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Tarif v. Phool Singh
Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This is a plaintiffs' appeal arising from a suit for possession of certain zemindari property. The disputed property originally belonged equally to two brothers, Badan and Jhanda (both Jats). Badan died about 50 years before institution of the suit and was succeeded in possession by his widow, Bahalo, who subsequently remarried Khubi. Jhanda remained in possession of his share until 1906 and sold his share to Bhopal, who then sold it to Mt. Bahalo on 12 June 1907. Mt. Bahalo (the widow) remained in possession of Badan's property even after her remarriage and died on 23 February 1910, leaving a daughter, Mt. Sis Kunwar (by Khubi), who obtained mutation over the entire property and sold it on 16 February 1918 to Defendant No. 1 and predecessors of Defendants Nos. 2 to 4. The plaintiffs obtained a sale-deed of the entire property from Jhanda on 20 October 1921 and sued for possession.
Both lower courts found for the defendants: they held that a custom among the Jats caused a widow to forfeit rights on remarriage; Bahalo's continued possession after remarriage was adverse to the reversionary heirs, and after 12 years of adverse possession she became absolute owner of Badan's share, which passed to Sis Kunwar and thence to the defendants. The plaintiffs appealed to the court whose opinion is summarized here.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Bahalo, by continuing in possession of Badan's share after her remarriage, acquired an absolute title to that share by adverse possession (or whether her adverse possession could only establish title to the limited widow's estate she held prior to remarriage).
- Whether the property of Jhanda purchased by Bahalo (using the income of her husband's property) became an accretion to her deceased husband's estate (and thus remained only a widow's interest) or whether it became her own proprietary estate.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiffs' Arguments
- Bahalo remained in possession of Badan's share as a Hindu widow; on her death, Jhanda (who survived Bahalo) became entitled to Badan's share.
- As to the property of Jhanda purchased by Bahalo, the plaintiffs contended that Bahalo bought that property with the income of her husband's property and therefore that purchased property partook of the same nature as the deceased husband's estate; consequently she had no interest in the purchased property higher than that of a widow, and on her death Jhanda became entitled to that share.
- The plaintiffs relied on authorities (Isre Dutt Koer v. Hansbutti Koerain and Sheolochun Singh v. Saheb Singh) to support the presumption that when a widow in possession invests income of her husband's property in the purchase of other property, the presumption is that such purchase is an accretion to the husband's estate.
Defendants' Arguments (Respondents)
- There was a Jat custom that a widow forfeited all rights to her deceased husband's property upon remarriage; consequently Bahalo lost rights on remarriage.
- Because Bahalo continued in possession after remarriage for more than 12 years, her possession became adverse to the reversionary heirs and she acquired absolute title by adverse possession to Badan's share; this absolute title passed to her daughter Sis Kunwar on her death.
- By purchasing Jhanda's share, Bahalo became full owner of that share, and that ownership also passed to Sis Kunwar; accordingly, plaintiffs could not acquire title from Jhanda's later sale to them (because Jhanda lacked title), and the defendants obtained good title from Sis Kunwar's sale.
