Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Swadeshi Cotton Mills Company, Ltd., In Re

Allahabad High Court
Jan 26, 1932
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Summary of Legal Opinion (Sulaiman, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a reference from the Board of Revenue under the Stamp Act concerning an agreement dated 26 January 1921 between Messrs Horsman (the vendors), proprietors of a private firm trading as Swadeshi Cotton Mills, and the Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. (the company). The vendors agreed to sell all business undertakings and assets as from 1 January 1920, including goodwill, freehold hereditaments, plant and machinery, contracts, outstanding debts and other goods, except certain short-period profits and some furniture. The company had a nominal capital of Rs. 30,00,000 divided into preference and ordinary shares; part of the consideration was the allotment of nearly all shares, with the company to pay outstanding debts and certain items to be valued at market price.

The agreement declared that the sale would take effect as from 1 January 1920, possession would be given on completion, and that vendors would retain possession until completion and carry on the business pending completion, being deemed to do so on behalf of the company from 1 January 1920. The company was to bear costs of executing leases and other assurances and the costs of documents needed to transfer the properties.

After execution of the agreement, a sale deed dated 8 November 1922 was executed by the vendors in respect of the immovable property; no subsequent deed of transfer was executed as regards goodwill or movable properties. The agreement was filed with the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies under Section 104 of the Companies Act after allotment of shares had been made.

The Board's learned Government Advocate contended that the agreement was in substance a deed of conveyance of movable properties (within Section 2(10) of the Stamp Act) and a contract of sale in respect of shares under Section 104 of the Companies Act and therefore should have been stamped as a deed of transfer. The instrument, however, had been stamped as a mere agreement, bearing a stamp of eight annas only.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the agreement of 26 January 1921 constituted a deed of conveyance (requiring stamp duty as a conveyance) in respect of the assets transferred, including goodwill and movable properties.
  2. Whether the agreement amounted to a contract of sale in respect of shares under Section 104 of the Companies Act such that duty payable on a conveyance must be levied on an agreement for the allotment of shares by a company in futuro.
  3. Whether the instrument, as executed and stamped as an agreement (with an eight-anna stamp), satisfied the duty obligation under the Stamp Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Board of Revenue / Government Advocate

  • The agreement was in substance a deed of conveyance of movable properties as defined by Section 2(10) of the Stamp Act and thus required stamping as a deed of transfer.
  • The agreement was a contract of sale in respect of the shares within the meaning of Section 104 of the Companies Act and should have been stamped accordingly.

The opinion does not set out a distinct, detailed pleading or formal argument presented by the company in opposition; the court's reasoning records how the instrument on its face operated and the legal consequences it drew from that language.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. G. Angus and Co. Principle that if parties choose to effectuate a transaction by a mere contract (short of an instrument that itself conveys property), the Crown cannot demand conveyance stamp duty; choosing not to execute a conveyance to avoid duty is not a fraud on the Crown if the statutory right to duty is not otherwise made out. The court invoked Lord Esher's observation from this case to support the conclusion that an agreement, deliberately left as a contract rather than an executed conveyance, does not attract conveyance stamp duty; hence the agreement in issue could not be treated as a deed of conveyance for stamp purposes.
Civil Reference under Section 46 of the Indian Stamp Act Illustrated distinction between an actual grant/conveyance of premises (on which duty was charged) and a separate agreement to transfer business/goodwill (which was not treated as a conveyance and not charged duty as such). The court relied on the case to show that where an actual grant of premises was present and charged, the accompanying agreement to transfer goodwill and business had not been treated as a conveyance for stamp purposes. The court treated that authority as supporting the company’s position that the agreement before it was not a conveyance.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the language and structure of the instrument and reached the following conclusions based solely on the text of the agreement and the subsequent instruments:

