payment of the decretal amount by instalments within the meaning of section 48(1)(b). The decree-holder is therefore not entitled to count twelve years from this date.
As the operative portion of the judgment of Dalal, J., was correct, I would dismiss the appeal; but in the exercise of my revisional jurisdiction I would set aside the order of the Assistant Collector on the ground of material irregularity, and dismiss the application for execution for the reasons given above.
Mukerji, J.:— The facts involved in this case briefly are these. A suit for profits was decreed in favour of the respondent Dau Dayal and against the appellant Gobardhan Das in 1915 by the revenue court. After some applications for execution had been made from time to time, an application was made on the 21st of March, 1923. The prayer was that the property of the judgment-debtor was to be attached and in case it was not found possible to realise the money in that way he might be arrested. No list of properties to be attached was filed with the application, nor was it stated that the movable property in the possession of the judgment-debtor, as pointed out by the decree-holder on the spot, should be attached. Instead of attachment of property warrants for arrest of the judgment-debtor were issued from time to time, and ultimately parties agreed on the 29th of August, 1923, that the whole of the decretal amount then due should be paid by the judgment-debtor in several six-monthly instalments of certain fixed amounts and that on the 15th of January, 1928, the judgment-debtor should pay up the balance of the decretal amount. When this compromise was filed the Assistant Collector executing the decree passed the following order: “Parties have come to a compromise. Warrant may be cancelled.”
The instalments were regularly paid, and on the 10th of January, 1928, the judgment-debtor sent by money order a sum of Rs. 57-3-0 to the decree-holder as the balance of the amount due to the latter. The decree-holder refused to accept this amount on the ground, which was correct, that it was insufficient, and the day after the expiry of the date fixed for payment he made an application for execution. This application was presented on the 16th of January, 1928, and prayed that the amount due might be realised by attachment and sale of property.
The judgment-debtor thereupon pleaded limitation as contained in section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned Assistant Collector held that the judgment-debtor by raising the plea of limitation was guilty of fraud and that on that account the decree-holder's application was taken out of the purview of the twelve years' rule of limitation. He accordingly dismissed the objection and allowed the execution to proceed.
The judgment-debtor appealed to the District Judge. The appellate court did not agree with the court of first instance as to its view of fraud but held that the application for execution made in 1928 might be treated as a continuation of the application of 1923 and that the latter must be deemed to have been still pending. The District Judge accordingly dismissed the appeal, and thereupon the judgment-debtor filed a second appeal to this Court.
The appeal came before Dalal, J., and that learned Judge dismissed the appeal, holding that, although the District Judge was not right in treating the application of 1923 as still pending, the case fell within the exception created in the case of fraud on the part of the judgment-debtor. The learned Judge relied on the case of Lalta Prasad v. Suraj Kumar , and said: “Any action of the judgment-debtor which puts off the decree-holder from executing his decree at once should be taken as fraud if the result thereof is to bar the execution of the decree under the twelve years' rule …. By making an agreement he (judgment-debtor) derived an advantage and when he is not prepared to fulfil the agreement his conduct amounted to fraud.” The second appeal was dismissed and the present Letters Patent appeal has been filed by the judgment-debtor.
At the outset, it seems to be clear to me that no second appeal lay to the High Court, as the case arose out of a suit for profits heard by a revenue court. The Agra Tenancy Act of 1926 by section 249 disallows an appeal from an appellate order. By section 248 of the Agra Tenancy Act an appeal to the District Judge is allowed in the case of an execution of a decree for profits, but by section 249 no further appeal is allowed. By section 264 of the Tenancy Act, 1926, the Code of Civil procedure is to apply to the revenue courts with certain exceptions, and one of the exceptions is “provisions inconsistent with anything in this Act, so far as the inconsistency extends”. To allow a second appeal from the order of the District Judge in this case, on the ground that the “order” passed by the District Judge was a “decree” within the meaning of section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, would be inconsistent with the clear provision of section 249. I hold, therefore, that no second appeal lay to this Court.
The learned counsel for the appellant has asked us to take up the matter in revision. The revisional jurisdiction of this Court over the revenue courts is conferred by Section 253 of the Tenancy Act. It says that in cases where an appeal lay to the District Judge, the High Court may call for the record of any suit which has been decided by a subordinate revenue court and in such cases may pass such orders as it thinks fit. In this case an appeal did lie to the District Judge and, therefore, where a case falls within any of the clauses (a), (b) and (c) of section 253 a revision would be maintainable.
On behalf of the respondent it was argued that the order of the Assistant Collector having been confirmed by the District Judge, unless we are able to set aside the order of the District Judge also, we are not competent to interfere with the order of the Assistant Collector.
