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Daya Ram v. Emperor

Allahabad High Court

Dec 5, 1929

Judgment

Subsequent
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Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion arises from an application for revision brought in relation to an order of the District Magistrate of Agra dated 22nd June 1929. The dispute concerns two factions of the Radhaswami sect — the Swamibagh faction and the Dayalbagh faction — and their respective rights to use certain religious properties (samadhs) in Agra. The record contains an earlier letter from the then District Magistrate, Mr. Dreyfus, dated 12th June 1927, complaining that members of the faction represented by the applicant (Dr. Katju) alleged they had been physically assaulted by members of the opposite faction.

Procedurally, the controversy followed civil litigation in which an official of the Swamibagh section sought a declaration that the trust holding the brotherhood's properties was private; that suit failed and an appeal was dismissed by the High Court on 12th June 1929. Administrative and criminal proceedings were instituted with notices under Section 147 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) in 1927; the District Magistrate had earlier placed restrictions on the Dayalbagh section's use of the samadhs, which were removed by the 22nd June 1929 order subject to certain provisos. The applicant challenged that order by way of revision; the court below (Sessions Judge) had a view (described in the opinion) that the District Magistrate acted in an "executive capacity," a view not supported before the current court.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the District Magistrate's order of 22nd June 1929 fell within the scope of Section 147 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), and whether he had jurisdiction to make the directions contained in that order.
Whether the District Magistrate was required to conduct a particular form of enquiry under Section 147 (including recording an order, calling for written statements) before making the impugned order.
Whether the District Magistrate could, in criminal proceedings under Section 147, interpret the judgment of the High Court and adjudicate the existence of a right asserted by one faction (specifically whether the Dayalbagh section had a right to use the trust properties/samadhs).
Whether the statutory three-month requirement (for exercise of the claimed right) relevant to proceedings under Section 147 had been satisfied in the present case.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant (Dr. Katju)'s Arguments

Members of both sections (the factions) were mostly LL.Bs and therefore unlikely to cause a breach of the peace (submitted to minimize perceived risk of disturbance).
The District Magistrate had not complied with the enquiry requirements under Section 147: no proper enquiry was held, no order recorded, and no written statements from the two parties were called for.
The District Magistrate was not entitled to interpret the judgment of the High Court in criminal proceedings and therefore should not have determined rights that, in his view, required civil adjudication.
The District Magistrate overlooked the three-month requirement for the exercise of the right in whose favour the order was made (arguing that the statutory time condition was not met).
The applicant implicitly objected to the portion of the order directing the Swamibagh branch to permit equal opportunities of worship, treating it as objectionable to his client's interests.

Respondent / Opposing Side (as represented by Dr. Sapru and others)

Opposing counsel argued that the order was covered by the provisions of Section 147 CrPC and that the District Magistrate had jurisdiction to make directions concerning the exercise of rights of use of land or entry.
Dr. Sapru referred to the last sentence of the High Court's judgment — "We find also that the defendants are entitled to have an interest in the alleged trust and in the trust properties." — to support the existence of the Dayalbagh section's right to use the trust properties (including the samadhs), a point relevant to the Magistrate's decision under Section 147.
It was pointed out that notices and a declaration by the Magistrate under Section 147 were present in the record (including a notice issued on 15th November 1927), and that proceedings had been suspended under a compromise where both parties agreed to abide by the High Court's decision.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Emperor v. Nehal Chand	Identifies the proceedings as having been started on the complaint of the applicant's party (contextual/filing history).	The court noted this heading to show that the proceedings were instituted on the complaint of Dr. Katju's party, indicating who first sought criminal protection.
Kader Batcha v. Sader Bakha	Represents the Madras High Court view that the scope of Section 147 CrPC is wide and includes disputes over entry and use of religious places.	The opinion cites this case as reflecting the wider view ultimately adopted by legislative amendment (Act No. 18 of 1923) and uses it in prefacing the conclusion that Section 147 covers entry into places used for religion.
Guiram Ghosal v. Lal Behari Das	Represents the narrower Calcutta High Court view (prior to the 1923 amendment) that Section 147 related to rights of easement and similar rights only.	The court described the conflict between this case and Kader Batcha, and observed that the conflict was resolved by the 1923 amendment adopting the wider view; the court treated Guiram Ghosal as restricted by the earlier phrasing and not decisive after amendment.
Surendra Nath Banerji v. Shasi Bhushan Sarkar	Post-1923 Calcutta decision noting a dispute limited to performance of pooja rather than entry; observed in relation to whether Guiram Ghosal remained operative after amendment.	The court cited the case to show that the Bench there did not examine the effect of the 1923 amendment because the dispute before it was narrowly confined; the present opinion uses that point to explain why Surendra Nath Banerji did not displace the conclusion that Section 147 covers entry/use after amendment.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded by first accepting the factual record (the typed papers provided by the applicant), which showed repeated indications of a real danger of a breach of the peace if no orders were made to regulate conduct between the two factions. The District Magistrate's order of 22nd June 1929 was treated as a continuation of proceedings begun in 1927 (including the District Magistrate Mr. Dreyfus's letter of 12th June 1927).

