K.S Varma, J.:— The present appeal under S. 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 is directed against the award given by B.B Srivastava, District Judge as the Motor Accidents Claim Tribunal, Barabanki. The facts giving rise to the appeal are that the late Sri Rajendra Swarup Saxena was posted in Barabanki as an overseer at the relevant time in the Public Works Department. On 25-4-1973 when he was proceeding on a motor cycle on Lucknow-Faizabad Road, private passenger bus U.S.D 468 came from the opposite direction and collided with the motor cycle at Naka Satrikh. The deceased Rajendra Swarup Saxena sustained fatal injuries due to accident and died on the spot. The passenger bus USD 468 was driven by driver Mohammad Sami. At the time of the accident the bus belonged to Liaqat Ali Khan and was driven by Mohammad Sami, his driver. The said dug was insured with the Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd., Lucknow. The deceased at the time of his death left behind him his widow Srimati Mithlesh, a son Khagendra Vijai and his mother Srimati Chandrawati. Shrimati Chandravati and Khagendra Vijai have moved the claim petition for compensation and claimed Rs. 85,000/-. The claim was made by the applicants on their behalf and also on behalf of Shrimati Mithlesh widow of the deceased. Shrimati Mithlesh did not join the claim and she was arrayed as an opposite party. The claim put forward on behalf of the heirs of the deceased, referred to above, was contested by Liaqat Ali Khan on the ground that he had given the said vehicle on contract to Farid Ahmad and Atiq Ahmad for three years under an agreement dated 28-11-1972. At the time of the accident the said vehicle was driven by Mohammad Sami, the driver of Farid Ahmad and Atiq Ahmad. Since Farid Ahmad and Atiq Ahmad had not been joined as opposite parties, the claim was bad for non-joinder of parties. It was also contended on behalf of Liaqat Ali Khan that the accident occurred due to the negligence of the deceased himself and as such no compensation could be claimed by the representatives of the deceased. It was also maintained that the claim was barred by time and that, at any rate, the claim made was excessive. The claim put forward by the heirs of the deceased was also contested by the Oriental Fire and General Insurance Company on the ground that the bus in question was being driven on the right side of the road with normal speed and that the deceased was himself responsible for the alleged accident. It was also contended on behalf of the Insurance Company that it was not liable for any compensation as on the date of the accident the insured vehicle was not in possession of the owner. Mohammad Sami contested the claim on the ground that he was not driving the bus in a rash and negligent manner and the accident occurred on account of the negligence of the deceased.

2. The Claims Tribunal framed fee following issues:—

“1. Whether the application suffers from the defect of non-joinder of Farid Ahmad and Atiq Ahmad? If so, its effect?

2. Whether the opposite party No. 1 executed a contract of the vehicle in favour of Farid Ahmad and Atiq Ahmad, as alleged? If so, its effect?

