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Daya Nand v. State Of Haryana .
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant was tried for an incident dated 2 February 1998 in which he allegedly attempted to rape the prosecutrix while she was in the fields. Evidence from the prosecutrix, her mother, two police officers and a photographer led the Additional Sessions Judge, Narnaul, to convict the appellant under Section 376 read with Section 511 of the Indian Penal Code. He was sentenced to five years’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs 2,000, with a further two-month term in default.
The High Court of Punjab and Haryana (Criminal Appeal No. 174-SB of 1999) upheld the conviction and sentence on 15 October 2009. Throughout the proceedings the appellant asserted that he was a juvenile on the date of the offence. The Principal Magistrate, Juvenile Justice Court, originally accepted this plea on 20 March 1998, but the Sessions Judge reversed that finding, relying on the birth register which showed a date of birth of 14 August 1981. Consequently, the trial proceeded in a regular court and not before a Juvenile Court. The present Supreme Court appeal is confined to the question of juvenility and its legal consequences.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the appellant, who was 16 years, 5 months and 19 days old on the date of the offence, is entitled to be treated as a “juvenile in conflict with law” under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 as amended in 2006.
- If deemed a juvenile, what consequential orders should be passed regarding the sentence already imposed and his further custody.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant’s Arguments
- The appellant was a juvenile on 2 February 1998 and therefore should have been tried by the Juvenile Justice Court.
- Amendments introduced by Act 33 of 2006 permit a claim of juvenility to be raised at any stage and extend the Act’s protection to anyone who had not completed 18 years at the time of the offence.
State’s Response
This information was not available in the provided opinion.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand (2005) 3 SCC 551 | Section 20 of the 2000 Act (pre-2006) applied only to accused who were below 18 on 1-4-2001. | Explained that, under the unamended Act, the appellant would not have benefited; used as a contrast to show the legal position before the 2006 amendments. |
| Hari Ram v. State of Rajasthan (2009) 13 SCC 211 | After the 2006 amendments, all persons under 18 on the date of offence are treated as juveniles; claim can be raised at any stage. | Treated as the governing authority; led the Court to conclude that the appellant must receive juvenile treatment. |
| Dharambir v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2010) 5 SCC 344 | Affirmed Hari Ram and the retrospective application of the amended Act. | Cited to reinforce the conclusion that benefits of the Act extend to the appellant. |
| Mohan Mali v. State of M.P. (2010) 6 SCC 669; AIR 2010 SC 1790 | Further affirmation of Hari Ram principles. | Relied upon as additional support for treating the appellant as a juvenile. |
Court’s Reasoning and Analysis
The Court first noted that, based on the birth register, the appellant was 16 years, 5 months and 19 days old on the date of the offence. Under the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 a male below 16 was a juvenile, so he fell outside that definition at the time of trial. However, the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000—which enlarged the definition to anyone under 18—was amended in 2006 to insert Sections 1(4), 2(l), 7-A, and an expanded Section 20, together with Section 64. These provisions:
- Apply to all cases involving detention or sentence of a juvenile in conflict with law, irrespective of any other law.
- Define a “juvenile in conflict with law” as a person who had not completed 18 years on the date of the offence.
- Allow a claim of juvenility to be raised at any stage, even after disposal of the case.
- Render any sentence already passed against a juvenile ineffective once the juvenile status is established.
In Hari Ram and subsequent cases, this Court held that these amendments operate retrospectively and override the earlier position in Pratap Singh. Applying those authorities, the Court concluded that the appellant, being under 18 on 2 February 1998, must be treated as a juvenile. Consequently, the sentence imposed by the trial court and affirmed by the High Court had no legal effect. The proper course is to release him from prison and remit the matter to the Juvenile Justice Board for appropriate orders under the Act.
Holding and Implications
The Supreme Court set aside the appellant’s sentence, ordered his immediate release, and directed that he be produced before the Juvenile Justice Board, Narnaul, for further orders under the Juvenile Justice Act.
Direct Effect: The appellant will no longer serve the custodial sentence imposed by the trial court; his case will be dealt with by the Juvenile Justice Board, which may impose rehabilitative, non-penal measures.
