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Firm Chimanram Motilal v. Firm Vandravandas Gordhandas

Bombay High Court
Sep 16, 1946
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Factual and Procedural Background

The motion before the Court was filed by defendants 1 seeking that the suit and all proceedings be stayed on the ground that the dispute was subject to an arbitration agreement. The notice of motion was addressed to the plaintiffs and to defendants 2 (the Bombay Bullion Exchange) and defendants 3, 4 and 5 (members/officials connected with the clearing house sub-committee). Only the plaintiffs contested the motion; defendants 2–5 did not appear.

Facts as set out in the opinion: both plaintiffs and defendants 1 were members of the Bombay Bullion Exchange. For delivery No. 18 dated 28-2-1946 plaintiffs had transactions entitling them to take delivery of 4,378 silver bars. Delivery orders were handed over via the clearing house; one delivery order for 50 bars was issued by defendants 1. A note on delivery orders required payment of an additional import duty (Rs. 10-5-0 per 100 tolas) which plaintiffs refused to pay and offered only the base price for the 50 bars. Disputes arose, and plaintiffs feared disciplinary action by the Exchange.

Plaintiffs previously filed a suit on 7-3-1946 including a challenge to Rule 28 of the Exchange's Rules of Business. An interlocutory injunction granted by Coyajee, J. was dissolved by the Appeal Court on 28-3-1946. Plaintiffs then filed multiple suits, including the present suit (filed 15-5-1946) against defendants 1 (issuer of the 50-bar delivery order), the Bullion Exchange (defendant 2) and members of the clearing house sub-committee (defendants 3–5). Plaintiffs sought, by notice of motion in this suit, to restrain the Exchange and the sub-committee from adjudicating disputes and from taking disciplinary action.

The clearing house sub-committee initially attempted adjudication but on 9-8-1946 referred the parties to arbitration as defendants 1 had not applied for an auction sale. Defendants 1 then appointed an arbitrator (defendant 5) by letter of 10-8-1946; plaintiffs, while disputing the right to go to arbitration so long as the suit was pending, appointed an arbitrator on 17-8-1946 "without prejudice" and reserved rights in the suit. Defendants 1 brought the present notice of motion for a stay on 28-8-1946, invoking the arbitration agreement.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether there existed an arbitration agreement between the parties that required the disputes (including the 50-bar delivery) to be referred to arbitration, thereby entitling defendants 1 to a stay of the proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.
  2. Whether defendants 1 had, by conduct or delay (including participation before the clearing house sub-committee and signing a consent præcipe), taken a step in the proceedings such as to disentitle them from seeking a stay under Section 34.
  3. Whether defendants 1 were ready and willing at the time proceedings were commenced to do all things necessary for proper conduct of arbitration within the meaning of Section 34.
  4. Whether the dispute involved complicated questions of law (notably the alleged ultra vires character of Rule 28 of the Exchange) such that the Court in its discretion should refuse to stay court proceedings and leave those issues to be decided by the Court rather than by arbitrators.
  5. Whether a stay limited to defendants 1 (while proceedings against the Bullion Exchange, defendant 2, continued) would create a risk of conflicting decisions between arbitrators and the Court, making a stay inappropriate in the exercise of judicial discretion under Section 34.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' Arguments (Mr. Banaji)

  • There was no arbitration agreement between the parties that could oust the Court's jurisdiction and require reference to arbitration.
  • Defendants 1 had not complied with the Bullion Exchange's rules and regulations which were a condition precedent to reference to arbitration (e.g., they had not applied to the Exchange to hold an auction sale for the 50 bars).
  • Defendants 1 were not then ready and willing to do all things necessary for arbitration; they had delayed by prosecuting the reference to the clearing house sub-committee up to 9-8-1946 and had not applied for a stay earlier after the institution of the suit on 15-5-1946.
  • By signing unconditionally a consent præcipe (returned to plaintiffs' attorneys on 26-6-1946), defendants 1 had taken a step in the proceedings and were therefore disentitled from seeking a stay under Section 34.
  • The dispute involved complicated legal questions (whether R. 28 was ultra vires) and the Court should in its discretion refuse to stay the suit and leave such questions for judicial determination.

