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Banke Bihari v. Brij Bihari

Allahabad High Court
Dec 17, 1928
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Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a suit for partition of joint family property in which the appellant was the plaintiff. The dispute concerns shares in property held by a family in which Bhagwan Das (who died 1 May 1922) was an elder member. The plaintiff's pleaded case was that, upon Bhagwan Das's death, the family estate belonged by right of survivorship to the remaining family members including the plaintiff, entitling him to one-half of the property; he sought partition by metes and bounds of that one-half. The defendants pleaded that the plaintiff had separated himself from the family during the lifetime of Bhagwan Das and was entitled only to a quarter share.

The Subordinate Judge found there was no partition by metes and bounds but held that the family status had been split and decreed a partition awarding the plaintiff a quarter share. The main question on appeal was whether there had been an actual disruption of family jointness by the plaintiff's separation before Bhagwan Das's death, or whether the family continued joint at the date of suit (which would entitle the plaintiff to one-half).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiff actually separated from the joint family about July 1920 (i.e., whether there was a factual disruption of joint family status prior to Bhagwan Das's death).
  2. If the first issue is answered negatively, whether the plaintiff must be regarded as separated in interest after his registered notice of 2nd February 1922 (i.e., whether that notice effected a legal severance despite subsequent conduct).

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The plaintiff asserted that on Bhagwan Das's death the estate descended by right of survivorship among the remaining family members and that the plaintiff's share, on partition, was one-half of the joint estate.
  • Accordingly, the plaintiff sought separation by metes and bounds of his one-half share.
  • Regarding documentary evidence, the plaintiff admitted some account books belonged to the family when they were received in court but later alleged that some books were tampered with and unreliable.

Defendants' Arguments

  • The defendants claimed that the plaintiff had effectively separated himself from the joint family during Bhagwan Das's lifetime and had been allotted only a quarter share.
  • Ram Bilas's written statement (the primary defendant pleading) said that about July 1920 it was arranged that the plaintiff would take collections in three named villages (out of 22), yielding Rs. 1,500 net, and that adjustments would be made because the plaintiff's quarter share should yield Rs. 2,000; movable properties and servants were divided and some businesses were to be adjusted and shared, indicating a practical division.
  • The defendants relied on the view that the registered notice of 2nd February 1922 by the plaintiff was not the cause of separation because, in their case, separation had already occurred in July 1920; they also alleged that a deed of partition would be registered after Bhagwan Das recovered from illness (though the Court found no reliable evidence of such illness).
  • The defendants bore the burden of proving separation and relied on documentary and circumstantial evidence, including certain account books, to substantiate their plea of separation.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ram Kali v. Khamman Lal, A.I.R. 1928 All. 422 Contains propositions including (d) that consensus among coparceners is not necessary for severance of status; and (e) that where severance is effected by explicit declaration, the result is decisive and the legal result cannot be affected by subsequent conduct of the parties (wording used was "is"). The Court read Clause (e) critically, noting that the word "is" should be read as "has been." The Court held that Ram Kali did not decide that an unequivocal demand, not persisted in and subsequently abandoned, must be treated as affecting separation; thus Ram Kali did not control the outcome where separation was not completed and was abandoned.
Jai Narain v. Baijnath Rai, A.I.R. 1928 All. 419 Proposition (quoted with approval in Ram Kali) that where there has been a completed separation, there can be no joint family afterwards except by way of reunion. The Court relied on this proposition to clarify that it governs completed separations; because the Court found no completed separation on these facts, the proposition did not mandate treating the plaintiff as separated.
Kedar Nath v. Rattan Singh, [1910] 32 All. 415 Illustrates a situation where a demand for partition was abandoned (e.g., a suit withdrawn) and the jointness between remaining members continued. Used as an illustration supporting the principle that a demand for separation may be abandoned and that abandonment preserves joint family status; applied to support the conclusion that the plaintiff's abandoned demand did not disrupt jointness.
Palani Ammal v. Muthuvenkatachala Moniagar, A.I.R. 1925 P.C. 49 Another illustration where a demand for separation and a partition suit were ultimately compromised/abandoned and the family continued to be joint. Relied upon as an example confirming that abandonment or compromise of a separation claim can leave jointness undisturbed; the Court cited it to support the conclusion that the plaintiff's notice, later abandoned, did not create a legal separation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded methodically from pleadings to evidence and law:

