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Hansraj v. Official Liquidators
Full Bench Opinion — Summary
Factual and Procedural Background
This opinion arises from an order of Mr. Justice Mukerji dated 9 July 1927, made in the winding-up proceedings of a company. The appellants (mortgagees/decree-holders) had earlier obtained an ex parte mortgage decree (dated 12 January 1926 in the narrative and, in one recounting, a decree of 28 October 1924 is recorded for sale) and, after winding-up proceedings commenced (29 January 1926) and a general stay was imposed under section 169 of the Indian Companies Act, applied on 12 April 1927 for leave to proceed to execution of their decree (and also sought leave to proceed with a pending suit). Mr. Justice Mukerji refused leave to execute the decree. A Letters Patent appeal was brought; two members of the Division Bench (Mr. Justice Sulaiman and Mr. Justice Weir) were not wholly in agreement on the legal question and the matter was referred to the present Full Bench under clause 27 of the Letters Patent to state the point upon which the two judges differed. The principal question referred and decided by the Full Bench was whether, in the circumstances described, the winding-up Judge has power under the Companies Act (sections 169, 171 or otherwise) to refuse leave to a secured creditor absolutely (i.e., unconditionally and finally) or only temporarily (i.e., for such time as may be necessary to enable the liquidator to decide whether to attack the decree or to pay the claim).
Legal Issues Presented
- Where a mortgagee/decree-holder of a company in winding-up applies for leave to enforce his security, does the winding-up Judge have power under section 169, section 171 or any other section or rule of the Companies Act to continue the stay or to refuse leave absolutely (i.e., finally and unconditionally), or does he have only power to refuse or stay leave temporarily to enable the liquidator to decide whether to (a) direct the liquidator to pay the decree, (b) allow the decree-holder to proceed, or (c) direct the liquidator to file a suit to get the decree set aside?
- Whether the phrase in section 229 of the Companies Act — that "the same rules ... as are in force for the time being under the law of insolvency" — imports provisions or rules from the Provincial Insolvency Act (in particular section 28(6), section 9(2) and section 47) and related insolvency rules/practice into company winding-up law for the purposes of rights of secured and unsecured creditors.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments (decree-holder / mortgagee)
- The appellants accepted that leave to proceed must be obtained under section 171 but contended that the granting of leave should be a "mere matter of course" and that as secured creditors they had rights analogous to secured creditors in individual insolvency (i.e., they could stand out of the winding-up and rely on their security), with the winding-up Judge's approval being a mechanical sanction.
- The appellants relied on a wide construction of section 229 to import insolvency rules that protect secured creditors (including the immunity in section 28(6) of the Provincial Insolvency Act) so that the position of a secured creditor in company winding-up would be substantially the same as in individual insolvency.
- Counsel for the decree-holder supported the view taken by Mr. Justice Weir (that a stay or refusal of leave should generally be temporary to allow the liquidator to decide whether to attack the decree or pay it) rather than an absolute final refusal in ordinary cases.
Respondent's Arguments (liquidator / company)
- The liquidator contended broadly that there is no distinction in winding-up between the position of secured and unsecured creditors, except that if satisfied a secured creditor had a just debt the winding-up Judge might permit enforcement; consequently, the secured creditor should not be able to stand entirely outside the proceedings so as to evade scrutiny.
- Counsel for the respondent urged a narrow construction of "rules" in section 229 (relying on the General Clauses Act definition) so as not to import section 28(6) and similar insolvency provisions that exempt secured creditors from submitting to leave to proceed.
- The liquidator also argued that rules and provisions cited for the benefit of secured creditors do not apply in the winding-up context and that secured creditors should, in effect, be amenable to the same proving and scrutiny obligations as other creditors (subject to the Companies Act provisions).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| In re Union Indian Sugar Mills Co. v. Brij Lal | Mr. Justice Mukerji had held he could go behind a decree for damages and, in proper circumstances, refuse to allow effect to that decree and call upon the creditor to establish damage and extent thereof. | The Full Bench noted Mukerji J.'s prior holding and observed Mukerji relied on that approach; it was considered in analysing the scope of judicial scrutiny over decrees obtained ex parte, but the Full Bench emphasised limits on the winding-up Judge's power to annul a secured creditor's security or decree. |
| Ram Lal v. Kashi Charan | Division Bench had incidentally and generally approved Mukerji J.'s view on going behind decrees for damages. | The Full Bench noted that Ram Lal v. Kashi Charan gave incidental approval to Mukerji J.'s approach; it featured in the factual matrix and the debate about the Judge's capacity to scrutinize decrees. |
| David Lloyd and Co. (English authority) | James L.J.'s observation that the object of a provision analogous to section 171 is to prevent multiplication of costs to the detriment of the estate and not to enable interference with the mortgagee's property. | The Court relied on that principle to limit the scope of the winding-up Judge's interference with a secured creditor's property: the Judge's discretion must respect third-party rights and not be used to "tear up" security except perhaps in exceptional cases. |
| In re Van Laun, Ex parte Chatterton | Authority showing a secured creditor exercised the option to come into winding-up proceedings and submit his claim (i.e., was not compelled). | The Full Bench observed such cases are not authority for compulsion; rather they show a secured creditor may voluntarily submit to winding-up scrutiny but cannot be compelled by the winding-up Judge to do so. |
| Kashi Prasad v. Union Bank of India | Quoted by respondent but does not indicate it was a mortgage decree or involved rights of secured creditor. | The Court observed the decision does not assist the respondent on the specific point of secured creditors' rights and thus did not support forcing a secured creditor to submit his claim. |
| Amir Hassan Khan v. Sheo Bakhsh Singh (Privy Council) | Principle distinguishing absence of jurisdiction from erroneous exercise of jurisdiction: a court having jurisdiction may decide wrongly but still act within jurisdiction. | Invoked to support the proposition that even an erroneous or capricious refusal of leave by a winding-up Judge does not negate the existence of jurisdiction; errors in exercise are distinct from want of jurisdiction. |
| Rajwant Prasad Pande v. Ram Ratan Gir (Privy Council dictum quoted) | Doctrine that challenging the method of exercise of jurisdiction does not justify denial of the existence of such jurisdiction. | The Court relied on this dictum to hold that refusal of leave, even if erroneous in method, does not show absence of jurisdiction; jurisdiction under section 171 is not defeated by mistaken exercise. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Full Bench (chiefly through Boys, J., with concurring opinions from King, J. and Niamat-ullah, J.) analysed the legal and statutory framework and the competing precedents and practices. The reasoning proceeded broadly in the following steps, reflecting only the content of the opinion:
-
Interpretation of section 229 (importation of insolvency rules):
- Boys, J. analysed the phrase in section 229 — "the same rules ... as are in force for the time being under the law of insolvency" — and concluded the word "rules" must be given a wide meaning. He relied on the fact that section 229 is copied verbatim from the English Act, rule 104 of the Companies rules (which directs application of English practice where applicable), and practical difficulties in limiting "rules" to only rules made under an Act. He therefore held that provisions in sections of the Provincial Insolvency Act, rules made under that Act, and established rules of insolvency practice may be imported into the Companies Act unless there is an express or conflicting provision in the Companies Act.