Defendants 1's Arguments (as summarized in the opinion)

  • Both parties, when they became members, agreed to observe the Exchange rules; Rule 50(1) provided for referring differences arising in transactions in silver to arbitrators on the Exchange's panel, hence there was an arbitration agreement applicable to the disputes.
  • The observance or non-observance of preliminary rules (such as holding an auction) does not go to the root of the arbitration question; once delivery orders were accepted by plaintiffs, disputes could be referred under R. 50(1).
  • They did not take any prejudicial step in the suit: their conduct in submitting to the clearing house sub-committee (a domestic tribunal of the Exchange) and awaiting its action did not disentitle them to the relief under Section 34; when the sub-committee declined to adjudicate and referred parties to arbitration, defendants 1 promptly moved for arbitration (letter 10-8-1946 and motion 28-8-1946).
  • There was no unreasonable delay between 10-8-1946 (appointment letter) and the filing of the notice of motion on 28-8-1946 that would bar them from seeking a stay under Section 34.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
(1894) 2 Ch. 4781 (observations of Lindley L.J.) Definition of "a step in the proceedings" as meaning something in the nature of an application to the Court, not mere correspondence between solicitors. Used to evaluate whether defendants 1, by signing a consent præcipe, had taken a step in the proceedings that would disentitle them from seeking stay under Section 34; court relied on Lindley's narrower meaning and found no substantive step taken by defendants 1.
(1898) 2 Ch. 922 Principle that mere filing of affidavits in defence of a motion is not a "step in the proceedings" within the meaning of the relevant section; "step in the proceedings" means a substantive step such as an application to the court. Followed for the proposition that not all conduct amounts to a disqualifying step; court treated defensive or procedural acts with nuance when considering disentitlement under the arbitration provision.
46 Bom. L.R. 4023 (Kania, J.) Holding that filing consent præcipes with the Prothonotary amounted to steps in the proceedings because filing was an application to the Court; distinguishes mere exchange of letters from filing documents that invoke Court process. Distinguished by the Court: in the present case plaintiffs filed the consent præcipes with the Prothonotary (thus taking the step), whereas defendants 1 merely signed the præcipe transmitted by plaintiffs' attorneys; therefore the present facts did not amount to steps taken by defendants 1.
34 Cal. 4434 (case relied upon before Kania, J.) The opinion references this decision as one considered by Kania, J.; it was part of the comparative authority on what constitutes a "step in the proceedings." The Court noted that Kania, J. had considered this case among others; it formed part of the reasoning that filing with the Court (not mere correspondence) may constitute a step.
53 Bom. 2715 Cited for the proposition that Courts have discretion under relevant arbitration law to refuse a stay where the questions of law are such that they should not be left to arbitrators. Relied upon when considering whether the question of the ultra vires character of R. 28 was a legal issue unsuitable for lay arbitrators and hence a reason to refuse a stay under Section 34.
I.L.R. (1940) 2 Cal. 26 Authority (Panckridge, J.) noting that difficult questions of law are unsuited for decision by lay arbitrators; supports judicial discretion to refuse stay in such circumstances. The Court cited this decision to support the view that the ultra vires question concerning R. 28 was a difficult question of law unsuited for lay merchant arbitrators and therefore a valid ground to exercise discretion against staying proceedings.
(1946) 2 Ch. 867 (observations of Phillimore L.J.) Authority dealing with the question of an arbitrator's interest or impartiality. The Court observed that although bias/interest of the arbitrator (defendant 5) was raised in affidavits, counsel did not press the point; the Court noted that if it had been necessary it would be covered by this authority.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded through a sequence of legal analyses strictly grounded on the facts and authorities cited in the opinion:

