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Harkesh Singh v. Hardevi

Allahabad High Court
Mar 23, 1927
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Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appellate judgment (Lindsay and Sulaiman, JJ.) reviewing the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge concerning title to properties mentioned in the will of Kunwar Singh. The will purported to allocate certain properties (some described as ancestral) between Kunwar Singh's descendants, including Shib Sahai and the plaintiff (Harkesh). The Subordinate Judge found, albeit in an unsatisfactory manner according to the appellate court, that the properties mentioned in the will were ancestral and concluded matters of separation, possession and limitation in favour of the defendants. The plaintiff appealed. Key procedural events noted in the opinion include partition proceedings in the revenue court (circa 1903) in which Shib Sahai relied on the will's provision that there should be no partition without his consent, and a later civil suit (instituted in 1923) by the plaintiff asserting a right to share in the properties. The appellate court examined (a) whether the plaintiff had proved he remained a member of a joint Hindu family with Shib Sahai up to 1919, (b) whether the will operated as a valid partition or was otherwise accepted, (c) whether the plaintiff's claim was barred by limitation, and (d) which properties were joint or exclusively held by Shib Sahai. The appeal was allowed and the decree of the court below was set aside in part: the plaintiff was decreed a half share in the properties scheduled in the judgment, and the parties were directed to bear their own costs.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiff proved that he was a member of a joint Hindu family with Shib Sahai up to the year 1919 (and thus entitled to a right of survivorship).
  2. Whether the will of Kunwar Singh could operate as a valid partition of ancestral property (including whether the plaintiff had accepted or acquiesced in the will).
  3. Whether the plaintiff's claim was barred by limitation — specifically, whether Article 127 of the Limitation Act applied or whether Article 144 governed, and whether adverse possession by Shib Sahai had been established.
  4. Which of the properties in dispute were joint (co-parcenary) property and which were the exclusive property of Shib Sahai.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondents' Arguments

  • The learned Advocate for the respondents did not challenge the Subordinate Judge's finding that the properties mentioned in Kunwar Singh's will were ancestral property.
  • The respondents argued that the present suit was governed by Article 127 of the Limitation Act, so that the limitation period began to run from the date when the plaintiff was excluded from the joint family property.
  • In the revenue court proceedings of 1903, Shib Sahai relied on the will's provision that there should be no partition without his consent, and that stance was relied on in subsequent litigation.

Appellant / Plaintiff's Position (as reflected in the opinion)

  • The plaintiff asserted that he was a member of a joint Hindu family with Shib Sahai up to 1919 and claimed rights by survivorship (a claim the appellate court ultimately held could not be maintained).
  • The plaintiff repudiated at least one provision of the will and applied for partitions of villages in the revenue court (the revenue court granted partitions in favour of the plaintiff for some properties).
  • The plaintiff's delay in instituting the civil suit was explained in part by his periods of mental incapacity and in part by pursuing partitions through the revenue court rather than a civil suit.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Brijraj Singh v. Sheodan Singh The head of a joint Hindu family has no right to make a partition by will of joint property among the various members of the family except with their consent; validity depends on the acceptance of co-parceners. The court relied on this principle to hold that Kunwar Singh could not validly effect a partition by will over ancestral properties without the consent of co-parceners; hence the will could not be treated as a binding partition and was inoperative to bar the plaintiff's claim.
Bisheshar Tewari v. Bisheshar Dayal and Banoo Tewary v. Doona Tewary Article 127 of the Limitation Act presupposes the existence of a joint family and the exclusion of a co-parcener from his joint family property. The court used these authorities to conclude that Article 127 did not apply because there was no joint family then in existence for the purposes of limitation; instead Article 144 governed the present suit.
Burns v. Bryan The exclusive possession of one co-sharer, even with non-payment of profits, does not amount to adverse possession unless there has been an ouster of other co-parceners that is known and open. The court invoked this principle to reject the Subordinate Judge's finding that Shib Sahai had acquired title by adverse possession since 1903; the appellate court required evidence of a clear ouster or an open assertion of adverse possession, which it found lacking.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The appellate court conducted a stepwise review of the main contested points, applying documentary and oral evidence against established legal principles:

