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M.B. Singh And Co. v. Sircar And Co.

Allahabad High Court
Nov 29, 1929
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Judgment Summary — Boys and King, JJ.

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs-appellants are M.B. Singh and Co., colliery proprietors. It was admitted that they supplied coal to the defendants, Sircar and Co. A part of the original judgment was omitted from the report as not material for the decision set out in this opinion.

The trial court found that coal had been supplied at some date prior to 5 April 1922. The suit on a balance of account was filed on 6 April 1925, which on its face was beyond the period of limitation. The plaintiffs relied on three payments alleged to have been made on 12 April 1922, 1 May 1922 and 22 June 1922, evidenced by three cheques (Exhibits 9, 10 and 11). The trial court concluded that these cheques were drawn by the defendant company, were received and honoured, and held that the requirements of section 20 of the Limitation Act were complied with; it gave a decree for the plaintiffs.

On appeal the lower appellate court allowed the defendants' appeal, dismissed the suit as barred by limitation, and relied upon the decisions in Mackenzie v. Tiruvengathan and Ram Chander v. Chandi Prasad; it declined to decide the case in accordance with Kedar Nath v. Dina Bandhu. The present opinion is the further appeal to the court presided over by Boys and King, JJ.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether each or all of the transactions evidenced by the three cheques amounted to payments within the meaning of section 20 of the Limitation Act so as to save the plaintiffs' claim from being barred by limitation.
  2. Whether the cheques (and the writing therein) complied with the proviso to section 20 of the Limitation Act — specifically, whether the document in the handwriting of the debtor must show that the payment was towards part of the principal of the debt.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' Arguments

  • The three cheques drawn by the defendants and delivered to the plaintiffs were payments of part of the principal due.
  • The plaintiffs presented the cheques immediately for payment; the cheques were honoured and the plaintiffs' account was credited with the amounts. On these facts the plaintiffs contend that the payments fall within section 20 and save the suit from being barred by limitation.

Defendants' Arguments

  • Writing a cheque and handing it to the payee does not constitute the embodiment of the fact of a payment in the handwriting of the person making it.
  • A cheque is merely an order for payment and does not itself amount to payment; therefore, the cheques do not satisfy the requirements of section 20.
  • Even if the cheques are treated as payments, the document must further show that the payment was towards the principal (relying on Muthiah Chettiar v. Kuttayan Chetty and earlier authorities).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mackenzie v. Tiruvengathan Authority relied upon by the lower appellate court in holding the suit barred by limitation (used to support narrow view on when writing by debtor suffices). The lower appellate court relied on this decision; the present court notes it was followed in subsequent cases but analyzed and distinguished related authorities when reaching its conclusion.
Ram Chander v. Chandi Prasad Authority relied upon by the lower appellate court in its conclusion that the claim was barred. The lower appellate court relied on it; the present court recorded that reliance but reached a contrary result based on its analysis of the facts and section 20.
Kedar Nath v. Dina Bandhu Decision which the lower appellate court declined to follow when deciding the appeal. The lower appellate court declined to decide the case in accordance with that decision; the present court considered other authorities and its own reasoning instead.
Muthiah Chettiar v. Kuttayan Chetty Cited for the proposition that the document should show that payment was towards the principal; in that case the court followed Mackenzie v. Tiruvengadathan. The present court observed that this case supports the defendants' contention but noted that it merely follows Mackenzie and does not discuss the finer question raised here.
Ranchordas v. Pestonji Referred to on the question of whether a memorandum existed showing payment of principal. The court held that this case had no bearing on the present question because, in Ranchordas, there appears to have been no memorandum as to payment of principal.
A. Curlender v. Abdul Hamid Two-judge decision of this Court holding that it is not necessary that the document in the handwriting of the debtor state that the payment was towards the principal; it is sufficient if it evidences a payment. The present court agreed with the view in this decision and adopted its reasoning in concluding that the cheques, as evidenced and acted upon, were sufficient.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in two analytic steps corresponding to the two issues identified.

