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Amina Bibi v. Najm-Un-Nissa Bibi
Summary of Opinion — Tubball and Rafiq, JJ.
Factual and Procedural Background
Sheikh Minnat ullah died leaving a widow (the present plaintiff) and his father Khadim Husain as heirs. Under Muhammadan law the widow was entitled to one-fourth of the estate and the father to three-fourths. A mortgage-deed dated 14 February 1891 shows Nasratullah and Musammat Karamat Bibi borrowed Rs. 7,296 from Minnatullah.
After Khadim Husain's death, his widow (defendant No.1, Musammat Amina Bibi) obtained a succession certificate as to the debt due from the mortgagor. The present six defendants then sued to recover the mortgage-debt, impleading the plaintiff pro formâ (admitting her one-fourth share) and obtaining, on 14 May 1903, a decree for Rs. 17,168-8-0 plus future interest at 9% from the date of suit until payment, and costs. The decree was put into execution and the mortgaged property was sold by auction on 21 May 1906 (auction sale) and the sale was confirmed on 15 July 1906.
The amount due under the decree up to date of sale was Rs. 22,205-13-0. The property was knocked down for Rs. 23,590 (an excess of Rs. 1,384-13-0). The purchasers (identified as defendants Nos. 1–3 in the pleadings, though sale was at one point said to have been knocked down to all defendants) applied under Order XXI, rule 72 to set off the purchase money and decretal amount and had the decree satisfied; they paid into court the small surplus due on their bid beyond the decretal amount.
The present suit was filed by the widow (plaintiff) on 1 June 1912 against all defendants. She sought, primarily, Rs. 8,562-3-6 (her one-fourth share of Rs. 22,205-13-0) plus interest from the auction date (claimed as from 21 May 1906, though the plaintiff alternatively used 15 July 1906) and, alternatively, a one-fourth share in the property with mesne profits.
The lower court held that (1) the money claim was not barred by limitation (applying article 120), and (2) defendants Nos. 4–6 were not liable because they had neither received the plaintiff's share nor purchased the property; the court gave a money decree but disallowed part of the interest claimed. Both the purchasers (defendants Nos. 1–3) and the plaintiff appealed: the purchasers challenged limitation (arguing article 62 applied) and the plaintiff appealed only to recover the full interest claimed.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the plaintiff's suit for one-fourth of the decretal money is barred by limitation, and if so, which article of the Limitation Act governs (article 62 v. article 120).
- Whether the plaintiff is entitled, alternatively, to a one-fourth share of the property purchased at auction and to mesne profits.
- Whether defendants Nos. 4 to 6 are liable to the plaintiff, given that they neither received the decretal money nor purchased the property.
- Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the full interest claimed (issue on the plaintiff's appeal).
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff's Arguments
- The plaintiff claimed her one-fourth share of the decretal sum (Rs. 8,562-3-6) plus interest from the date of the auction sale (she alleged interest from 21 May 1906, but also used the sale-confirmation date 15 July 1906 in places).
- In the alternative, she sought a one-fourth share of the property purchased and mesne profits if the money relief could not be granted.
- She asserted that, for limitation purposes, the period of the defendants' absence on pilgrimage to Mecca (defendants Nos.1–3 having been absent from September 1911 to March 1912) should be allowed in calculating the period of limitation.
- On appeal the plaintiff sought to recover the full interest claimed (i.e., challenged the lower court's disallowance of part of the interest).
Defendants' Arguments
- The defendants pleaded that the suit for a one-fourth share of the recovered money was barred by limitation.
- They contended that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover a share in the property purchased at the auction.
- The defendants Nos. 4 to 6 argued they were not liable because they had neither received the plaintiff's share of the decretal money nor purchased the property in lieu of that money.