- As a result, Boys, J. held that provisions such as section 9(2), section 28(6) and section 47 of the Provincial Insolvency Act are to be regarded as imported (unless inappropriate or in conflict with Companies Act provisions). King, J. added that section 228's reference to the "law of insolvency" supports a liberal construction of "rules" in section 229.
-
The rights of secured creditors in winding-up:
- The court emphasised that section 229 distinguishes between the rights of secured and unsecured creditors, and the imported insolvency principles include the broad principle that a secured creditor can elect to stand outside the proceedings and rely on his security (subject to the requirement of leave under section 171).
- Boys, J. noted the inconsistency of allowing a secured creditor to keep his security but permitting a winding-up Judge to "tear it up" by compelling submission and scrutiny; he found no principle to justify treating corporate insolvency differently from individual insolvency in this respect.
-
Scope and limits of the winding-up Judge's powers under sections 169 and 171:
- The Court accepted that sections 169 and 171 are wide enough to permit the winding-up Judge to stay proceedings and to refuse leave.
- Both Division Bench judges had agreed that the Judge can refuse leave; they differed on whether refusal can be absolute. The Full Bench addressed that precise question.
- Boys, J. concluded the winding-up Judge has jurisdiction to refuse leave absolutely but clarified important limits: the Judge does not have jurisdiction, under colour of refusing leave, to annul or modify a secured creditor's security or decree. The discretion to refuse should be exercised with due regard to third parties' rights and ordinarily only for such time as is necessary to decide whether to direct the liquidator to pay the claim, allow the creditor to proceed, or to have the liquidator challenge the decree.
- Niamat-ullah, J. emphasised that the Companies Act lacks an equivalent of section 4 of the Provincial Insolvency Act conferring plenary jurisdiction to decide title and priority; consequently, a winding-up court cannot generally adjudicate on third-party title except as provided by sections 231 and 232, and liquidators must ordinarily use regular suits to challenge third-party claims. He also accepted that section 171 confers very wide power (including refusing leave absolutely), but that such power should be exercised in furtherance of justice and not capriciously; absolute refusal may be appropriate only in rare, exceptional cases where the secured claim is manifestly baseless.
-
Interaction with precedent and practice:
- The Court surveyed English practice and cases and found that there is no authority to support compelling a secured creditor to submit to winding-up scrutiny; cases where secured creditors came in were voluntary submissions. The absence of contrary authority suggested established practice in favour of secured creditors' immunity from compulsory submission.
- The Court invoked English authorities (e.g., David Lloyd and Co.) to underline that provisions like section 171 aim to prevent multiplicity of costs to the estate rather than to extinguish the mortgagee's proprietary rights.
-
Practical and public-interest considerations:
- The opinion emphasised practical consequences of an unconditional refusal of leave: it risks prejudicing the secured creditor's right to an unprejudiced trial, affecting market perceptions and purchasers' willingness to pay full value, and may have serious repercussions on third parties.
- Consequently, while absolute refusal is within jurisdiction and conceivable in exceptional cases, ordinarily the Judge should refuse leave only temporarily to enable an appropriate decision (e.g., whether liquidator will pay, attack the decree by a suit, or allow proceedings).
Holding and Implications
Holding:
- DISPOSITION (core rulings as expressed by the Full Bench):
- That no secured creditor need, or can be forced to, prove his debt, and that, with limited exception, such a creditor can stand wholly outside the winding-up proceedings and rely upon his security or his decree if he has obtained one.
- That every secured creditor must obtain leave to proceed from the winding-up Judge (i.e., section 171 requires leave to take proceedings against the company or to execute a decree).
- That the winding-up Judge has jurisdiction to refuse leave absolutely.
- That the winding-up Judge has not jurisdiction, under colour of refusing leave or otherwise, to annul or modify a secured creditor's security or decree.
- That although absolute refusal is within the Judge's jurisdiction, ordinarily leave should be refused only for such time as may be necessary to enable the Judge to decide whether to direct the liquidator to pay off the claim (saving costs to the estate), to give leave to proceed, or to direct the liquidator to try to have the decree set aside; absolute refusal should be exceptional.
Implications:
- Direct effect on parties: Secured creditors retain the substantive ability to stand outside winding-up proceedings and enforce their security subject to obtaining leave; they are not automatically compelled to submit their claims to the winding-up court's scrutiny.
- Procedural consequence: A secured creditor must apply for leave under section 171 before instituting suits or executing decrees against a company in winding-up, but the Judge's refusal of leave, even if absolute, does not authorize the Judge to annul the underlying security or decree — those matters remain for proper adjudication in competent proceedings if challenged.
- Limit on judicial power: The Full Bench imposes a doctrinal and practical limitation — while jurisdiction to refuse absolutely exists, it is constrained by principles of fairness to third parties and commercial consequences; absolute refusals should be rare and reserved for exceptional circumstances (e.g., manifestly baseless claims).
- Statutory interpretation: The decision adopts a liberal construction of section 229, treating the "rules" of the law of insolvency as sufficiently broad to import certain substantive insolvency provisions (e.g., sections 9(2), 28(6), 47 of the Provincial Insolvency Act) into company winding-up law unless inconsistent with the Companies Act.
The Full Bench returned the case to the Division Bench with the expressions of opinion set out above; the Court did not purport to specify an exhaustive list of exceptional circumstances in which absolute refusal would be appropriate, but clarified statutory scope and limitations on the winding-up Judge's exercise of discretion under sections 169 and 171.
Boys, J.:— This case arises out of an order of Mr. Justice Mukerji, dated the 9th of July, 1927, made in winding-up proceedings.
A Letters Patent appeal was filed from that order and came up for hearing before Mr. Justice Sulaiman and Mr. Justice Weir. Those two learned-judges were to some extent but not wholly in agreement, and the case has been referred to the present Bench consisting of Mr. Justice King, Mr. Justice Niamut-ullah and myself for an expression of our “opinion on the question of law raised in the appeal as regards the extent of the jurisdiction vested in the Company Judge under section 171 in the matter of granting leave to a mortgagee decree-holder.” This question I shall redraft presently.
The case has been referred to us for our opinion under clause 27 of the Letters Patent. That clause requires the Judges who have differed to “state the point upon which they differ”. In the form in which it has been referred to us we have had to ascertain from the record (there were no less than 10 grounds of appeal), and from the statements of counsel and by comparing the judgement under appeal and the two judgements of the Appellate Bench what exactly was the question which we were invited to answer.
