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Lakhmi Das v. Mt. Badla
Judgment Summary — Iqbal Ahmad, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
The suit arises from a mortgage executed on 17 November 1861 by Imam Bakhsh in favour of four persons (Bhojraj, Mohan Lal, Hukum Chand and Parmanand) for Rs. 450, the mortgaged property being four kachcha shops. Imam Bakhsh died before 1867 leaving two heirs, son Khwaja Bux and an unnamed daughter. Khwaja Bux later died leaving his son Rahim Bakhsh. On 5 February 1867 Karima, purporting to act as guardian of Khwaja Bux, sold the equity of redemption in all four shops to the four mortgagees. The lower appellate court found that Khwaja Bux admitted and acquiesced in that sale and thereafter never challenged it, and that the mortgagees treated the property as their own. The mortgagees divided the property among themselves (5 September 1892). Two shops were transferred by heirs of Hukum Chand on 17 October 1894 and later passed by inheritance and gift to defendants; the remaining two shops were sold on 16 July 1909 to predecessors of other defendants. Purchasers rebuilt pucca shops on the sites. The plaintiff purchased the equity of redemption from Rahim Bakhsh by a sale-deed dated 15 November 1921 for Rs. 1,000; on findings of the courts below the plaintiff in fact paid no consideration and obtained the deed to "gamble in litigation." The plaintiff instituted a redemption suit seeking possession of the four pucca shops upon payment of Rs. 450. The defendants pleaded, and both lower courts accepted, that the 1867 sale passed the equity of redemption and that the suit was barred by Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act and by Article 134 of the Limitation Act. The suit was dismissed by the courts below and the present appeal challenges that dismissal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the 1867 sale of the equity of redemption by Karima (purporting to act as guardian of Khwaja Bux) operated to pass the equity of redemption to the mortgagees, in light of the lower court finding that Khwaja Bux admitted and acquiesced in that sale.
- Whether the plaintiff (purchaser of Rahim Bakhsh's purported equity of redemption in 1921), having paid no consideration, is nevertheless entitled to a decree of redemption if Rahim had a subsisting right at the date of his sale-deed.
- Whether the suit is barred by Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act as against bona fide transferees for value from the mortgagees.
- Whether the suit is barred by Article 134 (and related provisions cited) of the Limitation Act, given the passage of time and intervening transfers for value.
- Whether knowledge (or reference) of the 1867 sale in later transfer deeds prevents transferees for value from claiming protection under the Limitation Act (i.e., whether they must be treated as having bought only a mortgagee's right).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's (Plaintiff's) Arguments
- Karima, as guardian of Khwaja Bux, had no authority to transfer the equity of redemption; therefore the 1867 sale was absolutely void.
- Because that sale was void, the mortgagees' estate was not enlarged and their possession did not become adverse to Khwaja Bux; the equity of redemption remained vested in Khwaja Bux and so Rahim Bakhsh (and through him the plaintiff) retained a subsisting right.
- Counsel relied on Mata Din v. Ahmad Ali (and related authority) to support the proposition that where a minor does not acquiesce in a de facto guardian's sale and suit is brought within the limitation period, the suit is not barred.
Respondents' (Defendants') Arguments
- The 1867 sale operated to pass the equity of redemption from Khwaja Bux to the mortgagees; consequently Rahim Bakhsh had no right left to transfer to the plaintiff.
- The suit is barred by Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act and by Article 134 of the Limitation Act because the mortgagees and their heirs dealt with the property as owners, divided it in 1892, and the later transfers (1894, 1909) to the defendants' predecessors were for consideration and in good faith.
