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Ram Sarup v. Kanhaiya Lal
Factual and Procedural Background
This is a plaintiff's appeal in a suit against his commission agent seeking rendition of accounts for the Sambat years 1973 to 1975 and a decree for Rs. 8,000 or such additional amount as may be found due. The plaintiff is the proprietor of the firm Lachhman Das Bhojraj at Jalaun; the defendant is Kanhaiya Lal, proprietor of the firm Kanhaiya Lal Baijnath at Shamli (Muzaffarnagar). The plaintiff alleged purchase and sale transactions in wheat and relied on an account dated 13 October 1918 showing Rs. 6,838-12-6 to the plaintiff's credit. The defendant denied any debt and claimed that, after transactions at Jalalabad and Baraut and a settlement, a balance of Rs. 5,260 was due to the defendant from the plaintiff.
The Subordinate Judge (having accepted that the defendant admitted the agency) passed a preliminary decree on 6 January 1922. On appeal to this Court (F.A. 120 of 1922) the defendant's appeal was allowed on 20 January 1925, the Subordinate Judge's decree was set aside and the case was remanded under Rule 23, Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure with directions to frame issues and re-examine matters relevant to para. 23 of the written statement and para. 6 of the plaint. On remand, the Subordinate Judge framed issues about whether Fakir Chand and Munshi Lal had authority to settle accounts for the plaintiff and whether they in fact settled and struck a balance of Rs. 5,260 in favour of the defendant, and he ultimately found for the defendant and dismissed the suit.
The present appeal challenges that finding. The appellant (plaintiff) contended that he never authorised the Jalalabad and Baraut transactions and relied on the earlier Suit No. 48 of 1920 as res judicata; he also contested that any settlement (para. 23 of the written statement) took place. The Court below had concluded that the Jalalabad and Baraut transactions had been proved and that Fakir Chand and Munshi Lal had authority to settle, resulting in a balance for the defendant.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the decree and findings in Suit No. 48 of 1920 operate as res judicata and therefore bar the trial of the question whether the plaintiff entered into transactions at Jalalabad and Baraut.
- Whether the plaintiff entered into the Jalalabad and Baraut transactions (i.e., did those transactions take place).
- Whether Fakir Chand and Munshi Lal had authority on behalf of the plaintiff to settle accounts with the defendant.
- Whether Fakir Chand and Munshi Lal actually settled the account with the defendant and struck a balance of Rs. 5,260 in favour of the defendant such that the plaintiff cannot now call upon the defendant to render an account.
- Whether the order remanding the case under R.23, O.41 CPC prevented the parties or the Court from raising or adjudicating the res judicata point on remand or on appeal.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments (Plaintiff)
- The plaintiff never authorised sales and purchases of wheat at Jalalabad and Baraut and never entered into business transactions at Jalalabad.
- The finding in Suit No. 48 of 1920 that there were no such transactions is res judicata and cannot be re-opened in the present suit.
- As a matter of fact, there was no settlement as alleged in paragraph 23 of the defendant's written statement.
Respondent's Arguments (Defendant)
- The defendant's case was that transactions at Jalalabad and Baraut took place and that on settlement a balance of Rs. 5,260 was due to the defendant.
- It was contended that the plaintiff did not raise the point of res judicata before the Subordinate Judge on remand or in the appeal (F.A. 120 of 1922), and therefore the plaintiff should not be permitted to raise it now; by analogy with Explanation 4 to Section 11 CPC, the present appeal was said to be barred.
- The respondent also argued (as summarized by the Court) that the previous suit related to dealings in a particular period (23 December 1918 to 2 April 1919) and that the present suit concerned transactions prior to that period, so the earlier judgment could not amount to res judicata on the present claims.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ram Kishan v. Lalta Singh, A.I.R. 1928 All. 527 | Cited in support of the respondent's contention regarding the effect of not raising a point earlier and the application of Explanation 4 to Section 11 CPC (i.e., matters which could and should have been raised earlier). | The Court held this case (and the others cited) did not apply to the facts of the present case and were not helpful in deciding the res judicata question. |
| Raja of Ramnad v. Velasami Tewar, A.I.R. 1921 P.C. 23 | Referred to by respondent counsel in support of the argument that prior procedure or failure to raise a point precludes re-opening the matter. | The Court found the authority inapplicable to the facts and not of assistance in resolving whether res judicata applied in this case. |
| Hook v. Administrator General of Bengal, A.I.R. 1921 P.C. 11 | Also cited with the other authorities to support the contention that the present appeal was barred by prior procedural omissions. | The Court again concluded that this precedent did not apply to the present factual and procedural circumstances and therefore did not support the respondent's contention. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded by identifying the concrete issues (authority of agents, whether a settlement occurred, and the impact of the earlier suit) and examined the procedural history, including the earlier appeal and the order of remand under Rule 23, Order 41 CPC. The Court interpreted the remand order and the accompanying decree as expressly directing the Subordinate Judge to frame careful issues and to consider "para. 23 of the written statement, para. 6 of the plaint, and any other matters which to the Court examining the pleadings may seem relevant and proper."
