Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Bijai Misir v. Kali Prasad Misir

Allahabad High Court
Mar 30, 1917
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Judgment Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs sued for, among other reliefs, possession of a share in the village of Bankata. Certain cosharers in that village applied for partition of their shares under Section 107 of the Land Revenue Act. Notices were issued to recorded cosharers under Section 110. On 11 September 1912 the parties to this suit and other cosharers applied under Clause (2) of Section 107, specifying the extent of the shares to be formed into a single lot (qura). Following that application, the Revenue Court drew up a proceeding under Section 114 declaring the basis upon which partition was to be effected and recorded the plaintiffs' share as set out in their application. Nearly a year later, in August 1913, the plaintiffs instituted the present civil suit for possession of the disputed share. The key procedural question before the court was whether the civil suit was barred by Section 233-K of the Land Revenue Act.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the present civil suit is barred by the prohibition in Section 233-K of the Land Revenue Act, i.e., whether a civil Court can take cognizance of this suit given the prior partition proceedings in the Revenue Court.
  2. What is the proper meaning of the expression "partition or union of mahals" within Section 233-K — whether it refers to the creation/alteration of revenue "units" (mahals) by the Revenue Court, or also includes the determination of title to specific land allotted in partition proceedings.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Shambhu Singh v. Daljit Singh Considered in relation to whether suits challenging matters dealt with in partition proceedings before the Revenue Court are barred by S.233-K; earlier decision held that certain suits were barred (as referred by the majority) while Richards C.J. had earlier held in that case that a suit was not barred. Banerji, J. observed that the present case would have been fully concluded by prior authority but for the Shambhu Singh decision; he found the present case distinguishable but expressed inability to acquiesce in all that was said in Shambhu Singh. Tudball, J. treated Shambhu Singh as distinguishable because, in that case, the subject-matter had not previously been the subject of partition proceedings. Richards, C.J. had given reasons in Shambhu Singh for holding that such a suit was not barred and referred to that earlier reasoning in the present judgment.
Muhammad Sadiq v. Laute Ram Principle (as observed by Straehey, C.J.) that if the object of a suit is to establish ownership and possession with respect to property which the Revenue Authorities in making a partition have declared should go to another party, that matter relates to partition and is therefore within S.233 so that a civil Court is forbidden to take cognizance. Banerji, J. relied on this observation to conclude that the present suit was, in substance, a suit in respect of the partition of a mahal and therefore barred by S.233-K. He noted that this authority was a Full Bench decision by five Judges and was followed in subsequent cases.
Kalka Prasad v. Manmohan Lal Referenced by Richards, C.J. as a case decided about the same time as Shambhu Singh and used in support of the view that certain suits are not barred by S.233-K; Richards referred to his reasoning in these cases for holding that a suit may not be barred. Richards, C.J. cited his earlier reasoning in Kalka Prasad (along with Shambhu Singh) to support the position that the present suit might be cognizable; he used these authorities to explain an alternative interpretation of S.233-K which limits its scope to the creation/alteration of revenue "units" rather than every question of title.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's judgment was delivered by a panel in which the judges expressed differing analyses and reached a majority decision to dismiss the appeal. The analysis can be summarized in the distinct positions taken by the three judges whose opinions appear in the text.

Banerji, J. (majority view)

  • He considered the substance of the plaintiffs' claim, not its form, and concluded the present suit was in substance a suit concerning the partition of a mahal within the meaning of Clause K of Section 233.
  • Section 233-K was read as prohibiting civil Courts from taking cognizance of suits in respect of matters listed therein, including "partition or union of mahals except as provided in Ss. 111 and 112."
  • He relied on the Full Bench authority in Muhammad Sadiq v. Laute Ram (as explained by Straehey, C.J.) for the proposition that a suit whose object is to claim ownership/possession of property which the Revenue Authorities in partition proceedings have declared should go to another is a matter relating to partition and thereby barred.
  • He rejected the notion that res judicata applied in this case; rather, the suit was barred by the specific statutory prohibition in S.233-K (i.e., it was not res judicata but a statutory bar).
  • Although he noted the decision in Shambhu Singh v. Daljit Singh, he found either the facts or some of the principles in that case to be distinguishable or not fully acceptable, but did not elaborate beyond saying he could not acquiesce in all that was said there.
  • Conclusion: the present suit is barred by S.233-K and the appeal should be dismissed.

