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Chhanga Mal And Others (Judgment-Debtors) v. Ram Dularey Lal (Decree-Holder).

Allahabad High Court
Feb 28, 1933
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Factual and Procedural Background

The appeal arises from an order refusing to set aside a sale during the pendency of the appeal. The appellants (judgment-debtors) became insolvent and a receiver was appointed to their estate. On behalf of the respondents an application was made under Order 22, Rule 8, Sub‑rule (1) calling upon the receiver to furnish security for the costs of the appeal; the application alternatively prayed that the appeal be dismissed. The receiver declined to furnish security. The court below refused to set aside the sale, and this judgment-debtor appeal challenges that refusal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Order 22, Rule 8 (and related Rules 3 and 4) applies to an appeal arising out of execution proceedings, or whether such appeals are exempted by Rule 12 of Order 22.
  2. Whether Rule 12's exemption for "proceedings in execution of a decree or order" extends to pending appeals that arise from execution proceedings.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • Counsel for the appellants contended that Order 22, Rule 8 has no application because the matter is an appeal arising out of execution proceedings and is therefore exempted by Rule 12 of Order 22.
  • The appellants' position was that if the original proceedings were execution proceedings, Rule 12 would apply even to appeals from orders arising out of those proceedings.

Respondents' Position / Relief Sought

  • The respondents applied under Order 22, Rule 8(1) requesting that the receiver furnish security for the costs of the appeal.
  • The respondents alternatively prayed that the appeal be dismissed if security was not furnished.
  • The receiver declined to furnish the security requested.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mir Khan v. Sharfu, A.I.R. 1923 Lah 560 Held that Rules 3 and 4 of Order 22 had no application to an appeal arising out of execution proceedings by virtue of Rule 12 of Order 22. The court acknowledged this authority but ultimately declined to follow its conclusion that Rules 3, 4 and 8 could never apply to such appeals.
Hakeem Syed v. Fateh Bahadur, A.I.R. 1929 Pat. 565 The Full Bench (majority) took the view that Rules 3 and 4 did not apply to appeals arising out of execution proceedings (by virtue of Rule 12); one judge dissented. The court referred to this decision but disagreed with the majority view and did not adopt it for the present case.
Sundayee Animal v. Krishan Chetti, A.I.R. 1928 Mad 772 Held that, by virtue of Rule 11, Rule 8 would apply to appeals as much as to suits; thus in Letters Patent appeal against an order in execution the legal representative could be brought on record and related rules would apply. The court noted this contrary authority and its reasoning; the court's conclusion that Rule 8 applies to the appeal aligns with the legal position expressed in this decision.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by identifying the nature of the proceedings: the appellants were insolvent, a receiver was appointed, and respondents sought security for costs under Order 22, Rule 8(1) with an alternative prayer for dismissal. The appellants argued that Rule 12 exempts appeals arising from execution proceedings from Rules 3, 4 and 8.

The court examined authority on both sides: some decisions (Mir Khan; majority in Hakeem Syed) supported the appellants' contention, whereas the Madras decision (Sundayee Animal) took the opposite view that Rule 8 applies to appeals. The court considered the functional difference between execution proceedings and appeals. Execution proceedings, the court observed, permit fresh applications to be made from time to time (subject to limitation and principles such as res judicata), so suits in execution do not abate in the same way. By contrast, an appeal stands on a different footing: if an appeal abates, successive appeals cannot simply be filed.

On that basis the court reasoned that Rule 12 could not have been intended to mean that Rules 3, 4 and 8 would never apply to appeals that arise out of execution proceedings. If Rule 12 were read so broadly, the death of appellants or respondents would not lead to abatement of an appeal, contrary to the ordinary consequences of abatement. Therefore, Rule 12 does not exempt pending appeals merely because they arise from execution proceedings, and Rule 8 is applicable to the present appeal.