3. Whether the application is barred by time?

4. Whether the opposite party No. 1 is not liable to pay the compensation, as, alleged?

5. Whether the opposite party No. 3 is not liable to pay compensation, as alleged?

6. Whether the accident was the result of rash and negligent driving of opposite party No. 2? If so its effect?

7. To what amount of compensation, if any, are the applicants entitled and against which opposite parties?”

3. On issues' Nos. 2 and 4 the Tribunal held that in spite of the agreement Ext. A-1 the control over the said vehicle remained with Liaqat Ali Khan and that he was liable to pay the compensation in case it was found that the driver of the vehicle was negligent. It was also held that Farid Ahmad and Atiq Ahmad were not necessary parties in the case. On Issue No. 3 the Tribunal held that the claim was within time. On issues 5 and 6 the Tribunal held that the accident took place due to the negligence and rash driving of the bus by Mohammad Sami. In consequence of that finding it was held that Mohammad Sami the driver of the said vehicle, Liaqat Ali Khan and the Oriental Fire and General Insurance Company Ltd. were liable to pay compensation. On issue No. 7 it was held that the heirs of the deceased were entitled to Rs. 36,000/- as compensation. As the vehicle was insured the amount of compensation was ordered to be realized from the Insurance Company. Out of the aforesaid compensation, Shrimati Chandravati and Shrimati Mithlesh were awarded Rs. 6000/- each. The balance of Rs. 24,000/- was awarded as compensation to Khagendra Vijai, the son of the deceased. The award given by the Tribunal is dated 22-3-1977. Aggrieved by the said award, the Oriental Fire and General Insurance Company Ltd. has come up in appeal before this court. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that on the date of the accident, namely, 25th April, 1973 Liaqat Ali Khan had no control over the use of the bus in question inasmuch as he had executed an agreement dated 28-11-1972 in favour of Farid Ahmed and Atiq Ahmad in regard to the bus in question for three years. It was also submitted that the bus in question was insured with Liaqat Ali Khan as the owner and since he had no control over the vehicle and this fact was not within the knowledge of the appellant, the Insurance Company is not liable to pay any compensation. The agreement sought to be relied upon by the respondents is Ext. A-1. It is an unregistered document and by this document the bus in question purports to have been given on hire to Farid Ahmad and Atiq Ahmad on payment of Rupees 700/- per month by them for a period of three years. In this respect the evidence clearly indicated that the certificate of insurance Ext. A-2 shows that the bus was insured with the appellant by the owner Liaqat Ali Khan. He admitted in his cross-examination that Farid Ahmad and Atiq Ahmad did not obtain permission from the Regional Transport Authority for plying the aforesaid vehicle. Liaqat Ali Khan has also admitted that he did not take permission from the Regional Transport Officer for executing the said agreement. Mohammad Husain has proved the execution of the agreement and in cross-examination he stated that he did not know whether any intimation in regard to the execution of the agreement was given to the office of the Regional Transport Officer. Reference in this connection was made to S. 59 of the Motor Vehicles Act which provides that a permit shall not be transferable from a person to another except with the permission of the Transport Authority. In the absence of any permission from the Transport Authority, it will be presumed that Liaqat Ali Khan was the owner of the vehicle in whose name it was insured and the position of Farid Ahmad and Atiq Ahmad would be that of agents of Liaqat Ali Khan. Since the registration of the bus was all along in the name of Liaqat Ali Khan and it was insured in his name, the Insurance Company cannot escape the liability for payment of compensation merely because he had arranged the bus to be plied through Farid Ahmad and Atiq Ahmad. After having heard the learned counsel for the parties we are of the view that the Tribunal was correct in holding that in spite of the agreement, control of the vehicle remained with Liaqat Ali Khan and liability to pay compensation remained with him. On behalf of the appellant, reliance was placed on Balwant Singh v. Jhannubai (1980 Accident Claims Journal, 126) (Madh Pra). A perusal of the said decision would indicate that it was a case where the vehicle had been sold and the question was whether the transfer of the Vehicle by the owner would still render him liable to pay compensation, if the registration of the vehicle stood in the name of the transferor. In our opinion, that case is distinguishable from the facts of the Instant case. Under the agreement, Ext. A-1, the vehicle was not transferred but Farid Ahmad and Atiq Ahmad were permitted to ply the bus on a monthly payment of Rs. 700/- fo Liaqat Ali Khan. Under the arrangement evidenced by Ext. A-1 it cannot be said that the vehicle was transferred to any person. The bus in question continued to be owned by Liaqat Ali Khan and Farid Ahmad and Atiq Ahmad would be plying the bus as the agents of Liaqat Ali Khan. We are, accordingly, of the view that the decision referred to above has no application to the facts of the instant case. The next case relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant is P.K Panda v. Premalata Chaudhary (1980 Accident Claims Journal, 213) : (AIR 1980 Orissa 102). That case also was a case of transfer of the vehicle. In the instant case, there is no evidence of transfer of vehicle. This case is also not applicable to the facts of the case for the reasons already indicated above. We, accordingly, come to the conclusion that in case the driver of the bus in question was driving the same in a rash and negligent manner, the liaity for payment of compensation shall be on Liaqat Ali Khan Mohammad Sami and the appellant.

4. On the question of rash and negligent driving we have examined the record of the case with the assistance of the learned counsel for the parties. It is unnecessary to discuss the evidence in detail as we find ourselves in agreement with the finding recorded by the Tribunal that the driver of the vehicle was driving it in a rash and negligent manner. It has come in the evidence that the bus bearing the number U.S.D 468 came from the opposite direction at a great speed, dashed against the motor cycle of the deceased and the motor cycle alongwith the deceased got entangled in the bus. The bus did not stop but proceeded ahead dragging the motor cycle alongwith the deceased and dashed against the telephone post. The telephone post, according to the evidence, lies at some distance from the scene of accident. Yadunath Singh Verma was produced before the Tribunal as an eyewitness to the accident and he stated on oath that the accident took place in the manner indicated above. The witness was cross-examined at length but nothing was elicited in his cross-examination which may discredit his testimony as regards the manner in which the accident took place. The evidence of Yadunath Singh Verma when analysed along with the injury report would clearly indicate that the bus in question was driven by the driver in a rash and negligent manner. In our opinion, the accident speaks for itself and the negligence of the driver of the bus in question is writ large. After having examined the evidence led by the parties, we are of the view that the accident took place in the manner deposed to by Yadunath Singh Verma. Accordingly our finding is that the deceased met his death on account of rash and negligent driving of the bus owned by Liaqat Ali Khan and driven by driver Mohammad Sami.