- Even though later deeds referred to the 1867 sale, the transferees were bona fide and entitled to the protection of the Limitation Act; alternatively, where transferees actually knew that their vendors only had a mortgagee's title, they would not be entitled to the protection (authority relied upon by the defendants addresses that proposition).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Imambandi v. Mutsaddi, A.I.R. 1918 P.C. 11 | Authority for the proposition that a sale of the equity of redemption by a guardian (de facto or otherwise) may be void — i.e., Karima had no right to transfer as guardian. | The court acknowledged that the legal proposition is sound (that Karima had no authority). However, the court accepted the lower appellate court's factual finding that Khwaja Bux admitted and acquiesced in the 1867 sale, so the legal nullity posited by appellant did not prevail on these facts. |
| Mata Din v. Ahmad Ali, [1912] 34 All. 213 | Illustrates that where a minor did not acquiesce in a de facto guardian's sale and a suit for redemption is brought within the limitation period, the suit may not be barred (case turned on facts of non-acquiescence and timing). | The court distinguished Mata Din: in that case there was no acquiescence and the suit was within 12 years; in the present case Khwaja Bux had admitted the sale and the present suit was brought long after 12 years, so Mata Din did not assist the appellant. |
| Panna Lal v. Rameshar Sahai, [1915] 29 I.C. 403 | Authority for the proposition that a purchaser who buys with full knowledge that his vendor's title is merely that of a mortgagee is not entitled to the benefit of Article 134, Sch. 1, Limitation Act. | The court treated this case as one of several authorities establishing that actual knowledge of the vendor's limited (mortgagee) title defeats the transferee's claim to limitation protection; but the court found on the facts that the transferees here were justified in believing the mortgagees to be full owners. |
| Dirgpal Singh v. Kallu, [1915] 37 All. 660 | Same principle as Panna Lal: actual knowledge by purchaser that vendor has only mortgagee's title prevents benefit of Article 134. | Cited among authorities supporting that principle; the court concluded the present facts did not show such actual knowledge by the defendants' predecessors-in-title. |
| Abdullah v. Shamsul Haq, A.I.R. 1921 All. 262 | Same principle: purchasers with actual knowledge that the vendor only has a mortgagee's title cannot claim the benefit of Article 134. | Relied upon as authority for the stated proposition; the court found the factual matrix here different (acquiescence and ostensible ownership by mortgagees), so the authority did not change the result. |
| Vishvanath Bhiva Raul v. Tukaram Vithu, A.I.R. 1925 Bom. 417 | Cited among cases on the effect of purchaser's knowledge of vendor's mortgagee status and limitation consequences. | The court grouped this case with the others establishing that actual knowledge disqualifies a purchaser from Article 134 protection; nonetheless, the court held that the defendants' predecessors lacked such disqualifying knowledge on the facts here. |
| Taramiya v. Shibelisahib, [1920] 44 Bom. 614 | One of the Bombay decisions cited in the argument; the opinion also refers to a Bombay case (referred to above) discussed more fully in the body of the judgment. | Taramiya was cited among authorities relied on; the judgment discusses a Bombay case holding that a suit to recover possession is not the same as a suit to redeem and comments upon (and disagrees with, in part) that proposition in the court's reasoning. The court ultimately rejected the broader reading that a mortgagor may avoid limitation simply by framing a suit as one for redemption. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded step-by-step from findings of fact made by the lower appellate court and applied legal principles accordingly.
-
The court accepted the factual findings of the lower appellate court that:
- Karima executed the 1867 sale and the mortgagees thereafter treated the property as their own;
- Khwaja Bux admitted the sale and did not challenge it during his lifetime (more than 50 years after the date of the sale);
- The mortgagees divided the property in 1892 and subsequent transfers (1894, 1909) to the predecessors-in-title of the defendants were for consideration and in good faith; purchasers rebuilt pucca shops.
- The court observed that although the legal proposition that a guardian cannot validly transfer the equity of redemption (as authority like Imambandi v. Mutsaddi indicates) is sound, this legal point must be applied to the facts: because Khwaja Bux admitted and acquiesced in the 1867 sale, the factual circumstances removed the appellant's contention from operative effect.
- On limitation, the court distinguished cases relied upon by the appellant (notably Mata Din) on temporal and factual grounds: Mata Din involved non-acquiescence by the minor and a suit brought within 12 years; by contrast, here a much longer period elapsed before the plaintiff's suit and Khwaja Bux had acquiesced.