I will briefly state the facts, which in greater detail appear from the judgements of Mr. Justice Mukerji and Mr. Justice Weir. After certain preliminary proceedings the present appellants, who had previously given some indecisive indications of their intention to submit their claim to the receiver, put in a definite application on the 12th of April, 1927, asking to be allowed to proceed to execution of a decree which they had obtained on foot of a mortgage. They also asked to be allowed to proceed with a pending suit. But as to this we have not been addressed. This action of the appellants has been understood throughout as an intimation of their intention to stand out of the winding-up proceedings and not to submit their claims to proof.
Mr. Justice Mukerji had in a previous suit, In re Union Indian Sugar Mills Co. v. Brij Lal , held that he was entitled, if he suspected that the claim was not a just claim, to go behind a decree for damages and in proper circumstances to refuse to allow effect to that decree, and to call upon the creditor to establish before him that he had suffered any damage, and the extent of that damage, and to disallow finally part the whole of the claim. The decision of Mr. Justice Mukerji that he had power in the case of a decree for damages to adopt that course was incidentally and generally approved by a Division Bench in Ram Lal v. Kashi Charan .
In the present case it was contended before Mr. Justice Mukerji, as set out in his judgement, that “although under section 171 of the Indian Companies Act the decree could not be executed without the permission of the court, yet the granting of the permission was a mere matter of course and should be granted.” This position was founded on the fact that in the present case the applicants for leave were in the position of a secured creditor, who had the same rights as a secured creditor of an insolvent individual. It was contended that as a secured creditor the applicants had a right to stand out of the winding-up proceedings altogether, and to proceed as if those proceedings did not exist, with this single exception that they must draw their claims to the notice of the winding-up Judge in order to obtain his mechanical sanction to their proceeding. Mr. Justice Mukerji did not refer in his judgement to section 28(6) of the Provincial Insolvency Act or to any suggestion that section was imported into the law regulating the winding up of companies by section 229 of the Companies Act. I quote the following excerpts from the conclusion of Mr. Justice Mukerji's judgement:—
(a) “Having regard to the conduct of Mr. Belti Shah (the managing director) alone I should hesitate more than once before accepted an ex parte decree against the company as a bona fide one and above the scrutiny of the Official Liquidators.”
(b) “If the decree be found to be supported by good consideration the applicants may be, if they agree, put down as secured creditors with a first charge on the entire or a portion of the assets of the company, and they may thus be put in the same position in which they would be if they could execute the decree by themselves. However, that is a point which has not arisen for decision.”
(c) “After the consideration of the decree has been inquired into it will be time to see whether the decree should be executed by representatives of Lala Eaghu Mal or whether the liquidators should pay them, as a first charge-holder, out of the assets of the company or out of such parts of the assets of the company as may have been validly charged by the company.”
(d) “I hold therefore that leave to execute the decree should be refused.”
I note here that Mr. Justice Mukerji did not say what course he proposed to adopt if, after the liquidators had time to consider the merits of the case in which the decree had been obtained, he (Mr. Justice Mukerji) thought that the decree or part thereof was not supported by consideration in his opinion good.
As the judgement stands it may be that in that event he would continue to refuse leave to proceed to execution of the decree only until the liquidators had time to file a suit to get the decree set aside. On the other hand it may be that he would hold that he was entitled to ignore the decree and himself allow only such part of debt, if any, as he might find to be justly due. As Mr. Justice Mukerji's judgement has not definitely stated which of these two courses he would adopt, it as at least open to argument that the appeal from his order, on the main ground on which we are asked to set it aside, is premature.
But it is contended for the appellants that from the statement of Mr. Justice Mukerji in an earlier portion of his judgement that he was still of the opinion that he has expressed in I.L.R, 49 All., 728, and from the general tenor of the judgment, it was a fair inference that he had held that in the case of this decree obtained by a secured creditor he had the same powers, and meant to exercise those powers, as he had already held himself to be entitled to exercise in the case of the holder of a decree awarding damages.
There is something to be said for this view of the judgement under appeal put by the applicants, and it appears to have been so accepted by the Judges who referred the case to us, and I therefore think it desirable to deal with the question raised in the appeal. Moreover, both Judges were of opinion that an appeal did lie and therefore that question cannot perhaps be considered as being included in the matter for our consideration.
In order to ascertain the exact point upon which our opinion is really required I have analysed and com pared the judgements of Mr. Justice Weir and Mr. Justice Sulaiman.
Mr. Justice Weir was apparently of the opinion that the words “the same rules… as are in force for the time being under the law of insolvency” sufficed generally to import the provisions of section 28 and particularly section 28(6) of the Provincial Insolvency Act, Y of 1920, but in so far as the immunity given by section 28(6) to a secured creditor from being required to obtain leave of the, court was concerned it could not be availed of in winding-up proceedings in view of the specific provisions in section 171 of the Companies Act. Mr. Justice Sulaiman was of the view that the word “rules” must be interpreted in the sense of the Genera] Clauses Act, section 3(47), and the use of that word did not suffice to import section 28(6) of the Provincial Insolvency Act. It will be seen, therefore, that, though for different reasons, both the learned-judges were of opinion that section 171 must prevail, and in this respect section 28(6) of the Provincial Insolvency Act would not help the appellants.
Both Mr. Justice Weir and Mr. Justice Sulaiman were in agreement that a winding-up Judge has jurisdiction to refuse leave to a secured creditor and were equally in agreement that he has no jurisdiction to order a secured creditor to come in and justify his decree. There is no effective difference, then, in the opinions of the two learned-judges on either of these three, points, nor was there on certain other minor points.
Mr. Justice Weir further held that the winding-up Judge, while he has jurisdiction to refuse leave, has “jurisdiction” to refuse only temporarily to enable him to decide whether he will (a) direct the liquidator to pay up the decree, or (b) allow the decree-holder to proceed, or (c) direct the liquidator to file a suit to get the decree set aside; that the winding-up Judge has no jurisdiction to refuse leave “absolutely” and thus himself virtually tear up the decree and the mortgage-deed on the foot of which the decree was obtained. Mr. Justice Sulaiman on the other hand has held that the winding-up Judge has power to refuse leave “absolutely”, and this would, of course, include the lesser powers which alone Mr. Justice Weir would allow. It is in this last point that the learned-judges have really differed, and I have, therefore, redrafted the question for our opinion as follows:—
Where a person has obtained a mortgage (dated the 4th of April, 1923) on the assets, including moveable and immoveable property, of a company, and has obtained what was in effect an ex parte decree (dated the 12th of January, 1926), and winding-up proceedings of the affairs of the company have commenced (on the 29th of January, 1926), on which date also a general stay order was passed under section 169 of the Companies Act, and he has applied to the winding-up Judge for leave to proceed to the further enforcement of his security, has the winding-up Judge, if on inquiry he is for any reason satisfied that the claim was not a just one, power under section 169, section 171 or any other section of or rule made under the Companies Act, VII of 1913, to continue the stay absolutely or to refuse absolutely to grant leave; or has he only power so to stay or so to refuse leave temporarily, with a view to determining whether he will direct the liquidator to pay up the decree, or allow the decree-holder to proceed, or direct the liquidator to file a suit? The phrase “refuse absolutely” may be used for the sake of brevity for that which I should prefer,—“to meet with an unqualified refusal an application for leave to proceed” or “to refuse leave finally and unconditionally”.
