Uma Kant Pandey Revisionist v. Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Karvi, Banda And Others

Giridhar Malaviya, J.:— The additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Karvi, district Banda in case no. 20.IX/94, P.S Mau under Sections 218, 167, 120-B, 420 and 500 of I.P.C by his order dated 7.7.1995 summoned the applicant Uma Kant Pandey and five others on a complaint filed before him by one Chimmi. It was alleged in the complaint that after the death of her husband, Deomati her mother-in law O.P No. 2 and Sangam Lal her brother-in-law, did not want her to get the land of her husband, and taking advantage of her stay with her parents, respondent no. 2 Deomati by setting up some other women to impersonate her, wanted to get the said land transferred by means of a registered deed. Consequently, on 20.6.1991 she gave an application to the Registrar in the registration office that if any such a transfer deed might be produced before him, the same may not be registered. This application frustrated the design of respondent No. 2. The complainant wanted to get her share in the agricultural land separated and consequently made an application before the Assistant Collector I Class Banda on 4.4.1992 This case was abated under the Consolidation of Holdings Act. Thereafter on 16.7.1991 she filed a complaint in the Court of S.D.M Karvi district Banda against Sangam Lal, Deonath, Ram Naresh, Sheo Naresh, Babu Lal, Mahadeo and Ram Prakash for assaulting her, which was pending. Her in-laws were constantly on a lookout to grab her property 1 and to achieve this object they bribed the Lekhpal Uma Kant Pandey, the applicant, with the result that he submitted a false report before the court of Tahsildar Mau, district Banda under Sections 34/95 of the Land Revenue Act. This act of Lekhpal Uma Kant Pandey was aimed to cause harm to the complainant and undue benefit to Deomati O.P No. 2 as knowing very well that the complainant Chimmi was alive, the lekhpal in his report had recorded the fact that she was dead, and because of this report of lekhpal Uma Kand Pandey to the court of Tahsildar Mau, he got such a declaration made and the necessary proclamation issued on 15.5.1993 in connivance with the Opposite Parties. A false report was also submitted by him that the complainant, widow of Munni Lal was searched but it was found that after her second marriage she had gone away from the village. Another report dated 16.6.1993 was submitted by him to the court of Tahsildar, Mau that her in-laws were her successors, with the result that an order adverse to the complainant was passed causing damage both to the property and reputation of the complainant. It was accordingly pleaded that the O.Ps were guilty of having committed a crime under Sections 218/167/120-B of I.P.C as also under Sections 499 and 500 of I.P.C for which a prayer was made to punish the guilty.

2. On the initiation of the complaint, the statement of complainant under Section 200 Cr. P.C was recorded. The Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Karvi after hearing the counsel for the complainant on the question of summoning the accused and after perusing the record came to the conclusion that a prima facie case under Section 218/167 was disclosed against Uma Kant Pandey and against Deomati, Ram Kumar, Ram Khilawan, Ram Naresh and Ram Prasad as offence under Section 500 I.P.C was prima facie disclosed. Consequently the accused were summoned under the above mentioned sections to appear before the court on 31.8.1995 Aggrieved by the said judgment this revision has been filed in the High Court by Uma Kant Pandey. When the revision came up for admission before Hon. Mr. Justice R.N Ray, he by his order dated 17.10.1995 raised a question whether the issuance of process for examination of the witnesses is an interlocutory order and whether that can be interfered with by this High Court under its revisional powers. He further observed that since prima facie a disputed question of law arose as whether the issuance of summons by the Magistrate after examination of complainant and its witnesses is an interlocutory order or not and since there were conflicting decisions given by Hon'ble Judges of this Court, he was not inclined, to go into the merits of the case himself and had referred the question of law to be decided by a larger Bench. Accordingly he directed the record to be placed before Hon'ble Chief Justice for getting finally decided the question of law as mentioned above by a division Bench. That is how the matter is before us.

3. We have heard Sri G.S Chaturvedi in the matter. Section 397 Cr. P.C reads as follows:—

4. Calling for records to exercise of powers of revision:

1. “The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court, and may, when calling for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement, that he be released on bail or on his own bond pending the examination of the record.

