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Basdeo Singh v. Ram Raj Singh
Factual and Procedural Background
On 29 November 1928 Ram Raj Singh, Ram Deo Singh and Mt. Parkali instituted Suit No. 688 of 1928 in the Court of the Havali Munsif of Benares City seeking a declaration of title to property in village Rajwari and the cancellation of an arbitral award dated 17 September 1928 made consequent upon an agreement of reference dated 2 June 1928. The plaintiffs alleged that the agreement of reference and the award were vitiated by fraud and therefore not binding.
Basdeo Singh filed a written statement on 22 January 1929 traversing the plaintiffs' material facts. On 25 January 1929 Basdeo Singh presented an application under para. 20, Section 2, Civil P.C., praying that the award of 17 September 1928 be filed and a decree passed in accordance with it; this application was registered as Suit No. 46 of 1929 and was directed against Ram Raj Singh and Ram Deo Singh (Mt. Parkali was not made a party).
Both proceedings were fixed for hearing on 31 August 1929. On that date the parties agreed in Court to abide by the statement of Thakur Baldeo Singh (the order-sheet used the word "faisla" — decision — but the opinion reads the order sheet as showing an intention to abide by Thakur Baldeo Singh's statement). The Court ordered that a parwana be issued to the referee to file his faisla (decision).
A parwana was directed for Suit No. 46 to require the referee to file his faisla by 4 September 1929. On 3 September 1929 Thakur Baldeo Singh came to Court, took an oath, and made a statement recorded in Suit No. 46 of 1929; the learned Munsif accepted that statement and dismissed Basdeo Singh's application for filing the award. In Suit No. 688 of 1928 Thakur Baldeo Singh filed a written statement on the next day purporting to repeat his earlier decision and the learned Munsif accepted it and decreed the plaintiffs' suit with costs.
Two appeals were preferred to the District Judge and transferred for hearing to the Second Additional Subordinate Judge of Benares. The appellate Judge first held that there was no reference to arbitration within Section 2 Civil P.C., that the agreement was an agreement to abide by a statement on oath, and that the Court was bound to pass a decree in accordance with that sworn statement; he affirmed the trial Court's order in Suit No. 46. He then dismissed the connected appeal on the ground of res judicata. Those orders gave rise to the second appeal and the civil revision now under consideration.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the parties' agreement (as recorded in the order-sheets) amounted to an agreement of reference to arbitration within the purview of Section 2, Civil P.C., or instead to an agreement to abide by the statement of a nominated person.
- Whether the agreement amounted to an agreement to abide by the sworn testimony of the referee (i.e., a statement on oath) within the meaning of Sections 9 and 11 of the Oaths Act.
- Whether the learned Munsif's procedure in taking up and deciding Suit No. 46 of 1929 on 3 September 1929 (a date not fixed for hearing) without the parties' appearance and behind their backs was regular and lawful.
- Whether the order of the lower appellate Court was open to revision under Section 115, Civil P.C., as contended by counsel for the respondents.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiffs (Ram Raj Singh, Ram Deo Singh and Mt. Parkali)
- Alleged that the agreement of reference dated 2 June 1928 was vitiated by fraud.
- Contended that the award dated 17 September 1928 was the product of fraud and collusion and therefore not binding on them.
- Asserted title to the property, relying in part on an alleged partition that took place nearly half a century earlier.
Respondent / Applicant (Basdeo Singh)
- Filed an application (Suit No. 46 of 1929) under para. 20, Section 2, Civil P.C., seeking that the award dated 17 September 1928 be filed and that a decree be passed in accordance with the award.
- Filed a written statement in the original suit traversing the plaintiffs' allegations.
- Sent a telegram (received in Court before 4 September 1929) indicating that the "panch decision not required" because of relationship and pressure; the Munsif did not act upon this telegram.
