Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Lalta Prasad v. Sri Mahadeoji Birajman Temple

Allahabad High Court
Apr 7, 1920
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant is Lalta Prasad, grandson of Gajadhar Lal. Gajadhar Lal's son predeceased him. In 1914, when the appellant was about seventeen years old, the appellant and his mother (apparently living away from the grandfather's residence) instituted a suit for partition on 18 November 1914, with the appellant suing by his mother as next friend. There is nothing in the record to show that the grandfather knew of that suit. The grandfather made a will on 22 November 1914 and died on 25 November 1914. The appellant challenged the will in the court below on several grounds, including that the testator was not of sound disposing mind at the time of making the will and that, as karta of a joint Hindu family, the grandfather had no power to make a bequest of joint ancestral property to an idol to take effect after his death. The matter was heard by a bench including the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Piggott; Mr. Justice Banerji later joined for assistance. The appeal raises two principal questions of Hindu law: (1) whether the institution of the partition suit by the appellant (a minor suing by his mother as next friend) itself effected a severance of the joint family, and (2) whether the specific bequest in the will (dedicating a portion of family property to an idol) was competent if the testator was a karta of a joint family at death.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the institution of a suit for partition by a minor through a next friend (here, the appellant suing by his mother) operates, by itself and immediately, to sever a joint Hindu family and convert it into separate families.
  2. Whether a Hindu karta of a joint family has the power to devise (by will to take effect after his death) part of the joint ancestral property—specifically, whether the bequest in the fifth clause of the testator's will (dedicating property to an idol) was a competent bequest if the testator remained karta of a joint family at his death.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant contended that the grandfather was not of sound disposing mind when he made the will on 22 November 1914, and therefore the will should be declared null and void.
  • The appellant argued that the institution of the partition suit on 18 November 1914 (brought by him through his mother as next friend) had the legal effect of causing a severance of the joint family.
  • The appellant further argued that even if the suit did not effect severance, the grandfather, as karta of the joint family, had no power to will away joint ancestral property to the idol to take effect after his death, so the bequest under the fifth clause of the will was invalid.

Respondents' Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondents' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Girja Bai v. Sadashiv Dhwndiraj (1916) I.L.R. 43 Calc. 1031 Holds that the institution of a suit for partition by a person sui juris is a clear, unequivocal act that effects severance of a joint family. The court accepted the general rule but limited its scope: it applied the case to confirm that a suit by a person of full capacity effects separation, but held that the rule is not applicable to a suit brought on behalf of a minor through a next friend which has not matured into a decree.
Chelimi Chetty v. Subbammi (1917) I.L.R. 41 Mad. 442 Supports the proposition that a suit for partition brought on behalf of a minor (by a next friend) does not automatically effect a severance of the joint family. The court cited this authority to reinforce the conclusion that a minor's suit represented by a next friend does not by itself create an alteration of status in the family.
Vitle Butten v. Yamenamma (1874) 8 Mad. H.C. Rep. 6 States that when there is a conflict between the right of survivorship (which vests at death in co-sharers) and a right asserted by devise, the right of survivorship, being prior, takes precedence and the devise cannot operate. The court relied on this authority to support the conclusion that a karta cannot devise joint ancestral property to take effect after his death because survivorship rights vest at death and supersede the will.
Suraj Bunsi Koer v. Sheo Persad Singh (1879) I.L.R. 5 Calc. 148 Recognized the principle that survivorship can prevail over a devise; discussed in contexts involving execution against a mortgaged share and earlier rights acquired during the lifetime. Invoked by the court as an example of recognition of the principle that the right of survivorship prevails over a posthumous devise by a coparcener; cited to support the invalidity of the posthumous devise in the present case.
Rathnam v. Sivasubramania (1892) I.L.R. 16 Mad. 353 Referred to in the opinion as part of the body of authority dealing with alienation and devise by coparceners (specific rule paraphrased through citation). Referenced among authorities supporting the court's view that a coparcener cannot effectively dispose of his undivided share by will to take effect after death where survivorship operates.
Lakshman Dada Naik v. Ramchandra Dada Naik (1880) I.L.R. 5 Bom. 48 Privy Council approved the Madras High Court practice: a coparcener may alienate his share by gift inter vivos but cannot dispose of it by will to take effect after death; rationale being that the power of alienation rests on the right to partition which dies with him and survivorship vests at death. The court relied on the Privy Council's reasoning in this case to hold that the testator, as manager/karta, could not devise the joint ancestral property to take effect after his death, so the bequest to the idol was invalid as a posthumous devise.
Order XXXII Rule 12 (Civil Procedure) Procedural rule concerning a minor who attains majority during the pendency of a suit and the effect of his election then to proceed with the suit. The court noted this rule as an "intermediate stage" exception: if a minor attains majority during the pendency of a partition suit and elects to continue, that election may have the same force as if a person of full age had instituted the suit. In the present case this circumstance did not arise because the suit abated on the grandfather's death.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in a two-part analysis corresponding to the two main issues.

