- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Ishri Prasad v. Sri Ram
Iqbal Ahmad and Kendall, JJ.:— After setting out the facts as above, thus continued:—
It is argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the judgement, on which the suit giving rise to the present appeal was based, was a judgement given “on the merits of the case” and the lower appellate court has erred in holding otherwise. It is further argued that the courts below were wrong in proceeding on the assumption that it lay on the plaintiff appellant to show that the defendant was residing within the jurisdiction of Rampur court at the time when the suit was riled and the decree was obtained by the plaintiff and that, in view of the provisions of section 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it was incumbent on the courts below to presume that the judgement, on which the present suit was based, was pronounced by a court of competent jurisdiction, unless the contrary was proved.
It is a fact that the decree obtained by the plaintiff in Rampur was an ex parte decree. The judgement of the Rampur court, after giving a summary of the plaint, runs as follows:—
“The defendant notwithstanding due service of summons has not contested the suit. The document is registered. The failure of the defendant to contest the suit amounts to an admission of the plaintiff's claim. Accordingly the plaintiff's suit is decreed.”
We are unable to hold that this judgement was not a judgement given “on the merits of the case.” It appears to us that the phrase “the merits of the case” has been used in the Code in contradistinction to a judgement by way of penalty. If without considering the questions, the determination of which is necessary for the decision of the case, the court, because of certain default made by a plaintiff or by a defendant, penalizes the party in default by deciding the case against him, the decision cannot be regarded as a “judgement given on the merits of the case.” In the present case it appears that the Rampur court was impressed by the fact that the document sued on was a registered document, and having taken that fact into consideration along with the fact that the defendant did not contest the plaintiff's claim, came to the conclusion that the plaintiff's case was true. That being so, it cannot be said that court pronounced it? judgement without considering the question whether or not the amount claimed was due to the plaintiff from the defendant. The case reported as Keymer v. Visvanatham Reddi, on which reliance has been placed by the lower appellate court, is distinguishable. In that case, upon the defence being put in, the plaintiff applied for liberty to exhibit interrogatories. He was allowed to do so, and the interrogatories were exhibited, calling upon the defendant to answer with respect to some of the material matters in dispute. This the defendant failed to do, and then an application to have the defence struck out was made on behalf of the plaintiff under order XXXI, rule 21 of the English Judicature Act, which provides that where a defendant fails to comply with an order to answer interrogatories he shall be liable to have his defence struck out. The application was allowed, and the plaintiff was allowed to sign judgement against the defendant. The judgement so obtained by the plaintiff was not a judgement on the merits, inasmuch as, as observed by their Lordships of the Privy Council, not one of the questions that arose for consideration in the case was “ever considered” or was “ever the subject of the adjudication at all” and the merits of the case were never investigated. As was pointed out in the case of Cole v. Harper, “the judgement followed as a penalty upon the defendant not complying with the order of the court.” In the present case a decree was granted to the plaintiff by the Rampur court, not because of the failure of the defendant to comply with any order of the court but because the court, rightly or wrongly, was of opinion that the fact that the document on which the suit was based was registered coupled with the omission of the defendant to contest the suit furnished a primâ facie proof of the genuineness of the plaintiff's claim. We are, therefore, unable to hold that the judgement on which the present suit was based was a judgement that was pronounced by the Rampur court without considering the merits of the case.
The argument of the learned counsel for the appellant, that both the courts below wrongly cast on the plaintiff the burden of proving the fact that the defendant was subject to the jurisdiction of the Rampur court when the suit was filed in Rampur, has considerable force. The courts below seem to have overlooked section 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The plaintiff did produce a certified copy of the judgement of the Rampur court. On such copy being produced, it was imperative on the courts below to presume that the judgement was pronounced by a court of competent jurisdiction, unless the contrary was proved. It is a well settled rule of international law, that courts cannot, by their judgements, bind absent foreigners was have not submitted to their jurisdiction, and can only exercise jurisdiction over persons who are within the territorial limits of their jurisdiction, and, therefore, a judgement of a foreign court obtained against a defendant cannot be enforced in British India where the defendant at the time of the commencement of the suit was not a subject of, nor resident in, the country in which the judgement was obtained; vide the case of Kassim Mamoojee v. Isuf Mahomed Sullaiman. That being so, in a suit based on a foreign judgement, one of the questions that arises for consideration is, was the defendant at the time of the commencement of the suit in the foreign court residing within the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of the State in which the suit was brought? But on the production of a certified copy of a foreign judgement the court is bound to presume that the judgement “was pronounced by a court of competent jurisdiction” and therefore it devolves on the defendant, by his pleading and evidence, to deny and disprove every fact and circumstance which negatives the jurisdiction of the foreign court. “Jurisdiction over him being presumed, he must allege and establish facts from which the inference must necessarily arise that in his case the presumption is contrary to the facts;” vide Freeman on Judgements, 4th edition, page 1017. In the present case, as already stated, both the courts below decided the point against the plaintiff because the plaintiff adduced no evidence to show that the defendant was residing in Rampur State at the time that the suit was filed against him by the plaintiff. Inasmuch as the findings of the courts below on this point proceed on a misapprehension of the law on the subject, we consider it desirable to decide this appeal after having a finding from the lower appellate court on the following points:—
(1) Is the defendant a subject of Rampur State?
(2) Was the defendant residing in Rampur State at the time that the suit was filed by the plaintiff in that State?
Parties will be allowed to adduce further evidence. On receipt of the finding ten days will be allowed for riling objections.
Issues remitted.
Alert