Counsel for the Respondents / Lower Court (Mr. Shastri)
- Raised a preliminary objection that the order of the lower appellate Court was not open to revision under Section 115, Civil P.C., relying on Chandu Lal v. Koka Mai (A.I.R. 1921 All. 226).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Himanohal Singh v. Jatwar Singh, A.I.R. 1924 All. 570 | Support for the view that an agreement to abide by the statement of a nominated person amounts to acceptance of an adjustment based on that statement (i.e., agreement to accept adjustment furnished by the nominee's statement). | The Court cited this case as one of a number of decisions endorsing the construction that an agreement to abide by a nominee's statement is not an arbitration within Section 2 but an agreement to accept an adjustment founded on the nominee's statement. |
| Deoraj Misra v. Abhai Raji, A.I.R. 1927 All. 584 | Same general principle as above: authority for treating agreements to abide by a nominee's statement as agreements to accept an adjustment rather than formal arbitration. | Referred to as supporting authority for the Court's conclusion that the parties' agreement did not constitute arbitration under Section 2, Civil P.C. |
| Ram Batan v. Ram Lal Singh, A.I.R. 1929 All. 759 | Again cited for the view that an agreement to abide by a nominee's statement equates to acceptance of an adjustment based on that statement. | Used to reinforce the Court's construction of the parties' agreement as not falling within Section 2 arbitration or as an agreement to abide by sworn testimony. |
| Bishambhar v. Radha Kishunji, A.I.R. 1931 All. 557 | Authority for the proposition that where there is no arbitration within Section 2 and no agreement to abide by sworn testimony under the Oaths Act, the agreement may be withdrawn by either party before the statement has been made in Court and action taken thereon. | The Court invoked this case to support the proposition that the parties could resile from the agreement prior to a proper statement being made and acted upon, and therefore Basdeo Singh had the right to resile up to the time of such statement. |
| Chandu Lal v. Koka Mai, A.I.R. 1921 All. 226 | Examined on the question whether an appellate order is open to revision under Section 115, Civil P.C., where the appellate Court had jurisdiction and passed orders it considered fit. | The Court distinguished the present facts from Chandu Lal: whereas Chandu Lal involved an appellate Court exercising jurisdiction and making an order even if erroneous, in the present case the learned Munsif had no jurisdiction to take up the case on an unappointed date and decide it behind the parties' backs; thus Section 115 revision was entertained despite Chandu Lal. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court first examined the agreement of reference as recorded in the two order-sheets and concluded there was no agreement of reference to arbitration within Section 2, Civil P.C., nor an agreement to abide by the sworn testimony of the referee within the meaning of the Oaths Act (Sections 9 and 11). Instead, the Court found the parties had undertaken to be bound by the statement of Baldeo Singh, the nominee — an agreement which the Court characterised as an agreement to accept an adjustment that might ensue from the nominee's statement.
The Court relied on earlier decisions (Himanohal Singh, Deoraj Misra, Ram Batan) to support the construction that an agreement to abide by a nominee's statement is not the same as an agreement to refer to arbitration under Section 2. Consequently the Court rejected the lower appellate Court's construction that the statement was to be given on oath and therefore binding under the Oaths Act.
The Court then analysed the procedure adopted by the trial Court in disposing of Suit No. 46 of 1929. It was found to be irregular because the learned Munsif took up and decided the case on 3 September 1929 — a date not fixed for hearing — without the parties or their pleaders being present. The Munsif accepted what was treated as the referee's sworn testimony and dismissed the suit behind the parties' backs. That conduct was held to be beyond the Munsif's jurisdiction and contrary to law.
The Court noted that a telegram from Basdeo Singh, received before 4 September 1929 and actually received on 3 September, indicating that a "panch decision not required," was ignored by the learned Munsif on two grounds: (1) a telegram was not a representation entitled to attention; and (2) the suit had already been disposed of. The Court considered the Munsif had decided the suit with "indecent haste."