Broader Implication: The judgment re-affirms that, after the 2006 amendments, any person who was below 18 at the time of the offence—regardless of present age or procedural stage—is entitled to the protective regime of the Juvenile Justice Act, rendering prior sentences unenforceable.
Aftab Alam, J.— Leave granted. The appellant stands convicted under Section 376 read with Section 511 of the Penal Code, 1860 and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for five years and a fine of Rs. 2000 with the direction that in default of payment of fine he would undergo rigorous imprisonment for a further period of two months.
2. According to the prosecution case, on 2-2-1998, at about 10.00 a.m, the prosecutrix had gone out to the fields for relieving herself. There she was accosted by the appellant. Seeing him take off his pants, the prosecutrix tried to run away but the appellant caught hold of her and pulled her down to the ground. The prosecutrix freed herself by biting on the appellant's hand and ran towards her house. The appellant chased her and again caught hold of her. He pulled her down and grabbed her breasts and attempted to commit rape on her. She resisted him and in their struggle some mustard crops growing in the field were also damaged. On alarm raised by the prosecutrix, her mother and uncle came to the spot and on seeing them, the appellant ran away threatening the prosecutrix that he would kill her in case she went to the police.
3. In support of its case, the prosecution examined the mother of the prosecutrix as PW 1, the prosecutrix herself as PW 2 and two policemen connected with the investigation and a photographer who had taken pictures of the place of occurrence. The Additional Sessions Judge, Narnaul, trying the offence, on a consideration of the evidence adduced before him, found and held that the charge against the appellant was fully proved and by judgment and order dated 13-2-1999/15-2-1999, passed in Sessions Case No. 39 of 6-10-1998, Sessions Trial No. 1 of 1-2-1999 convicted and sentenced him, as noted above.
4. Against the judgment and order passed by the trial court, the appellant preferred an appeal (Criminal Appeal No. 174-SB of 1999) before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh. The High Court dismissed the appeal by judgment and order dated 15-10-2009, maintaining the conviction and sentence awarded to the appellant.
5. So far as the question of the appellant's guilt is concerned, that seems to be amply established by the evidence adduced by the prosecution and there is no need to go into any further detail in that regard. What needs to be considered in this appeal is the appellant's plea based on juvenility.
6. From the judgment of the High Court coming under appeal, it appears that the plea of the appellant's juvenility was raised at an early stage of the proceedings and the Principal Magistrate, Juvenile Justice Court, Narnaul, by his order dated 20-3-1998 had found that the appellant was a juvenile. Against the order of the Principal Magistrate, the State went in appeal and the learned Sessions Judge, Narnaul, reversed the findings of the Principal Magistrate, Juvenile Justice Court, observing that the date of birth of the appellant as recorded in the deaths and births register maintained by the Registrar was 14-8-1981 and reckoned on that basis, that he was not a juvenile on 2-2-1998, the date of the occurrence. As a consequence, the appellant was tried not before a Juvenile Court, but before the Additional Sessions Judge, Narnaul.
7. The plea of juvenility was again raised in appeal, but the High Court rejected it referring to the finding of the Sessions Judge on the matter and observed as follows:
“The learned counsel for the appellant argued that the appellant was a juvenile at the time of occurrence and should have been tried by the Principal Magistrate, Juvenile Justice Court, Narnaul. However, after going through the records of the case, I do not find any merit in this argument. In his order dated 20-3-1998, the Principal Magistrate, Juvenile Justice Court, Narnaul, had held that the appellant was a juvenile. Against the order dated 20-3-1998, the State had gone in appeal and the learned Sessions Judge, Narnaul, reversed the findings of the Principal Magistrate, Juvenile Justice Court, Narnaul by observing that the date of birth of the appellant was 14-8-1981 as mentioned in the deaths and births register so maintained by the Registrar. Thus, on 2-2-1998 i.e the date of occurrence, the appellant was not a juvenile.”
8. From the above it is evident that on the date of occurrence the age of the appellant was 16 years 5 months and 19 days.
9. In the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986, a “juvenile” was defined under Section 2(h) to mean a boy who has not attained the age of 16 years or a girl who has not attained the age of 18 years. On the basis of the finding of the Sessions Judge that on the date of occurrence, the appellant was over 16 years of age, he did not come within the definition of “juvenile” under the 1986 Act.