- Respondent counsel specifically maintained that forfeiture on remarriage divested the widow's estate and that thereafter Bahalo's continued possession was not limited to a widow's estate but was possession of full proprietary rights adverse to reversioners.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Umrao Singh v. Pirthi, A.I.R. 1925 All. 369 (affirmed on Letters Patent Appeal No. 148 of 1924, 6 July 1925) | Support for the view that a widow continuing in possession after remarriage can only prescribe title to the widow's estate (and not enlarge it into full proprietary rights). | The court followed the view taken in Umrao Singh to hold that Bahalo could only prescribe title to the widow's estate of Badan and not acquire an enlarged proprietary estate by mere continuance in possession after remarriage. |
| Lajwanti v. Safa Chand, A.I.R. 1924 P.C. 121 (Privy Council) | Stated principle: "if possessing as widow she possesses adversely to anyone as to certain parcels, she does not acquire the parcels as stridhan but she makes them good to her husband's estate." | The court relied on this principle (via Umrao Singh) to conclude that possession as a widow cannot be converted by mere continued occupation after remarriage into a full proprietary title distinct from the husband's estate; thus the adverse possession could only vest title in the widow's estate, not enlarge it. |
| Kali Charan v. Peare, A.I.R. 1924 All. 740 | Authority on widows of deceased members of a joint Hindu family acquiring absolute title by adverse possession (facts concerned widows of members of a joint family who had no right to possession as widows during continuance of the joint family). | The court held this authority inapplicable to the present case because Bahalo was a widow of a separated Hindu who had come into possession as a widow; thus Kali Charan's facts differ materially and do not support respondents' position. |
| Isre Dutt Koer v. Hansbutti Koerain, [1884] 10 Cal. 324 | Rule: where a widow in possession of her deceased husband's property invests the income of that property in the purchase of other property, the presumption is that the purchased property is an accretion to the husband's estate. | The court acknowledged the rule but held that it does not apply to this case because the rule is limited to widows remaining in possession as heirs (i.e., as widows) and not to cases where the widow had prescribed a title by adverse possession. |
| Sheolochun Singh v. Saheb Singh, [1887] 14 Cal. 387 | Same proposition as Isre Dutt Koer regarding presumption of accretion to husband's estate when income of husband's property is used to purchase other property. | The court said this authority is similarly inapplicable for the same reason: the case applies where the widow remained in possession as heir/widow, not where she had acquired the widow's estate by adverse possession. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded in two principal analytical stages corresponding to the two grounds of appeal.
1. Analysis regarding Badan's share (whether adverse possession after remarriage conferred absolute title):
- The court accepted the factual findings of the lower courts as to existence of the Jat custom (these findings were not challenged on appeal).
- The court rejected the respondents' submission that Bahalo's possession after remarriage converted into full proprietary rights simply because she continued in possession and the reversioners did not assert their rights within 12 years. The court distinguished between the capacity in which Bahalo was in possession (as a Hindu widow) and the effect of remarriage (which forfeited her widow-rights).
- The court reasoned that the only right forfeited by remarriage was the right to possession in her capacity as a Hindu widow; being allowed to continue in possession thereafter could not automatically enlarge the quantum or quality of the estate held. Consequently, the court held that Bahalo by continuing in possession could at most prescribe a complete title to the widow's estate she already held, not a new or enlarged proprietary estate.
- This approach was supported by prior decisions: the court cited Umrao Singh v. Pirthi (and the Privy Council decision in Lajwanti v. Safa Chand) as authority for the principle that possession as a widow does not convert parcels into stridhan for the widow but makes them good to the husband's estate; hence the lapse of the limitation period could vest a complete title only in the widow's estate and not change its character.
- The court also explained why Kali Charan v. Peare was inapplicable: that case concerned widows of deceased members of a joint Hindu family who, during the continuance of the joint family, had no right to possess any portion of the joint family property as widows; thus its facts and legal principle did not fit the present case of a widow of a separated Hindu who had come into possession as a widow.
2. Analysis regarding Jhanda's share (whether the purchase by Bahalo was an accretion to her deceased husband's estate):
- The appellants argued that the purchased share should be treated as an accretion to the husband's estate because it was bought with income of the husband's property and was managed in the same manner as the husband's estate.
- The court accepted the general proposition in the authorities cited (Isre Dutt Koer and Sheolochun Singh) that a widow in possession who invests income of her husband's property in acquiring other property gives rise to a presumption that the acquisition is an accretion to the husband's estate.
- However, the court distinguished those authorities: their application is limited to situations where a widow remains in possession as heir/widow. In the present case, the court found that Bahalo had prescribed a title to the widow's estate by adverse possession and, after prescribing title, enjoyed the usufruct as a person entitled in her own right rather than in the capacity of a widow. Therefore, the income she received after prescribing title was her own income, and acquisitions made with that income were made by her in her own capacity.