The Court examined the content of Thakur Baldeo Singh's statement (both his oral statement in Suit No. 46 and his written statement in Suit No. 688) and found it "extremely vague" and failing to deal with the cardinal issues in dispute — in particular the plaintiffs' allegations of fraud in procuring the agreement of reference and the award, and their claim of title arising from a long-ago partition. The Court concluded Baldeo Singh did not apply his mind to the central questions and therefore his "decision" could not be treated as a proper adjudication of the controversies.
On the question whether the appellate order was open to revision under Section 115, Civil P.C., the Court considered the precedent relied upon by Mr. Shastri (Chandu Lal v. Koka Mai) but held the facts were materially different: Chandu Lal involved an appellate Court exercising jurisdiction (even if its order might have been erroneous), whereas here the learned Munsif had no jurisdiction to take up and decide the case on an unappointed date and behind the parties' backs. For that reason the Court accepted the application for revision and set aside the orders of the Courts below.
As a result of these findings the Court held that the agreement recorded on 31 August 1929 had been resiled from; the statements of the referee were not points-deciding pronouncements in conformity with the agreement; and the decrees based on them could not stand.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: The Court accepted the revision, set aside the orders and decrees of the Courts below, and remanded the matters for trial on the merits.
Specific consequences ordered by the Court:
- The order of the learned Munsif in Suit No. 46 of 1929 (the application to file the award) was set aside and that suit must be tried on the merits by the learned Munsif.
- The decree in Suit No. 688 of 1928 was set aside and the suit was remanded to the trial Court under Order 41, Rule 23, Civil P.C., for disposal according to law; because the agreement to abide by the nominee's statement had been resiled from, the suit must be tried by the learned Munsif himself.
- Basdeo Singh was awarded his costs in both suits throughout.
- The order previously made in Suit No. 46 of 1929 does not operate as res judicata in the connected suit.
Implications: The decision directly affects the parties by annulling the challenged orders and decrees and directing trial on the merits; the Court did not purport to lay down any new principle beyond applying existing authorities and established procedural protections (as reflected in the precedents cited). No broader precedent or rule beyond the application of the cited authorities and the remand for fresh trial is articulated in the opinion.
1. This second appeal and the connected civil revision are inter-dependent and proceed upon common grounds.
2. On 29th November 1928, Ram Raj Singh, Ram Deo Singh and Mt. Parkali instituted a suit against Basdeo Singh for a declaration of title to certain property situate in village Rajwari and for the cancellation of an award, dated 17th September 1928 made by Raghunandan Singh and others consequent upon an agreement of reference to arbitration, dated 2nd Juno 1928. The plaintiffs alleged that the agreement of reference was vitiated by fraud and that the award was not binding upon them. This suit was registered as No. 688 of 1928 in the Court of the Havali Munsif of Benares City. Basdeo Singh filed a written statement on 22nd January 1929 which amounted to a traverse of all the materials facts whereon the claim was founded.
3. On 25th January 1929 Basdeo Singh presented an application in the same Court under para. 20, Section 2, Civil P.C., and prayed that the award, dated 17th September 1928, be filed and that a decree be passed in accordance therewith. This application which was subsequently registered as Suit No. 46 of 1929 was directed against Ram Raj Singh and Ram Deo Singh. Mt. Parkali was no party to it. She appears to have been omitted from the array of defendants presumably on the ground that she had no interest in the subject matter in dispute. Sam Raj Singh and Ram Deo Singh filed a written statement on 15th February 1929. The grounds of attack in Suit No. 688 of 1928 constituted, in substance, the grounds of defence in this proceeding.
4. Both the cases were fixed for hearing on 31st August 1929. On that date, the parties made a statement in Court whereby they agreed to abide by the statement of one Thakur Baldeo Singh about the subject-matter in dispute. This statement was recorded in the order sheet. The word used in the order sheet is not "bayan" but "faisla" (decision); but reading the order sheet as a whole, there can be no doubt that the intention of the parties was to abide by the statement of Thakur Baldeo Singh. Mt. Par kali does not appear to have joined in the said statement before the Court. The Court ordered that a parwana be issued to *the referee -and that the latter be directed to file his faisla in two days.
