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Lachmi Narain Achari v. Mitthu Bhagat
Boys and Kendall, JJ.:— After stating the facts as above, thus continued:—
It was contended before us that the order of the first court was a legal order within the provisions of section 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure (but this was not pressed); that if it did not come within that section, it came at least within the spirit of it; that it was a proper order under order XXXIV, rule 13; that the finding of limitation was so unreasonable as to justify this Court in interfering with it; and, finally, that whether the order was valid or invalid, the plaintiffs were not competent to sue. The defendant mortgagee, appellant here, is in effect asking us to hold that the plaintiffs have no remedy either by appeal or separate suit, even if they have been wrongfully deprived of their money.
To consider first the applicability of section 73, and order XXXIV, rule 13:—
In our opinion, the scheme of the Code itself indicates that it is not contemplated that surplus assets after an auction-sale should be paid out to a subsequent incumbrancer otherwise than with the consent of the mortgagor, that is to say, that the surplus cannot be paid over to the subsequent incumbrancer, if the mortgagor challenges the existence or the validity of the incumbrance or any portion thereof, at any rate where these matters have not been determined in the prior proceedings.
The framers of the Code would appear to have considered it futile to give a court permission to pay over a surplus to a subsequent incumbrancer, where a mortgagor is a consenting party to such payment and does not challenge the existence or validity of the subsequent incumbrance or any part thereof. Clearly, any provision permitting the court to do so would be superfluous. There are, however, two cases in which there might be claimants in regard to whom it was desirable to give some directions. First, with a view to stopping unnecessary litigation, provision was made in section 73 for the case of other claimants against the assets of the judgement debtor, who had already obtained decrees. A second case to be provided for was where there was a prior mortgagee, and that special case is provided for in order XXXIV, rules 12 and 13. This latter case is appropriately dealt with in the order which specifically deals with suits relating to mortgages, for it can only arise in a mortgage suit. On the other hand, the provision for decree-holders coming in may arise in other kinds of suits, and, therefore, properly finds its place in the body of the Code.
Neither section 73 nor order XXXIV, rule 13, are applicable to the present case, which is the simple one of whether or not a subsequent incumbrancer is to be paid out of the surplus assets arising from the auction-sale.
In a case like the present, where there was a contest as to the disposal of the surplus—a contest which had not been determined in the suit or in the execution proceedings—there is no provision for what might actually, though not in name, become prolonged civil suit; and the court of first instance, and in this we agree with Mr. Justice P.C Banerji's views in Ram Narain v. Umrao Singh, should have referred the claimant to a civil suit.
If a civil suit was the proper course to be followed in the first instance, it is clear that the aggrieved party, if an order has in fact been improperly passed against him, will, having no right of appeal, have his remedy in a civil suit.
Holding, as we do that the plaintiff has a right to sue the rest is concluded by the finding on the facts by the lower appellate court that the Later mortgages were barred by limitation. The court exercised a judicial discretion in weighing the evidence in regard to the endorsements of the payment of interest, and its finding is not open to attack in second appeal. The appeal is dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
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