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Anandi Devi v. Mohan Lal

Allahabad High Court
Jan 28, 1932
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Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff filed a suit seeking possession of a 20 biswas zamindari share in mahal Mohan Lal, located in mauza Birsinghpur, pargana Karauli. The plaintiff's claim was based on a deed of gift dated 7th June 1919, by which her father, Mohan Lal, purportedly gifted the property to his wife, Mst. Kapuri. After Mst. Kapuri's death in 1921, the plaintiff and her sister became heirs to their mother's stridhan. In 1924, Mohan Lal allegedly repented the gift and sold the property to other defendants by two sale deeds dated 19th January and 14th April 1924. The defendants admitted the gift but contended it was fictitious and never acted upon, asserting it was void due to lack of acceptance by Mst. Kapuri. The trial court found the gift real but void for lack of acceptance and dismissed the suit. The plaintiff appealed this decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the gift deed executed by Mohan Lal in favor of his wife Mst. Kapuri was accepted by her within the meaning of section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act and section 3 of the Evidence Act.
  2. Whether acceptance of a gift must be express or can be implied under Indian law.
  3. Whether the trial court erred in dismissing the suit for lack of proof of acceptance.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendants' Arguments

  • The gift was fictitious and was never acted upon.
  • Mst. Kapuri never accepted the gift, rendering it void.
  • The gift was invalid against subsequent vendees due to lack of acceptance.

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The gift deed was genuine and intended to be acted upon.
  • The wife, Mst. Kapuri, accepted the gift, either expressly or impliedly.
  • Acceptance under section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act need not be express and can be implied from circumstances.
  • Based on circumstantial evidence, acceptance by Mst. Kapuri should be presumed.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Muhammad Abdul Nayeem v. Jhonti Mahion Acceptance of gift presumed unless dissent is shown, as per English common law applied in India. The court acknowledged the precedent but declined to fully adopt the English presumption of acceptance as binding under Indian law.
Ma Mi v. Kallander Ammal Mutation and possession in zamindari property imply delivery of possession and acceptance. The court relied on this principle to infer acceptance from mutation and possession acts in the case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court accepted the trial judge's assessment of the oral evidence but found the judge did not consider implied acceptance under section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act and section 3 of the Evidence Act. The court held that acceptance need not be express and can be inferred from circumstantial evidence. It examined the defendants' own account that the gift was intended as provision for the wife during the husband's pilgrimage, which must have been known and assented to by the wife. The deed was witnessed and publicly known, and mutation proceedings were taken immediately to put the wife in possession. The revenue court's order confirmed possession and transfer by gift. Subsequent revenue mutations after the wife's death recognized inheritance from her, supporting the validity of the gift. The court reasoned that these acts constituted strong circumstantial evidence of acceptance by Mst. Kapuri, fulfilling the legal requirement of acceptance under the relevant statutes.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is allowed with costs, and the plaintiff's claim for possession is decreed.

The direct effect of this decision is the reversal of the trial court's dismissal, recognizing the validity of the gift and acceptance by Mst. Kapuri. No new precedent beyond the application of established principles regarding acceptance of gifts and circumstantial evidence was set by this decision.

Show all summary ...

Sulaiman and Young, JJ.:— This is a first appeal from the judgment of the Sub-ordinate Judge of Mainpuri. The plaintiff brought an action for possession of a 20 biswas zamindari share in mahal Mohan Lal, mauza Birsinghpur, pargana Karauli. The plaintiff's case was that her father, Mohan Lal, had by a deed of gift dated the 7th of June, 1919, given this property to his wife, Mst. Kapuri; that in 1921 Mst. Kapuri died, and she (the plaintiff) and her sister then became the heirs to their mother's stridhan; that in 1924, by two sale deeds dated the 19th of January and the 14th of April, Mohan Lal, her father, having repented of the gift to his wife, and in fraud of his own daughters, sold the property to the other defendants in the case. The plaintiff prayed for a decree for possession.

The defendants admitted the gift, but said that the gift was fictitious and was never acted upon, that Mst. Kapuri had never accepted the gift and that it was, therefore, void.

The learned Judge has found that the gift was a real gift intended to be acted upon, but that the wife never having accepted the gift, it was void as against subsequent vendees. He, therefore, dismissed the suit, and the plaintiff appeals.