Explanation:—All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this sub-section and of Section 398 Cr. P.C

2. The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding.

3. If an application under this section has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other or them.”

5. Perusing sub-sections 2 and 3 of Section 397 Cr, P.C quoted above, it would be seen that they are the limitation imposed on the revisional jurisdiction of the court under Section 397(1) of Cr. P.C whereas sub-section 2 envisages a complete ban on the exercise of revisional jurisdiction as against any interlocutory order at any stage i.e in an appeal, enquiry, trial or other proceedings, sub-section 3 contemplates a ban on exercise of revisional powers for exercising the revisional jurisdiction for a second time at the instance of the same party which has already invoked revisional powers of some courts against that particular order. Consequently both sub-sections 2 and 3 relate to the ban imposed on the revisional power in the court under Section 397(1) Cr. P.C

6. Considering the scope of sub-section 2 of Section 397 Cr. P.C the point which is absolutely clear in the present case is that these sub-sections as such have imposed a complete ban on the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, if the order challenged before the revisional court is an interlocutory order. However Sri G.S Chaturvedi learned counsel for the applicant in this connection has relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Madhu Limaye v. State Of Maharashtra. . 1978 15 ACC 184 SC. In this case on some defamatory statement allegedly having been made against the Law Minister of Government of Maharashtra, the State Government decided to prosecute Sri Madhu Limaye under Section 500 of I.P.C A sanction to prosecute under Section 191(4)(a) of Cr. P.C was accorded. Complaint was thereafter filed in the court of Sessions Judge, Greater Bombay. The Sessions Court took cognizance under Section 199(2) of Cr. P.C and issued process against Sri Madhu Limaye on the complaint. The Chief Secretary of the Maharashtra Government proved the sanction before the Sessions Court. Sri Madhu Limaye filed an application before the Sessions Court to dismiss the complaint taking the stand that the allegations made against the Law Minister were in respect of his personal capacity and not in his capacity of discharging his functions as a Minister, hence the Sessions Court had no jurisdiction to proceed with the complaint and the proceedings in the trial were not maintainable. The Sessions Judge rejected the application on all three points which were raised challenging the jurisdiction of the Court and framed charge against Sri Madhu Limaye under Section 500 of I.P.C This order was challenged by Sri Madhu Limaye before the Bombay High Court in a revision filed under Section 397(1) Cr. P.C A preliminary objection was taken about the maintainability of the revision before the High Court in view of the bar created by the provisions under Section 397(2) Cr. P.C High Court of Bombay without going into the merits of the case upheld the preliminary objection and held that the revision filed by Sri Limaye in High Court was not maintainable in view of the provisions contained in sub-Section 2 of 397 Cr. P.C In other words the Bombay High Court found that the order of the Sessions Judge rejecting the application of Sri Madhu Limaye whereby he had contended the complaint was an interlocutory order against which no revision could lie in view of Section 397(2) of Cr. P.C

7. It would be desirable to examine in what manner and under what circumstances the Supreme Court had allowed the appeal of Sri Madhu Limaye and had set aside the judgment and order of Bombay High Court and had remitted the matter back to the High Court to decide the application of Sri Madhu Limaye on merits.

8. The Supreme Court first of all took note of its earlier decision in Amar North's case, in which it was held that where a revision to the High Court against the order of subordinate Judge was expressly barred under sub-section (2) of 397 of 1973 Criminal Procedure Code, the inherent power contained in Section 482 of Cr. P.C would not be available to deleat the bar contained in Section 397(2) Cr. P.C However the Supreme Court observed that the aforesaid statement of law in Amar Nath's case was not quite accurate and needed some modification. The Supreme Court then took note of the provisions of Section 482 Cr. P.C under which exercising inherent powers the High Court could make any such orders as would be necessary to give effect to any order passed by the court, or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.

9. Since in Madhu Limaye's case the Supreme Court had taken a categorical view that on the point of inherent powers contained in Section 482 vis-a-vis Section 397(2) Cr. P.C the view taken in Amar Nath's case needed modification the Hon'ble Judges deciding the case of Madhu Limaye thought it proper to reexamine that matter. The Hon'ble Judges thereafter in para 10 of the judgment noted the fact that final decisions in criminal cases got inordinately delayed due to repeated challenges to various orders in a criminal proceedings with the result that to achieve expeditious disposal of cases finally, the legislature in its wisdom had decided to check this delay by introducing sub-section (2) in Section 397 Cr. P.C It was further noted that on one hand a bar had been put in the way of High Court as also the Sessions Judge for exercise of the revisional power against any interlocutory order but on the other hand Section 482 Cr. P.C specifically mentioned that nothing in the Code (which would obviously include sub-section 2 of Section 397 Cr. P.C also) should be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to pass any order for one of the three objects mentioned in Section 482 Cr. P.C Consequently in paragraph 10 of the judgment the Hon'ble Judges observed as follows:—

