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Kanhaiya Lal v. Jagannath Prasad

Allahabad High Court
Nov 16, 1920
Smart Summary (Beta)

Analytical Summary of the Opinion (as provided)

Factual and Procedural Background

A suit was instituted in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Cawnpore by a firm styled "Jagannath Prasad, etc." against one Kanhaiya Lal for damages for non-delivery of goods. The defendant, Kanhaiya Lal, was alleged to be 22 years of age; he pleaded infancy and other defences, and a written statement denying the contract and setting up infancy and wagering defences was filed on his behalf by one Lachmi Narain. Issues were settled by the Judge on 9 January 1919. The question of the defendant's minority was separately tried and decided against him in March (year as in the opinion).

When the trial day came in May the parties agreed to refer their dispute to arbitration; the issues already settled were, by order of court, referred to an arbitrator. The arbitrator made an award on 23 June in favour of the defendant, holding that although the defendant was of age there had been no contract, and dismissed the suit. On 25 June the plaintiff filed objections in the Court of the Subordinate Judge seeking to set aside the award, alleging fraud and collusion between the defendant and the arbitrator, failure by the defendant to file his own written statement after the decision on age, and other misconductal complaints against the arbitrator.

On 16 September the Subordinate Judge set aside the award on the ground that the absence of a further written statement by the defendant invalidated the reference and the arbitration. The defendant applied to the High Court in revision to quash that order. The High Court (Walsh, J., with Piggott, J. concurring) considered the legality of the Subordinate Judge's interference and the scope of revisional jurisdiction in relation to arbitration awards and the trial court's order of reference.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the absence of a further written statement by the defendant after the decision on his minority could invalidate the order of reference to arbitration and the resulting award.
  2. Whether the Subordinate Judge had jurisdiction to set aside the award on the ground relied upon (i.e., that a further written statement was not filed), effectively reversing the earlier order of reference.
  3. What is the correct scope of judicial review/revision in respect of awards and orders of reference under the Code of Civil Procedure (including the interplay of paragraph 15 of Schedule II and provisions such as sections 104, 105 and 115 as discussed by the Court)?

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The plaintiff objected to the award and prayed that it be set aside on grounds including alleged fraud and collusion between the defendant and the arbitrator (implying misconduct by the arbitrator).
  • The plaintiff also relied upon the fact that, after the decision against the defendant as to his age, the defendant did not file a written statement of his own (this omission was asserted as a ground invalidating the arbitration and award).
  • Additional complaints of misconduct against the arbitrator were raised in the objections, though the opinion characterises them as "trumpery" and does not particularise them further.

Defendant's Arguments

  • The defendant adopted the written statement filed by Lachmi Narain, which denied the contract and pleaded infancy and wagering.
  • The defendant resisted the setting aside of the award and sought revision in the High Court to quash the Subordinate Judge's order that had set aside the arbitration award.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ghulam Khan v. Muhammad Hassan (Privy Council) Establishes treatment of arbitrations under the Code of Civil Procedure (head I situations where the trial court supervises proceedings). If an arbitrator proceeds regularly and decides only matters referred to him, errors of law or fact in the award (on matters actually in dispute) cannot be corrected by the parties and, if the award is duly made and an application to set it aside is dismissed by the trial Court, that Court must pronounce a decree in accordance with the award; such a decree is final and not appealable. The Court relied on Ghulam to show that once the dispute was referred under head I, the regularity of proceedings up to the point of reference cannot be reopened; the Privy Council's emphasis on the finality of awards informed the conclusion that the Subordinate Judge had no jurisdiction to set aside the award on the ground used.
Lutawan v. Lachya (Full Bench of this High Court) Interprets paragraph 15 of Schedule II and the phrase "or being otherwise invalid." The Full Bench held that the original (trial) court should decide objections to an award on the ground of invalidity from any cause, but the phrase must be limited: the decision must be a real decision of some ground which, if it existed, would invalidate an award. Trivial, idle, or irrelevant objections will not suffice as a decision of invalidity. The Court used Lutawan to explain that although the original court has jurisdiction to decide objections of invalidity, that jurisdiction is confined to genuine grounds affecting the validity of the award. The Subordinate Judge's reasoning was held not to amount to a real ground affecting validity.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in a sequence anchored to the statutory framework and the authorities cited:

  1. The Subordinate Judge's decision was described as "clearly indefensible." The Court emphasised that both parties were bound by the order of reference as to all matters covered by it, including the pleadings and the issues as settled at the time of the reference.
  2. After the order of reference, it was too late for either party to object to the form of the proceedings or to the issues as they existed at the time of reference. Any objection to pre-reference proceedings would have been out of time once the court had made the order of reference.
  3. The Court observed that the defendant himself could not have objected after the reference, and the plaintiff had even less ground to complain about the absence of a fresh written statement by the defendant, since any prejudice from that omission would have fallen on the defendant alone.
  4. The ground relied on by the Subordinate Judge (lack of a further written statement) was characterised as, in reality, an objection to the arbitrator's decision disguised as an objection to the trial court's proceedings. By setting aside the award on that basis, the Subordinate Judge had effectively reversed the earlier order of reference without any change in circumstances other than the making of the award.
  5. The Court examined the relevant authorities. Drawing on Ghulam Khan, it reiterated that in "head I" cases (where the trial court supervises the arbitration) the agreement to refer and the court's order of reference are final for the purpose of regularity of pre-reference proceedings; the original court should not be reopening those matters. From Lutawan, the Court accepted that paragraph 15's residual phrase "or being otherwise invalid" gives the original court authority to decide objections of invalidity, but that such a decision must be a real decision of some substantive ground that would, if established, invalidate the award.
  6. Applying those principles, the Court concluded the Subordinate Judge had travelled outside his jurisdiction and acted with material irregularity by setting aside the award on an irrelevant ground that did not affect the award's validity.
  7. The Court acknowledged the tension identified in authorities about allowing revision where an attempt is made effectively to re-open or review an arbitrator's decision; the Privy Council had warned about permitting revision in such circumstances because it undermines the finality of awards. Nevertheless, the present case was held to be one where the Subordinate Judge had exceeded jurisdiction and therefore revision was appropriate.
  8. Justice Piggott (concurring) treated the matter as substantially a question of procedure and emphasised interpretational issues under sections 115 and 105 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He expressed a preference for a liberal interpretation of "affecting the decision of the case" in section 105 so that procedural errors by trial courts can be remedied, but concurred in the order disposing of the objectionable order below, while reserving his view on the wider point of the proper remedy under section 105.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The High Court set aside the order of the Subordinate Judge (described in the opinion as the Order of the Subordinate Judge of the 20th of September, 1939) that had set aside the arbitrator's award, and restored the application to the Court file to enable a decree to be passed in accordance with the award.

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The order of the Subordinate Judge setting aside the award was quashed.
  • The application to have a decree entered in accordance with the arbitrator's award was restored to the file to be dealt with according to law.
  • The plaintiff was ordered to pay the costs in the High Court and the costs of the proceedings in the Court below.

Broader implications: The Court emphasised and restored the intended finality of arbitration awards under the statutory scheme (subject to genuine grounds of invalidity under paragraph 15). The opinion expressly disavows any desire to depart from the principle that genuine objections of invalidity to arbitration proceedings and awards should be decided by the original court; but it also confirms that the original court may not set aside an award on trivial or irrelevant grounds that do not affect the award's validity. The opinion does not purport to lay down a new precedent beyond application of the existing authorities cited.

Show all summary ...

Walsh, J.:— In this case a suit was brought in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Cawnpore by a firm named Jagannath Prasad, etc. against one Kanhaiya Lal, who was alleged to be 22 years of age, for damages for non-delivery of goods. The defendant alleged infancy, and a written statement was filed on his behalf by one Lachmi Narain, in which the contract was denied, and the defences of infancy and of wagering were set up. Issues were settled by the Judge on the 9th of January, 1919. The question of the defendant's minority was separately tried and was decided against him in March. When the day for the trial in May arrived the parties decided to refer their dispute to arbitration, and the issues which had been struck were, by order of Court, referred to an arbitrator, who made an award on the 23rd of June in favour of the defendant, holding that, although the defendant was of age, there had been no contract, and dismissing the suit.