  1. Existence of an arbitration agreement: The Court found that both plaintiffs and defendants 1 had, by becoming members of the Bombay Bullion Exchange, agreed to observe existing and future rules; Rule 50(1) provided that differences arising in transactions in gold, silver or guinea between members should be referred to arbitrators on the Exchange's panel. Once the delivery order issued by defendants 1 was accepted by plaintiffs, the resulting disputes were within the scope of R. 50(1) and prima facie referable to arbitration. The Court rejected plaintiffs' contention that procedural preconditions (such as an auction application) negated the arbitration agreement, treating such procedural observances as not going to the root of arbitrability.
  2. Readiness and delay (Section 34): Addressing the contention that defendants 1 were not "ready and willing" and had delayed by prosecuting the reference to the clearing house sub-committee until 9-8-1946, the Court accepted that defendants 1 had reasonably relied on the domestic tribunal of the Exchange to adjudicate disputes. When that tribunal referred the parties to arbitration, defendants 1 promptly moved for arbitration (appointment letter dated 10-8-1946 and motion 28-8-1946). The Court concluded this did not constitute such delay as would disentitle them to Section 34 relief.
  3. Whether defendants 1 took a "step in the proceedings": The Court examined the legal meaning of "a step in the proceedings" by reference to authorities (Lindley L.J. and subsequent cases). It distinguished cases where consent præcipes were filed by the defendant (which amounted to taking a step) from the present facts where plaintiffs' attorneys filed the consent præcipes with the Prothonotary after obtaining defendants 1's signature. The Court held that defendants 1's unconditional signing of the consent præcipe did not amount to taking a substantive step which would disentitle them from seeking a stay under Section 34.
  4. Merits of refusal in exercise of discretion — complicated question of law and risk of conflicting decisions: Although the Court rejected plaintiffs' technical objections on several points, it identified a decisive discretionary ground under Section 34 against staying the suit. The suit continued as against the Bullion Exchange (defendant 2), and the question whether Rule 28 was ultra vires the Exchange was essential to the plaintiffs' claim. If the arbitration proceeded only as between plaintiffs and defendants 1 but the Court continued to hear the challenge to R. 28 as against defendant 2, there arose a real risk of conflicting decisions between arbitrators (on whether R. 28 applied and whether defendants 1 were liable) and the Court (on the ultra vires challenge). Citing authorities that courts may refuse a stay where difficult questions of law are unsuited for lay arbitrators, the Court concluded that because determination of R. 28's validity was an essential part of the controversy and the Exchange remained a party, it would not be proper in the exercise of discretion to stay proceedings against defendants 1.
  5. Arbitrator impartiality: Although affidavits alleged interest in the arbitrator appointed by defendants 1 (defendant 5), counsel for plaintiffs did not press this point; the Court noted that relevant authorities would cover such an objection if it had been pursued.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court dismissed the notice of motion; the application by defendants 1 for a stay of the suit was refused. The order concluded: "Notice of motion dismissed." Costs of the plaintiffs and defendants 1 of the notice of motion were to be costs in the cause and were to be taxed.

Implications and consequences:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The proceedings in this suit will continue in Court; defendants 1 are not granted a stay under Section 34 and therefore cannot compel arbitration in a manner that would stay the court proceedings. The suit will continue at least as to defendant 2 (the Bombay Bullion Exchange), and any attempt to arbitrate only with defendants 1 risked producing conflicting outcomes that the Court found unacceptable.
  • Costs: Costs of the notice of motion were ordered to be costs in the cause and to be taxed.
  • Broader precedent: The opinion exercised the Court's discretion under Section 34 and applied existing authorities about (a) what constitutes a "step in the proceedings," (b) the readiness/delay inquiry under Section 34, and (c) the Court's discretion to refuse a stay where complicated legal questions (such as an ultra vires challenge to a rule) and the presence of a non-arbitrating party create a risk of conflicting decisions. The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel legal principle beyond applying those established lines of authority to the specific facts before the Court.
Show all summary ...

1. This is a notice of motion taken out by defendants 1 that the suit and all proceedings therein be stayed. The notice of motion is addressed not only to the plaintiffs but also to defendants 2, 3, 4 and 5 herein. The plaintiffs are the only persons who have appeared on this notice of motion, contesting the same. Defendants 2, 3, 4 and 5 have chosen not to appear.

