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Kukia v. Mewa Lal
Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The Court (Sen and Weir, JJ.) reviewed evidence after stating the facts (as set out earlier in the opinion). The plaintiffs had set up a pedigree claiming certain succession rights. The court found that the pedigree put forward by the plaintiffs was proved and that Chokhey was the reversionary heir of Ishri Das at the date when Ishri Das's widow Musammat Bhagni died. The trial court had also made findings about Musammat Mulia's marriage with Chokhey, the absence of proof of adoption of Mewa Lal by Chokhey, and the legal necessity (or lack of it) for a mortgage executed by Bhagni in favour of Debi Din (the appellant).
On these findings the appellate opinion concluded that the appeal ought to succeed against Mewa Lal and that the suit brought by Mewa Lal claiming to be the legal representative of Chokhey ought to be dismissed. The question was also raised whether Musammat Mulia — who had not appealed against the dismissal of her claim as Chokhey's widow — could nevertheless be granted a decree in her favour by the appellate court under order XLI, rule 33, of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the pedigree set up by the plaintiffs is proved and whether Chokhey was the reversionary heir of Ishri Das on the relevant date.
- Whether the evidence supported the trial court's finding that Musammat Mulia had married and lived with Chokhey and whether that finding should be disturbed.
- Whether there was evidence that Mewa Lal had been adopted by Chokhey or that any alleged caste custom made him Chokhey's son.
- Whether the mortgage made by Bhagni in favour of Debi Din was without legal necessity.
- Whether the appellate court can, under order XLI, rule 33, of the Code of Civil Procedure, pass a decree in favour of Musammat Mulia even though she did not appeal against the dismissal of her claim.
- Whether, on the combined findings, the appeal should succeed against Mewa Lal and the plaintiff's suit be dismissed.
Arguments of the Parties
Argument seeking relief for Musammat Mulia
- It was argued that although Musammat Mulia did not file an appeal against the dismissal of her claim as the widow of Chokhey, the Court ought to pass a decree in her favour under order XLI, rule 33, of the Code of Civil Procedure (the rule empowering appellate courts to pass any decree or make any order which ought to have been made).
- The appellant relied on authorities (including Mahomed Khaleel Shirazi v. Les Tanneries Lyonnaises) and invoked the jurisdiction and scope of order XLI, rule 33, as capable of supporting a decree in favour of a person who had not appealed.
The opinion does not set out a more detailed record of opposing party submissions on this specific point within the provided text.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Purnell v. Great Western Railway Company | Illustration of practice where an appellate court set aside a verdict in favour of a defendant who had not been served with notice of a motion for a new trial; demonstrates the wide scope of the corresponding English rule. | The Court used it as an English example to assist in applying order XLI, rule 33, and to show that English practice allowed extensive remedial orders even as to parties who had not appealed, in certain circumstances. |
| Sandford v. Porter | Example from the Court of Appeal in Ireland where a verdict in favour of one defendant was set aside even though the plaintiff had not asked for a new trial as against him; relied on Purnell. | Used to illustrate the exercise of appellate power to set aside part of a trial outcome so as to place all parties back in their original positions when justice demands it. |
| Attorney-General v. Simpson | Demonstrates that the Court of Appeal could vary parts of a judgment even when no appeal had been taken against that part. | Quoted as an authority showing the Court of Appeal's jurisdiction to alter part of a judgement without an appeal on that part; the House of Lords later reversed one aspect (see Simpson v. Attorney-General) but did not question the Court of Appeal's jurisdiction to alter parts of a judgment. |
| Simpson v. Attorney-General (House of Lords name for the above) | Shows that although the House of Lords reversed the decision on substance, it did not question the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal to alter parts of judgments where no appeal had been taken on those parts. | Cited to emphasize that the underlying jurisdiction exercised by appellate courts to alter parts of judgments (as exemplified by the Court of Appeal) was not denied by the House of Lords. |
| Huntly (Marchioness of) v. Gaskell | Example where the Court of Appeal struck out all endorsements on a writ on the ground the writ was an abuse of process, illustrating the Court's power to effect comprehensive remedies. | Held up as another illustration of appellate courts exercising wide power to mould relief, including striking out material beyond what was specifically appealed. |