- They also relied on the contention that the correct Limitation Act article to govern the claim was article 62 (money had and received) rather than article 120 (as applied by the court below).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Umardaraz Ali Khan v. Wilayat Ali Khan | Authority relied on by the court below for applying article 120 (limitation) to a claim for distributive share. | The court below had based its decision on this authority. The present court held that the headnote is misleading for present purposes: that earlier judgment rejected article 123 but did not discuss article 62, and so it was not decisive on whether article 62 or 120 applied here. |
| Sithamma v. Narayana | Quoted in the Umardaraz judgment to define article 123 as relating to suits against executors/administrators to obtain distributive shares. | The present court noted that the earlier Bench quoted Sithamma to show article 123 did not apply in that case; the present court used that context to explain why Umardaraz did not resolve the present article-62 issue. |
| Mahomed Biasat Ali v. Hasin Banu (Privy Council) | Privy Council held that a similar claim was governed by article 120 and refused to apply article 123. | The present court observed that the Privy Council judgment did not address article 62; it therefore treated that decision as not determinative of whether article 62 or 120 applied to the present money claim. |
| Riasat Ali v. Hasin Banu (Privy Council) | Held that for cash and movables wrongfully seized, article 120 applied; it refused to apply article 123 and stated article 49 was inapplicable to suits to establish inheritance rights. | The court noted that Riasat Ali involved an attempt to establish proprietary/inheritance rights and treated its holding as showing article 120 applied to certain suits for movables/cash, but it differentiated the present case as one concerned with money "received by defendants for the plaintiff's use", leading to article 62 application here. |
| Mahomed Wahib v. Mahomed Ameer | Support for treating a suit for money received for another's use as governed by article 62. | The present court cited this decision as supporting the application of article 62 to the facts of the present suit. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court approached the principal question—whether the money claim was barred by limitation—by identifying the legal character of the claim. It reasoned that the plaintiff's claim was essentially a suit for "money had and received by the defendants for the plaintiff's use" because the plaintiff's right to one-fourth of the decretal money had been openly admitted by the defendants in the execution proceedings. On that basis the court held that article 62 of the Limitation Act governs the claim.
The court explained why earlier authorities relied upon by the lower court (notably Umardaraz Ali Khan v. Wilayat Ali Khan and the Privy Council decision in Mahomed Biasat Ali v. Hasin Banu) did not control the present determination. In particular, the court observed that the earlier decisions had considered and rejected article 123 (the twelve-year rule for suits against executors/administrators to obtain distributive shares) but had not addressed article 62; consequently those judgments did not decide whether article 62 rather than article 120 applied.
The court analysed the effect of the execution and sale: when the bidders (defendants Nos.1–3) had their bid set off against the decretal amount under Order XXI, rule 72, the court regarded this as a convenient mechanism equivalent to the purchasers having paid their bid money and the decree-holders then recovered the decretal amount. On the facts, therefore, the decretal money was treated as having been received by the defendants for the plaintiff's use, bringing the action squarely within article 62.
The court considered and rejected the plaintiff's reliance on section 10 of the Limitation Act (which relates to express trusts). It held section 10 inapplicable because it governs express trusts and not the factual circumstances of the present case.
Regarding the alternative claim for one-fourth of the property, the court addressed equitable entitlement. It noted: the plaintiff was not a co-decree-holder; the purchase price exceeded the decretal amount; the decretal recovery included suit and execution costs; the purchasers had a right to recoup legitimate expenditures (including costs of obtaining the succession certificate). The purchase was effectively made on behalf of three decree-holders and not all. On these specific facts the court concluded the plaintiff was not equitably entitled to a one-fourth share in the property.
Finally, the court applied the limitation period: the plaintiff delayed six years and nine days after the date of the sale before suing, despite the defendants' admission of her right. The court considered this delay fatal; on the applicable article (article 62) the suit was time-barred.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The court held that the plaintiff's suit is governed by article 62 of the Limitation Act and is barred by limitation. The court therefore allowed the (defendants') appeal and dismissed the plaintiff's suit with costs in both courts. The opinion concludes with the direction:
Appeal allowed.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The plaintiff's monetary claim for her one-fourth share of the decretal money was dismissed as time-barred; the plaintiff also failed to establish an equitable right to a one-fourth share of the property purchased at auction; costs were awarded against the plaintiff in both courts.
- Procedural/legal consequence: The court emphasised that a claim that money has been received for the plaintiff's use falls under article 62 (suit for money had and received), and that prior decisions rejecting article 123 do not automatically determine whether article 62 or article 120 governs such claims—each case must be assessed by reference to the legal character of the claim.
- No broader precedent beyond the case facts: The court did not purport to create a new rule beyond applying article 62 to these facts; it distinguished earlier authorities and explained why they did not directly control the outcome here.
Tubball and Rafiq, JJ.:— This and the connected appeal, No. 436 of 1912, arise out of one suit, being cross-appeals from the same decree. The main facts are not in dispute and are as follows:—
Sheikh Minnat ullah died, leaving as his heirs, his widow, the present plaintiff, and his father, Khadim Husain. Under Muhammadan Law, the widow inherited a one-fourth share in his estate and the other three fourths went to the father. The latter died subsequently, leaving the present six defendants as his heirs.