It does appear that the High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere in revision with the order of a District Judge passed by him in a revenue matter on appeal. This is due no doubt to an oversight, but the fact is there. section 264 of the Tenancy Act made section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code inapplicable to “all suits and other proceedings” under the Tenancy Act, and therefore an appellate order, of the District Judge is exempted from the operation of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This was held to be the case in Bhagwat Das v. Chhedi Koeri and also in Jagdeo Singh v. Kesho Prasad Singh . The result is that where a revenue court passes a right order, and on appeal the District Judge passes a wrong order and the District Judge's order is otherwise capable of being revised by this Court, the District Judge's cannot be touched.
It, however, does not follow that because the District Judge's order cannot be touched in revision the order of the “subordinate revenue court” cannot be touched simply because it has been affirmed by the District Judge on appeal. Section 253 of the Tenancy Act does not say that to enable the High Court to interfere it is necessary that there should be no appeal from the order of the revenue court. All that is needed is that the matter before the revenue court should be appealable to the District Judge.
In numerous cases decided by this Court it has been held that the High Court could interfere with the order of the first court, although the same may have been affirmed by the lower appellate court, in the exercise of the High Court's revisional powers under section 622 of the old Code and section 115 of the new Code of 1908. One of these cases is a Full Bench decision of this Court in Badami Kuar v. Dinu Rai . Another case and a more recent one is Ram Adhin v. Ram Bharose . I hold that a revision is maintainable.
The next question is whether the matter before us is a fit one in which we should interfere, in other words whether the case falls within any of the clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 253 of the Tenancy Act. In my opinion the case falls under clause (c). The learned Assistant Collector has not found as a fact that at any time prior to the lapse of twelve years from the date of the decree the judgment-debtor by fraud prevented the execution of the decree. If he had found on evidence, however flimsy, that such was the case, there would have been no case for the High Court for interference. But what the Assistant Collector found was that the very act of raising the plea of limitation was a fraud on the part of the judgment-debtor. If it was, that act was committed more than twelve years after the date of the decree. There can, therefore, be no doubt that the Assistant Collector acted with material irregularity in the exercise of his jurisdiction and, therefore, his order is liable to revision.
Now I come to the question whether the compromise which was entered into by the parties on the 29th of August, 1923, was in the nature of a “subsequent order” within the meaning of clause (1)(b) of section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure. By section 48 no application for execution shall be entertainable by a court executing a decree, if it was made more than twelve years after the date of the decree or more than twelve years after the date fixed for payment by the decree or by any subsequent order.
But before I take up this question I would like to say one word about an argument which prevailed before the learned District Judge and which was reiterated before us. The question is whether the application of the decree-holder made on the 16th of January, 1928, an in any way be treated as a continuation of the previous application of the 21st of March, 1923. I have already pointed out that the previous application, although it was for attachment of property and arrest, did not contain any list of property to be attached and was continued and prosecuted as an application for arrest. No less than four warrants for arrest were issued one after another, and on the filing of the compromise, the proceedings were allowed to be dropped. In his present application, dated the 16th of January, 1928, the decree-holder stated that his previous application of the 21st of March, 1923, was one for the arrest of the judgment-debtor. This was a correct statement of the circumstances, and it is not right on his part now to say that he made a misstatement of fact.
Before going back to the question what is meant by a “subsequent order” as the expression is to be found in section 48, I might dispose of another small point, namely, whether we are to treat or not the order of the 29th of August, 1923, as an order accepting the compromise and thereby directing payment of money on certain dates. On this point I am of opinion that, although the learned Assistant Collector does not, in so many terms, say that the judgment-debtor is to pay the decretal amount on the dates fixed in the compromise, yet when he accepted the compromise and cancelled the warrant, he, tacitly at any rate, directed that the terms of the compromise should be carried out.
Now I go back to the interpretation of the expression “subsequent order”. The principal question that arises is whether an order, passed by an execution court as such, by which it accepts, as in the present case, a compromise and directs that the terms of the compromise should be carried out and orders the judgment-debtor to pay the decretal amount on the dates fixed, amounts or not to a subsequent order within the meaning of section 48. On principle it is abundantly clear that and execution court cannot go behind the decree and cannot alter it. By the provisions of order XX, rule 3, a judgment when once pronounced and signed cannot be afterwards altered or added to, except as provided by section 152 or on review. The action of the executing court cannot come within the provision of order XX, rule 3 and, therefore, it is not competent to alter the terms of a decree. Where the decree says that a certain sum of money is to be paid at once, it will not be open to an executing court to say that the decretal amount shall be paid in a different way, i.e, by instalments, and ja dates convenient to the judgment-debtor. Even where the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor come to terms, neither of them has the power to so contract as to supersede the rule of limitation or to extend it. The judgment-debtor, in the case of a contract otherwise valid, may be estopped—I do not decide that he is estopped—from pleading that he is not bound by the compromise. But where the result of a compromise is that the limitation provided by the law is extended, it is open to the judgment-debtor to plead that the decree-holder's application is barred by limitation. This was held in East India Company v. Oditchurn Paul .