1. Payment by cheque — whether the cheques amounted to payments under section 20:

  • The court declined to adopt an absolute rule that mere writing of a cheque and handing it over to the payee will always and necessarily constitute a payment. It recognized that a creditor may accept a cheque as payment in some circumstances and may in others treat it merely as a promise or order for payment.
  • Given that factual variability, the court focused on the specific facts: the cheques were drawn by the defendant, presented immediately for payment, honoured, and the plaintiffs' account was credited with the amounts. There was "no doubt whatever on the facts" that the cheques were received by the plaintiffs in payment of their account so far as those cheques were concerned.
  • On these facts, the court held that there was a payment which prima facie would save the action from being barred by limitation under section 20.

2. Compliance with the proviso to section 20 — whether the writing must state that the payment was towards the principal:

  • The defendants urged that, even if a payment is established, the document in the debtor's handwriting must expressly show that the payment was towards part of the principal in order to satisfy the proviso to section 20. The court was referred to Muthiah Chettiar and earlier authorities supporting that contention.
  • The court analyzed section 20: payments proved to be made towards interest need no writing; if a payment is not shown to have been made towards interest at the time, it is to be treated as a payment towards principal ("paid as such" being the relevant phrase in s.20(1)).
  • The court reasoned that the proviso requires the fact of the payment to be recorded in the handwriting of the debtor when the payment is to be treated as towards principal. However, to require further that the handwriting must also state explicitly that the payment was towards the principal would be to read into the provision additional words ("as such") that are not present. The legislature could easily have required that explicit wording if it had so intended.
  • The court therefore followed the earlier two-judge decision in A. Curlender v. Abdul Hamid, agreeing that it is sufficient if the document in the handwriting of the debtor evidences a payment; it is not necessary that it additionally state that the payment was towards the principal.

Applying these conclusions to the present facts, the court found that the cheques evidenced payments by the defendants which were received and credited by the plaintiffs and that the writings (cheques) complied with the requirements of section 20 as interpreted by the court.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The appeal is allowed. The court set aside the decree of the lower appellate court and restored the decree of the trial court. The appellants (plaintiffs) are entitled to their costs of the appeal and of the court below.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The plaintiffs' suit is saved from being barred by limitation because the three cheques, as received and honoured, amounted to payments within section 20 of the Limitation Act; the trial court's decree in favour of the plaintiffs is restored and costs are awarded to the appellants.
  • Interpretative outcome: The court applied and affirmed the view taken in the two-judge decision A. Curlender v. Abdul Hamid that it is sufficient for the debtor's handwriting to evidence payment; it is not necessary that the handwriting additionally contain an explicit statement that the payment was towards the principal. The court rejected a rule that the mere writing and delivery of a cheque will always be a payment, emphasizing that the question is factual and depends on the creditor's acceptance and the surrounding circumstances.
  • No broader new legal rule was asserted beyond the court's application of section 20 as interpreted and its agreement with the cited earlier decision; the immediate consequence is the restoration of the trial court's decree in favour of the plaintiffs and the award of costs.

This summary is entirely based on the content of the provided opinion and does not add facts or authorities beyond those expressly mentioned in the text.

Show all summary ...

Boys and King, JJ.:— The plaintiffs appellants are M.B Singh and Co., colliery proprietors, and it is admitted that they supplied coal to the defendants, Sircar and Co.

[A part of the judgment, not material for the purpose of this report, has been omitted here.]

A finding of fact is that the plaintiff company supplied coal at some date prior to the 5th of April, 1922. The suit on a balance of account was filed on the 6th of April, 1925. Prima facie, therefore, the claim was barred by limitation. The plaintiffs, however, relied on three payments alleged to have been made to them on the 12th of April, 1922, the 1st of May, 1922 and the 22nd of June, 1922. It is on the basis of the transactions evidenced by three cheques that the plaintiffs claimed that their suit was saved from being barred by limitation. We have seen these three cheques, Exhibits 9, 10 and 11 … The trial court's judgment proceeds on the view, and obviously correct view, that these cheques were drawn by the defendant company in favour of the plaintiff company. It says, while discussing the cheques:—“In the present case the plaintiffs received payments for the three cheques and the cheques being in the handwriting of the defendant himself, the requirements of section 20 of the Limitation Act are complied with.”. [The judgment, after pointing out that some of the facts relating to these three cheques were misconceived by the lower appellate court, and how such misconception arose, proceeded.] The trial court gave the plaintiffs a decree. The lower appellate court allowed the defendants' appeal and dismissed the suit, holding it to be barred by limitation and, relying upon the decisions in Mackenzie v. Tiruvengathan and Ram Chander v. Chandi Prasad, declined to decide the case in accordance with the decision in Kedar Nath v. Dina Bandhu.