“……But if we were to say that the said bar is not to operate in the exercise of the inherent power at all it will be setting at nought one of the limitations imposed upon the exercise of the revisional powers. In such a situation, what is the harmonious way out? In our opinion a happy solution of this problem would be to say that the bar provided in sub-section (2) of Section 397 operates only in exercise of the revisional power of the High Court meaning thereby that the High Court will have no power of revision in relation to any interlocutory order. Then in accordance with one or the other principles enunciated above, the inherent power will come into play, there being no other provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party. But then if the order assailed is purely of an interlocutory character which could be corrected in exercise of the revisional power of the High Court under the 1898 Code, the High Court will refuse to exercise its inherent power. But in case the impugned order clearly brings about a situation which is an abuse of the process of the court for the purpose of securing the ends of justice interference by the High Court is absolutely necessary, then nothing contained in Section 397(2) can limit or affect the exercise of the inherent power by the High Court. But such cases would be few and far between. The High Court must exercise the inherent power very sparingly. One such case would be the desirability of the quashing of a criminal proceeding initiated illegally, vexatiously or as being without jurisdiction. It may be noted that in the same paragraph, the Supreme Court has made it clear that an order of the court taking cognizance or issuing processes may not be an interlocutory order. It further observed, that if in a case requiring sanction a court takes cognizance without the sanction then even if such an order could be assumed to be an interlocutory order still it could not be said that the High Court could not exercise its inherent power to stop the said proceedings as early as possible, and permit the accused to be harassed up to the end of the trial and the bar under Section 397(2) would not operate vis-a-vis the inherent powers of the High Court. The Supreme Court observed that the label of the petition filed by the aggrieved party was immaterial and the High Court could examine the matter in an appropriate case in its inherent powers. The court further observed that the case of Madhu Limaya undoubtedly called far exercise of power of High Court in accordance with Section 482 of the Code even assuming although not accepting that invoking the revisional power of the High Court was impermissible. Thereafter quoting from the judgment of the Supreme Court in the R.P Kapoor's case their Lordship without being exhaustive pointed out the categories of some of the cases wherein the inherent powers of the High Court should be exercised without the bar of Section 397(2) Cr. P.C

10. It was after discussing aspects mentioned here-in-before that the Apex Court took up the question as to what could be meaning of the expression ‘Interlocutory order’ and in paragraph 12 observed that it had been understood and taken to mean as a converse of the term “final order”. Then quoting the Halsburys Law of England, their Lordship clearly observed that “an interlocutory order though not conclusive of the main dispute, may be conclusive/as to the subordinate matter with which it deals.”

11. Thereafter the following observations in paragraph 13 of the judgment in Madhu Limaye's case are very relevant for the question before us. “But in our judgment such an interpretation and the universal application of the principle that what is not a final order must be an interlocutory order is neither warranted nor justified. If it were so it will render almost nugatory the revisional power of the Sessions Court or the High Court conferred on it by Section 397(1). On such a strict interpretation, only those orders would be revisable which are orders passed on the final determination of the action but are not appealable under Chapt. XXIX of the Code. This does not seem to be the intention of the Legislature when it retained the revisional power of the High Court in terms identical to the one in the 1898 Code. In what cases then the High Court will examine the legality or propriety of an order or the legality of any proceeding of an inferior Criminal Court? Is it circumscribed to examine only such proceeding which is brought for its examination after the final determination and wherein no appeal lies? Such cases will be very few and far between. It has been pointed out repeatedly, vide, for example, the River Wear Commissioners W. William Adamson and R.M.D Chamarbangwatla v. The Union of India . 1957 SCR 930, that although the words occurring in a particular statute are plain and unambiguous, they have to be interpreted in a manner which would fit in the context of the other provisions of the statutes and bring about the real intention of the legislature. On the one hand, the legislature kept intact the revisional power of the High Court and, on the other, it put a bar on the exercise of that power in relation to any interlocutory order. In such a situation it appears to us that the real intention of the legislature was not to equate the expression “interlocutory order” as invariably being converse of the words ‘final order’. There may be an order passed during the course of a proceeding which may not be final in the sense noticed in Ruppuswami's case . AIR 1949 FC 1., but yet it may not be an interlocutory order pure or simple. Some kinds of order may fall in between the two. By a rule of harmonious construction, we think that the bar in sub-section (2) of Section 397 is not meant to be attracted to such kinds of intermediate orders. They may not be final orders for the purposes of Article 134 of the Constitution, yet it would not be correct to characterise them as merely interlocutory orders within the meaning of Section 397(2). It is neither advisable, nor possible, to make a catalouge of orders to demonstrate which kinds of orders would be merely, purely or simply interlocutory and which kinds of orders would be final, and then to prepare an exhaustive list of those types of orders which will fall in between the two. The first two kinds are well known and can be culled out from many decided cases. We may, however, indicate that the type of order with which we are concerned in this case, even though it may not be final in one sense, is surely not inter locutory so as to attract the bar or sub-section (2) of Section 397. In our opinion it must be taken to be an order of the type falling in the middle course.”