Addressing the res judicata contention, the Court rejected the respondent's submission that the plaintiff was precluded from raising res judicata because the point had not been pressed earlier before the Subordinate Judge on remand or when the case was previously before the High Court. The Court reasoned that the order of remand did not prevent the Court below or this Court from considering whether the point of res judicata had been properly raised, and thus there was no impropriety in considering the res judicata issue on appeal. The authorities cited by the respondent in support of the contrary view (Ram Kishan v. Lalta Singh; Raja of Ramnad v. Velasami Tewar; Hook v. Administrator General of Bengal) were considered inapplicable to the facts and hence unhelpful.
On the factual questions, the Court reviewed the evidence concerning the Jalalabad, Shamli and Baraut transactions. While the Court observed that no question arises as regards the Baraut shop transaction instituted after the present suit, it nonetheless concluded that the plaintiff could not "get behind" the Baraut transactions by asserting Fakir Chand and others had no legal authority. The Court found that the defendants had produced sufficient evidence to show they honestly believed the plaintiff had authorised his relations to enter into transactions relating to Shamli, and that Fakir Chand (the plaintiff's natural father) and other relations had either implied or express authority to act as agents for particular transactions. Therefore the plaintiff was held bound to pay the defendant the sums attributable to the Baraut transactions.
The Court declined the appellant's suggestion to pass a preliminary decree and instead resolved the matter finally, noting the long duration of litigation (eight years) and the sufficiency of materials on record to decide the merits. Using admissions in the record, the Court noted that as of 13 October 1918 Rs. 6,838 was admitted to be due to the plaintiff, and that in the plaint of Suit No. 48 of 1920 it was admitted that Ram Sarup had paid Rs. 5,436 to the plaintiffs through the defendants' shop. On that basis the Court reasoned that the defendants had in their hands a sum they alleged they transferred to another firm and therefore must pay back Rs. 5,438 to the plaintiffs (as calculated by the Court from the admitted figures). The Court thus allowed the appeal and passed a final decree.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal is allowed; the decree of the Court below is set aside; the plaintiffs' claim is decreed for Rs. 5,438 with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from 13 October 1918 until payment. Costs are ordered to be paid and received in both Courts in proportion to failure and success.
Implications: The direct effect of the decision is that the defendant must pay Rs. 5,438 with interest to the plaintiffs and the earlier dismissal by the Subordinate Judge is set aside. The Court declined to pass only a preliminary decree and instead entered a final judgment on the merits based on the record and admissions. The opinion does not purport to establish a new legal precedent beyond its application of established principles concerning remand procedure, res judicata arguments and the authority of agents; it resolves the dispute between the parties on the facts and law as presented.
