- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Gaya Prasad v. Bansidhar
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal arises from a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Mainpuri in favour of the plaintiff, Gaya Prasad. The plaintiff had instituted a suit for foreclosure of the village Patara under a mortgage by way of conditional sale, seeking foreclosure without giving the mortgagor and puisne mortgagees an opportunity of redeeming; alternatively he sought foreclosure with a right of redemption to some defendants, and in the alternative recovery from the defendant Bansidhar of Rs. 7,646-8-0 and interest.
The material facts recorded in the opinion are:
- On 20 July 1889 Chaudhri Fateh Chand executed a mortgage by conditional sale of the village Patara in favour of the appellant and Kunj Bihari Lal to secure Rs. 7,101 and interest.
- On 22 October 1891 Chaudhri Fateh Chand executed a second mortgage (also by conditional sale) of the same village in favour of the appellant and Anant Ram to secure Rs. 10,000 and interest.
- On 1 October 1891 Anant Ram transferred his interest in the second mortgage to the respondent, Gaya Prasad.
- On 27 September 1893 the appellants, Bansidhar and Kunj Bihari Lal, instituted suit No. 123 of 1893 for foreclosure under the mortgage of 20 July 1889 against Chaudhri Raj Kumar (son of the mortgagor) as principal defendant and against Gaya Prasad as a puisne incumbrancer.
- On the same date Gaya Prasad instituted a suit for foreclosure under the puisne mortgage of 22nd October (the opinion records the year as 1889 in one paragraph and 1891 in others).
- On 22 December 1894 foreclosure decrees were passed in both suits, with six months for redemption; redemption time was extended repeatedly.
- On 3 January 1896 Gaya Prasad paid into Court Rs. 15,093 to prevent an absolute order for foreclosure being passed against him; the amount was later drawn out of Court by the first mortgagees Bansidhar and Kunj Bihari Lal.
- By virtue of Section 74 of the Transfer of Property Act, Gaya Prasad claimed to have acquired the rights and powers of the first mortgagees. He on 3 August 1897 applied in the first-mentioned mortgage suit for an order absolute for foreclosure in his favour. The Subordinate Judge refused that application by an order dated 6 November 1897 on the ground that Gaya Prasad "had not acquired the status of a decree-holder" and therefore could not execute the decree as a decree-holder. There was no appeal from that order; Gaya Prasad acquiesced and instead brought the present separate suit.
- The Subordinate Judge in the present suit gave a decree for foreclosure in favour of Gaya Prasad. Bansidhar alone defended, arguing the suit did not lie because the matters were determinable by execution in the earlier suit under Section 244 of the Civil Procedure Code.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, upon payment of the prior mortgage debt by a puisne mortgagee under Section 74 of the Transfer of Property Act, the puisne mortgagee acquires the rights and powers of the prior mortgagees such that he becomes entitled to seek an order absolute for foreclosure by way of execution under Section 244 of the Civil Procedure Code.
- Whether the remedy of the puisne mortgagee in the circumstances was by an application in execution in the existing foreclosure suit (under Section 244 CPC) rather than by instituting a separate suit.
- Whether the separate suit instituted by Gaya Prasad was maintainable, or barred by the provisions of Section 244 of the Civil Procedure Code.
- Ancillary question raised by the respondent: whether, because a decree in the earlier suit had been passed and the mortgagor did not appeal, the appellant (Bansidhar) had locus standi to appeal.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments (Bansidhar)
- The suit does not lie because a foreclosure decree had already been passed in suit No. 123 of 1893 and the matters in dispute in the present litigation were determinable on an application for execution in that earlier suit under Section 244 of the Civil Procedure Code.
Respondent's Arguments (Gaya Prasad)
- Gaya Prasad contended (and acted) on the basis that having paid off the first mortgage debt he acquired the rights of the first mortgagees under Section 74 and could seek an order absolute for foreclosure; he applied in the earlier suit for such an order but the Subordinate Judge refused.
- Before this Court the respondent argued that in suit No. 123 of 1893, Bansidhar had appeared only in the capacity of a prior mortgagee and not as a puisne incumbrancer, and therefore the earlier suit could not have determined any question Bansidhar might have as a puisne mortgagee — so a separate suit was necessary.