On general principles, therefore, an executing court as such cannot make an order which would operate as a “subsequent order” directing payment of the decretal amount on a certain date.
One illustration of a “subsequent order” mentioned in section 48 will be found in the provision of order XX, rule 11(2), by which, after the passing of a decree for payment of money, the court, on the application of the judgment-debtor and with the consent of the decree-holder, may direct the payment of the decretal amount by instalments. But, for the purpose of such an order, the parties must go to the court which passed the decree and within six months of the making of the decree, as provided by article 175 of schedule I of the Limitation Act. It may be that where the parties approach the court which passed the decree after six months and the delay is overlooked by the parties and the court, and then an order as contemplated by order XX, rule 11 is passed and is not set aside on appeal, the order will be binding on the parties on the ground of res judicata; but that is not the case here. In this case it cannot be pretended that the parties were approaching the court to exercise its powers under order XX, rule 11, of the Code of Civil Procedure, even if we assume that the Assistant Collector's court was the very court which had made the decree for profits in 1915.
I am of opinion, therefore, that on principle the subsequent order must be an order made by the court which passed the decree and not an order made in the course of execution.
The view taken by me is the view that has always been held in this Court, with some exceptions which were due to the existence in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, of a section, namely 257A, and to the fact that at one time execution applications were treated as miscellaneous applications to which the rules as to trial of suits applied. But section 257A is no longer the law, and order XXIII, rule 4 clearly states that the rules as to withdrawal and adjustment of suits do not apply to proceedings in execution of a decree or order. The decision of Mahmood, J., in Muhammad Sulaiman v. Jhukki Lal , is one of the few exceptions I have in mind. On the other hand, the cases of Debi Rai v. Gokal Prasad and Jurawan Pasi v. Mahabir show that the view taken by me was the view that prevailed in this Court.
No useful purpose will be served by examining the cases decided by other Courts, but it will be enough to examine two cases which were decided after the passing of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1908.
One of these cases is Hridaymohan Sanyal v. Khagendranath Sanyal . With all respect I am unable to agree with the view laid down in the case. It seems to have been held there that by a compromise entered into in the execution department a decree is substituted for the original decree, and the so-called substituted decree may be executed as if it were the decree originally passed.
The second case is D.S Apte…Plaintiff v. Tirmal Hanmant Savnur…Defendant . . In this case the learned Judges do not give sufficiently convincing reasons for holding that an order passed by an execution court may be a subsequent order within the meaning of section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Before leaving the case I might notice the last argument of the learned counsel for the respondent, namely, in the case of a decree directing delivery of property what would be a subsequent order within the meaning of section 48 if it be not an order made in the execution department? For reasons already given I am clear that an order made in the execution of a decree cannot be “a subsequent order” within the meaning of section 48. Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure allows the court to make such orders as may be necessary in the ends of justice, and it is conceivable that there may be a case in which, in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction as recognized by the said section 151, a court may direct a certain property to be delivered at a date other than the date already fixed by the decree passed. Then, again, the court is always entitled and authorised to correct clerical and arithmetical mistakes in judgments and decrees, and a decree when properly corrected may fix a date for delivery of property other than the date originally contained in the decree. These are possible cases that occur to me now and there may be other cases.
In the result; I would set aside the judgment of Dalal, J., on the ground that he had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal, upholding his decree dismissing the appeal to the High Court, take up the case in revision and setting aside the order of execution passed on the respondent's application of 16th January, 1928, would direct the said application to stand dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, I would direct that the parties should pay their own costs throughout.
Boys, J.:— I have had the advantage of seeing the judgment of my brother Mr. Justice Mukerji, and as I am in practical agreement with him it is not necessary for me to discuss every point. The facts are very fully set out in the judgment of my brother, and there is only one further fact to which I shall have to refer later.
On the first point that no appeal lay to this Court I agree.