V.B/R.K
1. This is a plaintiff's appeal in a suit against his commission agent praying for rendition of accounts for the Sambat years 1973 to 1975 and for a decree for Rs. 8,000 or whatever additional amount may be found due to the plaintiff by the defendant. The plaintiff is the proprietor of the firm, Lachhman Das Bhojraj at Jalaun, and the defendant Kanhaiya Lal is the proprietor of the firm Kanhaiya Lal Baijnath at Shamli in the district of Muzaffarnagar. The plaintiff's case is that there were transactions of purchase and sale of wheat and the result of an accounting on 13th October 1918, was that a sum of Rs. 6,838-12-6 was found to the credit of the plaintiff. The defendant pleaded that no money was due to the plaintiff. His case was that the plaintiff entered into certain transactions with his shop at Jalalabad and Shamli and on an account of all the transactions having been settled it was found that a sum of Rs. 5,260 was due to the defendant by the plaintiff. The Subordinate Judge holding that the defendant admitted the agency passed a preliminary decree on 6th January 1922. There was an appeal to this Court and on 20th January 1925, the defendant's appeal was allowed, the decree of the Subordinate Judge set aside and the case remanded to the Court below with certain directions. It is admitted by the learned advocate for the respondent that the remand was one under the provisions of R. 23, O. 41 of the CPC. The case having gone back to the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Muzaffarnagar the learned Subordinate Judge recorded the statement of the parties and framed issues. It was admitted before him that up to 13th October 1918, Rs. 6,838-12-6 was due to the plaintiff from the defendant on account of profits of khatti transactions at Shamli. The defendant's case was that the plaintiff purchased some other khattis at Jalalabad and some grain at Baraut and got the payment made for them by the defendant and finally there was a balance of a large sum of money in favour of the defendant's firm. The learned Subordinate Judge states in the judgment at p. 20:
“I examined the parties and find that the only points on which they are at difference are about this alleged settlement of account, about the fact whether the plaintiff entered, into any transactions at Jalalabad and Baraut through the defendant and the defendant had to pay anything on the plaintiff's account about these transactions.”
2. The points, therefore, that he had ta decide were whether the plaintiff entered into the Jalalabad transactions and the Baraut transactions and whether the defendant had to pay anything on account of the plaintiff for these transactions. The learned Subordinate Judge framed the following issues:
(1) Had Fakir Chand and Munshi Lal any authority on behalf of the plaintiff to settle accounts with the defendant and (2) If so, did those persons actually settle the account with the defendant and strike balance of Rs. 5,260 in favour of the defendant and can the plaintiff therefore not now call upon the defendant to render an account?
3. He hag found that the defendant had proved that the plaintiff entered into the Jalalabad and Baraut transactions and that a sum of Rs. 5,260 was the balance found due to the defendant on an accouut being settled by Fakir Chand and Munshi Lal who had authority on behalf of the plaintiff to settle account with the defendant. He, therefore, dismissed the suit.
4. The plaintiffs have come up in appeal before us and it is contended by the learned advocate for the appellant that the plaintiff never authorised the sales and purchases of wheat at Jalalabad and Baraut, that the plaintiff never entered into any business transaction at Jalalabad and that the finding in Suit No. 48 of 1920 that there was no such transaction was res judicata and could not be gone into in this case. It was further submitted that, as a matter of fact, there was no settlement as alleged in para. 23 of the written statement.
5. The first point which we have to decide is whether the decree and the finding of the Subordinate Judge in Suit No. 48 of 1920 bars the trial of the question in the present suit.
6. In para. 11 of the plaint the plaintiff referred to the suit and stated that the defendant had brought a false suit. In para. 24 of the written statement we have the defendant's version about the suit. It was admitted that the plaintiff in that suit had denied having entered in any transaction but as Kanhaiya Lal had left the case to be decided on the oath of the plaintiff the plaintiff took the oath and the claim was dismissed.
7. To enable us to see whether there was the alleged settlement we have to decide whether the Jalalabad, Shamli and Baraut transactions did or did not take place. We have some to the conclusion that the finding arrived at in that suit that Ram Sarup had not entered into those transactions at Jalalabad cannot now be agitated in this suit.
8. It is contended by the learned advocate for the respondent that as the plaintiff had not raised the question of res judicata before the Subordinate, Judge at the trial of the suit after remand he cannot now be permitted to raise the point, specially as the point was never urged when the case was before this Court in appeal (F.A 120 of 1922). It was said that the judgment in that case directed an enquiry to be made whether there was the settlement as alleged in para. 23 and the point not having been raised either in the High Court or before the Subordinate Judge on the analogy of Expl. 4 to Code of Civil Procedure. S. 11, the present appeal is barred. We can not accept the contention. All the facts necessary for determining the point were before the Court and the parties had admitted the fact of the suit and the plaint and the necessary papers are before the Court. We cannot accept the contention of the learned advocate that permitting the plaintiff to plead res-judicata would be going behind the judgment of this Court in F.A 120 of 1922. The order of remand was clearly an order under R. 23, O. 41 and the decree, which follows the judgment says as follows:
“It is ordered…… that the case be and it hereby is sent back to the Court of the said Subordinate Judge with directions to summon the parties before it and to strike careful and considered issues so that the merits of the case may he gone into from the points of view of para. 23 of the written statement, para. 6 of the plaint, and any other matters which to the Court examining the pleadings may seem relevant and proper.”