12. Thereafter their Lordships in the end of para 15 of the judgment observed as follows:—

“Yet for the reasons already adduced to we feel no difficulty in coming to the conclusion, after due consideration that an order rejecting the plea of the accused on a point which when accepted will conclude the particular proceeding, will surely be not an interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 397(2)”.

13. For the reasons given by their Lordships in their judgment they had remitted the case back to the High Court after setting aside the High Court's order.

14. In view of the judgment of the apex Court in the case of Madhu Limaye, now there is hardly any scope to doubt that there may be some interlocutory order against which if the plea of accused is accepted by the revisional Court it may conclude the entire proceedings. In such cases those interlocutory orders would not be treated to be interlocutory orders for the purposes of bar under Section 397(2) Cr. P.C Consequently whenever some person invokes the revisional jurisdiction of a court against the inter-locutory order it would be necessary for that court to go into the question whether if the plea of the applicant before the revisional court is accepted then it would bring to an end the proceeding in the court below or not, and if the answer be in the affirmative then a revision against such an interlocutory order would be maintainable despite the bar created by Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Sri G.S Chaturvedi also relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in case of A.K Subbaiah v. State of Karnataka . 1987 24 ACC 459 SC, and pointed out that the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case has categorically held in paragraph 15 that when the issue of process is challenged in the revision petition before the High Court what the High Court was expected to see is as to whether the complaint and the papers accompanying the complaint prima facie indicate that an offence was made out, and if in the opinion of the High Court the complaint and the papers accompanying did not prima facie disclose an offence then it would be open to the High Court to entertain the revision and quash the proceedings. The learned State counsel has contended that Supreme Court in the case of A.K Subbaiah was not considering the question of bar under Section 397(2) and therefore the said observation of the Supreme Court can not be held to be the ratio of that case. It is relevant to note that in the said case, A.K Subbaiah had challenged before the High Court in a revision, the order dated June 30, 1986 by which process had been issued against them. When the matter was admitted respondent No. 2 Director General of Police and respondent no. 3 the Chief Minister of the Karnataka were the parties to the said proceedings. However, at a later stage when the revision was taken up by the High Court, the names of the above mentioned respondents No. 2 and 3 were deleted holding that they were not necessary parties. The Supreme Court had heard the appeal on special leave being granted against the order deleting the names of the respondents No. 2 and 3. Accordingly the learned Government Advocate states that the question of the decision against any interlocutory order being maintainable before the High Court or the question of bar under Section 397(2) was not at all before the Supreme Court and hence this judgment should be of no consequence so far as the controversy under question before this Bench is concerned. Be that as it may, due weight is to be given to the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of A.K Subbaiah and it has to be held that in view of the above mentioned observations made by the Supreme Court in A.K Subbaiah's case and in view of their earlier judgment in the case of Madhu Limaye as has been discussed earlier a revision is maintainable even against an interlocutory order.