  1. Separation and joint family membership: The court considered whether the plaintiff (Harkesh) proved that he remained a member of a joint Hindu family with Shib Sahai up to 1919. Although finding the Subordinate Judge's treatment of witnesses cursory and his discussion unsatisfactory in places (including misdescriptions and incorrect statements about which defendants testified), the appellate court accepted the Subordinate Judge's conclusion on separation. The court gave greater weight to documentary evidence over oral testimony, observed there was no proof of continued joint residence between Shib Sahai and Harkesh, noted Harkesh's periods of insanity and the lack of any re-union, and concluded the plaintiff's claim of being joint at the death of Shib Sahai could not be maintained. Consequently, the plaintiff's right-of-survivorship claim failed.
  2. Validity and effect of the will: The court accepted that the properties mentioned in Kunwar Singh's will were ancestral in his hands and that he had no independent source of income enabling him to make valid self-acquisitions. Applying the Brijraj Singh principle, the court held that Kunwar Singh could not effect a partition by will of ancestral joint property without the consent of co-parceners; at best, the will expressed his wish to be given effect after death. Because the plaintiff was a minor when Kunwar Singh died, he could not have legally given consent. The court also found that the plaintiff had repudiated at least part of the will (by seeking partitions in the revenue court) and there was no evidence of an unequivocal acceptance by the plaintiff of the will's allocations. The mutation of entries occurred while the plaintiff was a minor and could not be taken as his acceptance. Therefore, the will did not operate as a bar to the plaintiff's claim.
  3. Limitation and adverse possession: Addressing limitation, the court rejected the respondents' argument that Article 127 applied, reasoning (with citation) that Article 127 presupposes an existing joint family and exclusion of a co-parcener. The court held Article 144 was the proper provision, which meant the defendants had to prove adverse possession for over twelve years. The court reiterated the principle (citing Burns v. Bryan) that exclusive possession by one co-sharer does not constitute adverse possession absent an ouster known and open. The Subordinate Judge's conclusion that Shib Sahai's reliance on the will in the 1903 partition litigation established adverse possession as of that date was held to be unsupported: the partition proceedings related to jointly entered properties and not to items exclusively assigned to Shib Sahai under the will; reliance on a provision of the will in relation to certain items could not be taken as an open assertion of adverse possession as to other items not in dispute. The court found no satisfactory direct or circumstantial evidence that Shib Sahai had acquired title to the plaintiff's half-share by adverse possession for over twelve years; hence limitation did not bar the claim.
  4. Identification of joint and exclusive properties: The opinion states that the last point requiring consideration was which properties were joint and which were exclusively Shib Sahai's; the judgment proceeded to decide that point (the present summary records only that the court undertook that determination and reached the consequential decree described below).

Holding and Implications

Core Holding: APPEAL ALLOWED.

The appellate court set aside the decree of the Subordinate Judge insofar as it refused the plaintiff's claim for a share, and decreed that the plaintiff is entitled to a half share in the properties mentioned in Schedules A and B to the judgment (schedules being those approved and accepted by the parties' counsel). The plaintiff's claim for the entire property by right of survivorship was rejected.

Consequences: The direct effects ordered by the court were (1) the plaintiff is decreed a half share in the properties specified in the judgment schedules, (2) the lower court's decree is set aside to the extent inconsistent with that relief, and (3) the parties are to bear their own costs in both courts. The opinion does not purport to establish any new legal precedent beyond applying established authorities to the facts of the case.

Appeal allowed.
Show all summary ...

Lindsay and Sulaiman, JJ.:— After stating the facts as above thus continued:—

The learned Advocate on behalf of the respondents has not challenged the finding of the court below that “the property mentioned in the will of Kunwar Singh is surely ancestral property.” That finding was vague but it is not challenged. The fact is that although the will mentioned that some property was the self-acquired property of Kunwar Singh, there is no evidence to show that Kunwar Singh had any independent source of income other than the income from his ancestral properties with which he could have acquired properties as his own.

The first question which we have to consider is whether the plaintiff has proved that he was a member of a joint Hindu family with Shib Sahai up to the year 1919.