- Because Bahalo ceased to possess as a widow from the date of remarriage and effectively prescribed title to the widow's estate by adverse possession, the court held that the purchase of Jhanda's share did not automatically become an accretion to the husband's estate; the purchased property was treated as acquired by Bahalo in her own right.
Combining these analyses, the court concluded that the lower courts were incorrect in treating Bahalo's post-remarriage possession as conferring an absolute, enlarged proprietary title to Badan's share; rather, any title by prescription was to the widow's estate alone. Conversely, as to the share of Jhanda, because Bahalo had prescribed title and thereafter held income in her own right, the purchase of Jhanda's share was not necessarily an accretion to her deceased husband's estate; on the facts the court concluded the rights regarding Jhanda's share favored the defendants.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The court partly allowed the plaintiffs' appeal by modifying the decrees of the Courts below. Specifically, the court decreed the plaintiffs' claim with respect to one half of the property in dispute (i.e., the share attributable to Jhanda or as the opinion prescribes), and dismissed the remainder of the plaintiffs' suit.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The plaintiffs recover half of the disputed property; the defendants retain title to the remaining half. Both parties were directed to bear their own costs throughout because each side succeeded and failed to an equal extent.
- No broader precedent is expressly announced by the opinion beyond its application of existing authorities. The court relied on prior decisions (including Lajwanti and Umrao Singh) to clarify that possession as a widow cannot by mere continuance be transformed into a larger proprietary estate; and it reiterated the limited applicability of the presumption that investments of husband's income become accretions to the husband's estate, confining that presumption to circumstances where the widow remained in possession as widow/heir rather than as one who had acquired the widow's estate by adverse possession.
- This opinion modifies the lower courts' decrees consistent with the court's construction of the applicable authorities and the facts as found below; it does not purport to establish a new general rule beyond the applications discussed.
1. This is a plaintiffs' appeal and arises out of a suit for possession of certain zemindari property.
2. The property in dispute admittedly belonged to two brothers Badan and Jhanda who were Jats in equal share. Badan died about 50 years prior to the institution of the suit, and was succeeded by his widow Bahalo, who entered into possession of the property of Badan. Within few years of the death of Badan, Bahalo re-married one Khubi. Jahanda remained in possession of his share till the year 1906, in which year he sold his share to one Bhopal and the latter in his turn sold the same to Mt. Bahalo on the 12th of June 1907. Notwithstanding her remarriage, Bahalo remained in possession of Badan's property in her lifetime. Mt. Bahalo died on the 23rd of February 1910, leaving a daughter Mt. Sis Kunwar by Khubi who obtained mutation of the name over the entire property in dispute. Sis Kunwar sold the property to Defendant No. 1 and the predecessor of Defendants Nos. 2 to 4, On the l6th of February 1918. The plaintiffs, on the other hand, secured a sale-deed of the entire property in dispute from Jhanda on the 20th of October 1921.
3. The plaintiffs' case was that Mt. Bahalo remained in possession of Badan's share as a Hindu widow and on her death Jhanda, who survived Bahalo, became entitled to the share of Badan. As regards the property of Jhanda purchased by Mt. Bahalo from Bhopal, the plaintiffs maintained that Bahalo having purchased that property with the income of her husband's property, that property partook of the same nature as the property of Badan of which she was in possession as a widow, and as such she had no interest in the property of Jhanda higher than that of a widow, and on her death, Jhanda also became entitled to that share. The plaintiff alleged that Sis Kunwar had no interest in the property in dispute and as such no title passed to the defendants by the sale made by her on the 16th of February 1918.