15. We had also the advantage of going through the cases mentioned in the referring order. We found ourselves to be in agreement with the view of Hon'ble S.K Dhaon, J. in case of Ram Yash. The case of Ram Yash referring to the case of Kuppuswami Rao v. The King in which the following dictum of Lord Esher in Salomon v. Warner was approved:

“If their decision, whichever way it is given wilt, if it stands, finally disposed of the matter in dispute, I think that for the purposes of these rules it is final. On the other hand, if their decision, if given in one way will finally dispose of the matter in dispute, but, if given in the other, will allow the action to go on, then I think it is not final, but interlocutory.”

16. Hon. S.K Dhaon, J. had also relied upon some other cases of the Supreme Court including the case of Madhu Limaye v. State Of Maharashtra. (supra), and had observed in para 14 that sub-section (2) of Section 397 of New Code kept purely interlocutory orders beyond the purview of sub-section (1) of Section 397 and not intermediate orders. Quoting Corpus Juris Secondum which says “An intermediate order has been defined as the one made between the commencement of an action and the entry of the judgment”, he had thereafter observed that an order passed under Section 204 of the New Code issuing the process to a person to appear as an accused was an intermediate order within the meaning of sub-section (2) of Section 397 of the new Code and hence revision against such an order was maintainable. We have also perused the reasonings and the observations of Hon. Mr. Justice I.S Mathur in the case of Om Prakash Paswan v. State of U.P which has been referred in the referring order as the decision in Criminal Rev. No. 235 of 1995 in case of Jawahar Yadav and find ourselves to be in agreement with the views expressed therein. Hon. Mr. Justice I.S Mathur has placed reliance on the views taken by the Supreme Court in the case of Amar Nath v. State of Haryana as also in the case if Madhu Limaya v. State of Maharashtra and A.K Subbaiah v. State of Karnataka, and arrived at almost similar conclusion as of ours. Hon. Mr. Justice I.S Mathur had also referred to the case of Ram Yash decided by Hon. Mr. Justice Dhawan in criminal revision no. 1294 of 1982 which we have also considered. Consequently we hold that the law laid down in the case of Om Prakash Paswan v. State of U.P (decided alongwith the Criminal Revision No. 235 of 1995) Jawahar Yadav v. State of U.P, connected with Atiq Ahmad M.L.A v. State of U.P . Criminal Misc Case No. 468 of 1995., and also the views taken in case of Ram Yash v. State of U.P . 1985 Crime 129 Cr. R. No. 1294 of 1984. are in accordance with law and contrary view expressed in case of Kailash Chaudhary v. State of U.P as also in case of Chet Ram Gangwar v. State of U.P do not law down correct law when they say that every summoning order passed under Section 204 Cr. P.C by a Magistrate is necessarily an interlocutory order which cannot be revised in view of the provisions of Section 397(2) Cr. P.C

17. So far as the judgment of Hon. S.R Singh, J. in Kailash Chaudhari v. State of U.P . Cr. Misc App. No. 8762 of 1993. is concerned, brother S.R Singh, J. mentions that two questions of considerable importance viz (1) as nature, scope and ambit of the powers of a Magistrate under Sections 200, 202, 203 and 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and (2) the question whether an order issuing processes under Section 204 of Cr. P.C by, Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence under Section 190(1)(a) is amenable to inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 Cr. P.C had been raised before him. In his learned judgment brother S.R Singh J. went through the various provisions of the Act and quoting extensively from the observations of eminent jurists as also the case law on the subject, he held that Section 204 of the Code cast a duty upon the Magistrate to record the reasons in brief while issuing processes. He also observed that the issue of processes under Section 204 of the Code was not a final order and was rather a step towards ultimate decision on a complaint. He further observed that the formation of the opinion by the Magistrate as to whether there was not sufficient ground to proceed, involved scrutiny of the complaint and to some extent the evaluation of the material including the statement of the com plainant and that of the witnesses as also the result of inquiry or investigation, if any, with a view to find out whether the prima facie offence was disclosed or not. Thereafter relying upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of K.M Mathew v. State of Kerala . 1992 1 SCC 217, he held that the Magistrate on being satisfied by the summoned person that the process against him ought not to have been issued could recall, vary or rescined his order. In this background it was held by Brother S.R Singh, J. that if a person was aggrieved from an order issuing process he could under Section 204 Cr. P.C itself approach the Magistrate to recall that order as Section 204 Cr. P.C also impliedly provided the remedy inasmuch as it confers a discretion to a Magistrate to recall the ex-parte order issuing processes if he was satisfied that the processes should not have been issued. He further observed that if the matter thereafter was put up before the High Court in a revision under “Section 397 of the Code, High Court would be in a better position to appreciate the question whether the process issued was perverse or vexatious. Brother S.R Singh, J. thereafter relying upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of K.M Mathew's (supra) further held that the processes issued under Section 204 Cr. P.C was an interim order and since it could be varied, rescinded or recalled by the Magistrate and the proceedings could be dropped if the Magistrate found that no offence was disclosed hence Section 397(2) of Code created an express bar, so far as the revision before the High Court was concerned. He further held that once there was an express bar created by the Code under Section 307(2), the inherent powers of the High Court to quash the complaint could not be invoked unless the accused had first approached the Magistrate to dismiss the complaint.