Tudball, J. (concurring with majority)

  • He characterized the suit as an attempt to annul or reverse the partition made by the Revenue Court and emphasized that the appellants had been parties to the partition proceedings and the disputed property had been the subject-matter of those proceedings.
  • On that basis he considered the case an obvious application of Clause K of Section 233 and dismissed the appeal.
  • He expressly distinguished the present matter from Shambhu Singh on the factual ground that in Shambhu Singh the subject-matter had not been the subject of partition proceedings.

Richards, C.J. (dissenting in part; concurring in outcome)

  • He agreed with the factual narrative but did not accept the majority's broader reading that S.233-K necessarily barred the present suit in all circumstances.
  • Richards C.J. analysed the phrase "partition or union of mahals" and proposed that "partition" should be read as the opposite of "union of mahals", meaning the creation or alteration of revenue "units" (mahals) by the Revenue Court.
  • Under that interpretation, Section 233-K would bar civil suits that seek to affect the revenue "unit" itself (i.e., the configuration of the mahal), but would not necessarily bar ordinary civil suits for possession where a judgment in the civil Court would not alter the revenue unit created by the Revenue Court—only ownership within that unit.
  • He recognized the practical concern of allowing parties to partition proceedings to re-open title issues in civil courts and noted the potential benefits of settling such questions in the Revenue Court, but warned that an interpretation which prevents persons (especially those not party to partition proceedings) from asserting rights in civil Courts could cause grave injustice.
  • Richards C.J. stated that at least one of his colleagues might have held the suit cognizable but that, given the plaintiff had been a party to the Revenue partition proceedings, he appreciated the force of the majority's objection. He nevertheless explained his different interpretative approach to Section 233-K.

Holding and Implications

Holding: APPEAL DISMISSED — the Court ordered that the appeal be dismissed with costs.

Implications (as stated in the opinion):

  • The majority concluded that the civil suit was barred by Section 233-K of the Land Revenue Act because, in substance, it sought relief in respect of partition or matters dealt with in prior partition proceedings in the Revenue Court.
  • Richards, C.J. recorded a narrower interpretation of "partition or union of mahals" (focused on the creation/alteration of revenue units) and warned that a broad application of the majority's view could prevent persons who were not parties, or who had not been in a position to raise title issues in Revenue Court proceedings, from asserting rights in civil Courts — a result he viewed as potentially unjust in some circumstances.
  • Direct effect on the parties: the plaintiff's civil suit for possession was not allowed to proceed; the appeal by the plaintiffs was dismissed and costs were awarded against them.
  • The court's disposition follows the majority view; the judgment records disagreement as to the proper scope of Section 233-K and notes possible practical consequences, but the order itself simply dismisses the appeal with costs. The text does not purport to lay down any broader rule beyond the result in this case other than the reasoning explained by the judges.
By the Court — The order of the Court is that the appeal is dismissed with costs. V.B/R.K
Show all summary ...

Banerji, J.:— In this suit out of which this appeal has arisen the plaintiffs claimed, among other reliefs, possession of a share in the village of Bankata and it is this part of the claim with which we are concerned in this appeal. It appears that certain cosharers in the aforesaid village applied for partition of their shares under Section 107 of the Land Revenue Act. Notice was issued to all the recorded cosharers as required by S. 110 of the Act and thereupon an application was made on 11th September 1912, by the parties to this suit and other cosharers under Cl. (2) of the section, praying for partition of their shares. In that application they set forth the extent of the shares which they prayed should be formed into one lot or qura. After this application was made a proceeding was drawn up by the Revenue Court under S. 114 of the Act declaring the basis upon which, partition was to be effected and in that proceeding the extent of the plaintiffs share was put down as that mentioned in the application to which I have referred. Nearly a year after this, that is, in August 1913, the plaintiffs instituted the present suit. The question to be determined is whether the suit is barred by the provisions of Section 233-K of the Land Revenue Act. I should have considered that the point was fully concluded by authority in this Court had it not been for the decision in the recent case of Shambhu Singh v. Daljit Singh (1). In my opinion the present suit is in substance a suit in respect of the partition of a mahal within the meaning of Cl. K.S 233. That section provides that no civil Court shall take cognizance of a suit in respect of the several matters mentioned in the section. One of these matters is “partition or union of mahals except as provided in Ss. 111 and 112.” In determining-whether the section applies we have to look to the substance of the claim and not to the form in which it is dressed up.