- The court then applied the conditions of Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act: given that the mortgagees paid consideration for the 1867 sale, dealt with the property as owners, divided it, and the later transferees took transfers for value and in good faith, the defendants satisfied the conditions entitling them to invoke Section 41.
- The court applied Article 134 (and related Articles of the Limitation Act) to hold that the plaintiff's suit was time-barred. The transfers to the predecessors-in-title of the defendants were transfers for valuable consideration of full proprietary rights by mortgagees, more than 12 years prior to the suit; therefore Article 134 barred the action.
- The court addressed the appellant's argument that reference to the 1867 sale in later deeds should have put the transferees on notice that they were only buying a mortgagee's title. The court noted authorities to the contrary (cases where transferees had actual knowledge and were not entitled to limitation protection), but found that on the facts here the transferees were justified in believing that the mortgagees were full owners and that Khwaja Bux had acquiesced; thus the transferees retained the benefit of limitation provisions.
- The court considered a Bombay decision (referred to in the judgment) that had suggested a distinction between suits for possession and suits for redemption and the consequence that limitation periods might differ. The court rejected the idea that a mortgagor can avoid the operation of Article 134 merely by framing an action as a suit for redemption: where a transferee for value from a mortgagee reasonably believes he has bought an absolute title, he is entitled to the benefit of Article 134 even if the mortgagor frames the action as one for redemption with possession.
- Having applied these principles to the accepted findings of fact, the court concluded that the lower courts correctly dismissed the plaintiff's suit.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal is dismissed. The court held that the decisions of the courts below were correct and dismissed the appeal with costs.
Consequences and implications:
- The plaintiff's redemption suit is time-barred and fails; the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief sought.
- The defendants (as bona fide transferees for value from the mortgagees or their heirs) are entitled to the protection of Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act and Article 134 of the Limitation Act on the facts found.
- The court declined to give effect to the appellant's argument that the 1867 sale was void in law in circumstances where the mortgagor (Khwaja Bux) had admitted and acquiesced in that sale and where much more than 12 years elapsed before the present suit.
- The court expressly disagreed with a broad principle (attributed to a Bombay decision discussed in the judgment) that a mortgagor may avoid limitation merely by framing a suit for redemption; the court treated redemption with possession as essentially seeking possession and protected transferees for value under Article 134 where they reasonably believed they had acquired absolute title.
- The opinion resolves the dispute on the facts before it and does not purport to create a new general rule beyond these applications; the direct effect is dismissal of the appeal and affirmation of the defendants' protection under the statutes cited.
This summary is strictly confined to and derived from the content of the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts or holdings beyond those expressly contained in the text.
Iqbal Ahmad, J.
1. This is an appeal by the unsuccessful plaintiff in a redemption suit. The mortgage, sought to be redeemed, was executed by one Imam Bakhsh, on the 17th November 1861, in favour of four persons named Bhojraj, Mohan Lal, Hukum Chand and Parmanand, for a sum of Rs. 450. The property mortgaged consisted of four kachcha shops. Imam Bakhsh, the mortgagor, died sometime before the year 1867, leaving as his heirs his son Khwaja Bux and a daughter (whose name is not known). Khwaja Bux died about 2 years prior to the institution of the suit leaving, as his sole heir his son Rahim Bakhsh. The plaintiff purchased the equity of redemption from Rahim Bux under a sale-deed dated the 15th November 1921, for a sum of Rs. 1,000. On the findings of the Courts below, it is abundantly clear, that the plaintiff paid no consideration for the sale, and obtained a sale-deed only with a view to gamble in litigation. However, this fact alone would not disentitle the plaintiff to a decree, if Rahim Bux had a subsisting right to the equity of redemption, on the date of the sale-deed executed by him, in the plaintiff's favour.