5. The learned counsel for the appellant assailed the finding recorded by the Tribunal on the question of quantum of compensation. We explicitly put it to the learned counsel for the appellant as to how the determination of the amount of compensation by the Tribunal was contrary to any established principle for determination of compensation. It may be recalled that the legal position is well established that if in determining the compensation the Tribunal has not committed any mistake on a matter of principle, the appellate Court will be slow to interfere with the assessment made by the Tribunal in regard to the compensation payable to the heirs of the deceased. The Tribunal has discussed in detail various aspects in coming to the conclusion that the compensation should be assessed at Rs. 36,000/-. We find ourselves in agreement with the assessment so made. We also agree with the Tribunal that out of this compensation Shrimati Chandrawati and Shrimati Mithlesh should be awarded Rs. 6000/- each and the remaining amount of Rs. 24,000/- should be awarded as compensation to Khagendra Vijai, son of the deceased.

6. It was next contended by the learned counsel for appellant that respondent No. 3 at least was not entitled to any amount of compensation, as she had remarried.

7. Claim petition was filed before the Tribunal by Smt. Chandrawati (mother of the deceased) and Sri Khagendra Vijai (son of the deceased). Smt. Mithlesh, widow of the deceased, was impleaded as opposite party No. 4 in that claim petition. With respect to respondent No. 4, it was mentioned in the claim petition as under:

“The respondent No. 4 is also entitled to compensation. Due to the sad and sudden demise of her husband she fell seriously ill and is still lying ill. She is not able to come from Badaun to present the application and as such the application is being filed for her benefit and on her behalf and she is arrayed as respondent No. 4 as provided under S. 110-A, Motor Vehicles Act.”

8. Smt. Mithlesh has not appeared in the witness-box. Smt. Chandrawati, who was claimant No. 1 before Tribunal and is respondent No. 1 in this appeal had appeared as a witness and stated that Smt. Mithlesh was the second wife of the deceased. She also stated that after the accident, the father of Smt. Mithlesh remarried her at another place. In spite of this evidence, the Tribunal has awarded a sum of Rs. 6000/- as compensation of Smt. Mithlesh.

9. It has been urged by the learned counsel for appellant that dependency of Smt. Mithlesh had come to an end on her remarriage and, therefore, she was not entitled to any compensation.

10. In England prospects of remarriage of a widow was always considered to be a relevant consideration for assessing quantum of damages payable to her on the death of her husband in an accident The problem, however, was solved by the intervention of the Legislature which enacted Law Reforms (Misc. Provisions Act, 1971). Section 4(1) of the Act provides that “in assessing damages payable to a widow ………… there shall not be taken into account remarriage of the widow or prospects of her remarriage.” The position in India, however, is different, as observed by the Delhi High Court in the case of Jaimal Singh v. Jawala Devi reported in 1976 ACJ 207 : (AIR 1976 Delhi 127) (at p. 131):

“So long as there is no legislative reform the possibility of the remarriage of the widow claimant must continue to hold the centre of the stage in India. The judges will continue to be engaged in the guessing game of sizing up the claimant's chances of finding a new husband and bringing the dependency to an end.”

11. However, in the present case the admitted position is that Smt. Mithlesh has remarried. The evidence on record clearly establishes that she was remarried soon after the death of her husband. Her dependency, therefore, came to an end on her remarriage and she was, therefore, in our opinion, not entitled to any amount of compensation, The Tribunal was in error in awarding a sum of Rs. 6000/- as compensation to Smt. Mithlesh.

12. Appeal is consequently allowed in part. The judgment of the Tribunal in so far as it purports to award a sum of Rs. 6000/- to Smt. Mithlesh, is set aside but in all other respects it is maintained.

13. Respondents 1 and 2 shall be entitled to their costs.

14. Appeal partly allowed.