18. In view of what we have discussed hereinbefore, we find that barring the observation of Hon. S.R Singh, J. that order issuing the processes under Section 204 Cr. P.C is an interlocutory order against which no revision would lie in the High Court in view of bar under Section 397(2) Cr. P.C rest of the judgment of brother S.R Singh, J. in the case of Kailash Chaudhary meets our full approval.

19. Coming to the decision by Hon'ble Mr. Justice N.B Asthana in Chet Ram Gangwar v. State of U.P we find that the main inquiry in that case was whether the order of the Magistrate summoning the applicant Chet Ram under Section 342/376 of I.P.C was suffering from any legal infirmity so as to call far interference in the revision by the High Court. Brother N.B Asthana, J. also relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of K.M Malhew (supra) and held that if the applicant in revision before him thought that no case against him was made out he could approach the court below as he could even after commitment show at the stage of Sections 227 and 228 Cr. P.C, that no case was made out against him and he was liable to be discharged. Consequently it was held by him that no case for interference in the revision was made out. We are in complete agreement with the views of brother Asthana, J. on this point. Thereafter Brother N.B Asthana, J. also considered the question whether a revision lay against the summoning, order. Relying upon various judgments, he ultimately held that no revision lay against an order summoning the accused. For the same reasons as we have mentioned earlier on this question we are of the view that the judgment in the case of Chet Ram Gangwar so far as it categorically holds that no revision lies against the order of summoning an accused, can not be upheld.

20. Accordingly our answer to the question referred is that a summoning order passed by Magistrate under Section 204 Cr. P.C can not necessarily be treated to be an interlocutory order thereby completely barring a revision against the same in view of the bar under Section 397(2) Cr. P.C The test to examine whether such an order is an interlocutory order or not is that if the decision against such an order, finally terminates the criminal proceedings, it would not be treated as an interlocutory order. On the other hand if decision given either way would still allow the proceedings to go on then the order would not be a final order but an interlocutory order and then a revision against such as order would be barred under Section 397(2) Cr. P.C However, before concluding we must make it clear High the High Court as also the other courts of revision should be slow in interfering against the orders summoning an accused persons and it should be in the rarest of rare cases, when the revisional courts find that there was absolutely no point to permit a case to proceed, such as where there is an absolute bar for taking cognizance as under the Arms Act or Prevention of Corruption Act without sanction etc., then alone in a clear case the revisional court should interfere against such an order. We also are otherwise in agreement with the views expressed by the Hon. Judges in the cases mentioned in the referring order to the extent mentioned above and in particular to the following observation of Hon'ble I.S Mathur, J. in the case of Om Prakash Paswan and Jawahar Yadav wherein he had accepted the submission of the learned Advocate Genera] and had observed as follows:—

“In the present case, as indicated above, the submission of the learned Advocate General that these revisionists or the petitioner may raise this question before the learned Sessions Judge, as he will be in a better position to appreciate these arguments at the first instance, appears to be well founded. The entire record is with the Sessions Judge and it may be necessary for him to peruse that record, which I am informed is quite bulky, to arrive at a proper decision. The Sessions Judge will be able to hear both the accused and the State and appreciate the arguments on the basis of the record in proper perspective. He may, inter alia, consider the question regarding the power under Section 7 of the Criminal Amendment Act, 1952, which as learned counsel for the petitioners points out, stands repealed by Section 30 of the Prevention of Corruption Act as also the question whether or not an offence under Section 13(1)(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is made out and the two sets of the accused can be tried together.”

21. The papers should now be sent back with this opinion to the Hon'ble Single Judge.