My brothers, Mr. Justice King and Mr. Justice Niamat-Ullah agreed that this is the real question for our consideration.
We have been referred to the following provisions of law by one or other of the counsel:—
The Indian Companies Act, section 169, section 171, sections 228-232 and any other Act, section or rule which may be held to be imported by section 229, more particularly with reference to the Provincial Insolvency Act, V of 1920, sections 28(6) and 47, the rules under the Companies Act, particularly rules 45 to 50 and 104; and the practice and procedure in company matters in England so far as imported by rule 104 of the Indian Companies Act, with more particular reference to the English Companies (winding-up) Rules, 1909, Nos. 88 to 92, 103, 104 and 135.
I shall further refer to sections 2(1)(e), 9(2), 33, 34, 44, 45, 61 and 64 of the Provincial Insolvency Act and rule 21 of the Provincial Insolvency Act Rules and section 183(4) of the Indian Companies Act.
On behalf of the decree-holder appellant's cunsel has contended in effect for the view taken by Mr. Justice Weir. He did not challenge the position that his client must ask for leave to proceed. For the respondent, i.e for the liquidator, counsel has contended broadly that there is no distinction in winding-up matters between the position of an unsecured and a secured creditor, except possibly to this extent that in the case of a secured creditor the winding-up Judge may, if he so desires, give him permission, if he is satisfied that the debt was a good and just debt, to proceed to enforce his security whether by filing a suit or by proceeding to execution of his decree if he has already obtained one. We were also invited by counsel on both sides to consider the numerous cases quoted in the judgements of Mr. Justice Mukerji and Mr. Justice Weir, together with a few further cases not so mentioned. I will proceed to state as briefly as possible my view.
On the face of them sections 169 and 171 are wide enough to confer upon the winding-up Judge power respectively to stay all proceedings by a secured creditor and to refuse leave to a secured creditor to proceed. The appellant then relies on section 229. That section provides that in the winding-up of an insolvent company (and in this case there is no doubt about the insolvency) the same rules shall prevail and be observed with regard to the respective rights of secured and unsecured creditors and to debts provable and to the valuation of annuities and future and contingent liabilities as are in force for the time being under the law of insolvency with respect to the estates of persons adjudged-insolvent. The second portion of the section says that “all persons who in such case would be entitled to prove for and receive dividends out of the assets of the company may come in under the winding-up, and make such claims against the company as they respectively are entitled to by virtue of this section”. There was much contention before us as to the meaning of the phrase “the same rules… as are in force for the time being under the law of insolvency.”
For the liquidator it was contended that the word “rules” must be restricted to the scope given to it by the General Clauses Act, section 3(47). For the appellant creditor it was contended that the phrase is wide enough to include rules contained in the sections of the Provincial Insolvency Act, rules made under any power conferred by that Act and rules of practice.
As to the proper construction Mr. Justice Weir and Mr. Justice Sulaiman differed, and though they both agreed, though for different reasons, that the secured creditor could obtain no benefit from section 28(6) of the Provincial Insolvency Act, it is still necessary for us to consider, which is the correct interpretation, for there are provisions besides section 28(6) to be considered in answering the main question.
I am of opinion that the contention of the appellant is correct. The section is copied verbatim from the English Act and prima facie it would be unjustifiable in such circumstances to restrict the word to a meaning given to it by a purely Indian Act. Again, by rule 104 of the Companies ct the court is instructed to apply “the practice and procedure of the High Court of Justice in England in matters relating to companies”. Again, the rule 104 just referred to begins: “In cases not provided for by these rules or by rules of procedure laid down in the Act”. That rule itself, therefore, definitely applies the word “rules” to provisions contained in the Act itself. Finally, on the supposition that the word “rules” was to be taken in the sense of rules made under an Act, counsel for the respondent was invited to say to what rules made under an Act relating to insolvency the section referred if his interpretation was accepted. There are some rules made under section 79 of the Provincial Insolvency Act but no rules bearing in any way on the rights of secured and unsecured creditors, and counsel was not able to point to any such and was reduced to acknowledging that if this interpretation of the section was accepted the section was without meaning. I see, therefore, no reason for restricting the word “rules” in section 229 to the narrower sense of “rules made under an Act”. I am, therefore, of opinion that the rules contained in any section of the Provincial Insolvency Act, the rules, if any, made under the Act and any appropriate established rules of practice in insolvency proceedings are imported into the Companies Act, unless there is something in the Companies Act itself already providing for the matter in question, or in conflict with the rule which it is proposed to import.
Counsel for the respondent next contended that even if the wider meaning must be given to the word “rules” in section 229, the rule by which a secured creditor was given immunity in insolvency proceedings was not intended to be imported but only the rule giving a secured creditor priority. There does not, however, appear to be any justification prima facie for admitting the one class of rule and not admitting the other. Moreover it is manifest that the rule giving a secured creditor priority, if and so far as any such rule existed, is not a right given by the law of insolvency.
Counsel was unable to point to any provision in the Insolvency Act or in any rule made under that Act by which priority was given and admitted that the right to priority, in so far as it existed, was given by “the general law”. The only relevant sections in the Provincial Insolvency Act and the Companies Act of which I am aware are section 61 in the former and section 230 in the latter, which have no bearing on priority in this connection.
If, therefore, the word “rule” in section 229 is given the wider meaning it is not apparent what rules there are in insolvency to be imported except the rules contained in section 9(2), section 28(6) and section 47 of the Provincial Insolvency Act.
Mr. Justice Mukerji is also apparently, though he has not discussed the point, of the view that the rules contained in appropriate sections of the Provincial Insolvency Act are imported by section 229, for he refers to and relies on section 34(2) of that Act at page 733 of his judgement in In re Union Indian Sugar Mills Co. v. Brij Lal .
If in truth the appropriate sections of the Provincial Insolvency Act are not to be held imported by section 229 we should look in vain for much necessary guidance; e.g where are we to find the definition of “secured creditor” except in section 2(1)(e) of that Act?
I should also find it surprising if the principles contained in rules made under an Act were imported (so far as appropriate) and not the principles contained in rules made in the Act.