  1. Effect of a partition suit brought by a minor through a next friend

    The court acknowledged the established rule (as in Girja Bai) that a partition suit instituted by a person sui juris operates as a clear and unequivocal expression of determination that causes severance of a joint Hindu family. It then considered whether that rule applies when the person suing is a minor represented by a next friend. The court rejected the contention that a minor so represented should be put in the same position as a person sui juris. The reasoning advanced was:

    • A minor cannot demand partition as a right; partition for a minor is a matter within the court's discretion and is granted when it appears for the benefit of the minor.
    • If a minor's next friend (or guardian) could, by instituting a suit, bring about an immediate severance, it would permit persons appointed as guardians (who might be antagonistic to the family) to effect an abrupt and potentially prejudicial alteration of family status without the safeguards that apply to adults.
    • There is an intermediate exception: if a minor attains majority during the pendency of the suit and then elects to continue the action (Order XXXII Rule 12), that election may have the same force as an action commenced by a person of full age. In the present case, however, the suit abated on the death of the grandfather, so the appellant never had the opportunity to attain majority during the pendency and elect to proceed. Consequently, the court concluded that the institution of the suit on 18 November 1914 did not, by itself, sever the joint family.
  2. Competence of the bequest in the will by a karta of a joint family

    The court examined the bequest in the fifth clause of the testator's will, which purported to dedicate a portion (about 1/30th in value) of the family property to Sri Mahadeoji (an idol), stating that the testator would remain in possession during his life and that the bequest was to take effect after his death. The appellant's argument was that a karta cannot make a devise of joint ancestral property to take effect after death because at the moment of death the right of survivorship vests in co-sharers and that right prevails over any devise.

    The court reviewed prior authorities (including Vitle Butten, Suraj Bunsi Koer, Rathnam, and Lakshman Dada Naik) and the reasoning of the Privy Council. The key legal principle extracted from those authorities is that while a coparcener may, in certain circumstances, alienate his undivided share inter vivos (by gift) as part of the exercise of his partition rights, he cannot effectively dispose of his undivided share by will to take effect after his death because the title by survivorship vests in co-sharers at the moment of death and thus there remains nothing in the deceased upon which the will can operate. Applying this principle, the court concluded that the testator had no power to devise the joint ancestral property to the idol to take effect after his death; accordingly, the bequest under the will was ineffective as to the joint property.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The appeal is allowed. The court held that (1) the institution of the partition suit on 18 November 1914 by the appellant (a minor suing by his mother as next friend) did not, by itself, effect a severance of the joint Hindu family; and (2) the bequest in the testator's will (dated 22 November 1914) purporting to devise a portion of the joint ancestral property to the idol to take effect after his death was not competent and therefore did not operate.

Immediate consequences for the parties as stated in the opinion:

  • The appeal is allowed and the plaintiff's claim is decreed as sought in his memorandum of appeal to the Court.
  • Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 are directed to pay the plaintiff's costs of the appeal both in this Court and in the court below.
  • The order of the court below as regards costs of the other defendants is left undisturbed.

The opinion applies existing principles from cited authorities to the facts; it does not state that a new legal precedent is being created beyond applying and clarifying the scope of prior decisions on the effect of a minor's partition suit and on a karta's incapacity to devise joint ancestral property to take effect after death.

Additional Notes

The opinion records that the Court examined and rejected the appellant's contention that the testator lacked testamentary capacity; that question was decided against the appellant and the Court proceeded directly to the two substantial points summarized above. The judgment is delivered by the learned Chief Justice with concurring opinions by Pramada Charan Banerji, J. (who expressly agreed with the Chief Justice's reasoning and order) and by Mr. Justice Pigott (who concurred).

Show all summary ...

1. This appeal raises two interesting and important questions of Hindu Law. It was originally opened before Mr. Justice Piggott and myself, and subsequently we, deemed it proper to have the weight and assistance of Mr. Justice Banerji's wide knowledge and long experience.