Under a mortgage-deed, dated the 14th of February, 1891, Nasratullah and Musammat Karamat Bibi borrowed Rs. 7,296 from Minnatullah. After the death of Khadim Husain, the first defendant, Musammat Amina Bibi, his widow, obtained a succession certificate in regard to this debt due from the mortgagor. Then she and the remaining defendants jointly sued to recover the mortgage-debt, impleading the present plaintiff as a pro formâ defendant admitting that she was entitled to a one-fourth share; but alleging that she refused to join as plaintiff. On the 14th of May, 1903, they obtained a decree for the recovery of Rs. 17,168-8-0 plus future interest at 9 per cent. per annum from the date of suit up to the date of payment. In addition to this they were awarded their costs. They put the decree into execution. Thereupon the present plaintiff applied to the court to be added to the proceeding as a decree-holder. To this the decree-holders naturally objected, as she was not a decree-holder, and stated that they would pay her one-fourth of the amount recovered after deducting the costs of the suit and execution proceedings. Her application was disallowed on the 19th of February, 1904. The mortgaged property was put to sale and sold for Rs. 23,590. The decree-holders obtained sanction to bid at the auction.
According to the statements in the plaint and the written statement in this suit, the property was purchased by the defendants Nos. 1 to 3, but it is stated before us that the property was knocked down to all the defendants, and that then the other defendants withdrew, saying that the defendants Nos. 1 to 3 were the purchasers. This is of little consequence.
The amount of the debt due under the decree, inclusive of interest, up to the date of sale, was Rs. 22,205-13-0, so that the purchase was for a sum of Rs. 1,384-13-0, in excess of this. The costs of the suit and execution proceedings amounted to a little less than Rs. 1,384-13-0. The purchasers applied under order XXI, rule 72, that the purchase money and the amount due under the decree might be set off against each other and satisfaction of the decree entered up. This was allowed by the court, and they paid into court the small amount which was due on their bid, over and above the total amount of the decree.
The sale was confirmed on the 15th of July, 1906. The present suit was brought by the plaintiff on the 1st of June, 1912, against all the defendants. She sued in the alternative for two reliefs. Primarily she sought to recover Rs. 8,562-3-6 (being Rs. 5,551-7-4, her one-fourth share of Rs. 22,205-13-0) plus Rs. 3,010-12-2, interest from 21st of May, 1906, the date of the auction sale up to the date of suit. The date on which the cause of auction arose, was given as the 15th of July, 1906, the date of the confirmation of the sale.
Apparently in apprehension that the date on which the cause of action arose might be taken to be the date of the sale (21st of May, 1906), she alleged that the defendants 1 to 3 had been absent from India on a pilgrimage to Mecca from September, 1911, to March, 1912, (some six months) and that this period should be allowed to her for the purpose of calculating the period of limitation. In the alternative she pleaded that if the first relief could not be granted then she might be awarded possession of a one-fourth share in the property valued at Rs. 5,897-8-0 and be granted mesne profits.
The defendant among other pleas urged—
(1) That the suit for a one-fourth share of the money was barred by limitation.
(2) That the plaintiff was not entitled to recover a share in the property purchased.
(3) That the defendants Nos. 4 to 6 were in any case not liable as they had neither recovered the money nor purchased the property.
The court below held—
(1) That the money claim was not barred by limitation.
(2) That the defendants Nos. 4 to 6, not having received the plaintiff's share of the decretal money or purchased the property in lieu of the decretal money, were not liable to pay anything to the plaintiff.
It came to no decision in regard to the claim for a share in the property. It gave the plaintiff a simple money decree disallowing a part of the claim for interest. The defendants Nos. 1 to 3 have appealed and the point pressed is that the suit for money is barred by limitation as article 62 applies.
The plaintiff has also appealed as against all the defendants, and the sole point she takes is that she is entitled to all the interest she claimed. She does not on her appeal claim that she is entitled to a decree for possession of the one-fourth share in the property.