[The judgement then proceeded to discuss the evidence for or against separation and continued:—]

In view of all these circumstances, we have no doubt in our minds that the finding of the learned Subordinate Judge on the question of separation must be accepted. It is true that he has not discussed the matter satisfactorily and has referred to the ten or twelve witnesses produced on behalf of the plaintiff in a cursory manner and criticized them on the one general ground that the witnesses did not know the facts in connexion with the family. It is also true that he has either misdescribed the plaintiff or wrongly stated that the defendants had shirked the responsibility of coming into the witness-box, when as a matter of fact one of the defendants, Joti Prasad, was examined. We have examined the oral evidence and we are satisfied that it cannot in any way outweigh the inference drawn from the documentary evidence. It is not said that Shib Sahai and Harkesh continued joint in residence. No doubt for some time, as admitted by the vakil for the defendants in the Rubkar, dated the 26th of September, 1903, Harkesh went mad. It is impossible to hold that there was a re-union between Shib Sahai and Harkesh. Having regard to all these circumstances, we are of opinion that the plaintiff's claim that he was joint when the latter died, cannot be maintained. His claim for any share by right of survivorship, therefore, falls to the ground.

As remarked above, it has not been disputed before us that the finding of the Subordinate Judge, unsatisfactory though it is, that the properties mentioned in the will were ancestral properties, is open to challenge. We may, therefore, take it that all the properties mentioned in the will were ancestral in the hands of Kunwar Singh over which he had no absolute power of disposal without the consent of his coparceners. He purported to make a bequest of the entire property and allotted a few items to Shib Sahai exclusively and the other items to both of them jointly. There was no partition in the lifetime of Kunwar Singh and the will cannot be treated as a partition in the present time. At best it was the wish of Kunwar Singh which he desired should be given effect to after his death. When Kunwar Singh died, the plaintiff was a minor. It is, therefore, impossible to imagine that the plaintiff could legally have given his consent to the arrangement intended by Kunwar Singh. As held by their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Brijraj Singh v. Sheodan Singh, even the head of a joint Hindu family has no right to make a partition by will of joint property among the various members of the family except with their consent. They have independent rights in it with which he cannot interfere. Its validity can only depend on their acceptance of such an arrangement. The learned Subordinate Judge in a loose way has found that this arrangement was accepted and acquiesced in by the plaintiff for a period of forty-five years. The learned Judge has overlooked the fact that up to about 1896 Harkesh was a minor, and that for some time niter that there, was no disagreement between him and Shib Sahai, at any rate so long as his mother remained alive. He has also not attached due significance to the fact that from 1903 onwards Harkesh began to assert his right and to repudiate at least one provision of the will. The will had strictly provided that the property should not be divided without the consent of Shib Sahai. Ignoring that provision Harkesh proceeded to apply for partitions in the revenue court. Shib Sahai set up this will and relied on this provision. His objection was overruled by the revenue court and the plaintiff was granted the partitions. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the plaintiff accepted all the provisions contained in the will. He certainly repudiated one part of it. As regards the rest, there is no evidence on the record to show that he expressly or in clear language accepted the dispensation of the property made by his grandfather. The inference drawn by the Subordinate Judge is based entirely on the circumstance that the present suit was not instituted till the year 1923. From the long delay which has taken place the learned Judge has inferred that the plaintiff must have accepted the arrangement made by his grandfather. We are unable to draw that inference. Part of the delay is explained by the circumstance that the plaintiff was off and on of insane mind and it is also explained partly by the fact that he proceeded to get partitions of villages one after another through the revenue court, which was a much easier process than the institution of a suit in the civil court. We have shown that Harkesh did not accept one part of the will. There is no evidence to show that he expressly accepted the other parts. His mere silence for a long time or the delay in bringing the suit cannot, therefore, justify the inference that this will was accepted by him. So far as the mutation of names is concerned, that was effected soon after the death of Kunwar Singh when the plaintiff was a minor of tender years and had no voice in the matter. After the mutation took place the plaintiff could not get the entries corrected through the revenue court unless and until he had established his right through the revenue court. We are, therefore, unable to accept the finding of the Subordinate Judge that this arrangement was accepted and acquiesced in by the plaintiff so as to amount to an estoppel and prevent him from going behind it. Kunwar Singh, as pointed out above, had no dispensing power over the joint property and the document as a will is inoperative. We must, therefore, hold that it is not a bar to the present claim of the plaintiff.