2. If, as observed by Straehey, C.J, in Muhammad Sadiq v. Laute Ram (2), the object of the suit is to establish the plaintiff's ownership and possession in respect of property as to which the Revenue Authorities in making a partition have declared that it should go to the defendant, that is a matter relating to partition and a civil Court is forbidden to take cognizance of it by the provisions of S. 233. I am unable to distinguish this case from the case last mentioned, which is very similar to the present. It is a Full Bench decision by five Judges of this Court, and the view taken in it was held in subsequent cases also. I see no reason to depart from the course of rulings on the point. No question of res judicata, in my opinion, arises in a case like this. Had the question of the title of the parties been decided by the Revenue Court under Ss. 111 and 112, the matter would have been res judicata.

3. In my opinion the present suit is barred by reason of the prohibition contained in S. 233 and not on the ground of res judicata. It is not necessary for the purposes of this case to say whether I agree or disagree with the ruling in Sambhu Singh v. Daljit Sing referred to above, as the facts of that case are different from those of the present case but if it is deemed that the principle involved in that case is the same as that which arises in this, I am unable, with great deference, to acquiesce in all that was said in that case. In my judgment the decision of the learned Judge of this Court from which this appeal has been preferred under the Letters Patent is correct and I would dismiss the appeal.

Tudball, J.:— The facts of the case have just been stated by my learned colleague Banerji, J. It is unnecessary to repeat them. In substance the present suit is merely an effort to turn round and annul the partition made by the Revenue Court. The appellants were parties to that partition, the property in dispute was the subject-matter of that very proceeding and the present case is nothing but a very very clear instance to which S. 233 Cl. K applies beyond doubt. The case is clearly distinguishable from the case of Shambhu Singh v. Daljit Singh , for in that suit the subject-matter thereof had not been the subject-matter of a partition case in any way at all. I would dismiss the appeal.

Richards, C.J:— The facts have been fully stated by my learned brother Banerji. The property claimed by the plaintiff in the present suit has in recent partition proceedings been allotted to the defendants. The plaintiff was a party to these proceedings and there is no doubt that he could then have put forward the title he now alleges (Sections 111, 112 of the Land Revenue Act). While I do not agree with my learned brothers that the present suit is barred by the provisions of S. 233-K, I quite appreciate the objection of allowing parties to partition proceedings in the Revenue Court to re-open in the civil Court questions of title which could, and ought, to have been decided before partition, in the manner provided by the Revenue Act. If the result of the view taken by the majority of the Court in this case is to settle that parties to portion proceedings in the Revenue Court cannot re-open questions of title in the civil Court, which have been or ought to have been decided before partition, some good and little harm will probably be dona, particularly if the Revenue Courts by their rules and practice give proper facility and opportunity for the raising and decision of such questions. If, however, as a consequence of our decision persons are prevented from asserting their rights in the civil Court merely because of partition proceedings in the Revenue Court to which they were not parties (or in which they were not interested to assert such rights), grave injustice will often be done. The only question for decision in the present appeal is whether or not the civil Court could take cognizance of the present suit having regard to the provisions of Section 233-K of the Land Revenue Act.