2. The plaintiffs as well as defendants 1 are members of the Bombay Bullion Exchange, Ltd. For the delivery No. 18 of 28-2-1946, the plaintiffs had entered into a large number of transactions for the purchase and sale of silver with defendants 1 and other merchants as a result of which transactions the plaintiffs were on the whole to take delivery of 4378 silver bars of the said delivery. In accordance with R. 54(4) of the Rules of Business of the Bullion Exchange a clearance sheet was submitted by the plaintiffs to the clearing house and delivery orders for the 4378 silver bars of the delivery were ultimately handed over by the clearing house to the plaintiffs. One of the delivery orders was a delivery order for 50 silver bars issued by defendants 1. On each of those delivery orders the Bullion Exchange appended a note that the person who took delivery of the silver bars thereunder was bound to pay Rs. 10-5-0 per 100 tolas being the additional import duty announced by the Finance Member in the budget. The plaintiffs contended that they were not bound to pay the additional Rs. 10-5-0 per 100 tolas and offered to pay to defendants 1 the price of 50 bars of silver apart from that additional import duty of Rs. 10-5-0 per 100 tolas. This was the position adopted by the plaintiffs with regard to all the members of the Bullion Exchange from whom they had received the delivery orders through the clearing house. Disputes arose between the parties and apprehending that by reason of their attitude the Bullion Exchange would take, disciplinary action against them, the plaintiffs filed on 7-3-1946, a suit inter alia against the Bullion Exchange for various reliefs, one of which was for a declaration that R. 28 of the Rules of Business of the Bullion Exchange was ultra vires the Bullion Exchange and/or its Board of Directors and/or its Merchants Mandal. Interlocutory proceedings were taken at the instance of the plaintiffs. The notice of motion was heard before Coyajee, J. and he granted an injunction inter alia against the Bullion Exchange on certain terms. The matter went before the Appeal Court and on 28-3-1946, the Appeal Court allowed the appeal, dissolving the injunction. The judgment delivered by the Appeal Court proceeded on the basis that the persons who had issued the delivery orders which had ultimately gone to the plaintiffs through the clearing house were not parties to that suit, that the Bullion Exchange would not take any action against the plaintiffs unless and until a default alleged to have been committed by the plaintiffs was reported by the parties concerned to the Bullion Exchange, and that as the position then stood there was no cause of action for any in junction against the Bullion Exchange. It appears that after this decision of the Appeal Court dissolving the injunction, the plaintiffs thought of filing suits against the several parties as also the Bullion Exchange and the members of the clearing house sub-committee, and the present suit is one of that series. This suit was filed on 15-5-1946, against defendants 1 who, as I have stated, had issued a delivery order for 50 silver bars which had gone to the plaintiffs through the clearing house and also against the Bullion Exchange and the members of the clearing house sub-committee to whom the disputes between the plaintiffs and the parties who issued delivery orders including defendants 1 had been referred by the Bullion Exchange for adjudication. A notice of motion was taken out by the plaintiffs in this suit seeking to restrain the Bullion Exchange who are defendants 2 herein and defendants 3, 4 and 5 who were the members of the clearing house sub-committee from adjudicating the disputes in respect of the delivery of the 50 bars between the plaintiffs and defendants 1 and from taking any action against the plaintiffs by way of declaring or posting the plaintiffs as defaulters in exercise of the disciplinary jurisdiction. The notice of motion came on for hearing ultimately before Chagla, J., on 26-6-1946, and he dismissed the notice of motion with regard to prayers (b) and (d) of the plaint, adjourning the notice of motion as regards prayer (f) until occasion arose for bringing the same on. Certain directions were given by Chagla, J. as regards the filing of the written statement and the further hearing of the suit. It appears, however, that the clearing house sub-committee which had been appointed by the Bullion Exchange on 5-4-1946, to adjudicate upon the disputes between the plaintiffs and the other parties including defendants 1 did not take any further action until 9-8-1946. The sub-committeemet on 9-8-1946, and on that day proceeded with the adjudication of those disputes. The plaintiffs appeared without prejudice before the sub-committee. As defendants 1 had not applied for holding the auction sale as required by the rules of exchange, the sub-committee could not adjudicate upon the disputes and referred the parties to take steps to have the matter adjudicated by arbitration.

3. After the proceedings before the sub-committee terminated in such manner, defendants 1 moved in the matter of arbitration. A letter dated 10-8-1946, was received by the plaintiffs under the signature of the secretary of the Bombay Bullion Exchange, Ltd., stating that defendants 1 had appointed Jwalaprasad P. Tiwari, defendant 5 as adjudicator to adjudicate the disputes with regard to the 50 bars of silver and requested the plaintiffs to appoint their arbitrator within 7 days from the receipt of their letter. The plaintiffs by their attorneys' letter dated 15-8-1946, disputed the right of defendants 1, to go to arbitration so long as the present suit was pending. They, however, by their attorneys' letter dated 17-8-1946 for the sake of greater caution and in order that their case might not go by default appointed one Narandas Pokarmal as their arbitrator without prejudice to their rights and contentions in the suit and reserving their rights and remedies in the matter. Defendants 1, thereafter on 28-8-1946, took out this notice of motion for stay of the suit by reason of the arbitration agreement which subsisted between the parties.