5. A similar statement was recorded in the order-sheet of Suit No. 46 of 1929. The Court directed that a parwana be issued to the referee directing him to file his faisla till 4th September 1929 and that the case be put up for disposal on 4th September 1929.
6. On 3rd September 1929 Mt. Parkali appears to have signified her assent to a reference to Thakur Baldeo Singh. A parwana was directed to be issued to Thakur Baldeo Singh. The record shows that this parwana never reached the hands of the Thakur.
7. On 3rd September 1929 Thakur Baldeo Singh came to the Court of the learned Munsif of Havali. Oath was administered to him, and he made a certain statement. This statement was recorded in Suit No. 46 of 1929. The learned Munsif gave effect to that statement and dismissed the suit of Basdeo Singh for ' filing an award.
8. Suit No. 688 of 1928 was taken up by the Munsif on the following day. Thakur Baldeo Singh does not appear to have made any verbal statement before the Court; but he filed a statement in writing, which is to be found at p. 15 of the paper book. He stated that he had already given his decision in Court on 3rd September 1929, and his decision in the present case was just the same and that, as the result of his decision the plaintiffs' claim should be decreed with costs. The learned Munsif accepted the "decision" of the referee and decreed Suit No. 688 of 1928 with costs.
9. Two appeals were preferred to the learned District Judge from the orders of the learned Munsif in the two cases referred to above. These appeals were transferred for hearing to the Court of the Second Additional Subordinate Judge of Benares. He took up the appeal from the order in Suit No. 46 of 1929 first, and came to the conclusion that there was no reference to arbitration within the purview of Section 2, Civil P.C, that the agreement of reference amounted to an agreement to abide by a statement on oath and that the said statement having been given by the referee on oath, the Court was bound to pass a decree in accordance therewith. He accordingly affirmed the order of the trial Court and dismissed the appeal. He next took up the appeal in the connected suit and decided that case upon the ground that the order in the connected suit operated as res judicata.
10. The orders of the Second Additional Subordinate Judge of Benares have given rise to the second appeal and the application for civil revision that we are now dealing with.
11. We have considered the agreement of| reference as embodied in the two order sheets in the two cases and are of opinion that there was no agreement of reference to arbitration and that the transaction did not amount to an agreement to abide by the sworn testimony of the referee. The agreement amounted to an under, taking on the part of the disputants that they would be bound by the statement of Baldeo Singh, the nominee. The agreement to abide by the statement of a certain individual nominated by the parties to a pending action, amounts to an agreement to accept an adjustment of the case which might ensue as the result of the statement made by the nominee, the said statement furnishing the agreed data whereon the adjustment was to be founded. This appears to be the view which has been taken by this Court in a number of cases, notably in Himanohal Singh v. Jatwar Singh A.I.R. 1924 All. 570, Deoraj Misra v. Abhai Raji A.I.R. 1927 All. 584 and Ram Batan v. Ram Lal Singh A.I.R. 1929 All. 759. It follows that we do not accept the construction put upon the agreement by the lower appellate Court, that the statement referred to was to be a statement on oath.
12. Where the agreement of the parties is not to refer their dispute to arbitration within the purview of Section 2, Civil P.C., nor is an agreement to abide by the sworn 'testimony of a particular referee within the meaning of Sections 9 and 11, Oaths Act, the agreement in question may be withdrawn or resiled from by one party or the 'other before the statement has been made in Court and action taken thereon: vide in Bishambhar v. Radha Kishunji A.I.R. 1931 All. 557.
13. It is abundantly clear from the facts we have stated above that the procedure adopted by the trial Court in disposing of Suit No. 46 of 1929, was irregular and not in accordance with law. The 3rd September 1929 was not the date fixed for the hearing of the case On that date, the parties did not appear in Court either in person or through their pleaders. The learned Munsif however, for some reasons which do not appear from the record, took up the case on that date, and behind the back of the parties dismissed the suit by accepting the sworn testimony of the referee.