  1. Scope and burden: The Court noted the defendants pleaded separation and thus bore the burden of proof. The Court examined the written statement of Ram Bilas (the principal defendant pleading) and the adoption of that statement by later impleaded parties.
  2. Issues framed: The Court accepted the issue framed below — whether the plaintiff separated about July 1920 and, if not, whether the 2nd February 1922 registered notice effected separation in interest.
  3. Findings below reviewed: The Subordinate Judge had held there was no partition by metes and bounds about July 1920 but nevertheless found facts indicating the plaintiff had become regarded as owner of a quarter share; the appellate Court reviewed whether that factual finding was supported by evidence.
  4. Assessment of evidence: The Court criticized the Subordinate Judge's method of first determining the law and then fitting the facts to it, observing that the Judge had adopted a legal proposition (that an unequivocal declaration of intention to separate may amount to separation) and applied it to the whole case rather than first making findings of fact. The Court examined the oral evidence and documentary materials brought into Court (notably account books produced by a commissioner) and observed some account books were unreliable. The Court referred to Section 34 of the Evidence Act (as quoted in the opinion) to note that only properly kept account books are admissible as relevant evidence.
  5. On the July 1920 contention: After weighing oral and documentary evidence, the Court agreed that a regular partition by metes and bounds in or about July 1920 was not established. The Court thus rejected the proposition that a completed partition had occurred then.
  6. On the registered notice of 2nd February 1922: The Court considered the notice and the subsequent conduct of the parties. It found that the notice was given in a fit of petulance, that the notice did not lead to any serious disruption, and that a family meeting followed in which the plaintiff was induced (by promises of money for expenses and other interlocutory statements) to abandon his demand for partition. The Court explicitly found that the plaintiff conceived the idea of separation but gave it up "a day or two later" as a result of the family meeting and interactions with relations.
  7. Legal principle applied: The Court reviewed case law cited by respondents. It accepted that while a coparcener may unilaterally choose to separate and that an unequivocal declaration can effect severance, the question remains whether such a declared intention was later abandoned. The Court relied on Privy Council authority and cited illustrations (Kedar Nath and Palani Ammal) showing that a demand abandoned by the party (with consent or compromise) leaves jointness undisturbed.
  8. Conclusion from law and facts: Because the Court found no completed separation and specifically found the plaintiff's demand was abandoned, it held the plaintiff's registered notice did not effect a legal separation. Consequently the family remained joint at the death of Bhagwan Das.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is allowed. The Court held that the family was joint when Bhagwan Das died on 1st May 1922 and that the plaintiff is entitled to a one-half share in the entire joint family property. The decree of the Court below (which had awarded the plaintiff a quarter share) was modified and the plaintiff's suit for partition was decreed in its entirety as a preliminary decree to be carried out in accordance with law.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The plaintiff obtains a one-half share (instead of the quarter share awarded below). The partition will proceed as a preliminary decree under the law. The plaintiff is awarded the costs of the suit and of the appeal.
  • On precedent or broader law: The Court applied existing principles (including authorities demonstrating that a demand for separation, if abandoned, leaves jointness intact) but did not purport to lay down a novel rule of law; the decision turns on the trial Court's findings of fact and their application of established principles to these facts.

Note: All statements in this summary are derived directly from the provided opinion and do not add, infer, or invent information beyond that text.

Show all summary ...

1. This appeal arises out of a suit for partition of joint family property in which the appellant was the plaintiff. The relationship of the parties is shown by the following pedigree:

(For pedigree see p. 171)

2. The plaintiff's case was that, on the death of Bhagwan Das the family estate belonged by right of survivorship, to the rest of the family consisting of the parties to the suit and that in the case of partition the plaintiff's share was one-half. The plaintiff accordingly claimed separation by metes and bounds of his one-half share. The defence was that the plaintiff had separated himself from the rest of the family during the lifetime of Bhagwan Das and that he was allotted a quarter share only to which alone he was entitled.

3. The learned Subordinate Judge has held that the defendant's case was partially true that although no partition by metes and bounds took place, as alleged by the defendants, there was nevertheless enough evidence to show that the status of the family had been split up and that the plaintiff had come to be regarded as the owner of a quarter share. The learned Judge accordingly decreed the suit by directing a partition of a quarter share to the plaintiff. The main question for determination in this appeal is whether or not there was an actual disruption of the family by the separation of the plaintiff before the death of Bhagwan Das or whether at the date of the suit the family still continued to be joint in which event the plaintiff's share would be one-half.