4. Mr. Banaji for the plaintiffs has contested this notice of motion on various grounds. He first contended that there was no arbitration agreement between the parties and that therefore there was no question of referring the dispute between the parties to arbitration and staying the proceedings in this suit by reason of any such arbitration agreement. He contended that defendants 1, had not complied with all the rules and regulations of the Bombay Bullion Exchange which compliance was a condition precedent to any reference of the disputes to arbitration, that they had not applied to the Bullion Exchange for holding an auction sale in respect of these 50 silver bars and that in the absence of any auction sale held in pursuance of such application, there could not be any reference to arbitration. This contention of Mr. Banaji however ignores that by reason of the very applications which had been signed by both the parties, the plaintiffs and defendants 1, when they became members of the Bombay Bullion Exchange, Ltd., both of them agreed to observe and follow the present rules and regulations and the rules and regulations which might be framed in the future, that R. 50(1) of the Rules and Regulations of the constitution provided that the difference which may arise in connection with the transactions in gold, silver or guinea whether ready and/or forward between the members of the Exchange or between a member and non-member should be referred for decision to the arbitrators mentioned in the panel of arbitrators nominated by the Exchange, that once the delivery order issued by defendants 1, was accepted by the plaintiffs, the disputes which thereafter arose between the plaintiffs and defendants 1, in the matter of the taking delivery under the delivery order could under the above rule be referred for decision to the arbitrators, and that the observance or non-observance of rules preliminary to the submission of disputes to arbitrators was certainly not a matter which would go to the root of the question. Whether the rules and regulations preliminary to the dispute being referred to arbitration were observed or not, there was certainly a difference which arose in connection with the transaction of gold, silver or guinea, whether ready and/or forward, between the members of the Exchange and that difference could be referred for decision to the arbitrators as provided in R. 50(1) of the Rules and Regulations of the constitution of the Bullion Exchange. I therefore, do not accept this contention of Mr. Banaji.

5. Mr. Banaji next contended that defendants 1 were not at the time when the proceedings were commenced ready and willing to do all things necessary for the proper conduct of the arbitration within the meaning of Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, and therefore the Court should not make an order staying the proceedings in this suit. He urged that long before the institution of this suit on 15-5-1946, the clearing house sub-committee had been appointed by the Bullion Exchange on 5-4-1946, and all the disputes be tween the plaintiffs and the parties including defendants 1, were referred to their adjudication. Defendants 1 chose to proceed with the reference which was thus made by the Bullion Exchange to the clearing house sub-committee and prosecuted that remedy of theirs right up to 9-8-1946, even though they had an opportunity, after the institution of this suit on 15-5-1946, to take out proceedings for stay of this suit by reason of the arbitration agreement which subsisted between the parties. He contended that not having done so and having waited up to 9-8-1946, when only the clearing house sub-committee stated that they could not adjudicate the disputes and referred the parties to take steps to have the matter adjudicated by arbitration, it was not now open to defendants 1 to take out this notice of motion. He also pointed out that Chagla, J. had given directions for the hearing of this suit and had given to defendants 1 four weeks' time within which to file their written statement and that the hearing of the suit was fixed for 28-9-1946, immediately after the decision of Suit No. 899 of 1946. He therefore submitted that defendants 1 were not entitled to a stay of the suit. As regards the readiness and willingness of defendants 1, at the time when the proceedings were commenced in this suit, to do all things necessary for the proper conduct of the arbitration, it may be pointed out that the Bullion Exchange them, selves had appointed the clearing house subcommittee and referred all disputes between the plaintiffs and other parties including defendants 1 for their adjudication. It was a domestic tribunal set up by the Bullion Exchange purporting to act within the powers vested in them under the constitution, and if defendants 1 considering themselves bound by the rules and regulations of the Bullion Exchange submitted to the adjudication of the disputes which had arisen between themselves and the plaintiffs, that certainly could not be urged against them in the manner it has been sought to be done. Rightly or wrongly they thought that the disputes between themselves and the plaintiffs were going to be adjudicated upon by a domestic tribunal warranted by the rules and regulations of the Bullion Exchange subject to which the transactions in silver which had passed through the clearing house were effected by all the members of the Bullion Exchange including themselves, and their conduct in having waited up to 9-8-1946, is not such as to visit on them by reason thereof the punishment which would otherwise have been meted out to them by applying to them the provision of Section 34 of the Arbitration Act which disentitle the parties in such circumstances from having a stay of the proceedings. Immediately after the decision was announced by the clearing house sub-committee they moved in the matter of the arbitration without loss of any time and there is nothing in the period which has elapsed between 10-8-1946, and the taking out of this notice of motion on 28-8-1946, which goes in any manner against them. If there is an arbitration agreement between the parties, it is the prima facie right of a party to apply for a stay of proceedings in Court and it is for the party who opposes that application for stay to point out that there are sufficient reasons why the matter should not be referred in accordance with the arbitration agreement Mere delay of the sort which is pointed out by Mr. Banaji is not such a count against defendants 1 as to deprive them of the benefit of the provisions of Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. This contention of Mr. Banaji also fails.