- The respondent further argued that because the mortgagor did not appeal from the decree in the earlier suit, the appellant lacked locus standi to appeal.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Kidar Nath v. Lalji Sahai (1889) I.L.R. 12 All. 61 | Held that an order absolute for foreclosure (Section 87 T.P. Act) is an order in execution of the primary decree and is appealable as a decree under Section 244 read with Section 2 of the Civil Procedure Code. | The Court regarded this Full Bench decision as binding and treated an application for an order absolute for foreclosure as an application in execution under Section 244 CPC that is appealable; it supported the conclusion that Gaya Prasad's remedy lay by execution in the prior suit. |
| Oudh Behari Lal v. Nageshar Lal (1890) I.L.R. 13 All. 278 | The decision followed Kidar Nath and affirmed the proposition about an absolute foreclosure order being in execution and appealable. | The Court noted this Full Bench followed the same rule and relied on it as part of the binding precedent that an application for absolute foreclosure is an execution-application appealable under Section 244 CPC. |
| Ajudhia Pershad v. Baldeo Singh (1894) I.L.R. 21 Calc. 818 (Calcutta High Court) | The Calcutta High Court took a different view on whether an order absolute for foreclosure is an order in execution (i.e., contrary to the Full Bench view of the All-India Court). | The Court acknowledged this differing line of authority but held itself bound by the All-India Full Bench decisions (Kidar Nath and Oudh Behari Lal). |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in a step-by-step legal analysis strictly tied to the materials and rulings it cites:
- Effect of Payment under Section 74 T.P. Act:
The Court held that when Gaya Prasad, a second (puisne) mortgagee, paid off the claim of the first mortgagees he acquired "all the rights and powers of the first mortgagees" under Section 74 of the Transfer of Property Act. The Court concluded that he "practically became the decree-holder in place of the original decree-holders" for enforcement of rights.
- Continuation of the Earlier Suit:
The Court reasoned that the suit in which the decree had been passed did not terminate by reason of the payment; although the original plaintiffs ceased to have substantial interest, the suit continued as a subsisting proceeding so that the Court could adjust rights and liabilities of all parties and, if necessary, make and enforce an absolute order for foreclosure.
- Appropriate Remedy — Execution under Section 244 CPC:
Relying on Full Bench decisions (Kidar Nath; Oudh Behari Lal), the Court treated an application for an order absolute for foreclosure as an application in execution of the prior decree, falling under Section 244 CPC and therefore as the proper procedural route. The application which Gaya Prasad made in the earlier suit should have been considered and granted as one in execution.
- Rejection of Respondent's Technical Objections:
The Court rejected the respondent's contention that Bansidhar was not before the earlier suit in his capacity as a puisne incumbrancer and therefore a separate suit was necessary. The Court explained that a party's multiple interests in the mortgaged property cannot be split so as to prevent the Court from adjudicating all questions arising in regard to the mortgaged property in that suit.
- Locus Standi Argument:
The Court rejected the respondent's submission that the appellant lacked locus because the mortgagor did not appeal. It noted that a decree had been passed against the appellant in the earlier suit and therefore he was entitled to appeal.
- Effect of Acquiescence in the Earlier Order:
Although the Court found the Subordinate Judge's refusal to grant the order absolute in the earlier suit to be wrong and likely to have been set aside on appeal, it observed that Gaya Prasad acquiesced in that decision (i.e., did not appeal) and "must take the consequences."
- Conclusion from Applying Law to Facts:
Applying the principle that the proper remedy was execution in the prior suit, and given that the plaintiff did not appeal the refusal of 6 November 1897 but instead instituted a fresh suit, the Court concluded the present suit was not maintainable and was barred by Section 244 CPC.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL ALLOWED; DECREE OF THE LOWER COURT SET ASIDE; SUIT DISMISSED.
Direct consequences for the parties:
- The appellate court allowed the appeal brought by the appellant (Bansidhar).
- The decree of the Subordinate Judge in favour of Gaya Prasad was set aside as against all persons impleaded as defendants.
- The Court directed that the plaintiff's suit be dismissed.
- The Court did not award costs of this appeal to the appellant and made no order as to costs, observing the circumstances (including that Gaya Prasad had followed the Subordinate Judge's ruling).
Broader implications:
The decision applies existing Full Bench authority of this Court (Kidar Nath; Oudh Behari Lal) that an order absolute for foreclosure is to be treated as an order in execution of the primary decree and is appealable under Section 244 CPC. The opinion did not purport to create a new principle of law beyond applying those precedents to the facts; its principal effect is to hold that the plaintiff's remedy was by execution in the prior suit and not by a separate fresh suit.
and Burkitt, J.
1. This is an appeal from a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Mainpuri, passed in favour of the plaintiff, Gaya Prasad. The suit was brought for foreclosure of the village Patara in the district of Mainpuri under a mortgage by way of conditional sale, without giving the mortgagor and puisne mortgagees an opportunity of redeeming, and in the alternative, for foreclosure giving a right of redemption to some of the defendants, and also claiming, in case a decree for foreclosure should not be granted, recovery from the defendant, Bansidhar, of a sum of Rs. 7,646-8-0 and interest.