4. In order to enable the Court to weigh the evidence at its proper worth it is necessary to examine closely the pleadings of the parties. The defendants, who pleaded separation and on whom therefore the burden of proof lay, disclose their case in the written statement of Ram Bilas. It appears that originally Ram Bilas was the sole defendant in the case. Later on, his son and grandsons were impleaded. These, however, contented themselves with filing a short written statement and with the adoption of Ram Bilas's written statement. Ram Bilas's case, in his long written statement, put briefly was this: About July 1920 the plaintiff insisted on partition and it was arranged that he should make collections in three villages, viz., Gularia, Nawa Bagla and Mirpur Hirpur (out of 22 villages owned by the family), that these three villages yielded Rs. 1,500 a year as NIHAL CHAND _____________________________|_________________________________ | | Nand Lal Tula Ram | __________________________|_______ Bhagwan Das | | (died 1st May 1922) Ram Bilas, Defendant Thakur Pd.

the net profit, that as the total amount of yearly profits to which the plaintiff was entitled for his one quarter share was Rs. 2,000, it was arranged that at the close of the agricultural year which commenced in July 1920 (1328 F) an adjustment of account would take place and the deficiency in the plaintiff's profits would be made good by Bhagwan Das and Ram Bilas, that all moveable properties were actually divided, that the servants of the family were divided and they thereafter, managed for their respective masters and that as regards money lending and sugar business, it was agreed that after the payment of a possible debt, the balance would be divided. It appears that on 2nd February 1922, the plaintiff sent a registered notice to Bhagwan Das and Ram Bilas demanding partition. The defendants did not rely on it as a document creating, as a matter of law, a separation in the status of the family. The reason was that according to their case the partition had already taken place in July 1920. The defendants accordingly stated in para. 5 of the written statement (p. 9) that by means of this notice the plaintiff declared the separateness of his status and, the defendants added that it was agreed, as the result of the notice, that a deed of partition would be registered as soon as Bhagwan Das recovered from his illness. It was the defendants' case that on 2nd February 1922 Bhagwan Das was really ill, but we may state at once that there is no reliable evidence to prove this and the Court below has not found that such was the case.

5. In view of the pleadings stated above, the only question for decision was whether the plaintiff had separated in July 1920. No question arose as to whether if the family was joint, even at the date of the registered notice namely, 2nd February 1922, the delivery of the notice created a disruption in the family. The case, however, has been considered from both the aspects and the following issue was framed by the Court below:

Whether the plaintiff separated from the joint family about July 1920. If the answer to the above be in the negative, is the plaintiff to be looked upon as separated in interest after his notice or registered letter of 2nd February 1922.

6. The learned Subordinate Judge recorded the following finding as to the first part of the issue:

Therefore if I were asked on the strength of oral evidence... to hold that there was a regular partition by metes and bounds of all the joint family property in or about July 1920, I would unhesitatingly decline to do so.... In fact, I may go the length of saying that even the entire circumstantial evidence, to which I shall presently refer, read in conjunction with oral evidence referred to above, fails to my mind to establish that any regular partition of all the family property by metes and bounds was really made." (p. 115 of the printed record).

7. The learned Judge then proceeded to remark that the above finding did not preclude the Court from finding that the plaintiff had, as a matter of fact, severed his rights or interest in the joint family property. The learned judge ultimately held, as already stated, that the plaintiff had severed his interest during the lifetime of Lala Bhagwan Das, but did not say when the disruption took place. As we have already stated, the learned Judge was not satisfied that a partition took place in July 1920.

8. Before examining the evidence the learned Judge adopted a method of trying the case of which we do not approve. Instead of arriving at findings of fact first and applying the law then, he proceeded to find out what the law was and then to find his facts. This procedure is calculated to mislead a Judge and to tempt him to arrive at findings which are likely to fit in with his view of the law. In our opinion this is what has actually happened, in this particular case. The learned Judge found as a matter of law that a definite and unambiguous indication by one member of intention to separate himself and to enjoy his share in severalty may amount to separation (p. 116 of the record). It is not the case that the learned Judge applied this rule of law to the notice dated 2nd February 1922 specifically, but he applied it to the entire case.