6. In the matter of this suit the summons had not been served by the plaintiffs up to 25-6-1946, when the notice of motion was disposed of by Chagla, J. The plaintiffs' attorneys there, fore on 26-6-1946, sent to defendants 1's attorney a consent præcipe for the postponement of the suit as the writ of summons had not been served. Defendants 1's attorneys by their letter of 26-6-1946, returned the consent præcipe duly signed by them unconditionally. Mr. Banaji therefore contended that defendants 1 had taken a step in the proceedings and were therefore debarred from making the present application for stay of the suit, the ground being that by consenting to the postponement of the suit by signing unconditionally the consent præcipe without reserving any right, defendants 1 had taken a step in the proceedings. There is no doubt that the application for stay of the proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act has got to be made by a party before filing a written statement or taking any other step in the proceedings. The written statement has not been filed even though the directions had been given by Chagla, J. in that behalf on 26-6-1946. The question to consider in this connection is whether by their signing unconditionally the consent præcipe sent to them by the plaintiffs' attorneys defendants 1 can be said to have taken a step in the proceedings. In this connection my attention was drawn to a decision in (1894) 2 Ch. 4781 at pp. 483, 484 and the observations of Lindley L.J therein. In that case the plaintiffs had issued the writ against the defendant, the defendant had entered an appearance to the præcipe and by a formal document had required a statement of claim. That was contemporaneous with the entry of the appearance. The defendant had then written a letter to the plaintiffs' solicitors, saying that he should desire a statement of claim. That was all he had done. He had taken no other steps before he made the application for a stay under the relevant section. The plaintiffs contended that the defendant was too late because he asked for or gave notice that he should require a statement of claim and that was said to be the taking of a step in the proceedings. Lindley L.J considered the language of the relevant section which is analogous to the section which we have in our Arbitration Act and observed (p. 484):

“The authorities show that a step in the proceedings means something in the nature of an application to the Court, and not mere talk between solicitors or solicitors' clerks, nor the writing of letters, but the taking of some step, such as taking out a summons or something of that kind, which is, in the technical sense, a step in the proceedings.”

7. He observed that the step to be taken must be a step to be taken by the applicant. This case was followed in a decision reported in (1898) 2 Ch 922. in that case the plaintiff had given notice of motion for the appointment of a receiver and file certain affidavits in support of the same. They were answered by the defendant and not until the motion had come on and been ordered to stand over once or twice had given notice of motion to refer to arbitration. It was urged that he had taken a step in the proceedings so as to render his notice of motion to refer to arbitration too late. Stirling, J. referred to the observations of Lindley L.J above quoted and proceeded to observe (p. 94):

“It seems to me that the mere filing of affidavits in defence to a motion for a receiver is not in the nature of an application to the Court, and consequently not a ‘step in the proceedings’ within the meaning of the section. By such a step is meant a substantive step taken by a party. It may be that a very limited application to the Court—such as taking out a summons for extension of time—would be enough.”