The court added that the order under challenge was not an order passed by an execution court in the ordinary sense that would amount to a decree; rather it was an appealable order which, if passed by a Munsif or Subordinate Judge, would not be open to a second appeal. For these reasons the court rejected the view of the Lahore and Patna High Courts that Rules 3, 4 and 8 cannot apply to pending appeals of this kind.

Finally, because the receiver declined to furnish the security ordered under Rule 8, the court concluded that the appeal could not proceed and must be dismissed.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court held that Order 22, Rule 8 applies to the pending appeal even though the appeal arises out of execution proceedings, and, since the receiver declined to furnish the required security, the appeal is dismissed with costs.

Implications:

  • The direct effect on the parties is that the appeal is dismissed and costs awarded; those costs may be recovered as a debt against the estate of the original appellants.
  • The court explicitly rejected the view (expressed by decisions from Lahore and Patna High Courts) that Rules 3, 4 and 8 can never apply to appeals arising out of execution proceedings; it adopted reasoning consistent with the Madras decision cited that Rule 8 can apply to appeals.
Show all summary ...

1. This is a judgment-debtor's appeal from an order refusing to set aside a sale during the pendency of the appeal. The appellants-judgment-debtors became insolvents and a receiver was appointed to their estate. An application was made on behalf of the respondents under Order 22, Rule 8, Sub-rule (1) calling upon the receiver to furnish security for the cost of the appeal. The' alternative prayer contained in the application is that the appeal should be dismissed. The learned advocates for the appellants has urged that Order 22, Rule 8 has no application to this case, because this is an appeal arising out of execution proceedings and is therefore exempted by virtue of Rule 12 of that order. His contention is that if the proceedings originally were in execution, then Rule 12 would apply even to appeals from orders arising, out of these proceedings.

2. There is no doubt some authority in support of this contention. In the case of Mir Khan v. Sharfu A.I.R. 1923 Lah 560 it was held by a learned Judge of the Lahore High Court that Rules 3 and 4 of Order 22 had no application to an appeal arising out of execution proceedings by virtue of the provisions of Rule 12 of that order. It appears that the majority of the Full Bench of the Patna High Court in Hakeem Syed v. Fateh Bahadur A.I.R. 1929 Pat. 565 has taken the same view. One learned Judge however took the contrary view. On the other hand there is a judgment of a Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Sundayee Animal v. Krishan Chetti A.I.R. 1928 Mad 772 which does not appear to have been cited before the learned Judges of the Patna High Court and in which it was held that in the Letters Patent appeal against an order in execution of a decree, the legal representative of the deceased appellant can be brought on record for proceeding with the appeal. By virtue of the provisions in Rule 11, Rule 8 would apply to appeals just as much as to suits. Rule 12 provides: "Nothing in Rules 3 and 8 shall apply to proceedings in execution of a decree or order."

3. Fresh applications for execution, unless the principle of res judicata applies, can be made from time to time so long as limitation has not expired. It is therefore obvious why there need be no abatement of the suit in an execution proceeding. But an appeal stands on quite a different footing. Successive appeals cannot be filed, if one has already abated. It seems to us that Rule 12 does not contemplate that if an appeal has been preferred from an order in execution, then also rules 3, 4 and 8 would never apply. If this were the correct view, the result would be that the death of the appellants or of the respondents would in no way result in the abatement of the appeal at all. We are of opinion that Rule 12 would not exempt pending appeals even though they arise out of execution proceedings. We think that Rule 8 applies to this appeal.

4. There is another difficulty in the way of the appellants. Strictly speaking the order passed by the Court below was not an order passed by an execution Court in the ordinary sense of the word which would amount to a decree, but it was an appealable order, which if passed by a Munsif or a Subordinate Judge would not be open to a second appeal. With great respect to the learned Judges of the Lahore and Patna High Courts we are unable to accept their view that rules 3, 4 and 8 cannot apply to a pending appeal of this kind. The receiver, as stated above, has declined to furnish security. The appeal must accordingly be dismissed with costs which may be recovered as a debt against the estate of the original appellants.