Giving therefore, the wider meaning to the term “rules” in section 229 I would hold the provisions of section 9(2), section 28(6) and section 47 to be imported, unless there be something in the Companies Act itself either directly substituted for those provisions or something otherwise showing that the importation of those provisions is inappropriate. I agree, therefore, with Mr. Justice Weir's interpretation of section 229.
As to whether it is necessary for a secured creditor to apply at all for leave to proceed, it is not necessary for me to express an opinion since both the learned-judges were, though for different reasons, of one opinion that leave must be applied for.
The next and main question is, what, if any, are the special rights of a secured creditor?
Section 229 bears on the face of it a reference to “the respective rights of secured and unsecured creditors.” The phrase is in itself sufficient to show that the Legislature recognized a difference between the rights of the two classes of creditors. In view of what I have said above as to the scope of section 229 I see no reason for excluding from importation into winding-up proceedings the broad established and admitted principle of insolvency law in the case of insolvency of an individual,—that a secured creditor can stand outside the proceedings, as evidenced by, amongst other sections, section 9(2), section 28(6) except so far as getting leave is concerned (as to which both the learned-judges of the Division Bench were in agreement) and section 47, and as evidenced by the prevailing practice.
In this connection I note that rule 104 of the Indian Companies Act Rules of this Court authorizes this Court to be guided by the practice and procedure of the High Court of Justice in England in matters relating to companies so far as they are applicable and not inconsistent with these rules and the Act. Turning to the English “Companies winding up Rules, 1909”, we find rule 135 which was incidentally referred to by counsel for the appellant. That was a rule in reference only to the matter of voting, but it contains the phrase “a secured creditor shall, unless he surrenders his security, state…” With this may be compared “where a secured creditor relinquishes this security” in section 47 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, and the similar phrase in section 9(2). It is clear, then, that the situation is in all three cases contemplated that a secured creditor may choose not to surrender his security. I should find it difficult to reconcile the two positions that a creditor may decide not to surrender his security, while at the same time a winding-up Judge may throw that security aside and examine into the justice of the debt exactly as if no security had ever existed. Nor has any principle been suggested to us or suggested itself to me why a secured creditor should be allowed to stand out in the case of the insolvency of an individual and not in the insolvency of a company.
On the other hond I find no difficulty in reconciling the two positions, that a secured creditor can stand on his security but that he must obtain leave to proceed, when we bear in mind the purpose with which the provision in section 171 was enacted. In reference to the similar provision in section 87 of the English Act of 1862, it was pointed out by James, L.J, in David Lloyd and Co. , that the object was to enable the winding-up Judge to prevent a multiplication of costs to the detriment of the estate and not to enable him to interfere with “the property” of the mortgagee.
Counsel for the liquidator was driven to contend that no difference is made between a secured and an unsecured creditor and he referred to rules 47 to 53 and rule 104 of the Indian Company Rules and rule 103 of the English Rules. I shall refer by a general observation to these rules later, but a sufficient answer to the broad statement of counsel is that section 229 on the face of it shows that there is a difference in the rights of the two classes. And if indeed there be no difference between the rights of a secured and an unsecured creditor in the matter of their being liable to be called upon to prove their claims and secure entry on the schedule, what, in view of the provisions of section 61(5) of the Provincial Insolvency Act and section 183(4) of the Companies Act, becomes of the right to priority which at another stage of the argument for the liquidator it was admitted and contended the secured creditor had?
Counsel was further driven to urge that a creditor claiming to be a secured creditor is not a “secured creditor” at all until he has “proved” his security. To this the definition of “secured creditor” in section 2(1)(e) of the Provincial Insolvency Act is a sufficient answer. In fact even an unsecured creditor, in order to secure acceptance of his claim, does not necessarily have to do more than send it in under rule 45, which sending in would appear to be equivalent to the state which is described as “notifying” in section 64 of the Provincial Insolvency Act; even such a creditor need not prove unless called upon (vide rule 46).
In this connection I note the phraseology of the second part of section 229,—“all persons who would be entitled to prove … may come in.” The word “provable” as used in the Provincial Insolvency Act does not in my opinion mean “which must be proved”, but “capable of proof” or “which may be, i.e are allowed to be, proved”. To appreciate this meaning of “provable under this Act” in section 28(2), section 33(1) and (3), section 44(2), etc. we must look at sectfons such as the proviso to section 33(1), section 34(1) and section 45.
But of course the real question of importance is whether “provable under this Act” read with section 64 means that in the case of all creditors, secured as well as unsecured, if they do not choose to come in (rule 45) and prove if called upon to do so (rules 46 to 49) they will lose their claims. That this is not so in the case of secured creditors, in the sense that they must, if called upon to do so, satisfy the winding-up Judge that their security is for a just debt, is clear from section 47 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, the language of which is consistent only with the idea that the secured creditor need not prove at all if he relies on realizing his security.
Here I may note an indication from rules 135 and 136 of the English Company Rules under which, when a secured creditor himself wishes to prove for the purpose of voting, he puts his own value on his security and not the value which the liquidator may choose to allow.
All the rules either in the Indian Companies Act or in the English Company Rules quoted to us on behalf of the respondent relating to the necessity of proof and which it is suggested are of general application are entirely consistent with the view that they apply only to those creditors who are unsecured or, where they specifically refer to secured creditors, to those secured creditors who have given up their, security or who, having endeavoured to obtain satisfaction, have only succeeded in obtaining satisfaction in part and claim to prove for the remainder.
It is not, therefore, necessary to consider how far such rules as Nos. 88, etc. of the English Company Rules (or rule 21 under the Provincial Insolvency Act which was not, however, mentioned for the respondent) are imported at all by the Indian Companies rule 104 when there are Indian Companies rules (e.g rule 45, etc.), dealing with the same matters.
Similarly there is nothing in Kashi Prasad v. Union Bank of India , quoted for the respondent, to show that the decree was a mortgage decree or that any question of the rights of a secured creditor arose at all.
I have not considered it necessary to consider in detail the English cases to which reference has been made. It is admitted on all sides that not one of the cases, whether English or Indian, suggests that the winding-up Judge can compel a secured creditor to come into the winding-up proceedings or in any way submit his claim to scrutiny. In cases such as In re Van Laun, Ex parte Chatterton , it is clear that the secured creditor had exercised his option to come into the winding-up proceedings and submit his claim to the winding-up Judge. They are no authority for the proposition that the Judge has power to compel him to come in.