Two questions have finally emerged for decision. The first question is: Did each or all of the transactions evidenced by these cheques amount to payments within section 20 of the Limitation Act, so as to save limitation? It is not suggested that the amounts of the cheques were to go towards interest and were paid as such. It is contended for the plaintiffs appellants that the admitted facts amount, in the first place, to a payment of part of the principal due. Those facts are that the cheques were drawn by the defendants in favour of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs presented the cheques immediately for payment and they were honoured and the plaintiffs' account was credited with the amounts of the cheques. It is contended for the defendants that the writing of a cheque and handing it over to the payee does not constitute the embodying of the fact of a payment in the handwriting of the person making the same. It is contended that a cheque only constitutes an order for payment and does not amount to payment. After hearing the arguments of the counsel for the parties and considering the cases to which we have been referred, we are of opinion that it would be laying down a proposition too broadly to say that the mere writing of a cheque and handing it over to and its receipt by the payee will and must always constitute a payment of the amount. It is a matter of common knowledge that a creditor sometimes receives a cheque refusing wholly to regard it as a payment, while, on the other hand, sometimes it is accepted by him as payment. This may be illustrated by what is within the common knowledge of all. A creditor will sometimes give a receipt for the cheque stating that his account has been paid by cheque. On the other hand, he will sometimes acknowledge receipt of the cheque and say that a receipt for the amount will follow when the cheque has been duly honoured and the amount paid to the account of the creditor. In the present case, there is no doubt whatever on the facts that the cheque was received by the creditors plaintiffs in payment of their account so far as the cheques are concerned. We are, therefore, of opinion that there was here a payment such as prima facie would save limitation. It is next urged on behalf of the defendants respondents that the writing, i.e, the cheques, did not comply with, the requirements of the proviso to section 20, It is contended that while the fact of the payment, in view of the answer to the first question, must be admitted to appear in the handwriting of the defendants, the document must further show that the payment was towards part of the principal of the debt due. In support of this contention for the defendants we are referred to the case of Muthiah Chettiar v. Kuttayan Chetty. That case certainly supports the argument of the defendants. It does not, however, discuss the question, but merely follows the decision in Mackenzie v. Tirvengadathan. We were further referred to the case of Ranchordas v. Pestonji. That case has, in our view, no bearing on the question, for in that case, so far as the payment of principal is concerned, there appears to have been no memorandum at all. Other cases referred to for the defendants do not call for mention. On the other hand, there is a decision of two Judges of this Court to which we are referred for the plaintiffs reported in A. Curlender v. Abdul Hamid. The view of the learned Judges in that case was that it was not necessary that in the document in the handwriting of the defendants there should be any statement that the payment was made towards the principal of the debt in question. It was sufficient, if it evidenced a payment. Agreeing with the decision in that case, we would state our reasons as follows. Section 20 provides for cases in which a payment towards interest or a payment towards principal may be proved to save limitation. If there has been nothing in the handwriting of the defendant, as required by the proviso, the only way in which the plaintiff can show that it is open to him to use the payment to save limitation is by proving that at the time it was made it was avowedly made and accepted as a payment towards interest. If it was so made, it does not come within the proviso and no writing is necessary. But if there is no question of the payment being proved to have been made towards interest at the time it was made, then it must be treated as a payment towards principal. This, we think, is the meaning of the words “paid as such” in the first paragraph of section 20(1). The effect then of the first two paragraphs is that unless the creditor can show that, at the time, the amount was paid as interest, it will be treated as having been paid towards the principal. If it is to be treated as having been paid towards the principal, the fact of the payment must be recorded in the handwriting of the debtor. But to hold that there must further be recorded in the handwriting of the debtor the fact that the payment is towards the principal, is to require that something should be inserted in the handwriting of the debtor which ex hypothesi is already presumed. To accept the contention that it is necessary for the fact that the payment is towards part of the principal to be included in the document in the handwriting of the debtor, would further be to read into the section after the words “the fact of the payment” the words “as such”. If the legislature had desired to insert these words, it could very easily have done so. We are, therefore, in accord with the decision of this Court already referred to. Allowing the appeal, we set aside the decree of the lower appellate court and restore that of the trial court. The appellants will have their costs of the appeal and in the court below.