The court summarised the background: a trust was created in 1904; after the death of the sect's leader in 1907 a schism developed, generating disputes over control of trust property and access to samadhs. Civil litigation seeking to declare the trust private failed; the High Court dismissed the appeal on 12th June 1929, and the District Magistrate's order of 22nd June 1929 removed prior restrictions on the Dayalbagh faction's use of the samadhs while adding provisos.

The applicant contested the District Magistrate's power to make the challenged directions. The court identified the central legal question as whether the impugned order fell within Section 147 CrPC. The court held that there was a real danger of breach of the peace and that Section 147, as amended by Act No. 18 of 1923, applies to disputes about the use of land and entry into buildings for religious purposes. The opinion explains that prior conflict between the Madras and Calcutta High Courts (Kader Batcha v. Sader Bakha versus Guiram Ghosal v. Lal Behari Das) was resolved by the 1923 amendment which adopted the wider Madras view, making clear that Section 147 applies "whether such right be claimed as an easement or otherwise."

The court addressed specific procedural objections: the applicant's contention that no proper enquiry was held and that no written statements were called for was met by reference to the typed record, which contained a Magistrate's declaration and a notice issued under Section 147 on 15th November 1927. The court also dealt with the applicant's contention that a Magistrate could not interpret the High Court's judgment in criminal proceedings: the court observed that to decide the existence or non-existence of a claimed right the Magistrate inevitably had to interpret civil judgments, and in this case the High Court's judgment itself contained language ("We find also that the defendants are entitled to have an interest in the alleged trust and in the trust properties") that supported the Magistrate's conclusion about the Dayalbagh section's right to use the trust properties (including the samadhs).

Concerning the statutory three-month requirement, the court clarified that the relevant three months are the three months immediately before the institution of the enquiry (i.e., prior to June 1927). On the available facts the court was satisfied that the Dayalbagh party had exercised the right of entry within three months of 12th June 1927, and therefore the temporal condition was met.

On the question whether the Sessions Judge's view that the District Magistrate acted in an "executive capacity" was tenable, that characterization was not supported by counsel and did not determine the present issues; the court did not adopt that characterization as a basis for decision.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court dismissed the application for revision and withdrew the stay order. The opinion concludes: "Application dismissed."

Implications:

The direct effect is that the applicant's challenge to the District Magistrate's order of 22nd June 1929 fails; the Magistrate's order (including the removal of restrictions on the Dayalbagh section subject to the stated provisos) stands, and the stay previously in force is withdrawn.
The court's decision relies on the application of Section 147 CrPC (as interpreted in light of the 1923 amendment) and the Magistrate's assessment of the factual record; the opinion does not state that it is announcing any novel principle of law beyond applying the statutory provision and existing authorities and amendment. No broader new precedent is expressly claimed in the text of the opinion.

V.B/R.K

Show all summary ...