The fact that there are no cases in which it has been held that a winding-up Judge can compel a secured creditor to bring in his security and that he can scrutinize that security and, if he sees fit, in effect tear it up, and no cases in the opposite sense, suggests that the practice in England and in this country has been uniform in one direction or the other and has been regarded as not open to question. This uniformity of practice suggests the following consideration. If the practice has been uniform in favour of the secured creditor it would be natural to find that the question of his privilege had never been raised. On the other hand if the practice had been in a sense adverse to the secured creditor it is almost certain that practice would be found to have been confirmed by some judicial decision or decisions, for it is almost certain that some secured creditor would at one time or another, on the strength of the law and practice applying to bankruptcy proceedings, have challenged the power of the winding-up Judge. So far, therefore, as any conclusion can be drawn from the absence of any judicial authority either way, that conclusion must be in favour of the secured creditor.
If it be asked why a secured creditor should ever desire to come into the winding-up proceedings, it is manifest that there may be cases in which he may feel that his chances of realizing his money in good time, if he depends solely on his security, may possibly be jeopardized if he stands aloof from the winding-up proceedings altogether and allows them to arrive at a termination before he has realized his security.
Finally I would note that it would in my view be surprising indeed if the Legislature had meant by language merely requiring leave to be obtained to confer power to tear up a decree and also the security upon which it was founded.
In my view our answer must then be guided by the two considerations, the winding-up Judge has jurisdiction to refuse leave but his discretion to refuse leave must be exercised with a due regard to the rights of third persons who were not members of the company and who had not to come in and claim to share such as a mortgagee (Per James, L.J, in David Lloyd and Co. .
To say that the discretion is thus limited is in effect to place a restriction on the exercise of his jurisdiction by the winding-up Judge, but that is no more than the English Courts have found it necessary to do.
If is clear that in any case the orders of the winding-up Judge staying proceedings under section 169 and refusing leave under section 171 cannot be operative any longer than the winding-up proceedings continue; and further it is very difficult to conceive an unqualified refusal to give leave which would not infringe on the rights of the secured creditor. Ordinarily, for a winding-up Judge to say to a secured creditor that the merits of his claim are so dubious that leave to proceed is unconditionally and finally refused is going perilously near permitting him to adjudicate on the merits of the claim. It may not be in form an adjudication but it is a judicial pronouncement and it may have a serious repercussion on the right of the secured creditor to an unprejudiced trial of his claim and also it may induce a purchaser to pay an enhanced price under what may prove to have been a false impression of security created by the action of the Judge. But there may possibly, in very exceptional circumstances, be a case in which unqualified refusal would be upheld and it may be that Jessel, M.R, (with whom James, L.J, and Cotton, L.J, expressed their agreement) had this possibility in mind when he held in the case to which I have just referred that those who desire to restrain a secured creditor from proceedings must offer to pay him off or show some special grounds for restraining him.
I would state the following propositions:—
(1) That no secured creditor need, or can be forced to, prove his debt, and that, with the next following exception, such a creditor can stand wholly outside the winding-up proceedings if he so elects and rely upon his security or his decree if he has obtained one.
(2) That every secured creditor must obtain leave to proceed from the winding-up Judge.
(3) That the winding-up Judge has jurisdiction to refuse leave absolutely.
(4) That the winding-up Judge has not jurisdiction, under colour of refusing leave or otherwise, to annul or modify a secured creditor's security or decree.
(5) That, while there may be some exceptional case in which the winding-up Judge may refuse leave absolutely, he should ordinarily refuse leave only for such time as may be necessary to enable him in the particular circumstances of each case to determine whether he will direct the liquidator to pay off the claim and thus save unnecessary costs to the estate or whether he will give leave to proceed, or whether he will direct the liquidator to take such steps as may be open to him to get the decree set aside.
Where the secured creditor has not yet obtained a decree an alternative consideration may arise as to whether the winding-up Judge will direct the liquidator to apply to be made a party to any proceeding that the creditor may have instituted or desire to institute, but we have not been called upon to deal with that.
King, J.:— I fully agree to the views expressed by Boys, J., and have only one comment to make.
The language of section 228 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913, seems to me to furnish an additional argument for the view that the word “rules” in section 229 is not to be construed as having only the narrow meaning given to that word by section 3(47) of the General Clauses Act 1897.
In section 228 we find that the law of insolvency is to be applied “in accordance with the provisions of this Act” to the winding up of insolvent companies. It must be noted that the expression used is “law of insolvency” and not “rules which are in force under the law of insolvency.”
Now there is no provision of the Companies Act which expressly applies the “law” of insolvency to insolvent companies. Section 229 does, however, provide that “rules” which are in force, on certain subjects, under the law of insolvency shall be observed in the winding up of insolvent companies. Section 229, therefore, undoubtedly appears to be the provision of the Act which is mentioned an section 228 as applying the “law” of insolvency to insolvent companies. This leads me to conclude that the Legislature did not intend to draw a distinction between “the law of insolvency” (mentioned in section 228) and “the rules in force under the law of insolvency” (mentioned in section 229). This implies that the word “rules” in section 229 must be liberally construed in the sense of “rules of law” including (a) provisions of the Insolvency Act, (b) rules made under that Act, and (c) rules of practice.
Niamat-ullah, J.:— I agree with Boys, J., to the answer he proposes to make on the question referred to the Full Bench and would add a few observations in support of his conclusions and to emphasise some aspects of the case on which they rest.
The facts of the case, so far as they are necessary to make my remarks intelligible, are briefly as follows:—
The appellants Lala Hansraj and others obtained, on 28th October, 1924, an ex parte decree for sale, passed by a learned-judge sitting on the Original Side of the Calcutta High Court, for a large sum of money (about Rs. 1,77,000) on foot of a mortgage deed, dated the 25th of April, 1923, executed by the Dahra Dun Mussoorie Electric Tramway Co. Ltd., which has since gone into liquidation and is being wound up by Mr. Justice Mukerji, a learned-judge of this Court. Inasmuch as no legal proceedings can be taken except by leave of the Court, i.e, the Judge exercising jurisdiction under the Indian Companies Act (section 171), the appellants applied for leave to take out execution of their decree. Mr. Justice Mukerji held that the leave “to execute the decree should be refused.” His order, which has been quoted by Mr. Justice Boys in the leading judgement, has been construed to mean, and the case has been argued on the assumption, that he ruled, in effect, that after scrutinizing the claim of the appellants under their mortgage deed and the decree obtained by them the learned-judge “should decide what amount of money, if any, is due to them and what part of the company's assets should be charged therewith, or whether the decree should be allowed to be executed. On appeal from this order the learned-judges composing the Division Bench which heard it, disagreed on a question of law. Mr. Justice Sulaiman held that the learned Company Judge had the jurisdiction to refuse leave “absolutely” and “was not bound to suspend the grant of leave for a limited period only.” He added “I express no opinion on the question whether the present case is or is not a fit case in which leave should have been refused.” Mr. Justice Weir, the other learned-judge of the Division Bench, maintained that “since the appellants have refused to submit their claims to the scrutiny of the liquidators, Mukerji, J., has no jurisdiction to attempt to force them to do so; though I think that he can stay the execution of the decree for a reasonable period of time in order to enable the liquidators to_ make up their minds whether they will or will not take other steps to attack the decree. It seems to me that them power to stay execution of a decree, such as this, in a case like the present is limited to the extent which I have indicated”. He ordered accordingly that the execution of the decree be stayed for six months.