4. The suit is in form a suit which is brought every day in the civil Court. It is an ordinary suit for possession of land. Possession of the land in dispute is the appropriate relief for the plaintiff to seek. It is only after at least partial investigation that the suit could possibly be said to have been instituted contrary to the provisions of S. 233-K notwithstanding the partition proceedings. One at least of my colleagues would, I think, have held the suit cognizable, had it not been for the fact that the plaintiff was a party to the proceedings in the Revenue Court, In the case of Shambhu Singh v. Daljitj Singh there had also been partition proceedings and the plaintiff was seeking; to recover possession of property which had been dealt with (wrongly, it is true) in those proceedings. The Court below had held that the suit was barred by S. 233-K. I gave my reasons at some length in that case for holding that the suit was not barred and I referred to another case decided about the same time by the same Bench: Kalka Prasad v. Manmohan Lal (3). My brother Tudball expressed his concurrence in both cases. I did not understand him to take exception to anything I said in the course of my judgment. At the same time it must be admitted that the facts in the case of Shambhu Singh v. Daljit Singh differ materially, at least on the merits.

5. It is, however, common to all three cases that there had been recent partition proceedings in the Revenue Court and the property in dispute in the civil Court had been dealt with by the Revenue Court in the partition proceedings. S. 233-K provides that

“no person shall institute any suit or other proceeding in the civil Court with respect to partition or union of mahals except as provided in Ss. 111 and 112. The question is, what is the meaning of partition or mion of mahals?”

6. The expression “partition” is followed by the expression union of mahals.” In the course of the argument it was said (with the approval of both my colleagues) that “partition” meant the opposite of “union of mahals”. I agree and think that the word “partition” and the words “union of mahals” refer to “units” of area which the revenue authorities create in the course of partition proceedings. If this is the correct meaning of the expressions, the institution of the present suit was not contrary to the provisions of S. 233-K. If the plaintiff in this suit was successful the property would remain in the same unit in which it was placed by the Revenue Court, notwithstanding the plaintiff's decree for possession. The “unit” would not be affected though the ownership of the property in it would be. If the meaning which I give is the correct meaning, then a suit which seeks to affect a “unit” created by the Revenue Court as unit cannot be instituted by any person, whether he was or was not a party to partition proceedings, and the meaning of a badly drawn section becomes comparatively clear. There are obvious reasons why the legislature might have confined the power of altering and creating revenue areas (which for the want of a better name I call “units”) to the Revenue Courts. The reasons for the exclusion (even partial exclusion) of the power to decide questions of title or the right to possession to property in those rights for the civil Court is not so obvious. My learned colleagues agreed that “partition” meant the opposite of “union of mahals;” still they seem to think that it also means the determination of the title to the specific land allotted. It seems to me that to assert that there has been no “partition” in the Revenue Court because the plaintiff was not a party to those proceedings is to assert contrary to fact.

7. The section does not say that a person cannot institute a suit in respect of a partition to which he was a party. It seems to me that the very words “except as provided by Ss. 111-112” show that the expression “partition” is not confined to divisions actually made, because sections 111-112 contemplate the raising of questions of title before partition. The section cannot be read as meaning that no person can institute a suit in the civil Court which can in any way effect a contemplated division of zamindari. Such suits are instituted every day before any proceedings are taken in the Revenue Court and appear to be recognized by the Code of Civil Procedure. The rights of the parties are declared by the civil Court and it is only the actual division that is carried out by the Revenue Court. If you give any meaning to the expression “partition” other than the meaning I have given it and substitute that other meaning of the word “partition” and then read the section giving the language its ordinary meaning, I think you will find that confusion at once arises. It is said that the words “except as provided by Ss. 111-112” show that the expression “partition” means or at least includes the actual division as between the parties and the determination of their title. It may possibly be that the framers of the section hoped the introduction of these words would prevent subsequent questions of title being raised.

8. Another explanation might be to obviate some contradiction or inconsistency between Ss. 111-112 and S. 233-K. If the legislature intended to prevent questions of title being reopened after partition it would have been simpler, fairer, and less calculated to do injustice if the rules of res judicata as laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure had been incorporated. It is unnecessary for me to repeat what I have said in my judgments in Kala Prasad v. Manmohan Lal and Shambhu Singh v. Daljit Singh . As the view of the majority of the Court will prevail, I need not consider what; the order of this Court would have been had the views of my colleagues coincided with mine.

9. By the Court.— The order of the Court is that the appeal is dismissed with costs.

V.B/R.K

10. Appeal dismissed.