9. The first thing that we have to see is whether the learned Judge erred in his finding of fact, namely, that the plaintiff had separated his status from the joint family and had become a separated member. The learned Judge, as already stated, has discarded the oral evidence adduced on behalf of the defendants. He based his opinion on the account books said to belong to the family and the account book of a certain legal practitioner Lala Tribhuban Lal. He relied also on certain minor pieces of evidence which will all be noticed, in due course.

10. It appears that, as very often happens in the case of a suit for partition of large properties belonging to a joint family, the filing of the plaint was followed by an application to the Court to send down a man, styled a commissioner' to take possession of the account books and moveables in the possession of the defendant The object of this procedure is to prevent the defendants from manipulating the account books and removing the moveable properties and the cash, if any. A similar application was made in this case and certain account books were brought into Court by a certain pleader who was appointed the commissioner. When the account books were received in Court the plaintiff was asked to state if those books were or not the books belonging to the joint family. He replied in the affirmative. The learned Judge pinned the plaintiff down to this statement and did not permit him to say later on, that some of the account books had been tampered with at the instance of the defendants. Before us the learned Counsel for the plaintiff contented himself with pointing out that some of the account books were entirely unreliable, although they may have been kept and maintained by servants of the joint family. For reasons to be presently stated, we are satisfied that some of the account books cannot possibly be accurate. It is only the account books that are properly kept that are admissible in evidence as relevant: vide Section 34, Evidence Act. (Then the Judgment proceeded to consider the oral and documentary evidence of both parties and coming to the conclusion that at the date of the death of Bhagwan Das the parties were living jointly and there was no separation at all proceeded.) Now we come to a consideration of the effect of the registered notice which was given, evidently, in a fit of petulance, by the plaintiff to Bhagwan Das and Ram Bilas. This will be found printed at p, 147 of the record. As we have already said, it is not a part of the defendants' case, as put forward in the written statement of Ram Bilas that from the date of the delivery of this notice to the addresses of it, the families became separate, to all intents and purposes. The defendants' case on the other hand was that there already existed a separation which had taken place some 20 months previously and the result of this notice, dated 2nd February 1922, was only a declaration of the factum of separation. Before we consider the legal effect of this notice, we may at once point out that the very fact that such a notice was given tends to destroy the defendants' case that there had already existed a separation between the parties. By this notice, Bankey Behari asked for a partition. The reference to 'settlement of account' has no reference to any previous partition alleged by the defendants in the written statement and for two reasons. The notice does not imply any previous partition. Further, the Court below has found that there was no partition by metes and bounds and we have found that there was no partition at all.

11. There can be no doubt that a member of a joint Hindu family, if he chooses, may separate himself and to effect a separation in status it is not necessary that the other members should be a consenting party. But even where an unequivocal wish to separate is once declared any separation will not be effected, in law, if it be found, as a fact, that the intention was given up as the result of a subsequent agreement of the parties by which the notice was expressly or impliedly withdrawn. Before we proceed to consider the case-law, let us examine the facts of the case. The plaintiff's case is that after he had given this notice, he was called upon to explain his conduct towards an elder member of the family, like Bhagwan Das. One Lal Bahadur, undoubtedly a relation of the parties, and whose brother comes as a witness for the defendants, swears that he was present at the interview. The result of the interview was that the plaintiff was promised some money for his expenses and he admitted his error in asking for partition. There can be no doubt that the plaintiff himself and his witness, Lal Bahadur, have in occasional passages of the evidence made statements which cannot be accepted. But it is perfectly clear to us that the notice was not followed by anything serious in the nature of a disruption of the family. The defendants' case is that when the notice was received, the plaintiff was told, evidently by Ram Bilas, that Bhagwan Das was ill and the plaintiff must not hurry, and when Bhagwan Das got well, an account would be taken of what further profits were due to the plaintiffs and a deed of partition would be registered. We can take it, therefore, that it is common ground that no actual partition followed the giving of the notice (p. 147). Again, it is common ground that, as the result of the notice, a meeting among the member of the family took place, in which distant relations may or may not have been present, and nothing came out of the storm which the notice aroused. We may, therefore, safely take it, in view of the 'subsequent conduct and statements of the parties, enumerated above, and as the evidence adduced by the plaintiff shows that the plaintiff dropped his idea of separation, at the instance of the other members of the family and possibly of relations like Lal Bahadur. The plaintiff, having no son and only a daughter his separation meant the loss of a quarter share to the family. This very inducement was likely to have been put forward to make the plaintiff abandon his idea of separation. Our finding of fact, therefore, is that the plaintiff did conceive an idea of separation, but gave up that idea a day or two later as the result of a family meeting.