On the 25th of June, the plaintiff filed objections in the Court of the Subordinate Judge praying that the award be set aside. These objections alleged, first, fraud and collusion between the defendant and the arbitrator, and necessarily, therefore, misconduct by the arbitrator, secondly, failure by the defendant to file a written statement of his own after the decision against him as to his age, and, thirdly, further trumpery complaints of the nature of misconduct against the arbitrator, not necessary to particularize here.

On the 16th of September, in spite of the fact that the defendant had adopted the written statement of Lachmi Narain, and that the issues originally settled had been expressly referred to the arbitrator by the Court, the Subordinate Judge held that the absence of a further written statement by the defendant invalidated the reference and the arbitration, and that therefore the award was invalid, and he set it aside. The defendant now applies to this Court in revision to quash the order, and an objection is raised to the jurisdiction of this Court to interfere. This objection gives rise to a technical question of some difficulty.

The decision of the Subordinate Judge is clearly indefensible. The ground upon which he has interfered is no ground at all for questioning either the arbitration proceedings or the award. Both parties were bound by the order of reference as to all matters covered by it, including the pleadings as they then stood and the issues as settled. After the order of reference it was too late for either party to object to the form of the proceedings anterior to the reference, or to the form of the issues. The defendant could not have done so himself, and the plaintiff had less ground, if possible, than the defendant for objecting to the absence of a fresh written statement, as the prejudice, if any, would affect the defendant alone. The ground upon which the learned Judge has acted is, in fact, an objection to the decision of the arbitrator, in the guise of an objection to the proceedings of the trial court, and the decision of the Subordinate Judge amounts to a reversal of the order of reference passed by the same Court, without any change in the circumstances, except the execution of the order by the holding of the arbitration and the making of the award. In other words, it is equivalent to an order refusing to stay the suit where there has been not only an agreement, but an order to refer to arbitration. It is not so in terms, otherwise it would be appealable under section 104.

In the course of the argument we were referred to the case of Ghulam Khan v. Muhammad Hassan , the leading authority in the Privy Council on arbitration law as laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, and to that of Lutawan v. Lachya , a Full Bench decision of this High Court. In both cases a decree had been passed in accordance with, and not in excess of, an award, so that the point to be decided differed from the question now raised. It is necessary, therefore, to examine the principles established by those cases, which are, of course, binding upon us.