8. Both these cases came to be considered by Kania, J. in 46 Bom. L.R 4023. The case before Kania, J. was very near to the persent case before me. In that case the date for filing the written statement was fixed at 9-9-1942. On 8-9-1942, the attorneys of the defendants filed a consent præcipe and got the time within which to file the written statement extended to 23.9.1942 The time so granted was again extended to 7-10-1942 by a consent præcipe filed on 22-9-1942. The written statement was eventually filed on 30-10-1942, by consent of attorneys for the plaintiff. In the meanwhile, on 24-9-1942, the defendants took out a notice of motion for stay of the suit on the ground that the contract sued upon contained an arbitration clause. It was urged before Kania, J. that the attorneys of the defendants having filed consent præcipes and got the time to file the written statement extended, the defendants had taken steps in the proceedings, and therefore they were not entitled to the benefit of Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. Kania, J. discussed both the cases cited above by me and he also discussed the case which had been relied upon by the plaintiff there, reported in 34 Cal. 4434. He came to the conclusion that according to the reported decisions a mere exchange of letters does not amount to taking a step in the proceedings, while according to the observations of Lindley L.J anything done in the nature of an application is considered as taking a step in the proceedings. Applying the same rule, he said that it was clear that in the case before him the defendants' attorneys did not merely write to the plaintiff's attorneys to obtain their consent but a further step was taken, viz., the consent præcipes were filed with the Prothonotary. As the Prothonotary has jurisdiction under the High Court Rules to grant an extension of time, he made the orders granting time on the præcipes. The filing of the præcipes under the circumstances therefore amounted to consent applications to the Prothonotary for extensions of time which were granted. These were steps taken in the proceedings by the defendants although with the consent of the plaintiff. It is significant to observe that the learned Judge in that case took the filing of the consent præcipe by the defendants with the Prothonotary as steps taken in the proceedings by the defendants and did not consider the consent of the plaintiff to those præcipes as of any materiality. The case before me is a converse case. The plaintiffs' attorneys here sent to defendants 1's attorneys a consent præcipe to obtain the consent of defendants 1 and their attorneys to the postponement of the suit. The step which was taken in the proceedings was a step taken by the plaintiffs and their attorneys. No doubt defendants 1 and their attorneys gave their consent. The consent præcipes were, however, after obtaining the consent of defendants 1 and their attorneys, filed with the Prothonotary by the plaintiffs' attorneys, and if at all any person could be said to have taken any steps in the proceedings here they were the plaintiffs and their attorneys and certainly not defendants 1 and their attorneys. This is the distinguishing feature between the case before Kania, J. and the case before me. As was observed by Lindley L.J the step is meant to be a substantive step taken by the party. I do not see anything in the circumstances of this case to warrant the submission of Mr. Banaji that in doing what they did, viz., signing the consent præcipe though unconditionally defendants 1 and their attorneys took any step in the proceedings such as to disentitle them to the benefit of the provisions of Section 84 of the Arbitration Act.

9. Mr. Banaji next contended that the determination whether R. 28 of the Rules of Business of the Bullion Exchange was ultra vires the Bullion Exchange and/or its Board of Directors and/or its Merchants Mandal involved a complicated question of law and as such in the exercise of the discretion vested in the Court under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, the Court should not stay the proceedings in this suit. According to the authorities, arbitrators are competent to determine points of law as well as questions on the construction of the agreement, and merely because questions of law might arise in the course of arbitration it cannot be said that the Court should refuse to make an order staying the proceedings. There are, however, questions of law, and the Court certainly has the discretion, when it feels that the questions of law which would fall to be determined by the arbitrators are such as would rather not be left to be determined by them, not to make an order staying the proceedings in the exercise of the discretion which is vested in it. I do not want to go into the cases where this has been determined by the Courts. A reference only to 53 Bom. 2715 and I.L.R (1940) 2 Cal. 266 would suffice. In my opinion a tribunal of even the most important merchants in the trade such as is named in the panel of arbitrators by the Bullion Exchange, even though in particular cases it may be advised by lawyers in that behalf, would not be a satisfactory body to determine whether a particular rule such as R. 28 which is impeached here is ultra vires the Bullion Exchange. To use the words of Panckridge, J. in I.L.R (1940) 2 Cal. 26 the question which the arbitrators dealing with this matter in the event of the suit being stayed would have to decide would be a difficult question of law and quite unsuited for decision by laymen.