On the next point as to whether a power of revision is limited to Section 253 of the Tenancy Act, or whether we can also act under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, I agree that our powers are limited to section 253. This is not a conclusion which can be regarded as satisfactory, but the difficulty arises from the wording of section 253 and oversight by the legislature. To apply section 253 literally and excluding section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure involves three undesirable results:—
Firstly, treating the section literally, it is applicable to all cases where an appeal lies to the District Judge, whether an appeal has actually been filed or not. Where an appeal has in fact been filed, the section gives us no power to revise the order of the District Judge, but does give the High Court power to revise the order of the subordinate revenue court, in this case the court of the Assistant Collector. If we exercise that power and find ground within clauses (a), (b) or (c) to set aside the order of the subordinate revenue court, we cannot set aside the order of the District Judge in appeal. It has to be left in the air and assumed to be a nullity by implication. While this is unsatisfactory, it cannot perhaps be said to do much harm.
Secondly, where the trial court was wrong within the meaning of clauses (a), (b) or (c) of section 253, but the District Judge deciding the case on different grounds was right—his reasoning being unassailable. Here logically the subordinate court's order being the only one which we could consider, and being one which ought to be set aside, it cannot be set aside without also automatically rendering the order of the District Judge a nullity. This difficulty might be avoided by refusing to exercise the revisional power, which is discretionary. But this could hardly be regarded as a satisfactory solution.
The third difficulty that arises is more serious. A case can easily be imagined where the subordinate revenue court was absolutely right and its decision has been set aside in appeal,—the District Judge being hopelessly wrong. We can, on the hypothesis we are considering, set aside the order of the trial court; but it is right and does not require to be set aside, while we cannot touch the order of the District Judge though it is very wrong, wrong actually within clauses (a), (b) or (c) of section 253.
I have endeavoured to state these difficulties in their degrees of increasing gravity. Taken as a whole, the result in my view should be to incline the courts strongly, if there was room for the view, to hold that power was with it to act under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but that power is excluded by section 264 and schedule II, list I, of the Tenancy Act; for it is impossible, without undue straining of language, to hold that an “appeal” is not a “proceeding”. No other view, therefore, is possible than that our revisional power is restricted to Section 253 of the Tenancy Act; and, further, it is clear that we have power to revise under section 253 the order of the Assistant Collector, and if we did so revise it, the order of the District Judge in appeal can only be treated as a nullity.
As to whether there are grounds for our interference, I agree with my brother that the Assistant Collector did not in fact find that any fraud was committed within the period of twelve years. It is clear that the point did not occur to him. He uses the phrase—“The decree-holder never knew that the judgment-debtor will in the end take such a plea”. The words “never knew” clearly refer to the point of time at which the compromise was being entered into. The words “will in the end take such a plea” clearly refer to a point of time after the lapse of the twelve years. No other view, then, is possible but that he did not in fact find fraud to have been committed before the lapse of twelve years.
As to the order of the Assistant Collector of the 29th August, 1923, which states that a compromise has been arrived at and the warrant may be cancelled. I would hold that this did not amount to an order substituting the compromise for the rights which the decree-holder had under the decree standing by itself. The order is itself ambiguous, and I think that as we shall be holding in this case that the execution court has no power to vary the terms of the decree, we should not assume that the Assistant Collector was passing an order which he had no power to pass, unless his action is capable of no other interpretation. In the present case the essential thing, so far as he was concerned, was that he was being asked to withdraw the warrant. It may well have been his attitude, and the subordinate courts have not too much time for debating refinements, “Very well, if you both say you have compromised I am prepared to withdraw the warrant.” I do not think that the facts or the language of the order justify us in holding that he considered himself to be substituting, or can be held to have substituted, the compromise for the decree. I think, therefore, that he did not pass any order, and the question whether he would have power to pass such an order so as to extend the period of limitation under section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not arise. But I would add that if it be treated as an order, I agree that the execution court has no power to pass such an order.
There is only one further point to which I need briefly refer, and that is the question whether the proceeding of the 16th of January, 1928, was merely a continuation of the original application of March, 1923, or whether that application had finally terminated on August 29th, 1923, and the application of the 16th of January, 1928, was an entirely new proceeding. I should be disposed to hold that the second was a continuation of the first application, and I would not hold the decree-holder too, literally bound by the phraseology of the application of the 16th of January, 1928. But it is unnecessary for me to consider this point further, because while it has been urged before us, it does not appear to have been ever hinted at by the decree-holder at any earlier stage of the proceedings.
I agree with the order proposed by Mr. Justice Mukerji.
By the Court:—We dismiss the appeal, but in the exercise of our revisional jurisdiction we set aside the order of the Assistant Collector dated the 24th of February, 1928, and dismiss the application for execution. In the circumstances of this case we direct that the parties should bear their own costs throughout.
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