4. The defendants' case was that under a custom prevailing among the Jats, Bahalo on her re-marriage with Khubi, forfeited all her rights to Badan's property, and as she continued in possession of the same after her re-marriage for a period of more than 12 years, she acquired an absolute title to Badan's share by adverse possession, and that by purchase of Jhanda's share she became full owner of that share and as such the plaintiffs were not entitled to a decree with respect to any portion of the property in dispute. Both the Courts below have held that the custom set up by the defendants has been proved, and as by virtue of that custom Bahalo had lost her rights in her first husband's property on re-marrying Khubi, her possession of Badan's share after her re-marriage, must be regarded as adverse to the reversionary heirs of Badan, and as Bahalo had remained in adverse possession for more than 12 years after her remarriage, she became an absolute owner of the share of Badan and the same on her death passed to her daughter Sis Kunwar. In the view that both the Courts below took of the nature of possession of Bahalo over Badan's share, they held that the purchase by her of Jhanda's share, conferred an absolute title on her even with respect to the property so purchased by her, and the same on the death of Bahalo also passed to Mt. Sis Kunwar. On these grounds the Courts below held that Jhanda was not entitled to any portion of the property in dispute and as such he could not pass a title to any portion of the property in dispute to the plaintiffs, and that the defendants by their purchase from Sis Kunwar obtained a good title to the entire property in dispute. On these findings the plaintiffs' suit was dismissed by both the Courts below.
5. The findings of the Courts below as to the existence of the custom set up by the defendants-respondents have not been challenged before me in appeal, and the decrees of the Courts below have been assailed before me only on two grounds.
6. It is argued that the Courts below were wrong in holding that Bahalo by continuing in possession of Badan's property after her re-marriage completed by adverse possession, an absolute title to the estate. It is urged, that though by her re-marriage she forfeited her rights to the property of Badan, and though Jhanda then became entitled to the possession of the same still by being allowed to continue in possession she could prescribe a title only with respect to the limited estate of which she was in possession before her re-marriage and for nothing more. In other words Bahalo must be deemed to have continued in possession of the same limited estate of which she came into possession as a widow of Badan on the latter's death, and as such she could not by adverse possession for more than 12 years, prescribe a title to an estate of a different quality to that of which she was in possession. On these grounds it is urged that the Courts below were wrong in holding that Bahalo became an absolute owner of Badan's share and the same did not pass to Jhanda on the death of Bahalo. The learned Counsel for the respondents maintains that as Bahalo on her re-marriage forfeited all her rights to the property of Badan, her possession thereafter was adverse to Jhanda, who became entitled to the immediate possession of the property, and Jhanda not having claimed that property, within 12 years of the date of re-marriage, Bahalo by continuing in adverse possession of the same acquired a complete title to Badan's share and Jhanda lost all his rights with respect to that property. It is said that the necessary consequence of the forfeiture was that the widow's estate of which Bahalo was in possession was divested, and thereafter Bahalo continued in possession of the property not in the limited capacity of a Hindu widow, but as a person in possession of full proprietary rights adversely to the person who on her remarriage had become entitled to possession of that property.
7. I am unable to agree with the contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents. Bahalo was in possession of Badan's property as a Hindu widow and the only right that she forfeited by her re-marriage was the right to possession of Badan's property in her capacity as a Hindu widow. Therefore, by being allowed to continue in possession of the property notwithstanding the forfeiture, she could only prescribe a title to the widow's estate of which she was in possession before her re-marriage. In short by being allowed to remain in possession of Badan's share after her re-marriage, there could not be an automatic enlargement of her estate but she must be presumed to have continued in possession of the same limited estate of which she was in possession since the death of Badan, The inaction of the reversioners for a period of twelve years from the date of the re-marriage could only result in vesting a complete title in Bahalo to the widow's estate in respect of Badan's share. This was the view taken by a learned Judge of this Court in the case of Umrao Singh v. Pirthi A.I.R. 1925 All. 369, and that decision was affirmed on Letters Patent Appeal No. 148 of 1924 on the 6th July 1925. The decision of this Court was based on the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case reported as Lajwanti v. Safa Chand A.I.R. 1924 P.C. 121. In that case it was held that:
if possessing as widow she possesses adversely to anyone as to certain parcels, she does not acquire the parcels as stridhan but she makes them good to her husband's estate.