2. It is admitted on all hands that, on the 5th February 1867, one Karima, purporting to act as guardian of Khawaja Bux sold the equity of redemption in all the four shops to the four mortgagees named above. It has been found by the lower appellate Court that the sale-deed was executed by Karima for the benefit of Khwaja Bux, and that Khwaja Bux acquiesced in the same and never challenged the same, though he lived for a period of more than 50 years after the date of that sale. Thereafter the mortgagees, according to the finding of the lower appellate Court, all along regarded themselves as owners of the mortgaged property, and on the 5th September 1892, the property was divided by the mortgagees, or their heirs amongst themselves. On the 17th October 1894, two out the four shops in dispute, were transferred by the heirs of one of the mortgagees, viz, Hukum Chand to one Mt. Khanu, and the same passed by right of inheritance to Mt. Badla defendant 1. Mt. Badla transferred the two shops to her daughter Mt. Nanhi defendant 9, under a deed of gift dated the 8th June 1920. The remaining two shops were sold by the remaining mortgagees or their heirs, to the father of defendants 2 to 5 on the 16th July 1909. The transferees rebuilt pucca shops in place of the kachcha shops originally mortgaged.
3. It has been found by the lower appellate Court that Khwaja Bux was well aware of the sale of the equity of redemption in the year 1867, and that the mortgagees thereafter were dealing with the property as owners, and Khwaja Bux never questioned their right to do so. After all these transfers were made in favour of the persons, who have been found by the lower appellate Court to be bona fide transferees for value, the present suit has been brought by a speculator for possession of the four pucca shops, by redemption of the mortgage of 1861, on payment of Rs. 450. The plaintiff had not even the grace to offer to pay to the transferees, the consideration paid by them for the sales in their favour and the amount spent by them in reconstructing the shops.
4. The defence to the suit was that, by the sale-deed of 1867, the equity of redemption passed from Khwaja Bux to the mortgagees and, as such Rahim Bux had no right left in the mortgaged property which he could transfer to the plaintiff, and that the suit was barred by Section 41, Transfer of Property Act, and by Article 134, Limitation Act. All the pleas urged in defence have been accepted by both the Courts below, and the suit has been dismissed.
5. It is argued that Karima had no right to transfer the equity of redemption, as guardian of Khwaja Bux and that the sale by him was absolutely void. This contention is perfectly sound. [vide Imambandi v. Mutsaddi A.I.R. 1918 P.C. 11.] It is then argued that the sale by Karima being void, the estate of the mortgagees was not enlarged, nor did their possession become adverse to Khwaja Bux, and that the equity of redemption all along remained vested in Khwaja Bux, and in support of this argument reliance has been placed by the learned Counsel for the appellant on the case of Mata Din v. Ahmad Ali [1912] 34 All. 213. I am unable to agree with this contention. In the case relied on by the learned Counsel for the appellant, it was found, as a fact, that the sale of the equity of redemption, by the de facto guardian of the minor, was not acquiesced in by the minor on attaining majority. In this case the finding of the lower appellate Court is the other way. The lower appellate Court has found that.
Khwaja Bux admitted the said sale-deed (of 1867) to be valid and to be binding on him.
6. Moreover, in the case cited by the learned Counsel, the suit for redemption was brought within 12 years of the date of the accrual of the cause of action, and it was held, by their Lordships of the Privy Council, that the suit was not barred by Article 144, Sch. 1, Limitation Act.
7. In the present case the mortgage was not for a fixed period, and as such the mortgagor had a right to institute a suit for redemption at any time after the date of the execution of the mortgage-deed, and the present suit was filed long after the expiry of 12 years from the date of the accrual of the cause of action to institute a suit for redemption of the mortgage in dispute. If the mortgage is for a fixed period, a suit for redemption cannot be brought within the period for which the mortgage is made, and in that case, the alienation of the equity of redemption by an unauthorized person, acting as a de facto guardian of a minor, does not set the time to run against the minor, till the date of the expiry of the period fixed by the mortgage, and a suit brought within 12 years of that date to question the alienation and for the redemption of the mortgage is not time-barred. But in the present case, a much longer time elapsed, after the date of the unauthorized alienation, and of the accrual of the cause of action for a suit for redemption of the mortgage, before the present suit was filed, and as such the case relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellant does not help him.