10. This, however, is not the only objection to the granting of the application of defendants 1. There is a further objection and it is this. The suit as against the Bullion Exchange and the clearing house sub-committee even though the interim relief has been refused by Chagla, J. has not yet ended. As regards defendants 3, 4 and 5 the members of the clearing house sub-committee, it may be stated that they have already divested themselves of whatever jurisdiction they had in the matter of the adjudication of the disputes between the plaintiffs and defendants 1, they having stated that the parties should go to arbitrators. As regards defendants 2, the Bullion Exchange, however, the suit does survive and the point for determination, so far as they are concerned, would certainly be whether R. 28 of the Rules of Business is ultra vires the Bullion Exchange. If defendants 1 had been the only parties to this suit, it would have been possible to say that the question for determination of the arbitrators being whether defendants 1 were liable to the plaintiffs in the amount claimed the matter was a fit one to be referred to arbitration in spite of its involving the determination of various questions including the construction of the rules, the ultra vires character thereof, etc. In so far, however, as defendants 2, the Bullion Exchange are parties to this suit and the determination of the ultra vires character of R. 28 will have to be made by the Court, as the hearing of the suit will not certainly be stayed so far as they are concerned, the determination of the questions between the plaintiffs and defendants 1 by the arbitrators might involve a conflict of decisions between them on the one hand and the Court on the other, a result which cannot be looked at with any complacence by any Court of law. As the plaint is framed it is necessary for the determination of the liability of defendants 1 to the plaintiffs as claimed herein to determine whether R. 28 is valid and binding on the plaintiffs or being ultra vires the Bullion Exchange is one which they are entitled to set at naught, or treat as not subsisting. If R. 28 was binding on the plaintiffs, they would be out of Court and there would be no liability of defendants 1 to them. If it is not binding on them on the ground alleged by them in the plaint, the result would certainly be that defendants 1 were guilty of default and would be liable to the plaintiffs. These are the prima facie considerations as appearing from the plaint which would go to show that the determination of the ultra vires or otherwise character of R. 28 is an essential part of this case, and that would have to be determined by the arbitrators before arriving at the conclusion one way or the other whether defendants 1 are liable to the plaintiffs or not. The Court would also not be in a position to brush aside this determination when the matter came on for hearing before it. The suit would be stayed only so far as defendants 1 are concerned; it would go on so far as defendants 2 are concerned. When the Court comes to determine these questions as between the plaintiff and defendants 2, the Bullion Exchange, it might come to a conclusion which is not the conclusion which the arbitrators came to and there might be a possibility of conflicting decisions being given on this question by the arbitrators and the Court. It is therefore that in the exercise of my discretion under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, I feel that I should not stay the proceedings in this suit even though I am against Mr. Banaji on the other points which I have referred to earlier in the course of this judgment. The judgment of the Appeal Court in suit No. 399 of 1946 does not touch this aspect of the case at all. The Appeal Court decided the appeal before it in favour of the Bullion Exchange mainly on the ground that the parties who would move the Bullion Exchange in the matter of the exercise of its disciplinary jurisdiction against the plaintiffs were not there, and whatever the decision was arrived at in that suit, would certainly not be binding on those parties in their absence. That defect is sought to be remedied in this suit by bringing in defendants 1 as party defendants to the suit along with defendants 2, the Bullion Exchange.

11. Whatever be the merits of the conduct of the plaintiffs from the business or the commercial point of view, I have got to construe the provisions of Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. In so far as I envisage this possibility of conflicting decisions by the arbitrators and by the Court, I do not think it fit in the exercise of my discretion to stay the proceedings in this suit.

12. I may observe in passing that even though the point as to the arbitrator named by defendants 1, viz., defendant 5, being interested was taken in the affidavits, Mr. Banaji wisely did not press that point before me. If it were necessary, I would say that it is covered by the decision in (1946) 2 Ch. 867 and the observations of Phillimore L.J at p. 102 therein.

13. Under the circumstances, the notice of motion will be dismissed. The costs of the plaintiffs and defendants 1 of the notice of motion will be costs in the cause. Costs will be taxed.

14. Notice of motion dismissed.