8. The learned Counsel for the respondents has placed reliance on the case of Kali Charan v. Peare A.I.R. 1924 All. 740. In my opinion that case has no application to the present case.
9. In Kali Charan's case A.I.R. 1924 All. 740 the two widows who successfully claimed an absolute title to the property by adverse possession, were the widows, not of separated Hindus but the widows of some of the deceased members of a joint Hindu family. Those widows during the continuance of the joint Hindu family, had no right to possession of any portion of the joint family property in the capacity of a widow; all that they were entitled to was to be maintained from the joint family property. Here the case is essentially different. Mt. Bahalo, as the widow of a separated Hindu, came into possession of the property of her deceased husband, as a Hindu widow and as such it appears to me that the case comes within the principle of law laid down in Lajwanti's case A.I.R. 1924 P.C. 121. For these reasons, I am of opinion that the decrees of the Courts below as regards the share of Badan cannot be sustained.
10. Now, I proceed to consider the ground on which the decrees of the Courts below as regards the share of Jhanda are assailed on behalf of the appellants. It is argued that if, as I have already held, Bahalo was in possession of Badan's property as a widow, the purchase by her of Jhanda's property must be regarded as an acquisition to the estate of her husband. It is pointed out that the fact that the estate acquired by Bahalo was the same in extent which she already had and that the same belonged to her husband's brother and the further fact that no attempt to dispose of the estate so acquired, or to deal with it in a manner different from the estate of her deceased husband, was made by Bahalo, lead to the inevitable conclusion that the acquisition of Jhanda's property by Bahalo was an acquisition to the estate of her deceased husband. In support of this argument reliance is placed on the cases of Isre Dutt Koer v. Hansbutti Koerain [1884] 10 Cal. 324 and Sheolochun Singh, v. Saheb Singh [1887] 14 Cal. 387. It is argued that it lay on the respondents to show, that the acquisition made by the lady was of a different kind of estate, and was not an acquisition to the estate of her deceased husband, and this they having failed to do, the plaintiffs were right in asserting that the share of Jhanda having been purchased by Bahalo, with the income of her husband's property partook of the same nature and she had no higher interest than that of a widow in the same. I am unable to agree with this contention.
11. The two cases relied on by the learned Counsel for the appellants in support of his argument are an authority for the proposition that where a widow in possession of the property of her deceased husband invests the income of that property in the purchase of some other property, the presumption is that the property so purchased would be an accretion to the husband's estate. But, in my opinion, the facts of the present case do not invite the application of the rule of law laid down in those cases. The application of those cases is limited to the cases in which a Hindu widow has remained in possession as an heir to her deceased husband and not to cases where she has prescribed a title to the widow's estate by adverse possession of the same as Bahalo had done in the present case.
12. By prescribing a title to the widow's estate, Bahalo, entitled herself to the usufruct of the property, not in the capacity of a widow of Badan, but because she had become entitled to the widow's estate by virtue of her adverse possession. In other words the income that she received from Badan's property, after prescribing a title to the same, came in her hands not as the widow of Badan, and the acquisition that she made with that income was an acquisition made by her in the capacity of a person who had become entitled to the income of Badan's property not as his widow but in her own right. The intention to treat the newly purchased property as an accretion to the husband's estate can only be imputed to a widow so long as she remains in possession of her husband's property as his widow. Here, as said above Bahalo ceased to remain in such possession of Badan's property from the date of her re-marriage.
13. For the reasons given above, in my judgment, the rights of the case, as regards the share of Jhanda, were entirely with the defendants and not with the plaintiffs.
14. The result is that I modify the decrees of the Courts below by decreeing the plaintiffs' claim with respect to half of the property in dispute. The rest of the plaintiffs' suit is dismissed. As both the parties have succeeded and failed in the litigation to an equal extent I direct the parties to bear their own costs throughout.
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