10. The Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 was replaced by the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 that came into force on 1-4-2001. The 2000 Act defined “juvenile or child” in Section 2(k) to mean a person who has not completed eighteen years of age. Section 69 of the 2000 Act, repealed the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986. The 2000 Act, in Section 20 also contained a provision in regard to cases that were pending when it came into force and in which the accused at the time of commission of offence was below 18 years of age but above sixteen years of age (and hence, not a juvenile under the 1986 Act) and consequently who was being tried not before a Juvenile Court but a regular court.
11. Section 20 (prior to its amendment in 2006) provided as follows:
“20. Special provision in respect of pending cases.—Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, all proceedings in respect of a juvenile pending in any court in any area on the date on which this Act comes into force in that area, shall be continued in that court as if this Act had not been passed and if the court finds that the juvenile has committed an offence, it shall record such finding and instead of passing any sentence in respect of the juvenile, forward the juvenile to the Board which shall pass orders in respect of that juvenile in accordance with the provisions of this Act as if it had been satisfied on inquiry under this Act that a juvenile has committed the offence.”
12. The abovequoted provision came up for consideration before a Constitution Bench of this Court in Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand (2005) 3 SCC 551. In Pratap Singh (2005) 3 SCC 551, this Court held that Section 20 of the 2000 Act would apply only to cases in which the accused was below 18 years of age on 1-4-2001, the date on which the 2000 Act came into force but it would have no application in case the accused had crossed the age of 18 years on the date of coming into force of the 2000 Act. Applying the ratio of the Constitution Bench decision, the appellant would not be entitled to the protection and benefits of the provisions of the 2000 Act, since he was over 18 years of age on 1-4-2001, when the 2000 Act came into force. But the matter did not stop at that stage.
13. After this Court's decision in Pratap Singh (2005) 3 SCC 551 (and presumably as a result of that decision) a number of amendments of a very basic nature were introduced in the 2000 Act w.e.f 22-8-2006 by Act 33 of 2006. Some of the provisions incorporated in the 2000 Act by the 2006 Amendment insofar as relevant for the present are reproduced below:
“1. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the provisions of this Act shall apply to all cases involving detention, prosecution, penalty or sentence of imprisonment of juveniles in conflict with law under such other law.
2. (l) ‘juvenile in conflict with law’ means a juvenile who is alleged to have committed an offence and has not completed eighteenth year of age as on the date of commission of such offence;
7-A. Procedure to be followed when claim of juvenility is raised before any court.—(1) Whenever a claim of juvenility is raised before any court or a court is of the opinion that an accused person was a juvenile on the date of commission of the offence, the court shall make an inquiry, take such evidence as may be necessary (but not an affidavit) so as to determine the age of such person, and shall record a finding whether the person is a juvenile or a child or not, stating his age as nearly as may be:
Provided that a claim of juvenility may be raised before any court and it shall be recognised at any stage, even after final disposal of the case, and such claim shall be determined in terms of the provisions contained in this Act and the Rules made thereunder, even if the juvenile has ceased to be so on or before the date of commencement of this Act.
(2) If the court finds a person to be a juvenile on the date of commission of the offence under sub-section (1), it shall forward the juvenile to the Board for passing appropriate order, and the sentence if any, passed by a Court shall be deemed to have no effect.
20. Special provision in respect of pending cases.—Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, all proceedings in respect of a juvenile pending in any court in any area on the date on which this Act comes into force in that area, shall be continued in that court as if this Act had not been passed and if the court finds that the juvenile has committed an offence, it shall record such finding and instead of passing any sentence in respect of the juvenile, forward the juvenile to the Board which shall pass orders in respect of that juvenile in accordance with the provisions of this Act as if it had been satisfied on inquiry under this Act that a juvenile has committed the offence:
Provided that the Board may, for any adequate and special reason to be mentioned in the order, review the case and pass appropriate order in the interest of such juvenile.
Explanation.—In all pending cases including trial, revision, appeal or any other criminal proceedings in respect of a juvenile in conflict with law, in any court, the determination of juvenility of such a juvenile shall be in terms of clause (l) of Section 2, even if the juvenile ceases to be so on or before the date of commencement of this Act and the provisions of this Act shall apply as if the said provisions had been in force, for all purposes and at all material times when the alleged offence was committed.