1. Dr. Katju who argued this application for revision desired to impress the Court by stating that members of both sections of the Radhaswami sect were mostly LL.Bs and not likely to cause a breach of the peace. He has been kind enough to furnish this Court with a typed copy of all the relevant papers which has been a great help and saved a considerable amount of time. On the very first page there is a letter of the then District Magistrate Mr. Dreyfus, dated 12th June 1927, in which he speaks of a complaint by members of the faction whom Dr. Katju represents that they were pummelled and pushed by LL. B's of the opposite faction. The whole typed record is full of indication as to a fear of a breach of the peace, if no orders were passed to restrict the two parties and it is therefore idle to argue here that there was no possibility of a breach of the peace. The heading of the very order objected to shows Emperor v. Nehal Chand, that proceedings were started on the complaint of Dr. Katju's party, and that it was not the other party which first sought the protection of a criminal Court. The order complained of is by the District Magistrate of Agra, dated 22nd June 1929, and the typed book gives in serial order the various proceedings which followed the letter of the District Magistrate of 12th June 1927 referred to by me above. I consider the present order of 22nd June 1929, to be merely in continuation of the proceedings instituted in 1927. It is not necessary to go into details as to the dispute between the two factions but some summary of the dispute is necessary. There was no schism in the Radhaswami sect till the death of the Guru Mahraj Saheb in 1907. He was an accountant deeply versed in finance before it was discovered that he was' an emanation of God.

2. He, therefore, took the very base step of establishing a trust in 1904, and putting all the properties of the brotherhood in charge of the trust. Of the two present factions the Swamibagh faction and the Dayalbagh faction, this trust has been captured by the Swamibagh faction and that faction is in charge of the properties. The dispute arose after the death of Maharaj Saheb as he had indicated his sister as the next emanation, but on his death some of his followed did not accept that indication, but seceded and discovered the emanation in a gentleman of the name of Mr. Kamta Prasad Sinha, known after his recognition as Sarkar Saheb. The trust being captured by the Swamibagh section, the other section of the Dayalbagh found difficulty in worshipping at the shrines of their religion, two of them being at Agra, known as the samadhs, and a dispute arose as to the right of the Dayalbagh section to enter these samadhs for the purposes of worship. It appears that in 1927, the Dayalbagh people insisted on entering which led to the complaint to the District Magistrate by members of the Swamibagh section against the rough behaviour of members of the Dayalbagh section. At that time an appeal had been pending in this Court from a decision of the Subordinate Judge of Benares in a suit filed for a declaration by an official of the Swamibagh section, and it was desired by that section that the trust may be declared a private trust and not a public one and that the men of the opposite faction may be debarred from the use of the properties belonging to the trust. That suit failed in the Court of the Subordinate Judge and the appeal was dismissed by this Court on 12th June 1929. As the dispute was brought to the District Magistrate in 1927, proceedings continued and various orders were passed restricting the Dayalbagh section from the free use of the two samadhs at Agra. Finally on 11th June, 1929, the two parties came to a settlement and agreed to abide by the judgment of the High Court. The judgment of the High Court was delivered on 12th June and the District Magistrate's order complained of was passed on 22nd June. He removed all the restrictions placed on the Dayalbagh section as to the use of the semadhs. Dr. Katju frankly admitted that no objection can be raised to that portion of the order. If according to him the District Magistrate had no jurisdiction to interfere necessarily, it will follow that the District Magistrate will have no jurisdiction to place any restrictions on the use of the samadhs by the Dayalbagh section and he could not complain of the removal of these restrictions. After removing these restrictions the order goes on:

“provided only that they shall not held any ceremonies or worship on such day or days as may be reasonably required by the Swamibagh branch for similar ceremonies for their party.”

3. (This proviso is against the Dayalbagh party and the applicant here would naturally not object to it). The objectionable portion so far as the applicant is concerned now follows:

“The Swamibagh branch are hereby directed that they shall freely permit to the Dayalbagh branch opportunities for such worship etc. so far as may be equal in number and convenience with the opportunities which they reserve for themselves.”