The next point to consider is whether the claim is barred by limitation. The learned Advocate for the respondent has argued that the present suit is governed by article 127 of the Limitation Act and that, therefore, the period began to run from the date when the plaintiff was excluded from the joint family property. We are of opinion that article is not applicable inasmuch as there is no joint family now in existence. As held in the case of Bisheshar Tewari v. Bisheshar Dayal and the case of Banoo Tewary v. Doona Tewary, that article presupposes the existence of a joint family and the exclusion of a co-parcener from his joint family property. The proper article governing this suit is article 144, in which case the defendants must prove adverse possession for more than twelve years. The learned Subordinate Judge has found that the plaintiff has been out of possession over these properties for more than twelve years and that Shib Sahai had been in adverse possession. As regards the properties which were the properties of the parties and which did not under the will come exclusively to Shib Sahai, both Shib Sahai and Harkesh must be treated as co-parceners. Even after 1903 when a disruption in the joint status of the family took place, the parties must be deemed to have continued to be co-owners entitled to equal shares in the undivided properties. It is well established that the exclusive possession of one co-sharer even though coupled with the non-payment of profits, cannot amount to a clear adverse possession unless there has been an ouster of the other co-parceners to their knowledge and openly. Burns v. Bryan.

The learned Subordinate Judge was perhaps conscious of this difficulty and hence he relied on the setting up of the will by Shib Sahai in the litigations of 1903. As remarked above, one of the pleas raised by Shib Sahai in the partition suit was that the claim for partition was not maintainable in view of the provision of the will that there should be no partition without Shib Sahai's consent. The learned Subordinate Judge has not appreciated that the partition proceedings related to properties which were jointly entered in the names of the two parties and not to the properties which were exclusively assigned under the will. The written statement of Shib Sahai, therefore, cannot be taken to be an express assertion of adverse possession as regards the first class of items, namely, those which were entered exclusively in his name and which were not in dispute before the revenue court. The mere fact that Shib Sahai relied upon one provision of the will would not justify us in holding that he was openly asserting his adverse possession as regards items to which he did not refer and which were not even in dispute. We are, therefore, of opinion that the conclusion of the learned Subordinate Judge, that Shib Sahai asserted his adverse possession as early as 1903 and that since that date his possession has been adverse, cannot be accepted. It is true that the feelings between the parties were highly estranged and protracted litigation was going on. It is also true that Shib Sahai apparently did not pay the plaintiff's share of the property. It is also apparent that the plaintiff did not put forward any express claim or demand in respect of it for a large number of years, but in the absence of a clear demand and a clear refusal, we cannot hold that the possession of one co-sharer became adverse as against the other. The learned Subordinate Judge has thought that this possession became adverse since the date of the denial. This denial he takes to mean as set up in the provision of the will. That, in our opinion, however, did not amount to a clear denial of the plaintiff's title. Although, therefore, there has been a great delay in the institution of the suit, we are compelled to hold that there is no satisfactory evidence, direct or circumstantial, to prove that Shib Sahai had acquired title to the plaintiff's half share in the joint property by exercise of adverse possession for over twelve years. The plaintiff's claim cannot, therefore, be barred by limitation.

The last point which requires consideration is which property is joint and which is the exclusive property of Shib Sahai. [The judgement then proceeded to decide this point.]

The result, therefore, is that the plaintiff's claim for the entire property by right of survivorship cannot be sustained, but his claim, for a half share in the entire property in suit must be decreed. We accordingly allow this appeal, and setting aside the decree of the court below, decree the plaintiff's claim for a half share in the properties mentioned in schedules A and B attached to this judgement which have been approved of and accepted by the counsel of the parties. We direct that the parties should bear their own costs in both courts.

Appeal allowed.