14. A preliminary objection has been taken by Mr. Shastri that the order of the lower appellate Court is not open to revision under Section 115, Civil P.C, and reliance has been placed upon a decision of this Court in Chandu Lal v. Koka Mai A.I.R. 1921 All. 226. The facts of this case were that a certain plaint was returned by the trial Court for presentation to the proper Court. An appeal was preferred to the learned District Judge, who differed from the trial Court and, setting aside the order of that Court, remanded the suit for trial on the merits. An application for revision having been filed under Section 115, Civil P.C, this Court held that the appellate Court had jurisdiction to entertain the appeal and to pass such orders as it considered fit, and that even if the order were erroneous, it was passed by a Court having jurisdiction and consequently was not obnoxious to the provisions of section 115. We are of opinion that the facts of this case are entirely different from the case now in hand. The learned Munsif had no jurisdiction to take up the case on a date which was not fixed for hearing and to pass rders on the case behind the back of the parties. On this short ground, we would accept the application for revision, set aside the orders of the Courts below and send back the case to the trial Court for disposal of the-application according to law.
15. It was open to one or the other parties to the reference to resile from the agreement on 3rd September 1929. A telegram was sent to the Additional Munsif of Havali, which was worded thus;
Basdeo Singh v. Ram Raj Singh, etc., Case No. 46 of 1929. Baboo Baldeo Singh panch decision not required being uncle of Babo Jagannath Singh, pleader, who is pleader of against party hence no judgment hoped kindly try case yourself he is under pressureBasdeo Singh.
16. It was received in Court before 4th September 1929, which was the date fixed for the hearing of the suit. As a matter of fact, it was received on the 3rd September; but the learned Munsif paid no attention to it upon a twofold ground : firstly, that no representation made through a telegram was entitled to attention; and secondly, that the suit had already been disposed of. There can be no manner of doubt that the suit was decided by the learned Munsif with indecent haste. Basdeo Singh had the right to resile from the original agreement any time during the pendency of the suit and so long as no proper statement had been made by the referee in terms of the agreement. We have examined the statement of Baldeo Singh in detail and are of opinion that his so-called "decision" is extremely vague; and that we find it extremely difficult to hold that he had made any pronouncement upon any of the questions which were really in dispute-between the parties. It has got to be remembered that the plaintiffs claimed to sweep aside the award dated 17th September 1928, upon the ground that the initial agreement of reference, dated 2nd June 1928 had been procured by fraud, that the award itself was the outcome of fraud and collusion and that the property in dispute was the exclusive property of the plaintiffs because of a partition which had taken place nearly half a century before the action. Thakur Baldeo Singh does not appear to have applied his mind to this part of the case at all and he sweeps aside the award with the observation that the agreement to refer to arbitration is wrong. It is true that he states that the parties have been separate for a fairly long time and that there was no necessity to enter into an agreement of reference to arbitration about the division of the property, but he makes no attempt to definitely tackle the cardinal issues in the case.
17. The order of the Munsif in Suit No. 46 of 1929 having been set aside, the said order does not operate as res judicata in the connected suit. The statement in writing filed by the referee in the said suit is open to the same criticism which his sworn testimony was exposed to. The learned Munsif was not justified in accepting that statement as one in due accordance with the agreement arrived at between the parties on 31st August 1928 or as one deciding the points in. controversy. The result is that we set aside the decree of the Courts below in Suit No. 688 of 1928 and remand the suit to the trial Court under Order 41, Rule 23, Civil P.C., for disposal according to law. The agreement, dated 31st August 1928, having been already resiled from, the suit has to be tried by the learned Munsif himself. Basdeo Singh is entitled to his costs in both the suits throughout. Suit No. 46 of 1929 must also be tried on the merits by the learned Munsif.
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