| Rutherford v. Rutherford (affirmed as Rutherford v. Richardson) | Illustrated the Court of Appeal's power to remit parties to their original position and to dismiss or alter relief (wife's petition for divorce was ultimately dismissed by the Court of Appeal and affirmed by the House of Lords). | Used as an example showing the circumstances in which appellate courts have exercised wide remedial powers and how such exercise may be affirmed at the highest level. |
| Burnett's case (English Court of Appeal) | Referred to as the foundation for an illustration to order XLI, rule 33. | The opinion notes that the illustration to order XLI, rule 33, appears to be founded upon the decision in Burnett's case, supporting the scope of the rule. |
| Rangam Lal v. Jhandu | Quoted as authority in the local (Full Bench) context discussing the appellate power to alter parts of judgments and the limitations imposed by other Code provisions, Court Fees Act and law of limitation. | The Court relied on the observations in Rangam Lal v. Jhandu (including Richards, C.J.'s remarks) to emphasize that order XLI, rule 33, must be exercised with regard to the other Code provisions and limitation and is meant to enable complete justice between parties to the appeal. |
| Mahomed Khaleel Shirazi v. Les Tanneries Lyonnaises | Considered by the appellant as supporting relief under order XLI, rule 33; Judicial Committee held that giving the plaintiff the claimed relief would be tantamount to allowing a direct appeal to the Privy Council from a trial judge's decree, which rule 33 was not intended to permit. | The Court observed that this authority was relied on by the appellant but was not exactly in point and was cited to show limits on the application of rule 33 where it would effectively permit a direct appeal from a trial judge's decree. |
| Chockalingam Chetty v. Seethai Ache | Addressed whether plaintiffs could add as respondents those defendants in the original suit against whom the claim had been dismissed and no appeal preferred; stressed that such respondents had a substantive right secured by the final decree and should not lightly be deprived of it. | The Court used this case to support the proposition that a party who has allowed the time for appeal to lapse and thereby accrued a substantive right in their favour should not be lightly deprived of that right under the guise of order XLI, rule 33. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in two main strands: (A) factual conclusions drawn from the evidence and (B) legal analysis of the scope and application of order XLI, rule 33, of the Code of Civil Procedure in the circumstances of this case.
A. Factual conclusions
- The Court found on the evidence that the pedigree put forward by the plaintiffs was proved and that Chokhey was the reversionary heir of Ishri Das at the relevant date.
- The Court accepted the trial court's finding about Musammat Mulia's marriage to and long cohabitation with Chokhey; the custom of widow remarriage was admitted by defence witnesses and plaintiffs' witnesses proving marriage were believed by the trial court; no sufficient reason was shown to displace that finding.
- The Court found there was no evidence that Mewa Lal had been adopted by Chokhey, nor was any alleged caste custom to treat him as Chokhey's son established.
- The trial court's finding that the mortgage made by Bhagni in favour of Debi Din (appellant) was without legal necessity was left undisturbed; the appellate Court held the trial court's view on that point to be undoubtedly correct.
- On those findings, the Court concluded the appeal should succeed against Mewa Lal and that his suit claiming to be Chokhey's legal representative should be dismissed.
B. Legal analysis of order XLI, rule 33
The Court examined the origin, scope and limitations of order XLI, rule 33. It observed the rule was modelled on the concluding portion of order LVIII, rule 4, of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Judicature in England and that English and Irish appellate authorities could be used to illustrate the rule's application, though they are not binding.
From the English and Irish authorities the Court distilled three propositions:
- The jurisdiction conferred by the corresponding English rule is very wide.
- The appellate power “to give any judgement or make any order, which ought to have been made,” and to do so even when the appeal is only as to part of the decision or when some parties are not parties to the appeal, will be exercised in cases where it is "both logically and legally impossible" for the appellate decision to coexist with that part of the lower court's decree which has not been appealed, or where the appellate conclusions affect legal rights in a way that demands a broader readjustment than any party asked for.
- Since the Judicature Act there are relatively few reported instances of the English or Irish Courts exercising this jurisdiction, indicating that it is a jurisdiction to be exercised very sparingly.