64. Juvenile in conflict with law undergoing sentence at commencement of this Act.—In any area in which this Act is brought into force, the State Government shall direct that a juvenile in conflict with law who is undergoing any sentence of imprisonment at the commencement of this Act, shall, in lieu of undergoing such sentence, be sent to a special home or be kept in fit institution in such manner as the State Government thinks fit for the remainder of the period of the sentence; and the provisions of this Act shall apply to the juvenile as if he had been ordered by the Board to be sent to such special home or institution or, as the case may be, ordered to be kept under protective care under sub-section (2) of Section 16 of this Act:
Provided that the State Government, or as the case may be the Board, may, for any adequate and special reason to be recorded in writing, review the case of a juvenile in conflict with law undergoing a sentence of imprisonment, who has ceased to be so on or before the commencement of this Act, and pass appropriate order in the interest of such juvenile.
Explanation.—In all cases where a juvenile in conflict with law is undergoing a sentence of imprisonment at any stage on the date of commencement of this Act, his case including the issue of juvenility, shall be deemed to be decided in terms of clause (l) of Section 2 and other provisions contained in this Act and the Rules made thereunder, irrespective of the fact that he ceases to be a juvenile on or before such date and accordingly he shall be sent to the special home or a fit institution, as the case may be, for the remainder of the period of the sentence but such sentence shall not in any case exceed the maximum period provided in Section 15 of this Act.”
14. The effect of the amendments in the 2000 Act was considered by this Court in Hari Ram v. State of Rajasthan (2009) 13 SCC 211. In Hari Ram (2009) 13 SCC 211 this Court held that the Constitution Bench decision in Pratap Singh case (2005) 3 SCC 551 was no longer relevant since it was rendered under the unamended Act. In Hari Ram (2009) 13 SCC 211 this Court held and observed as follows:(-70)
“59. The law as now crystallised on a conjoint reading of Sections 2(k), 2(l), 7-A, 20 and 49 read with Rules 12 and 98, places beyond all doubt that all persons who were below the age of 18 years on the date of commission of the offence even prior to 1-4-2001, would be treated as juveniles, even if the claim of juvenility was raised after they had attained the age of 18 years on or before the date of commencement of the Act and were undergoing sentence upon being convicted.
67. Section 7-A of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, made provision for the claim of juvenility to be raised before any court at any stage, as has been done in this case, and such claim was required to be determined in terms of the provisions contained in the 2000 Act and the Rules framed thereunder, even if the juvenile had ceased to be so on or before the date of commencement of the Act.
68. Accordingly, a juvenile who had not completed eighteen years on the date of commission of the offence was also entitled to the benefits of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, as if the provisions of Section 2(k) had always been in existence even during the operation of the 1986 Act.
69. The said position was re-emphasised by virtue of the amendments introduced in Section 20 of the 2000 Act, whereby the proviso and Explanation were added to Section 20, which made it even more explicit that in all pending cases, including trial, revision, appeal and any other criminal proceedings in respect of a juvenile in conflict with law, the determination of juvenility of such a juvenile would be in terms of clause (l) of Section 2 of the 2000 Act, and the provisions of the Act would apply as if the said provisions had been in force when the alleged offence was committed.
70. In the instant case, there is no controversy that the appellant was about sixteen years of age on the date of commission of the alleged offence and had not completed eighteen years of age. In view of Sections 2(k), 2(l) and 7-A read with Section 20 of the said Act, the provisions thereof would apply to the appellant's case and on the date of the alleged incident it has to be held that he was a juvenile.”
Later on, the decision in Hari Ram (2009) 13 SCC 211 was followed by this Court in Dharambir v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2010) 5 SCC 344 and also in Mohan Mali v. State of M.P (2010) 6 SCC 669, AIR 2010 SC 1790
15. In view of the Juvenile Justice Act as it stands after the amendments introduced into it and following the decision in Hari Ram (2009) 13 SCC 211 and the later decisions, the appellant cannot be kept in prison to undergo the sentence imposed by the Additional Sessions Judge and affirmed by the High Court. The sentence imposed against the appellant is set aside and he is directed to be released from prison. He is further directed to be produced before the Juvenile Justice Board, Narnaul, for passing appropriate orders in accordance with the provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act.
16. The appeal is, thus, disposed of with the aforesaid observations and directions.
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