Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Asghari Begam v. Maula Baksh

Allahabad High Court
Feb 13, 1929
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

This second appeal arises from a suit filed by the plaintiff-respondent seeking the sale of certain property based on a mortgage. The mortgage concerned two types of property: land and a monetary charge on other property. The appeal concerns only the monetary charge. The dispute centers on the interpretation of a deed executed by Kishori Lal, a zemindar, in favor of two minor children. The deed was made in consideration of the children's mother relinquishing her rights to claim an exproprietary tenancy. The deed fixed a maintenance charge of Rs. 150 per year to the minor sons and their descendants, with a clause restricting their right to transfer this charge during their lifetime except back to the grantor.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the two clauses in the deed regarding the right to transfer the maintenance charge are repugnant and irreconcilable.
  2. Whether the clause restricting the minors' right to transfer the charge, except back to the grantor, is void under Section 10 of the Transfer of Property Act.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first examined whether the two deed clauses—one granting a maintenance charge to the minors and their descendants, and the other restricting the minors' right to transfer the charge except back to the grantor—were inconsistent. The court reconciled them by interpreting that the minors themselves could not transfer the charge during their lifetime, but their descendants could after their death.

Next, the court considered the validity of the restrictive clause under Section 10 of the Transfer of Property Act, which prohibits absolute restrictions on the transferee's right to transfer property. The court found that the clause effectively imposed an absolute restriction on the minors' right to transfer their interest, only allowing transfer back to the grantor, which was void under the statute. The court emphasized substance over form, concluding that the deed intended the minors to have an unfettered right to the charge, but the restrictive clause improperly curtailed this right.

Since no exact precedent was presented, the court relied on the principle that such restrictions are construed as an absolute restraint on the transferee's right to dispose of their interest, which Section 10 invalidates.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is dismissed with costs.

The court upheld the lower court’s decision, confirming that the restrictive clause in the deed is void under Section 10 of the Transfer of Property Act. This decision directly affects the parties by affirming the minors’ right to transfer the monetary charge beyond the grantor, after their lifetime, but does not establish a new legal precedent.

Show all summary ...

1. This second appeal arises out of a suit brought by the plaintiff-respondent for sale of a certain property on the basis of a mortgage. The mortgage was in respect of two kinds of property; one was land and the other was a certain money charge created on other property. It is with the latter only that we have to deal in this second appeal.

2. The question is solely one of interpretation of a certain deed.

3. This deed was executed by one Kishori Lal, a zemindar, in favour of two minor children in consideration of the mother of these children having given up her rights to claim an exproprietary tenancy.

4. The important portions of the deed are as follows:

“Therefore, in consideration of the relinquishment of their exproprietary rights Ss. 150 a year for maintenance in favour of Mohammad Abdul Hafiz Khan and Mohammed Abdul Aziz Khan minor sons of Mt. Ali-un-nissa, daughter of Ch. Mohammed Hidayat Ali Khan deceased resident of qasba Bahrain have been fixed for ever and after them to their descendants and successors-in-interest generation after generation and womb after womb.”

5. This is followed later cm by the following provision:

“The minors during their minority or after attaining majority shall have right to transfer this fixed maintenance to me at any time, but they shall have no right of transfer in favour of a stranger (shaksh gair).”

6. Now the first question is whether these two clauses are repugnant and irreconcilable. We agree that they can be reconciled by supposing that it was the intention of the grantor that the minors during their lifetime should have no right to transfer the charge or annuity, but that after their lifetime their descendants should have such a right.

7. The second question, however, is whether the subsequent clause was void under Section 10 of the Transfer of Property Act. Here we find that a charge on land is transferred subject to a condition restraining the transferees from parting with or disposing of that interest to any person other than the grantor. This clearly amounts to an absolute restriction on his right of transfer. The provision that the grantees may transfer back to the grantor has no effect. It would be the same if the deed provided that on transfer by the grantees the grant should be at an end.

8. It is true that we have to look at the substance and not the form. But this deed clearly indicates that the minor grantees should have an unfettered right to the charge. The deed gives that right but it cuts it down by the later clause. This is exactly what we conceive Section 10 of the Transfer of Property Act, was designed to obviate. No decision exactly on all fours with this case has been shown to us, but there are numerous decisions which justify it being held that such a restriction of a grant as is made by Cl. 2 in this deed would be construed as a

“condition or limitation absolutely restraining the transferee from parting with or disposing of his interest in the property.”

“His interest” means interest conferred by the earlier portion of the deed. For the above reasons we hold that the decision of the lower Court was correct and we dismiss this appeal with costs.

S.N/R.K

9. Appeal dismissed.