9. It is impossible to hold that the order of remand in any way prevented the Court below or prevents us from holding that the point of res judicata had not been properly raised and that we are in any way going behind the order passed in F.A 120 of 1922 re manding the case. In support of the contention of the learned advocate that Expl. 4 to S. 11 prevents our going into the question of res judicata reference was made to the case of Ram Kishan v. Lalta Singh . A.I.R 1928 All. 527. and to the case of Raja of Ramnad v. Velasami Tewar . A.I.R 1921 P.C 23, Hook v. Administrator General of Bengal . A.I.R 1921 P.C 11. These cases do not, in our opinion, in any way, apply to the facts of the present case and are not of any help to us in deciding the question of res judicata.
10. It was further contended by the learned advocate for the respondent that the previous suit was for recovery of money on account of dealings between 23rd December 1918 and 2nd April 1919 and as the plaintiff's suit related to transactions prior to this date the finding could not amount to res judicata. It was further contended that at the most the judgment shows that nothing was due on the transactions between the 23rd December 1918 and 2nd April 1919 but that did not show that there was anything due to the plaintiff. We are unable to follow this argument.
11. It was further submitted that there were insufficient materials on the record to find that the decision of the previous case amounted to res judicata and that the two suits were not between the same parties. We find from the statement of the defendant printed at p. 14 that he stated that he had sued for Jalalabad shop in the name of Kanhaiya Lal Balchand and for the Baraut shop in the name of Kanhaiya Lal Baijnath. No question arises as regards the transaction relating to the Baraut shop as that suit was instituted after the institution of the present suit in the Court of the Munsif of Kairana. (The judgment then discussed evidence and concluding that there was no settlement of account binding on the plaintiff proceeded.) There remains the question of the transactions entered into by the defendant Kanhaiya Lal at Baraut. It appears to us that the plaintiff cannot get behind these transactions by urging that Fakir Chand and others had no legal authority to act on his behalf. The defendants have, in our opinion, given sufficient evfdence for us to hold that they honestly believed that the plaintiff had authorized his own relations to enter into transactions relating to Shamli. Fakir Chand is the natural father and the other persons who entered into the contract on behalf of the plaintiff were admittedly his natural relations, and although they might legally not have any right to enter into a settlement of account under their authority as general attorneys they certainly could act as agents for particular transactions which in our opinion they did with either the implied or express authority from the plaintiff and the plaintiff is bound to pay the defendant the sums on account of the Baraut transactions. The learned advocate for the appellant suggested that we might pass a preliminary decree and when the final accounts are adjusted the defendant's claim for the Baraut transactions should not be set up as a set-off against the plaintiff's claim. We do not propose to pass a preliminary decree in the case. The litigation has lasted for eight years and we think there are sufficient materials on the record of this case to pass a final judgment between the parties. The defendant being admittedly a commission agent of the plaintiff no question of set off arises. The money which remains in the hands of the defendant after all the transactions are taken into account the defendant is bound to pay back to the plaintiff. Admittedly on 13th October 1918 the sum of Rs. 6,838 was due to the plaintiffs from the defendants. In the plaint in Suit No. 48 of 1920, para. 12 at p. 71, it was admitted that Ram Sarup had paid a sum of Rs. 5,436 to the plaintiffs, that is, the firm Kanhaiya Lal Balchand, through the shop of Kanhaiya Lal Baijnath (the defendants in this case). The defendants must, therefore, pay back to the plaintiffs, the sum of Rs. 5,438 as they admittedly had that sum in their hands which they allege they had transferred to their other firm. As regards the rest of the plaintiffs' claim we think that the plaintiffs have failed to show that the defandants had anything more than Rs. 5,438 in their hands. They are, therefore, entitled to a decree for that sum. We allow the appeal, set aside the decree of the Court below and decree the plaintiffs' claim for Rs. 5,438 with interest at the rate of 6 per cent from 13th October 1918 to the date of payment. Parties will pay and receive costs in both the Courts in proportion to failure and success.
V.B/R.K
12. Appeal allowed.
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