The Court then considered whether the word "parties" in order XLI, rule 33, was intended to include persons other than those who were appellants or respondents in the appeal. After reviewing the entire scheme of order XLI and related rules (including order XLI, rule 30), the Court explained that where a co-plaintiff has failed to appeal within the period allowed by the law of limitation, an important substantive right has accrued in favour of the defendant; such a co-plaintiff is effectively not a party to the appeal and his or her title need not be determined to grant adequate relief to those parties actually before the appellate court.
The Court relied upon Rangam Lal v. Jhandu and Chockalingam Chetty v. Seethai Ache to underscore that the statute and limitation rules protect the finality of decrees in favour of those who have not appealed, and that order XLI, rule 33, was intended to enable the court to do complete justice between the parties to the appeal, not to reopen final decrees in favour of persons who are not before the appellate court and whose presence is not necessary for settling the dispute between the parties actually before the court.
Applying these principles to the facts, the Court held:
- Musammat Mulia was not “interested in the result of this appeal” with respect to the rights of the contestants actually before the Court; her presence was not necessary to grant consequential relief to the parties before the appellate court.
- Her claim against Debi Din had been dismissed and, by the finality of that decree and the operation of limitation, Debi Din had acquired a substantive right which should not be lightly disturbed.
- Even on an expansive reading of “parties,” Musammat Mulia’s presence was not necessary for the final settlement of the dispute between the parties actually before the Court, and the court should not introduce her merely to reverse the decree and substitute a decree in her favour against the defendant respondent.
- The Court also recorded disapproval of Musammat Mulia's conduct at trial: setting up Mewa Lal as Chokhey's son, later abandoning that position and then relying on a caste custom; acting as guardian of Mewa Lal and pursuing a strategy aimed at installing him rather than vindicating her own claim.
Holding and Implications
Holding: APPEAL ALLOWED. The Court set aside the decree of the court below and dismissed the plaintiff's suit.
Implications and immediate consequences:
- Direct effect on the parties: The appellate Court's decision overturns the lower court's decree and dismisses the plaintiff's suit (as framed in the opinion). The appeal succeeds against Mewa Lal in light of the findings (lack of adoption evidence, failure to establish the alleged custom, and other factual findings).
- Costs: Because both parties had "freely engineered false evidence," the Court directed that they should bear their own costs both in the appellate court and previously.
- No broader precedent was announced beyond the application and exposition of the established scope and cautions surrounding the exercise of the wide power under order XLI, rule 33; the Court emphasised the rule should be exercised sparingly and took care to apply existing authorities and limitations (including the law of limitation and court-fee considerations) in reaching its conclusion.
Appeal allowed.
After stating the facts as above, the judgement of the Court (Sen and Weir, JJ.) went on to discuss the evidence and arrived at the following findings:—
We find on the evidence that the pedigree set up by the plaintiffs is proved and that Chokhey was the reversionary heir of Ishri Das on the date when his widow Musammat Bhagni died.
It is not necessary to make a detailed review of the evidence relating to Musammat Mulia's marriage with Chokhey. The custom of widow re-marriage is admitted by the defendant's witnesses. It is also admitted that Musammat Mulia lived with Chokhey for a long number of years right up to the death of Chokhey. The plaintiffs' witnesses in proof of her marriage with Chokhey have been believed by the court below and no sufficient reason has been shown to put a different view upon this evidence.
[Their Lordships further found that there was no evidence that Mewa Lal had been adopted by Chokhey, nor was the alleged caste custom by which he was to be considered as a son of Chokhey's established. The judgement then continued:—] No serious attempt has been made to impugn the finding of the court below that the mortgage made by Bhagni in favour of Debi Din appellant was without legal necessity. We hold that the view of the trial court on this point was undoubtedly correct.
On the above findings, the appeal ought to succeed against Mewa Lal, and his suit claiming to be the legal representative of Chokhey, the original plaintiff, ought to be dismissed.