2. The Subordinate Judge gave a decree for foreclosure.
3. The facts are shortly as follows:
On the 20th of July, 1889, one Chaudhri Fateh Chand executed a mortgage by conditional sale of the village Patara in favour of the appellant and of one Kunj Bihari Lal to secure repayment of a sum of Rs. 7,101 and interest.
4. On the 22nd of October, 1891, Chaudhri Fateh Chand executed a second mortgage of the same village, also by way of conditional sale, in favour of the appellant and of one Anant Ram to secure repayment of a sum of Rs. 10,000 and interest.
5. On the 1st of October, 1891, Anant Ram transferred his interest in this mortgage to the respondent, Gaya Prasad. On the 27th of September, 1893, the appellants, Bansidhar and Kunj Bihari Lal, instituted a suit, No. 123 of 1893, for foreclosure, under their mortgage of the 20th of July, 1889, against Chaudhri Raj Kumar, the only son of the mortgagor, Chaudhri Fateh Chand, who was then dead, as the principal defendant, and also against the respondent, Gaya Prasad, as a puisne incumbrancer.
6. On the same date Gaya Prasad instituted a suit for foreclosure under the puisne mortgage of the 22nd of October, 1889. On the 22nd of December, 1894, foreclosure decrees were passed in both these suits, and six months' time was allowed for redemption. The time for redemption was extended from time to time until ultimately, on the 3rd of January, 1896, Gaya Prasad, the respondent in the present suit, in order to prevent an order absolute for foreclosure being passed against him, paid into Court the sum which was then due to the mortgagees on foot of the mortgage of the 20th of July, 1889, namely, the sum of Rs. 15,093. This money was subsequently drawn out of Court by the appellants, Bansidhar and Kunj Bihari Lal, the mortgagees.
7. Having paid the amount so due, Gaya Prasad acquired all the rights and powers of the first mortgagees in respect of the mortgaged property by virtue of Section 74 of the Transfer of Property Act. He thereupon, on the 3rd of August, 1897, made an application to the Court in the first mentioned mortgage suit, and prayed in it that the right of the defendant in that suit to redeem the mortgaged property might be extinguished, and an order absolute for foreclosure granted in his (the applicant's) favour. The learned Subordinate Judge, by an order dated the 6th November, 1897, refused this application on the ground, as he says in his judgment, that Gaya Prasad, by paying off the mortgage debt and so becoming the representative of the mortgagees under Section 74 of the Act to which we have referred, was only entitled to bring a suit for foreclosure, and "had not acquired the status of a decree-holder," and that while he was a defendant he could not execute the decree as a decree-holder, and could not get a decree for absolute foreclosure. There was no appeal from this order. Gaya Prasad acquiesced in it and brought the present suit.
8. The appellant, Bansidhar, alone of the defendants, has defended the suit, and his principal defence was that the suit does not lie, inasmuch as a decree for foreclosure of the property in question has already been passed in a suit to which the plaintiff, Gaya Prasad, is a party, and that the questions sought to be raised in this suit were determinable on an application for execution in the former suit under Section 244 of the Civil Procedure Code, and not by a separate suit.
9. The Subordinate Judge did not accede to this contention, but gave a decree for foreclosure in favour of the plaintiff-respondent, holding that the decree passed in favour of Bansidhar and Kunj Bihari Lal in suit No. 123 of 1893 had, under Section 86 of the Transfer of Property Act, been fully satisfied by the payment made by Gaya Prasad, and that "after the satisfaction of the prior debt there remained no dispute between the decree-holders" (sic). We presume by this last paragraph that he intended to convey that between the original decree-holders and the representatives of the mortgagor there remained no dispute for determination. We do not clearly understand the reasons assigned by the learned Subordinate Judge for his judgment, but we presume that he meant by it that, inasmuch as the plaintiffs, the prior mortgagees, had been paid off, there was no party interested as a decree-holder before the Court who could enforce execution of the decree, and that consequently Section 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure had no application. This is the most favourable construction for the respondent which we can put upon the language of the judgment. Is this view correct? It seems to us clear that Gaya Prasad, who, as second mortgagee, was a party to the suit, when he paid off the claim of the plaintiffs, acquired under Section 74 of the Transfer of Property Act all the rights and powers of the first mortgagees, the decree-holders, in respect of the mortgaged property, and in effect stepped into the shoes of the plaintiffs, so far as regarded the enforcement of their rights. He practically became the decree-holder in place of the original decree-holders. The suit was not thereby terminated, nor did the plaintiffs cease to be parties to it, although they ceased no doubt to have any substantial interest in its further prosecution. It still remained for the Court to adjust the rights and liabilities of all parties to the suit in respect of the mortgaged property and in respect of costs; and if necessary for that purpose, to make and enforce an absolute order for foreclosure. The right which belonged to the plaintiffs to have the primary decree effectually worked out by execution passed to Gaya Prasad by virtue of Section 74 of the Act above referred to, he having satisfied the claim of the plaintiffs. With the change of interest so caused the suit continued to be a subsisting suit. If this is not the effect of the section, and if payment under it terminates a suit, it is obvious that serious loss in costs and time Would be incurred by puisne mortgagees--parties to the suit--who might be desirous of redeeming or of enforcing their claims, inasmuch as in order to redeem or enforce their claims, they would be obliged to institute separate suits, and the costs incurred by them in the earlier suit would be thrown away. If, as we think, the suit continued as a subsisting suit after the payment of the plaintiff's claim, and if Gaya Prasad acquired a right to prosecute the suit with a view to protect his own interests, then it is clear upon the authorities in this Court that the application which was made by him for an order absolute for foreclosure was proper, and the only application he could make, and was an application in execution under Section 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure and ought to have been granted.