2. The facts are quite simple and the points of law stand out in a form very convenient for a clear pronouncement. Lalta Prasad, the plaintiff in the court below and the appellant here, is the grandson of one Gajadhar Lal. Gajadhar Lal had a son,. who died during his life-time, and, in the year 1914, the appellant was about seventeen years of age. Gajadhar Lal and the mother of the appellant were not on good terms, and on the 18th of November, 1914, the appellant and his mother, apparently living away from the residence of the grandfather, commenced a suit for partition, the appellant, being the plaintiff in that case, suing by his mother as next friend. There is nothing to show that the grandfather ever knew of that suit, because, having made a will on the 22nd of November, 1914, he died on the 25th of November, 1914. The terms of the will were displeasing to the appellant, and one of the points taken in the court below and also argued before us was that the grandfather was not, at the time of the execution of the will, of sound disposing mind and that the will was consequently null and void. We examined the evidence on this part of the case and intimated to counsel that in our view, the appellant's contention in that respect was wrong, and thereupon we came at once to what are substantial points in dispute. One of the provisions of the will of the 22nd of November, 1914, was in these terms: "As all the expenses of the temples at Mauzas Bangawan and Ramapur, pargana Cawnpore, in which are seated the idols of Sri Mahadeoji and which (both) were built by my ancestors, have always been defrayed from the family -property, it is incumbent on me, the executant to set apart (a patron of the property for their expenses and management, so that the souls of my ancestors and the members of the family may be benefited thereby in the next worlds and my religious duties may be performed. With this view dedicate the property entered in list B, which is a portion of the entire property owned by me, the executant, to Sri Mahadeoji installed in the temples " aforesaid. The said Sri Mahadeoji shall be the owner thereof neither Lalla Din alias Munna, nor any other person shall have-any right in it. It shall be the exclusive property of Sri Mahadeoji The management of the property shall be made by Lalta Din alias Munna, through his mother, Musammat Sheo Rana Kunwar, during the period of his minority, and by himself after he has become adult." There was also a question as ' to whether the family was joint or separate, and the history of the family was quite clear down to the year 1911. From 1911 until 1914, in fact, up to the death of the testator, there was no suggestion of any amicable partition, but it was said that partition was ipso facto effected by means of a suit instituted on the 18th of November. These, therefore, are the two points for decision.

3. First, whether the institution of the suit by the appellant with his mother as next friend by itself and of itself has the effect in law of creating an alteration of the status of the family so that the -family hitherto joint becomes at once a separate family. The second point is whether the bequest contained in the fifth clause of the will was a competent bequest for a Hindu karta to make, if it was decided that in the circumstances the testator was joint at the time of his death.

4. Now on the first question, it is, of course, accepted law that a person sui juris, who is a member of a joint Hindu family can effect partition and he can bring about that partition by a request to the courts, if other methods prove unavailing, and it has been held and must be taken to be a definite statement of the law that the institution of a suit for partition is such a clear unequivocal and distinct expression of determination that that in itself is sufficient to cause a severance of the joint family. Girja Bai v. Sadashiv Dhwndiraj (1916) I.L.R. 43 Calc. 1031. The point that arises here is whether a minor, who commences an action through, a next friend, stands in any other different position to that of a person sui jurisl

"Now a minor may be. a youth who is so nearly approaching his majority that he. is capable of exercising some, perhaps, even a full measure of discretion upon so vital a question as partition. On the other hand, the minor may be a child three years old; but whether three years old or seventeen years of age, the law, requires that that minor shall be represented in the suit' by a next friend, and it has been argued before us that a mingr, so represented by a next friend, can, by the very institution of a suit, effect the same immediate legal consequences as would admittedly follow from a suit brought by a man sui juris. We cannot agree with that contention at all. It is evident that it would open up great dangers, a person might be appointed guardian of a minor, who was in a position of antagonism to the rest of the family, and who would, by reason of the rule of law contained in the above case, have the immense power by his or her own will alone of bringing about an immediate alteration of status in a family that might otherwise be quite united. The effect, therefore, we think, of an action brought by a minor through his next friend is not to create any alteration of status of the family, because a minor cannot demand as of right a separation; it is only granted in the discretion of the Court when, in the circumstances, the action appears to be for the benefit of the minor. See Chelimi Chetty v. Subbammi ( 1917) I.L.R. 41 Mad. 442. There is one intermediate stage and that is the case of a minor who, during the pendency of a suit, becomes of full age and in that case the provisions of Order XXXII Rule 12, apply, and in the event of a minor, who has attained his majority, during the pendency of a suit for partition, coming to a court and insisting on his right to continue the action, it may very well be that, at the moment when he was, by reason of having attained his majority, regarded by the law as a person competent to make up his own mind upon the matter, it may well be that on his appearing before a court and electing to proceed with the suit that that .election would be deemed to have the same force as at the time attaches tar. the election of. a man of full age who commences an"
action. for partition,. Inasmuch as in the present case the. suit abated by reason of the death of the grand father, the time never arrived for this appellant to show whether he was minded ,to continue the action and therefore we are of opinion that the joint family did not become separate by the institution of the action of the 18th of November, 1914.