It is argued, however, that although Musammat Mulia did not file an appeal against the dismissal of her claim as the widow of Chokhey, this Court ought to pass a decree in her favour under order XLI, rule 33, of the Civil Procedure Code. Order XLI, rule 33, of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that “The appellate court shall have power to pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made and to pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require, and this power may be exercised by the court notwithstanding that the appeal is as to part only of the decree and may be exercised in favour of all or any of the respondents or parties, although such respondents or parties may not have filed any appeal or objection.” There was no section in Act XIV of 1882 corresponding to order XLI, rule 33, of Act V of 1908. This rule has been copied, with a few alterations which are purely verbal, from the concluding portion of order LVIII, rule 4, of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Judicature in England. The effect of the rule can, therefore, be illustrated by cases in which the corresponding part of the English rule has been applied by the Court of Appeal in England or in Ireland. Though the decisions of these Courts do not bind us, we think we can use them to assist us in applying rule 33. The first of these cases is Purnell v. Great Western Railway Company . That was an action for damages for negligence, in which one of the questions was whether the persons who had caused injury to the plaintiff were acting as servants of the railway company or of Harris at the time when the accident happened. The jury found against the company and in favour of Harris. The company then moved for a new trial and by order of the court served notice of motion upon Harris. The Queen's Bench Division refused to grant a new trial, and the company appealed to the Court of Appeal; but did not serve notice on Harris. The Court of Appeal ordered service on Harris, and, after hearing him, set aside the verdict in his favour, although the plaintiff had not asked for a new trial as against him and had allowed the time for doing so to elapse. This decision followed and applied the practice at common law in England before the Judicature Act that if one defendant successfully applied for a new trial the court would grant a new trial against all the defendants. A similar course was taken by the Court of Appeal in Ireland in Sandford v. Porter . Porter was Waine's solicitor. Acting as such, he had marked judgement against the plaintiff and proceeded to levy execution. The judgement was set aside and the plaintiff then sued Porter and Waine for damages for illegal seizure. At the trial the Judge who presided directed a verdict for Waine, and the jury found against Porter. Porter would for a new trial and served notice of motion upon Waine. When the case came before the Court of Appeal it held that there was a misdirection in favour of Waine and that although the plaintiff had not asked for a new trial against him, the verdict in his favour should be set aside and a new trial should be ordered. In delivering judgement O'Connor, M.R said:—“I hold that the justice of this case is that the defendant, Waine, who wrongfully obtained a verdict at the trial and was the sole author of a miscarriage of justice to the serious prejudice of both the plaintiff and his co-defendant, should be remitted with them to the same position in which they were originally placed. In other words, both verdicts should be set aside and there should be a new trial between the plaintiff and both the defendants.” All the members of the Court quoted and relied upon Purnell's case. The difference between the two cases of course is that in Pumell's case the action was against the defendants alternatively, whereas in the Irish case the defendants were sued as joint wrongdoers. The next case in order of time is that of Attorney-General v. Simpson , which was quoted by a Full Bench of this Court in Rangam Lal v. Jhandu . That was a suit by the Attorney-General on behalf of the public for a declaration that the public was entitled to use a certain canal, which ran through the defendant's lands and in which there were several locks belonging to the defendant. The trial court held that the public was entitled to use the canal without paying tolls, but that the defendant was not bound to maintain and work the locks. The defendant appealed from the whole of the judgement except so much as declared that he was not bound to maintain and work the locks. The Court of Appeal varied the judgement by allowing the defendant reasonable tolls on boats passing through the canal when carrying merchandise or other goods; but, although, the plaintiff had not appealed from that part of the order which relieved the defendant of any obligation to maintain and work the looks, the Court declared that the defendant was bound to do so. This decision was reversed by the House of Lords under the name of Simpson v. Attorney-General , but the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal to alter part of the judgement although no appeal against that part of it had been taken was not questioned in the House of Lords. The next case is Huntly (Marchioness of) v. Gaskell , in which a Judge of the King's Bench Division struck out certain paragraphs from the plaintiff's writ on the ground that they were embarrassing and an abuse of the process of the court. The plaintiff appealed, and the Court of Appeal struck out all the endorsements on the writ on the ground that the writ was an abuse of the process of the court; but this was done without prejudice to the right of the plaintiff to bring a fresh suit. The last case is that of Rutherford v. Rutherford , affirmed by the House of Lords under the name of Rutherford v. Richardson . That was a wife's petition for divorce, which was granted by the trial court. The adultery alleged and relied on at the trial was adultery on a single occasion with a lady who had obtained leave to intervene. She appealed and the Court of Appeal was satisfied that in fact she had not committed adultery at all with the respondent. The respondent had not appealed, being at the time confined during His Majesty's pleasure as a criminal lunatic. The Court of Appeal directed that the papers should be sent to the King's Proctor, who appeared and contended before the Court of Appeal that the petition for divorce should be dismissed on the ground theft, since the Court of Appeal had found, not merely that the evidence against the intervenor was inadequate, but that, as a matter of positive fact, she had not committed adultery with the respondent, the respondent could not possibly have committed adultery with her, and so the decree nisi could not be upheld. The petition for divorce was accordingly dismissed and a decree for judicial separation was granted. The petitioner appealed to the House of Lords, but the decision of the Court of Appeal was affirmed.