Their Lordships point out that the Code deals with arbitrations under three heads. Only the first of these need concern us, namely, where the parties to a litigation refer to arbitration any matter in the suit, so that all proceedings are under the supervision of the trial Court. Subject to that an arbitrator has a free hand. If he proceeds regularly, and decides the matters referred to him and no others, he may make any error of law or fact with reference to the matters actually in dispute, without power of redress to any party, and if the award is duly made and an application to set it aside is dismissed by the trial Court, that Court has no option but to pronounce a decree in accordance with it. Against such decree there is no appeal. Turning to schedule II of the Code; paragraph 15 provides the grounds upon which an award may be set aside. Since the case of Ghulam (supra) was decided the words “or being otherwise invalid” have been added without in any way affecting the decision or the reasons given by their Lordships of the Privy Council. But reasoning mainly from that expression the members of the Court in Lutawan v. Lachya were unanimous in saying that the original court, and no other, should decide any objections to the award on the ground of invalidity from any cause whatever. That is to say, the “otherwise invalid” must not be construed as ejusdem generis with what has gone before it. Accepting to the full that construction, it is necessary to point out that some limitation must be placed upon the words so construed. They cannot mean that a decision merely adopting an idle or wanton objection, however absurd and irrelevant, would be a decision of “invalidity from any cause whatever.” We think the meaning to be put upon the language of the Full Bench is that the decision must be a real decision of some ground, no matter what, which if it existed would invalidate an award. In fact paragraph 15 prescribes and delimits the jurisdiction of the original Court. “No award”, it says “shall be set aside except etc.” The ground taken and adopted in the decision of this case is no ground affecting the validity of the award at all. It is merely a decision that the Court ought not to have referred. Is that a matter affecting the validity of the award once the dispute has been referred? On this point their Lordships say, (29 Calc., 183):—“In cases falling under head I” (as this case now does) “the agreement to refer and the application to the Court founded upon it must have the concurrence of all parties concerned and the actual reference is the order of the Court. So that no question can arise as to the regularity of the proceedings up to that point.” The decision before us in fact questions their regularity, and is based upon it is appears, therefore, to its that the Judge has traveled outside his jurisdiction as expounded by the Privy Council, without deciding any ground in any way affecting the validity of the award. In the ordinary way revision would therefore lie. The Privy Council, however, have pointed out in Ghulam's case that in cases where an attempt is made to review, or avoid a decision on the merits by an arbitrator, revision is more objectionable than an appeal, because the finality of the award would be open to question. But in Ghulam's case they took pains to explain that the application in revision was avowedly an application to set aside the award, and also (p. 186) that the Judge in the original Court, had not exercised a jurisdiction not vested in him by law, or failed to exercise his jurisdiction, or acted in the exercise of his jurisdiction with material irregularity. In our opinion the Judge in this case had no jurisdiction to reverse the order of reference, which he has in substance done, and in setting aside the award on the sole ground of some supposed defect in the order of reference, which was irrelevant, he has acted with material irregularity.

We have taken pains to make the position clear, as, although the result of our order will be to restore to the award that finality which the Legislature intended, it must not be supposed that we desire to depart, or have in any way departed, from the principle of inviolability which attaches to decisions, either upholding or rejecting objections under paragraph 15, when they are in fact decisions upon real objections of invalidity to the arbitration proceedings and award.

The order of the Court is that the order of the Subordinate Judge of the 20th of September, 1939, be set aside, and the application to have a decree passed in accordance with the award be restored to the file of the Court to be dealt with according to law. The plaintiff must pay the costs in this Court and of the proceedings in the Court below.

Piggott, J.:— I agree that the order complained of is quite unsustainable and I am clearly of opinion that the defendant must be allowed some legal remedy against it, so that the only proper ending to the suit necessarily is a decree dismissing the same in accordance with the award of the arbitrator. The difficulty which has been discussed in the judgment of my learned brother strikes me as in substance a question only of procedure. I have myself long inclined to the view that, under the present Code of Civil Procedure, the intention of the Legislature was to impose a somewhat stringent limit on the revisional jurisdiction of this Court by the use of the words “any case which has been decided” in section 115, but at the same time to open a wide door of relief to litigants who have been prejudiced by errors of procedure on the part of the trial courts by means of the provisions of section 105. I certainly think that those honorable judges who are disposed to accept the more rigid view of the effect of section 115, to which I have referred, ought to be prepared to give a very liberal interpretation to the words “affecting the decision of the case” in section 105. Possibly, if I were certain that my own individual view in this matter would prevail, not only at this stage but throughout the articular litigation, I might be disposed to hold that the proper course for the defendant was to wait for the final decree of the trial court and to challenge the order setting aside the award in his memorandum of appeal, in the event of the suit ending in a decree against him. I am aware, however, that there is considerable conflict of judicial opinion over the interpretation of the words, “affecting the decision of the case” in section 105 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and I certainly think it would be unjust to the defendant if he were to fail in the present application by reason of any doubts I might entertain as to the applicability of this Court's revisional jurisdiction and later on be deprived of his remedy by way of appeal on account of any judicial opinion regarding the operation of section 105 of the same Code. For these reasons, subject only to this reservation that I do not stand committed to the proposition that an order like the one here complained of could not be challenged in a petition of appeal under section 105, I concur in the order which has been passed.

Order set aside.