  1. On its face, the instrument was a contract to be subsequently completed; although the parties declared the transaction to take effect from 1 January 1920, the agreement itself contemplated later completion and transfer of possession on completion.
  2. For immovable property there was a later executed sale deed (8 November 1922) pursuant to the agreement, showing the parties effected a conveyance by a later instrument in that respect.
  3. Movable property could be transferred by delivery and therefore did not necessarily require a further executed deed of transfer; goodwill, however, cannot be physically delivered, and its transfer by agreement alone raises unique issues.
  4. The court accepted the legal proposition (as stated in Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. G. Angus and Co.) that parties may choose to remain with a mere contract (risking the need for specific performance or other litigation) rather than execute an instrument that itself conveys property; if they so choose the Crown cannot demand conveyance duty unless the instrument in question itself effects a conveyance.
  5. The court distinguished the cited Civil Reference under Section 46 of the Indian Stamp Act, noting that in that case there was an actual grant of premises (treated as a conveyance and charged accordingly) while the accompanying agreement to transfer business/goodwill was not treated as a conveyance for duty purposes; that authority, the court said, supported the company's position.
  6. Having considered the agreement as a whole and the surrounding facts (including the subsequent allotments of shares and the filing under Section 104), the court concluded that the instrument could not be regarded as a deed of conveyance but only as an agreement for which the duty due under the Stamp Act had been fully paid.
  7. The court expressly declined to rule on whether the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies was right in accepting the agreement as a contract of sale under Section 104 of the Companies Act, noting the allotments occurred after the agreement was executed and holding that Section 104 does not require that duty payable on a conveyance be levied on an agreement for the allotment of shares by a company in futuro.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Reference answered. The court held that the agreement of 26 January 1921 could not be regarded as a deed of conveyance and was only an agreement for which the duty payable under the Stamp Act had been duly paid.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The agreement as executed and stamped (with an eight-anna stamp) was sufficient for stamp purposes; higher stamp duty as on a conveyance was not exigible on the instrument before the court.
  • The court did not purport to lay down a novel broader precedent beyond applying established principles; it relied on prior authorities and on the specific facts (including the subsequent conveyance of immovable property) in reaching its conclusion. The opinion does not discuss broader legal consequences beyond the immediate determination for the parties and the answer to the reference.

End of summary. All information in this summary is drawn exclusively from the provided opinion.

Show all summary ...

Sulaiman, J.:— This is a reference from the Board of Revenue under the Stamp Act. The instrument in question is an agreement dated 26th January 1921 between Messrs Horsman who were the proprietors of a private firm carrying on business under the name of Swadeshi Cotton Mills called “the vendors” of the one part and the Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. called “the company” of the other part. The vendors agreed to sell all their business undertakings and assets as from 1st January 1920, including goodwill, freehold hereditaments, plants, machinery, etcetera contracts, outstanding debts and other goods, with the exception of profits for a short period which had to be assessed on a certain basis and some furniture. The nominal capital of the company was Rs. 30,00,000 which was divided into 15,000 preference shares and 15,000 ordinary shares of Rs. 100 each. Part of the consideration consisted of the allotment of all the shares with the exception of 33 ordinary shares, the consideration for the costs stores etcetera was to be their market value, and as for the residue of the consideration the company was to pay all the outstanding debts.

2. The agreement stated;

“Now it is agreed and declared… (that) the vendors shall sell and the company shall purchase with effect as on and from the 1st day of January 1920 etc.”

3. It again recited that

“the purchase, shall be completed on such date as may be mutually arranged between the parties hereto with effect as on and from the said 1st January 1920, possession of the premises shall be given to the company on the completion of the purchase.”

4. It was again repeated that

“the possession of the said lands and premises shall be retained by the vendors up to completion,”

and in the meantime the vendors shall carry on the business as heretofore and shall be deemed to be carrying it on for and on behalf of the company as from 1st January 1920. The agreement further provided that all the necessary parties

“shall at the expense and cost of the company execute and do or cause to be executed and done all such leases assurances and things for vesting the said premises in the company.”