5. Now the second point which was taken on behalf of the appellant was that the property, included in the will under the fifth head which in value was about l/30th of the family property, did not pass to the idol, because the grandfather had no power to will it away. In argument, it has been said that whatever power the karta of a joint Hindu family may have of making a gift inter vivos, he Has no power to make a bequest, because at the moment of his death, his rights' have passed to the surviving members of the Hindu family and then there is a conflict between the right of survivorship-and the alleged right under the will and that the right of survivorship prevails and in support of that contention we have been shown three authorities. The first one is to be found in Vitle Butten v. Yamenamma (1874) 8 Mad. H.C. Rep.,6. In that case an adopted son sought to set aside a will made by his adoptive father who had purported to dispose of immovable ancestral property. Therefore, leaving out the immaterial fact that it was a between an adopted son and an adoptive father, we get a very similar set of circumstances in that case to those which we are considering today. The Court in that case say: "We are of opinion that the will in the case referred to cannot take effect, 'At the moment of death the right of survivorship is in conflict with the right by devise. Then the title by survivorship, being the prior title, takes precedence to the. exclusion of that by devise." They then proceeded to declare the will of no effect as a valid devise of property in favour of, the defendant. Now that case has been referred to with approval in Suraj Bunsi Koer v. Sheo Persad Singh (1879) I.L.R. 5 Calc. 148 (161), Rathnam v. Sivasubramania (1892) I.L.R. 16 Mad. 353 and Lakshman Dada Naik v. Ramchandra Dada Naik (1880) I.L.R. 5 Bom. 48 (61) In the last mentioned case their Lordships of the Privy Council approved of the practice of the High Court of Madras, who have by their decisions admitted that a copartner; can effectually alienate his share by gift but have ruled that he cannot dispose of it by will. Their Lordships further say:-" Its reasons for making this distinction between a gift and a devise are, that the co-parcener's power of alienation is founded on his right to a partition; that that dies with him; and that, the title of his co-sharers by survivorship vesting in them at the moment of his death, there remains nothing upon which the will can operate. This principle was invoked in the case of Suraj Bunsi Koer v. Sheo Persad Singh (1879) I.L.R. 5 Calc. 148 (161), and was fully recognized by their Lordships, although they decided the particular case, which was one of an execution against a mortgaged share, on the ground that the proceedings had then gone so far in the life-time of the mortgagee as to give, not with standing his death, a good title against his co-sharers to the execution purchasers. It follows from what has been said that the weight of positive authority at Madras, as well as at Bombay, is against the proposition of the learned Counsel for the appellant. Their Lordships are not disposed to extend the doctrine of the alienability by a co-parcener of his undivided share without the consent of his co-sharers beyond the decided cases,"

6. With these cases to guide us it is clear that the plaintiff must succeed in this appeal on the ground that his grandfather by the will made on the 22nd of November, 1914, had no power to transfer the joint ancestral property to the idol, a devise which, it should be noticed, was to take effect after his death, he having in the will stated that he was to remain, as long as he lived, in possession of the property. In these circumstances the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge of Cawnpore must be overruled and the appeal allowed.

7. We allow the appeal, decree the plaintiff's claim by granting him the declaration, sought in his memorandum of appeal to this Court and direct that the respondents. Nos. 1 and 2 shall pay the plaintiff's costs of the appeal here and in the court below. As regards costs of the other defendants we do not interfere with the order of the court below.

Pramada Charan Banerji, J.

8. I am of the same opinion and agree with the judgment of the learned, Chief Justice on both the questions discussed in this appeal. The rule laid down by their Lord ships of the Privy Council in Girja Bai v. Sadashiv Dhundiraj (1916) I.L.R. 43 Calc. 1031, to the effect that the institution of a suit for partition of joiat family proparty has the effect of creating a separation of the joint family, cannot be applicable to a suit brought on behalf of a minor which has not matured into a decree. The reasons for the exception are stated in the judgment of the learned Chief Justice and I have nothing to add to them. The same view was held by the Madras High Court in Chelimi Chetty v. Subbamma (1917) I.L.R. 41 Mad. 442. As regards the other point which has been raised in this appeal, there can be no doubt that the manager of a joint Hindu family cannot by will devise any portion of the joint family property to take effect after his death, inasmuch as upon his death he ceases to be the manager of the family and has no estate left in him which can pass to the legatee under the will. This is manifest from the authorities which have been referred to in the judgment ' of the learned Chief Justice. I agree with the order proposed.

Pigott, J.

9. I concur.