These cases appear to us to show three things. (1) That the jurisdiction conferred by order LVIII, rule 4, is undoubtedly very wide. (2) That the power (in the words of the rule) “to give any judgement or make any order, which ought to have been made” and to do so even when the appeal is only from part of the decision of the court below, or when all the parties to the original proceedings as not parties to the appeal, will be exercised in England or Ireland in cases where, as was said by the Attorney-General in the course of his argument in Rutherford v. Rutherford , “it is both logically and legally impossible” that the decision of the Court of Appeal can exist side by side with that part of the decree of the lower court from which there has not been an appeal, or where the result of the conclusions at which a Court of Appeal has arrived affect the legal rights of the parties to the appeal in such a way as to demand a more extensive re-adjustment of those rights than that for which any of them had asked. (3) The fact that since the passing of the Judicature Act there are so few reported cases in which the Court of Appeal in England or in Ireland has exercised the jurisdiction conferred on those Courts by that part of order LVIII, rule 4, with which we are concerned, shows that the jurisdiction is one which should be very sparingly exercised. We my add that the illustration to order XLI, rule 33, of the Code of Civil Procedure appears to be founded upon the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Burnett's case already referred to.
Order XLI, rule 33, of the Code of Civil Procedure empowers the court of appeal to interfere with a portion of the decree passed by the primary court against which no appeal or cross-objection has been preferred, and is restricted to cases where, without disturbing the grounds upon which the judgement of the trial court proceeds, the appellate court considers that the decree should be modified in order to do justice to all the parties concerned, including such as have not set the law in motion. If the appellant has failed to appeal from a portion of the decree which was against him, or the respondent has not availed himself of his right to prefer a cross-objection, the appellate court is empowered to readjust the rights of the parties before it where the ends of justice call for such an adjustment. The powers conferred under this rule are very wide, but they are to be resorted to with great care and circumspection, and not as a matter of course but only where strong grounds exist for the exercise of such powers.