5. It also stated that the costs of

“all documents and things required for the purpose of transferring the properties hereby agreed to be sold to the company”

shall be paid by the company.

6. After the execution of this document a sale deed dated 8th November 1922 was executed by the vendors in respect of the immovable property but no subsequent deed of transfer was executed as regards the goodwill, or the moveable properties. It however appears that this very agreement was filed with the Registrar of the Joint Stock Companies under Section 104 of the Companies Act (7 of 1913) after the allotment of shares had been made subsequent to the agreement. The learned Government Advocate on behalf of the Board of Revenue contends that the agreement was in substance a deed of conveyance of moveable properties as defined in Section 2(10) of the Stamp Act and a contract of sale in respect of the share within the meaning of Section 104 of the Companies Act, and should therefore have been stamped as a deed of transfer. The instrument was stamped as a mere agreement and bore a stamp of eight annas only.

7. The language of the instrument as quoted above on the face of it shows that it was a mere contract entered into between the parties, which was to be subsequently completed although the parties intended that when completed it should take effect from 1st January 1920. So far as the immovable properties were concerned there was a subsequent deed of transfer in pursuance of this agreement. So far as the moveable properties were concerned, their transfer could take place by mere delivery and there was no necessity to execute a fresh deed of transfer. The only difficulty was about the goodwill which could not be “delivered.” It seems to us that if the parties chose to be satisfied with a mere contract for sale, without an actual deed of sale, stamp duty payable on a conveyance cannot be demanded. By entering into a mere contract short of an actual conveyance they ran a certain amount of risk. If either party resiles from the contract, the other party may have to institute a suit for specific performance of the contract. Trouble may also arise if the vendors subsequently convey the property to a bona fide transferee for value. But if in spite of this risk the parties refrain from getting an actual deed of conveyance prepared, they can successfully evade the payment of higher duty. As observed by Lord Esher in the Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. G. Angus and Co.(1) at 593:

“But it is said that if the appeal be decided against the commissioners purchasers will rest satisfied with an agreement of which specific performance would be decreed and will not go on to execute a conveyance, and so the Crown will lose the stamp duty and it is rather suggested that this would be cheating the Crown and committing a fraud. The Crown however must make out its right to the duty, and if there be a means of evading the stamp duty, so much the better for those who can evade it. It is no fraud upon the Crown, it is a thing which they are perfectly entitled to do. The Crown cannot have the stamp duty unless the parties to the sale chose to effectuate the transaction by an instrument which of itself conveys the property, and if they chose to be satisfled with something less, the matter is not brought within Section 70 (of the Stamp Act of 1870).”

8. It was also observed in the same case that even the goodwill of the business did not pass by the instrument, which was a mere contract to sell the business, premises and goodwill etcetera. The learned Government Advocate relies on the Civil Reference under S. 46 of the Indian Stamp Act(2). But in that case apart from the agreement to transfer the business, goodwill, assets etcetera, there was an actual grant of the premises valued at Rs. 1,50,000, which grant the other party confirmed. The learned Judges treated it as a conveyance of the premises for Rs. 1,50,000 and the stamp duty was charged on this sum only. The agreement to transfer the business, goodwill etcetera was not treated as a deed of conveyance and duty on its value was not charged as on a conveyance. In this sense this case actually supports the company. Having considered the agreement as a whole, we are of opinion that it cannot be regarded as a deed of conveyance but is only an agreement for which the duty due under the Stamp Act has been fully paid. It is not for us to consider whether the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies was right or wrong in accepting this agreement as a contract of sale under Section 104 of the Companies Act. The allotments of shares were to be made after this agreement was executed. The allotments were in fact made subsequently. We do not think that there is anything in the provisions of Section 104 of the Companies Act, which requires that a duty payable on a conveyance should be levied on an agreement for the allotment of shares by a company in futuro. This is our answer to the reference.

S.N/R.K

9. Reference answered.