10. In the case of Kidar Nath v. Lalji Sahai (1889) I.L.R. 12 All. 61 it was held by a Full Bench of this Court that the order mentioned in Section 87 of the Transfer of Property Act, i.e, an order absolute for foreclosure, is an order in execution of the primary decree for foreclosure, and is appealable as a decree under Section 244 read with Section 2 of the Civil Procedure Code. This decision was followed by a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Oudh Behari Lal v. Nageshar Lal (1890) I.L.R. 13 All. 278. A different view upon thie question was taken by the Calcutta High Court in the case of Ajudhia Pershad v. Baldeo Singh (1894) I.L.R. 21 Calc. 818 which has been followed by that Court in several later decisions. We, however, are bound by rulings of the Full Bench of this Court. The learned advocate for the respondent, recognizing that the decisions of this Court were against him on this question had recourse to an ingenious argument. He says that in suit No. 123 of 1893, the suit in which his client, Gaya Prasad, paid the amount of the prior mortgagee's claim, Bansidhar was not a party in the capacity of a puisne incumbrancer, but in that of a prior mortgagee only, and that, inasmuch as his claim in that suit as a prior mortgagee was satisfied, the suit came to an end so far as he was concerned, and no claim which he had as puisne mortgagee could have been determined in that suit, and that a separate suit became necessary for the purpose of having the questions decided, which are raised in the present litigation. We wholly fail to appreciate this contention. Bansidhar was first mortgagee and also a puisne incumbrancer. He could not as first mortgagee sue himself as a puisne mortgagee, and therefore he was not named a party defendant as well as a plaintiff, but he made his co-mortgagee in the puisne mortgage a defendant, as such puisne mortgagee, so that all persons who had an interest in the mortgaged property might be represented before the Court. The personality of a plaintiff to a suit of this kind cannot be split up so as to enable him or any other party to say that he was before the Court in respect of one interest which he possessed in the mortgaged property and not of another. If, instead of an order for foreclosure, an order for sale had been made, and the property had been sold and conveyed to a stranger, could Bansidhar have afterwards been listened to, if he contended that the sale was not binding on him as a puisne mortgagee, inasmuch as he was not a party to the suit as a puisne mortgagee, but only as a first mortgagee? Clearly not. So here when Bansidhar sought the aid of the Court as a plaintiff in the enforcement of his right as first mortgagee, he necessarily submitted for the Court's adjudication all questions arising in regard to his rights or liabilities generally in respect of the mortgaged property.
11. But another point has been made by the learned pleader for the respondent. He argues that, inasmuch as the mortgagor has not appealed from the decree which has been passed in this suit, the appellant has no locus standi for appealing. An obvious answer to this is, that the plaintiff-respondent made the appellant a party to the suit, and that a decree has been passed against him. It does not, therefore, lie in the respondent's mouth now to say that the appellant has not a right to appeal.
12. The decision of the Subordinate Judge in the former suit refusing to give Gaya Prasad an order absolute for foreclosure was a wrong decision, and would most certainly have been set aside on appeal, but Gaya Prasad submitted to and acquiesced in it, and he must take the consequences.
13. For the foregoing reasons we are of opinion that this suit is not maintainable. We hold that it is barred by the provisions of Sections 244 of the Civil Procedure Code, and that the plaintiff-respondent has mistaken his remedy, and should have appealed against the order of the 6th of November, 1897, instead of instituting a separate suit. We therefore allow this appeal. We set aside the decree of the lower court as against all the persons impleaded as defendants, and we direct that the suit do stand dismissed.
14. The case is a hard one upon the respondent, for in bringing the suit he followed the ruling of the Subordinate Judge after the latter had refused to give him an order to which he was entitled. The appellant was represented at the hearing of that application, and must have acquiesced in, if he did not support, the ruling.
15. Under these circumstances we do not think that this is a case in which costs should be awarded to the appellant, and we accordingly make no order as to costs of this appeal.
Alert