We take first the question of limitation. The plea taken is that article 62 of the Limitation Act applies, and not article 120 as applied by the court below, to the money claim. In our opinion article 62 clearly applies. The suit is clearly on the face of it, one for money had and received by the defendants for the plaintiffs use. The court below based its decision that article 120 applied on the authority of the ruling in Umardaraz Ali Khan v. Wilayat Ali Khan . The head note in the report is we think misleading. In that case one heir of a Muhammadan recovered a debt due to her deceased husband. The other heirs sued to recover their shares thereof from the widow. In respect to this claim the court of first instance, applying article 120, held that the suit was barred by limitation, it having been brought more than six years after the cause of action arose. The plaintiff appealed and urged that article 123 applied. This article governs a suit for a legacy or for a share of a residue bequeathed by a testator or for a distributive share of the property of an intestate and allows a period of twelve years. A Bench of this Court repelled this. It held that article 123 refers to a suit in which a plaintiff seeks to obtain his share from a person who either as an executor or an administrator represents the estate of a deceased person and is under a legal obligation to distribute shares to those entitled to them, and that the suit before them was not one of such a nature. They quoted the ruling in Sithamma v. Narayana . They then observed:—“In a recent case decided by their Lordships of the Privy Council, Mahomed Biasat Ali v. Hasin Banu , which was a suit of a nature similar to the present, their Lordships “refused to apply article 123 “and held the claim to “be governed by article 120.”
Nowhere in the judgement did the Judges who decided this case say that article 120 was the proper article to apply, though perhaps this might be inferred to be their opinion from the passage quoted above. Article 62 was not mentioned in the judgement nor apparently was the question now before us discussed at the hearing. For the purpose of that appeal it was unnecessary to discuss or decide whether article 62 or article 120 applied. In either case the suit was barred by limitation as having been brought more than six years after time. The only point decided was that article 123 did not apply.
In the case of Riasat Ali v. Hasin Banu the plaintiff sued to recover the estate of her deceased husband from the latter's brother Riyasat Ali who had taken possession of it. She based her title on a special custom. The estate consisted of both movable and immovable properties. Their Lordships of the Privy Council held, in regard to the cash and movables wrongfully seized by the defendant, that neither article 123 nor article 49 applied, but that article 120 applied. In regard to article 49 their Lordships remarked:—“This latter article does not appear to be applicable to a suit to establish a right to inherit the property of a deceased person.” It is obvious that the present suit is not one to establish a right of inheritance.
The plaintiff's right to a one-fourth share in the money in suit has not at any time been disputed. On the contrary, it has always been openly admitted by the defendants, who, in the execution proceedings, when they objected to the plaintiff being brought on the record as a decree-holder, stated that they would pay to the plaintiff her one-fourth share in the amount recovered from the judgement-debtor after deduction of costs.
When the amount of the decretal debt was set off in part against the amount of the defendants' bid at the auction, this was done as a matter of convenience, and it was as if the defendants Nos. 1 to 3 had paid in the amount of their bid and had then with defendants 4 to 6 recovered the amount due under the decree, and we have no hesitation, on the facts of the suit before us, in holding that article 62 applies. The money was received by the defendants for the plaintiff's use. The decision in Mahomed Wahib v. Mahomed Ameer supports us.
It is urged that section 10 of the Limitation Act applies, and that there is really no period of limitation for such a suit as the present. It is clear, however, that section 10 only applies to express trusts and not to circumstances such as those of the present suit.
It is also pleaded that if the money claim be held barred by time, then the court ought to give the alternative relief, i.e possession of a one-fourth share in the property. In the first place we must point out that, though the plaintiff has appealed, she has not appealed on this point at all. In the next place we fail to see that she is equitably entitled to a one-fourth share in the property. She was not a co-decree-holder, nor did the defendants Nos. 1 to 3 put the decree into execution to recover only a sum of money in the whole of which the plaintiff had a one-fourth share. The money recoverable by the decree included the costs of the suit and execution proceedings. The property was purchased for a sum of money greater even than the full amount of the decree. Moreover, in equity the defendants were entitled to recoup to themselves the costs incurred in obtaining the succession certificate. Moreover, the amount due under the decree was set off only in part against the money due from the defendants, purchasers, under their bid at auction. The purchase was made on behalf of only three of the decree-holders and not on behalf of all.
We, therefore, hold that the plaintiff has no cause of action to recover a one-fourth share in the property.
The plaintiff was entitled to recover a one-fourth share in the decretal debt after deduction of all expenditure incurred legitimately by the defendants in recovering the debt. She waited for six years and nine days after the date of the sale before she sued, though her right had been admitted, and has only herself to blame for the result of her own delay.
The suit is barred by limitation. We allow the appeal and dismiss the suit with costs in both courts.
Appeal allowed.
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