Mr. Justice Boys has laid down, after a careful-analysis of the judgements of the learned-judges composing the Division Bench, what question ought to be decided by this Full Bench, and it seems to me that the difference of opinion between those learned-judges reduces itself to the question whether the jurisdiction of the court refusing leave to a mortgagee decree-holder to execute his decree extends to the power to refuse leave altogether and it is only a matter of his discretion to refuse for a limited time or altogether, as Mr. Justice Sulaiman thinks, or whether his jurisdiction in that behalf is limited to such time as may be reasonable to enable the liquidator to decide if he should attack the decree by instituting a regular suit, as Mr. Justice Weir would have it.
That a secured creditor need not prove his debt in winding-up proceedings and can stand wholly outside such proceedings relying on his security is conceded by both learned-judges of the Division Bench. Mr. Justice Weir has quoted a number of English decisions in support of this view. Mr. Justice Sulaiman, though he does not consider that any of the sections of the Provincial Insolvency Act are imported into the provisions of the Indian Companies Act by section 229 of the latter Act, has nevertheless expressed himself as follows:—“Although there is no express provision in the Companies Act protecting secured creditors, their safety rests on well established principles. Under the Transfer of Property Act an interest is transferred to a mortgagee. A mortgagee's estate, so to speak, is carved out of the original estate and vests in the mortgagee. When a company is in liquidation, only the property of the company comes under the control of the court or the official liquidator. The interest which has previously passed to a mortgagee is separate and distinct and is not brought in. It follows that a mortgagee with his well defined interest can keep aloof and remain outside the jurisdiction of the court. His remedy to realize his security would ordinarily be unaffected by the insolvency of his debtor. He cannot against his will be dragged into the winding-up proceedings, or compelled to surrender his security and place himself on the same footing as other creditors by proving his debt. His rights are paramount and remain safe. Of course if he so chooses he may realize his security and prove for the balance, or he may surrender his security and prove for the whole debt; but he cannot be forced into doing that or to abandon his remedy. The liquidators may redeem the mortgage but cannot prevent him from selling the mortgaged property.
We find no provision in the Indian Companies Act conferring jurisdiction on the court to adjudicate, in winding-up proceedings, on the right of third persons whose claims come in conflict with the rights of the company. The only provisions which relate to such third persons are contained in sections 231 and 232 of the Indian Companies Act which run as follows:—
“231. (1) Any transfer, delivery of goods, payment, execution or other act relating to property which would, if made or done by or against an individual, be deemed in his insolvency a fraudulent preference, shall, if made or done by or against a company, be deemed, in the event of its being wound up, a fraudulent preference of its creditors, and be invalid accordingly.
(2) For the purposes of this section the presentation of a petition for winding up in the case of a winding up by or subject to the supervision of the court, and a resolution for winding up in the case of a voluntary winding up, shall be deemed to correspond with the act of in solvency in the case of an individual.
(3) Any transfer or assignment by a company of all its property to trustees for the benefit of all its creditors shall be void.”
“232. (1) Where any company is being wound up by or subject to the supervision of the court, any attachment, distress or execution put in force without leave of the court against the estate or effects of the company after the commencement of the winding-up shall be void.
(2) Nothing in this section applies to proceedings by the Government.”
It will be seen at a glance that sections 231 and 232 of the Indian Companies Act are parallel to sections 53 and 54 of the Insolvency Act, but it is significant that there is no provision in the Indian Companies Act corresponding to section 4 of the Provincial Insolvency Act which lays down:—
“(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the court shall have full power to decide all questions whether of title or priority, or of any nature whatsoever, and whether involving matters of law or of fact, which may arise in any case of insolvency coming within the cognizance of the court, or which the court may deem it expedient or necessary to decide for the purpose of doing complete justice or making a complete distribution of property in any such case.
(2) Subject to the provisions of this Act and notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, every such decision shall be final and binding for all purposes as between, on the one hand the debtor and the debtor's estate and, on the other hand, all claimants against him or it and all persons claiming through or under them or any of them.
(3) Where the court does not deem it expedient or necessary to decide any question of the nature referred to in sub-section (1), but has reason to believe that the debtor has a saleable interest in any property, the court may without further inquiry sell such interest in such manner and subject to such conditions as it may think fit.”
It follows from the foregoing remarks and the provisions quoted that a winding-up court, unlike an insolvency court, cannot take cognizance of and adjudicate on the title of third persons except to the limited extent mentioned in sections 231 and 232 of the Indian Companies Act, and if it is necessary to impeach such title, the liquidators must have recourse to regular suits cognizable by ordinary civil courts. A mortgagee or a secured creditor, qua the interest which has been transferred to him by the mortgage or hypothecation, is not a mere creditor but a person in whom the right is vested, and his right can be impeached, if at all, in the same manner as in the case of any other person who claims adversely to the company.
It has been said that a claimant, to occupy the advantageous position of a secured creditor, should establish before the court in winding-up proceedings the fact that he is a secured creditor. I do not think that any occasion can arise for his doing so. A person claiming to be a transferee of an interest, be he a vendee, donee or mortgagee, can establish it when he desires to enforce his claim and can defend his title if it is attacked before a competent court. Meanwhile, the liquidator is to take note of it in dealing with what lie thinks to be the property of the company. The right claimed by a secured creditor may be so palpably illusory that he feels justified in ignoring it and in assuming that the claim will not appreciably influence intending purchasers of the company's property affected by such adverse claim. In other cases the liquidator must either accept it or have the cloud on the title of the company removed by obtaining appropriate relief from a competent court.
Wherever a mortgagee or other secured creditor has already obtained a decree against the company in enforcement of his claim, it affords an additional strength to his title and can be questioned by the liquidator on the usual grounds such as fraud or collusion. Mr. Justice Sulaiman is inclined to think that, as between the liquidator on the one hand and the mortgagee decree-holder on the other, the binding character of the decree is to be judged with reference to the rule of res judicata contained in section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and that the former, being an officer of the court and representing the interest of the whole body of creditors as well as those of the shareholders, is not bound by the decree. I take leave to point out that before the rule of res judicata can be invoked by one or the other of the parties to determine the binding character of the decree, there must been issue in a suit or proceeding in a competent court between the parties, and in so far as such an occasion does not arise before a court in winding-up proceedings there is no room for the application of the rule of res judicata. Such an occasion will, of course, arise when the mortgage or the decree is in question in a regular suit brought by the liquidator to challenge the mortgage the decree or in any proceedings taken by the mortgagee to realise his security. I doubt if in such a case the liquidator can get over the bar of res judicata by an appeal to his position as a representative of the creditors generally. Prima facie he will, in that contingency, occupy no higher position than the one which an attaching creditor does under similar circumstances. It is, however, unnecessary to express a decisive opinion on this question.