12. Now we come to the question of law, which is involved in the second part of the issue framed by the Court below and) is reproduced here:

Has the plaintiff to be looked upon as separate in interest after his notice or registered letter of 2nd February 1922?

13. On behalf of the respondents reliance has been placed on a statement of law contained in the case of Ram Kali v. Khamman Lal A.I.R. 1928 All. 422 by two learned Judges of this Court, the judgment being delivered by Sen, J. The learned Judges professed to lay down the result of certain decisions of Hindu Law relating to joint families and partition. The proposition relied on by the respondents in support of their case is Clause (e) at p. 879 of the report. To understand this Clause (e) we have to read it with the preceding 01. (d). They are as follows:

(d) It is not necessary that there should be a concensus or agreement among the coparceners for the severance of status of the joint family.

(e) Where severance is effected by explicit declaration, the result is decisive and the legal result cannot be affected or controlled by subsequent conduct of the parties.

14. With the proposition in Clause (d) we have no quarrel. As regards Clause (e) too, we should have no quarrel with it, if the third word "is" may be read as "has-been."

15. We have not the least doubt that the learned Judges did use the word "is" in the sense of has been." The proposition that is laid down in Clause (e) is really a proposition that was laid down by this very Bench of the Court, in Jai Narain v. Baijnath Rai A.I.R. 1928 All. 419 quoted by the learned Judges themselves with approval at p. 878. This proposition lays down that where there has been a completed separation, there can be no joint family afterwards except by way of reunion,

16. The case before us is whether the evidence before us points to a completed separation or only to an attempted separation. We have found as a fact that there was no completed separation, that a separation was demanded but the demand was given up at the instance of the other members of the family. The question therefore is whether an unequivocal demand which has not been persisted in and has no doubt, been given up with the consent of the other members of the family must nevertheless be treated as affecting a separation? The answer to this question is not furnished by the case of Ram Kali v. Khamman Lal A.I.R. 1928 All. 422 relied on by the respondents. Indeed their Lordships do concede at p. 876 (of 26 A.L.J.) of the report that on the authority of the Privy Council, it must be held to be settled law that the intention to separate can very well be abandoned.

17. The cases quoted by their Lordships, viz,, Kedar Nath v. Rattan Singh [1910] 32 All. 415 and Palani Ammal v. Muthuvenkatachala Moniagar A.I.R. 1925 P.C. 49, afford illustrations of a demand for separation, subsequently abandoned with the result that the jointness of the family remained undisturbed. In the case of Kedar Nath v. Rattan Singh [1910] 32 All. 415, there were three brothers; one separated outright, the second brought a suit for partition but withdrew his claim and remained joint with the third brother against whom he had brought the suit. Their Lordships held that as between the second and third brothers there was no disruption of jointness. Similarly, in the Madras case there was a demand for separation. A partition suit was filed, but ultimately, the matter was compromised. It was held that the family did continue to be joint. In all these cases, the demand was abandoned with the consent of the other members of the family. It is not necessary for us to say, definitely, in this case, whether the person making the demand for partition may abandon it without the consent of the other members of the family, so as to enable him to continue to be a member of the joint family. But it is clear to us that, where all the parties are agreed, including the member demanding a separation, that the demand should be withdrawn, there is no disruption in the status of the family. Such being our view of the law we hold that the mere notice of 2nd February 1922, which was never persisted in and which was ultimately given up did not create a disruption of the joint family.

18. The result is that the family was joint when Bhagwan Das died on 1st May 1922. It follows that the plaintiff is entitled to a half-share in the entire joint family property. We allow the appeal, modify the decree of the Court below and decree the plaintiff's suit for partition, in its entirety. This will be the preliminary decree in the suit and the partition will be carried out in accordance with law. The plaintiff will have his costs of the suit and of the appeal.