4. The view of the learned Sessions Judge that the District Magistrate had passed this order in his executive capacity, a capacity not known to me or to the law, was not supported by counsel on either side here. What was definitely argued before me was on the side of the applicant that the order did not fall within the provisions of Section 147 of the Cr PC and on the opposite side that the order was covered by the provisions of that section. I have held that there is a danger of a breach of the peace. The application of the provisions of S. 147 can only be doubted if the question of entry into a place required by any religion were not subject to action under Section 147 of the Cr PC. There was a conflict of opinion between the Madras and Calcutta High Courts: see Kader Batcha v. Sader Bakha (1) in opposition to Guiram Ghosal v. Lal Behari Das (2). This conflict was, however, set at rest by Act No. 18 of 1923 amending the Code of Criminal Procedure wherein the view of the Madras High Court was adopted. Originally the words were:

“a right of use of any land or water including any right of way or other easement over the same.”

5. These words indicated to the Calcutta High Court certain rights which were confined to rights of easement and similar rights. In the amended section, the wider view of the Madras High Court was adopted and it was specifically noted that the provisions of that section would apply whether such right be claimed as an easement or otherwise. Dr. Katju the editor of a commentary on the Code of Criminal Procedure knew of this amendment and so he quoted a Calcutta case subsequent to the year 1923. Surendra Nath Banerji v. Shasi Bhushan Sarkar (3). In that case the learned Judge who delivered the judgment of the Bench specifically noted that there was no dispute then as to the right of a user of any land or entry into any building, but the dispute related only to the performance of pooja of an idol. Argument was addressed to the Bench there that the ruling in Guiram Ghosal v. Lal Behari Das was no longer operative after the amendment of the Code in 1923. But that argument was not examined for the reason that the dispute before the Bench was in as very narrow compass as to the right to perform pooja and not as to the right of entry into any temple or mosque. After the amendment of the Code no doubt remained as to the provisions of that section attaching to dispute as regards the entry into a temple or mosque. In the present case a samadh is of as great religious sanctity to the followers of the Radhaswami as a temple and the entry. In the compound of the samadh would be covered by the words “right of use of any land.”

6. Dr. Katju next pointed out that there had been no proper enquiry as directed in the section, that no order was recorded, and no written statements from the two parties called for. Again reference should be made to the typed copy of the relevant papers, in which such a declaration by a Magistrate will be found and such request to the parties to enter into written statements (notice issued under Section 147 of the Cr PC on 15th November 1927). The proceedings were suspended under a compromise by both parties, which was accepted by the District Magistrate that the parties would abide by the decision of the High, Court here. This compromise has given rise to the argument of Dr. Katju that a District Magistrate is not entitled to interpret a judgment of this Court in criminal proceedings. The Magistrate-has, however, to decide the question or the right of the Dayalbagh party according to Cl. (2), S. 147. That clause runs as follows:

“If it appears to such Magistrate that such right exists, he may make an order prohibiting any interference with the exercise of such right.”

7. It is difficult to understand how a Magistrate can adjudicate upon the existence or non-existence of a right without interpreting the judgments of a civil Court. In the present case Dr. Sapru has referred on behalf of the respondent to the last sentence of the judgment of this Court:

“We find also that the defendants are entitled to have an interest in the alleged trust and in the trust properties.”

8. Clearly therefore, the judgment gave evidence of the existence of the right of the Dayalbagh section to use all the properties of the trust and it was admitted that these samadhs in Agra are properties of the trnst.

9. Finally Dr. Katju referred to the ??? and pointed out that the District Magistrate overlooked the necessity of the party, in whose favour the order was made, exercising such right within three months. Three months however, ire not the three months prior to the order, but three months next before the institution of the enquiry. The enquiry was instituted in June 1927, and from the fact of the Dayalbagh party exercising the right which gave rise to the complaint to the District Magistrate. On the part of the Swamibagh section, I am satisfied that the right of entry was exercised by the Dayalbagh party within three months of 12th June 1927.

10. I dismiss this application. The stay order is withdrawn.