The next question is whether section 171 of the Indian Companies Act, which unquestionably subjects a secured creditor to a disability in enforcing his claim as fie must obtain leave of the winding-up Judge to institute a suit or to execute a decree if he has already obtained one, confers an unlimited power on the winding-up Judge to refuse leave. The jurisdiction of the court is not limited by anything contained in that section which confers the widest power to refuse leave. It does not make it obligatory on the court to withhold, leave in any given case for a limited time only. At the same time it can be confidently expected that the unlimited power to refuse leave will be exercised by a court of law in furtherance of the ends of justice and not capriciously. No court will so abuse it as to hold it in terrorem to induce the secured creditor to forego part of his claim or otherwise compromise his position. If the court is obdurate in refusing leave to a secured creditor without directing the liquidator to challenge his rights in a proper court and abide the result, it will cause incalculable harm to the interests of the company and the creditors. It cannot, by merely withholding leave, extinguish the charge, if it otherwise exists, or deprive the decree of its operative effect. The charge will subsist though it can not be enforced during winding-up proceedings. Whoever purchases the property subject to such charge will purchase encumbered property liable to be sold in the hands of the purchaser, as, it should be noticed, leave is necessary only for a “suit or other legal proceeding…. against the company.” Once it is possible to avoid proceeding against the company, the secured creditor is free from the trammels of section 171, Indian Companies Act. A prospect of this kind, and fear of future litigation, are likely to deter purchasers from offering anything like a fair market value of the property which a secured creditor claims to be burdened with his debt. It should be observed that limitation for the secured creditor's suit or application for execution, as the case may be, will remain suspended under section 15, Limitation Act. No court winding up the affairs of a company will, therefore, ordinarily consider it safe to withhold leave altogether and to court the disastrous consequences likely to follow its action. Cases are, however, conceivable in which the court may safely refuse leave altogether. The claim of a secured creditor may be so manifestly baseless as not to weigh with it and with the intending purchasers who may be willing to offer full value for the property, confidently relying on their ability to defeat the claim when made. In such a case the court may deem it desirable to withhold leave absolutely and to dispense with the necessity of the liquidator instituting a suit to vindicate the title of the company. In practice cases of this kind will be of rare occurrence but are not beyond the range of possibility. The Legislature did not consider it expedient or even possible to lay down exhaustively cases in which and the purposes for which leave should be granted and those where it should be refused. Unlimited jurisdiction has been, therefore, conferred by section 171 of the Companies Act on the winding-up Judge, to withhold leave for such time and on such terms or altogether as the circumstances of each case may warrant.
Where the Legislature has advisedly conferred jurisdiction or power on a court without imposing any fetters thereon, it cannot be limited by enumerating cases in which alone it can, in our present view, be exercised. It will be tantamount to adding a proviso to section 171 of the Indian Companies Act, which the Legislature has not thought fit to add.
“By jurisdiction is meant the authority on which a court has to decide matters that are litigated before it or to take cognizance of matters presented in a formal way for its decision. The limits of this authority are imposed by the statute, charter or commission under which the court is constituted or may be extended or restricted by the like impositions. If no restriction or limit is imposed, the jurisdiction is said to be unlimited; a limitation may be either as to the kind and nature of the actions and matters of which a particular court has cognizance, or as to the area over which the jurisdiction shall extend, or may partake of both these characteristics.”
(See Halsbury's Laws of England, volume IX, page 13, paragraph 10).
Numerous cases have arisen with reference to section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code in which a distinction has been drawn between absence of jurisdiction and erroneous exercise thereof. It was observed by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Amir Hassan Khan v. Sheo Bakhsh Singh : “The question then is, did the judges of the lower courts in this case, in the exercise of their jurisdiction act illegally or with material irregularity? It appears that they had perfect jurisdiction to decide the question which was before them and they did: decide it. Whether they decided it rightly or wrongly, they had jurisdiction to decide the case; and even if they decided wrongly they did not exercise their jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity.”
If therefore a winding up Judge has jurisdiction to grant leave or not and he withholds it altogether he cannot be said to have acted without jurisdiction ever when he erroneously disregarded the rights of a secured creditor.
The dictum of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Rajwant Prasad Pande v. Ram Ratan Gir that “it is very trite and very familiar that a challenge of the method of the exercise of the jurisdiction of a court can never in law justify a denial of the existence of such jurisdiction” has a peculiar hearing on the question which is engaging our attention. If a winding-up Judge refuses leave to a secured creditor without the slightest justification “his method of the exercise of the jurisdiction” may be erroneous, but his jurisdiction cannot be questioned.
An order passed without jurisdiction is a nullity, and therefore one of the tests of an order being without jurisdiction is to find if it can be treated as not possessing a binding effect. Can the order of a winding-up Judge refusing leave absolutely be regarded as a nullity? Can it be ignored after a reasonable time such as may be considered sufficient to enable the winding-up Judge to decide what steps should be taken with reference to the claim of the secured creditor? I have no doubt as to the answers to these questions. If a winding-up Judge has no jurisdiction to refuse leave without specifying a reasonable time, that order ought to cease to have binding effect after a reasonable time. It seems to me that there is a contradiction in terms in the proposition that a Judge has no jurisdiction to refuse leave for all time but can refuse leave for such length of time as he considers reasonable. If the length of time for which he can withhold leave rests with him, he can refuse it absolutely an J altogether according to the latter part of the proposition, a power which the first part thereof professes to deny.
For the reasons I have stated, I answer the question referred to the Full Bench in terms set out in the judgement of Boys, J.
By the Court:— Let the case be returned to the Division Bench hearing the appeal with the following expressions of opinion:—
(1) That no secured creditor need, or can be forced to, prove his debt, and that, with the next following exception, such a creditor can stand wholly outside the winding-up proceedings if he so elects and rely upon his security or his decree if he has obtained one.
(2) That every secured creditor must obtain leave to proceed from the winding-up Judge.
(3) That the winding-up Judge has jurisdiction to refuse leave absolutely.
(4) That the winding-up Judge has not jurisdiction, under colour of refusing leave or otherwise, to annual or modify a secured creditor's security or decree.
(5) That, while there may be some exceptional case in which the winding-up Judge may refuse leave absolutely, he should ordinarily refuse leave only for such time as may be necessary to enable him in the particular circumstances of each case to determine whether he will direct the liquidator to pay off the claim and thus save unnecessary costs to the estate or whether he will give leave to proceed, or whether he will direct the liquidator to take such steps as may be open to him to get the decree set aside.
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