We accept the findings of the learned Judge as regards the value to be attached to the oral evidence called on behalf of the plaintiff, and his finding that an express acceptance by Mst. Kapuri has not been proved. The learned Judge, however, merely finds acceptance not proved because he disbelieves the actual case set up by the plaintiff as regards express acceptance. He never directed his mind to the vital question as to whether there was proof of acceptance within the meaning of section 3 of the Evidence Act. It has been argued here by counsel for the respondents that the only acceptance under section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act contemplated by that section is an express acceptance. We, however, do not find anything in the section to limit acceptance to an express acceptance, and we must take it that acceptance may be either express or implied. As the learned Judge has not considered the question of an implied acceptance based upon circumstantial evidence at all, we must consider it. It has been argued by counsel for the appellant that the law in India based upon section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act is similar to the common law of England with regard to acceptance. There is no doubt that in England the law is that acceptance of a gift will be presumed, unless dissent is shown. That would mean that, in this case it would be for the defendants to prove that Mst. Kapuri had dissented from the gift. Lord Halsbury in his Laws of England (Volume 15, page 418) says. “Express acceptance by the donee is not necessary to complete a gift. It has long been settled that the acceptance of a gift by the donee is to be presumed until his dissent is signified, even though he is not aware of the gift; and this is equally so, although the gift be of an onerous nature, or of what is called an onerous trust”. This rule of law has been applied to India by a single Judge of the Patna High Court in the case of Muhammad Abdul Nayeem v. Jhonti Mahion (1). We, however, are not prepared to go so far. If section 122stopped short at saying that the gift must be accepted by or on behalf of the donee, as it would be natural for any person to accept a non-onerous gift we might be prepared to hold that the English law applied in India. However, a difficulty is put in the way of such a construction of the section by the fact that the section proceeds to enact that if the donee dies before acceptance, the gift is void. Such an enactment makes it, in our view, impossible to hold that there is a presumption of acceptance operating immediately upon the gift, whether known or unknown to the donee. There is no difficulty, however, in reading into the section that the acceptance may either be express or implied.

We shall look at the evidence in order to see whether it is possible to hold in this case that there is an implied acceptance.

The defendants' own case was that Mohan Lal intended to go upon a pilgrimage and wished to make some provision for his wife in case some accident might befall him, and that therefore the executed the deed of gift. This story is set out both in the deed of gift itself and in the sale deed executed by Mohan Lal in favour of the defendants vendees. We take the story of the defendants itself. The husband and wife were living together apparently, according to the story, on friendly terms. The fact that the husband intended to go upon a pilgrimage must have been known to the wife and must have been the subject of conversation between them. The intention of the husband to provide for his wife during his absence, and the precautions he intended to take in case of his death while on the pilgrimage, must in all probability equally have been the subject of discussion between the husband and wife. The question of what the husband intended to do must have been disclosed by him, in all probability, to his wife, and we think it can be assumed, in view of the subsequent conduct of the husband, that the wife assented to the proposal of the husband. It is to be noted in this connection that it is nowhere suggested in the pleadings or in the deed of gift that the wife was ignorant of the deed of gift. Further, the deed of gift was witnessed by four witnesses, two of them actually resident in the village of Karauli itself. There must have been publicity of the deed of gift, and we think that apart from what we have said above, knowledge of the deed of gift must, in all probability, have come to the wife. The husband proceeded immediately to apply for mutation. In the ordinary course proclamation was made in the village of the intended change of names. This, therefore, must have been known to the inhabitants of the village, and again we think that knowledge of this must, in all probability, have come to the wife. A few days later Mohan Lal filed the deed of gift itself in the revenue court. He did everything he could possibly do to put his wife in possession of the property. The revenue court itself in its order dated the 21st-July, 1919, says: “Notice was issued. The time allowed under the notice has expired. No objection has been taken. From the statement of the patwari the transfer of share and possession are proved. The application is within time. The property of Mohan Lal has devolved upon Mst. Kapuri Kunwar by means of a gift”. It is to be noted that the revenue court says that possession was proved. Actual or constructive possession is undoubtedly proof of acceptance, and in zamindari property, and especially in a case concerning husband and wife, mutation means delivery of possession, and the acts of the husband after mutation are acts on behalf of his wife: See the case of Ma Mi v. Kallander Ammal . We note this specially because the learned Judge has been greatly influenced in the decision to which he has come by the fact that after the mutation the, husband performed various acts which the learned Judge thought proved the contention of the defendants that there never had been a real transfer of the property or that the deed of gift was not intended to be operative. Further, when Mst. Kapuri died in 1921, Mohan Lal proceeded to get his name recorded in the revenue papers by mutation proceedings. The papers record that mutation was obtained by way of inheritance, that is, inheritance from his wife Mst. Kapuri. If the contention of the defendants was correct, there would, of course, have been no necessity for this entry in the revenue papers. The plaintiff and her sister at that time were very young and minors, and Mohan Lal was the guardian, at any rate, of one of them. They were not in a position to protest against or dispute the acts of their father.

All these facts amount, in our view, to very strong circumstantial evidence of acceptance by the donee, Mst. Kapuri, of the gift, and we hold accordingly that acceptance has been proved by the plaintiff within the meaning of section 3 of the Evidence Act.

The appeal is, therefore, allowed with costs, and the claim decreed.