8. Further, it appears to me, that the Courts below were right in holding that the suit was barred by Section 41, Transfer of Property Act, and by Article 134, Sch. 1, Limitation Act. It is clear, from the finding of the lower appellate Court, that the mortgagees, after the sale of 1867, were dealing with the property as their own property, and were the ostensible owners thereof. They had paid consideration for the sale-deed of 1867, and that sale was never questioned by Khwaja Bux. They divided the property amongst themselves as owners in 1892. The transfers of 1894 and 1909 made by them or their heirs, in favour of the predecessors-in-title of defendants 1 to 5, were transfers for consideration, and the transferees took those transfers in good faith. In short all the conditions necessary to invite the application of Section 41, Transfer of Property Act, were fulfilled in the present case, and the defendants were entitled to the benefit of that section. Then again the case fulfills the requirements of Article 1S4, Limitation Act. The transfers, in favour of the predecessors-in-title of defendants 1 to 5, were transfers for valuable consideration, of full proprietary rights by mortgagees, more than 12 years prior to the institution of the suit, and as such the suit was barred by that Article.
9. But it is argued that, as in the sale-deeds of 1894 and 1909, a reference was made to the sale-deed executed by Karima in the year 1867, the transferees, under the two first mentioned deeds, must have known that the sale of 1867, being by an unauthorised person, was ineffectual to pass the equity of redemption from Khwaja Bux to the mortgagees, and as such it is said that the transferees of 1894 and 1909 must be presumed to have been aware of the fact, that what their transferrers had a right to transfer was only the mortgagee right, and not full proprietary right, and that being so, Article 134, Limitation Act, has no application. In support of this argument reliance is placed on Panna Lal v. Rameshar Sahai [1915] 29 I.C. 403, Dirgpal Singh v. Kallu_ [1915] 37 All. 660 Abdullah v. Shamsul Haq A.I.R. 1921 All. 262, Vishvanath Bhiva Raul v. Tukaram Vithu A.I.R. 1925 Bom. 417 and Taramiya v. Shibelisahib [1920] 44 Bom. 614. The first four cases are an authority for the proposition that, a person, who purchases with full knowledge and his vendor's title is merely that of a mortgagee is not entitled to the benefit of Article 134, Sch. 1, Limitation Act. In all those cases the finding was that the transferees from the mortgagees had actual knowledge of the fact that their vendors' title was merely that of a mortgagee, and they did not believe that they were purchasing an absolute interest. But, in the case before me, the finding is that every one concerned knew and had reason to believe, that the mortgagees became full owners of the property mortgaged, because of the sale of 1867. It is not the case here that predecessors-in-title of defendants 1 to 5 took the transfers with the knowledge that their transferrers had only a mortgagee's interest in the shops in dispute. Even if it be supposed that they could be expected to know that Khwaja Bux had a right to ignore the sale-deed by Karima, as being a sale by an unauthorized person, they were perfectly justified in also assuming that Khwaja Bux, not having impeached that sale, acquiesced in and accepted the same.
10. In the Bombay case referred to above, it was held that
a suit to recover possession is not the same thing as a suit to redeem, and a mortgagor's right to redeem, the period of limitation for which is 60 years under Article 148, will not be defeated merely because his mortgagee transfers the mortgage to another person.
11. If it was intended to lay down by that case, that notwithstanding the transfer of full proprietary interest by the mortgagee claiming as absolute owner, the operation of Article 134, Limitation Act, can be avoided by the mortgagor by framing the suit as a suit for redemption, I with all respect am unable to agree with that decision. A suit for redemption of a mortgage with possession is essentially a suit for possession. The decree in such a suit directs delivery of possession of the mortgaged property to the mortgagor on certain conditions. The relief that he seeks by such a suit is the relief to be put back in possession of the property mortgaged. It appears to me, therefore, that a transferee for value from a mortgagee, who has taken that, which is de facto a mortgage, upon a representation made to him, and in the full belief that it is not a mortgage, but an absolute title, is entitled to the benefit of Article 134, Limitation Act, though the suit is a suit for redemption of the mortgage.
12. For the reasons given above, in my judgment, the decisions of the Courts below are perfectly correct, and I dismiss the appeal with costs.
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