The word “parties” in order XLI, rule 33, was not intended to connote persons other than those who had been arrayed as appellants or respondents in the appeal. We must keep in view the entire scheme of order XLI. We must also consider the significance of the word “parties” in order XLI, rule 30, of the Code of Civil Procedure. Where one of the co-plaintiffs has failed to appeal from the dismissal of his claim and the time allowed by the law of limitation for the presentation of the appeal has expired, the necessary consequence is that an important substantive right has accrued in favour of the defendant. The unsuccessful co-plaintiff is not a party to the appeal which has been preferred by the unsuccessful defendant against the successful co-plaintiff. The determination of his the title or interest in the property is not necessary for the grant of proper or adequate relief to the parties actually before the appellate court. The law of limitation has completely run out against him and the decree against him has become final. He has not paid the necessary court-fee for an appeal on his behalf. In view of all these circumstances it would be extremely difficult to hold that the legislature could ever have intended to extend order XLI, rule 33, to a person so situated as the co-plaintiff who did not appeal. The latter rule evidently applied to cases where no adequate relief could be granted to the appellant without allowing come consequential relief to the respondent even though the latter had not appealed or preferred a cross-objection. In Rangam Lal v. Jhandu , Richards, C.J, remarked that the court in exercise of the powers conferred by order XLI, rule 33, should not lose sight of the other provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure itself, nor of the Court Fees Act, nor of the law of limitation. He further observed that “the object of order XLI, rule 33, was manifestly to enable the court to do complete justice between the parties to the appeal.—Where, for example, it is essential in order to grant a relief to an appellant that some relief at the same time should be granted to the respondent, the court may grant relief to the latter, even though he has not filed an appeal or preferred an objection.” The case of Mahomed Khaleel Shirazi v. Les Tanneries Lyonnaises , has been relied on by the appellant, but unfortunately it is not exactly in point. In that case, the plaintiff's claim having been dismissed by the trial court, and the plaintiff having submitted to the decree, the question arose whether the plaintiff was entitled to ask the Privy Council to grant him certain relief against the successful defendant, under order XLI, rule 33, of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was held by the Judicial Committee time to give effect to the plaintiff's contention would be practically to allow an appeal to His Majesty in Council direct from the decree of the trial Judge and that order XLI, rule 33, of the Code of Civil Procedure was not intended to apply to such an appeal. In the present case the co-plaintiff could have appealed to this Court directly. She failed to do so. There is nothing in order XLI, rule 33, to indicate that relief could be granted to a person who is not before the court and whose rights are not the subject-matter of inquiry in the appeal and whose presence is not necessary for the final settlement of any dispute between the parties who are actually before the court, and whose legal rights would not be in any way affected by any decision at which we might arrive after the hearing of this case.
In Chockalingam Chetty v. Seethai Ache , the question arose whether the plaintiff was entitled to add as respondents certain defendants in the original suit against whom the claim had been dismissed and no appeal preferred. Their Lordships pointed out that the appeal against such respondents was primâ facie barred by limitation and the respondents were entitled to hold the decree in their favour, which was a substantive right of a very valuable character, of which they should not lightly be deprived. It could not be said that such respondents were “interested in the result of the appeal” within the meaning of those words in order XLI, rule 20, of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Musammat Mulia is not interested in the result of this appeal quâ the determination of the rights of the contestants actually before us. If she were to be impleaded, the result would be that she could then put forward a claim in direct opposition to the right of Debi Din on the one hand and to that of Mewa Lal, the so-called son and heir of Chokhey, deceased. Her claim against Debi Din having been dismissed, the latter has, by the finality of the decree, secured a very important substantive right against Musammat Mulia, which ought not to be lightly disturbed. Even on the assumption that the word “parties” is of sufficient amplitude to include a party to the original suit who has not appealed within the statutory period, the presence of Musammat Mulia in the court of appeal is not necessary to grant consequential relief to the plaintiff or the defendant now before the court. She is sought to be introduced, not with a view to grant relief to the parties now before the court; but with the object that the decree of the court below be reversed and discharged and a decree be substituted in her favour against the defendant respondent.
Musammat Mulia is not entitled to make a grievance of the fact that she has been deprived of her rights to the property of Chokhey which she undoubtedly has under the Hindu law. She deliberately came into court with an untrue story, when, in her first application for substitution of names, she set up Mewa Lal as the son of Chokhey. When she was forced to abandon that position she put forward the plea that, according to a custom prevailing amongst the chamars, a step-son is entitled to succeed to the estate of the step-father. It is to be remembered that Musammat Mulia is not a pardahnashin lady and is not hampered by the disabilities peculiar to ladies of the pardah. Throughout the trial she acted as the guardian of her son Mewa Lal, and she pleaded the custom already referred to, whereby Mewa Lal and not she, was heir to the estate of Chokhey.
She in fact does not appear to have ever cared to fight for the property for herself, and the real object of her suit was to install her son Mewa Lal in place of Ishri Das, to which he had not the shadow of a claim.
In view of all these circumstances, we do not think that we should be justified in passing a decree in favour of Musammat Mulia, even if it were lawful to do so under order XLI, rule 33, of the Code of Civil Procedure.
We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the decree of the court below and dismiss the plaintiff's suit. In View of the fact that both the parties had freely engineered false evidence we direct that they should bear their own costs both here and heretofore.
Appeal allowed.
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