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Sohan Lal v. Raghunath Prasad

Allahabad High Court
Mar 13, 1981
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Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

These proceedings are revisions by the decree-holder directed against the judgment of the learned Civil Judge, Jhansi, which dismissed an execution application as barred by limitation.

Material factual events (as recorded in the opinion):

  • On 25 June 1944 Shyam Lal (one of three brothers) took a loan from Sohan Lal (the present decree-holder) and deposited title deeds of certain properties as security.
  • An arbitration award dated 10 March 1954 allowed Sohan Lal's claim for Rs. 100,000 with 3% per annum simple interest. The award was made rule of court and a decree followed on 30 October 1954.
  • The decree-holder filed an execution application at Jhansi on 6 August 1956; that execution was transferred to Mathura and was dismissed for non-satisfaction on 24 August 1957.
  • The decree-holder later filed another execution application that is variously recorded in the opinion: once as filed on 14 March 1966 (registered as No. 14 of 1966) and elsewhere as filed on 13 June 1965 (recorded as Execution Case No. 15 of 1966). The opinion records orders issued under Order XXI (notice under Rule 22 and a direction under Rule 23) and subsequent steps to hold sale proceedings.
  • During execution proceedings multiple objections were filed by transferees (four sets of objectors claiming various houses by sale deeds executed after the first execution was dismissed). The judgment-debtor Shyam Lal died during the pendency of the objections; his heirs were substituted but filed no objection.
  • The execution court, by judgment dated 18 December 1967, held inter alia that the second execution application was barred by limitation (the first execution having been dismissed on 24 August 1957 and the second filed more than six years later), and dismissed the execution application. The decree-holder sought revision in this Court.
  • Procedurally, the matter was referred to increasingly larger benches: initially heard by a learned single Judge, then placed before a three-Judge Full Bench which considered whether it could overrule an earlier Full Bench (Genda Lal), and ultimately came before a Full Bench of five Judges for decision on the issues that had been referred up.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a judgment-debtor is precluded by the doctrine of constructive res judicata from raising the plea of limitation at any time during the pendency of execution proceedings (i.e., whether the failure to appeal an order under Order XXI, Rule 23 operates as constructive res judicata to bar a later plea of limitation).
  2. Whether an execution application filed within twelve years of the decree (invoking Section 48, CPC) is nevertheless required to comply with the Limitation Act (particularly Article 182) for each execution application.
  3. Whether persons who purchased the judgment-debtor's interest after the execution had become time-barred are bound by the decree as the judgment-debtor's "representatives" (and hence barred from raising the plea of limitation), or whether they stand as title paramount and may raise limitation and other pleas to protect the interest they purchased.

Arguments of the Parties

Decree-holder / Applicant (arguments recorded in the opinion)

  • It was submitted before the Court that the judgment-debtor was precluded by the doctrine of constructive res judicata from raising the objection that execution was barred by limitation.
  • The decree-holder relied on the Full Bench decision in Genda Lal's case (AIR 1936 All 21) which had been understood to hold that a judgment-debtor could raise the plea of limitation at any time during execution; the decree-holder contended that that Full Bench view was not correct in view of later Supreme Court decisions (Goenka and Prem Lata).
  • Mr. Prakash Gupta, counsel for the decree-holder, submitted that an execution application filed on 14 March 1966 was within twelve years of the decree dated 30 October 1954 and therefore within time under Section 48, CPC.
  • Mr. Prakash Gupta further argued that the court had issued notice under Order XXI, Rule 22 and later passed an order on 30 April 1966 (treatable under Order XXI, Rule 23) which had the force of a decree and was appealable; since no appeal was filed, the judgment-debtor was said to be precluded by the doctrine of constructive res judicata from raising the limitation plea later in execution proceedings.

Objectors / Transferees (arguments recorded in the opinion)

  • Four distinct sets of objectors (Madhu Kamal; Bhuvanendu Arjaria; H.K. Sharma & R.K. Sharma; B.K. Gupta) each claimed title to specified houses on the basis of sale deeds executed after the first execution was dismissed. They sought release of their properties from sale in execution and contended that the execution against those properties was barred by limitation.
  • The objectors who claimed by transfers from Kanhaiya Lal and Kishan Lal did not claim title through the judgment-debtor (i.e., their pleadings were not controverted by the decree-holder), and relied on their transferred title and the bar of limitation to oppose sale of the properties they claimed.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Genda Lal's case, 1935 All LJ 1189 / AIR 1936 All 21 (Full Bench) Held (as understood by parties) that a judgment-debtor was competent to raise the plea of limitation at any time during the pendency of execution application. The Court noted the Full Bench status of that decision and observed that a smaller Full Bench could not overrule it; because the question of overruling it implicated a larger precedent issue, the Full Bench of three referred the matter to a larger Bench. The five-Judge Bench refrained from expressing any opinion on the correctness of Genda Lal since the facts did not require deciding whether a judgment-debtor (or his representative) would be barred by constructive res judicata.
Goenka's case (AIR 1953 SC 65) Cited by the decree-holder as authority relevant to competency to raise limitation plea during execution (advanced as counter to Genda Lal). Mentioned as part of the argument that Genda Lal was not the correct view in light of Supreme Court authority; the Court recorded the reliance but did not decide the larger conflict of opinion between Full Bench and Supreme Court precedents on that abstract question because facts rendered the specific question unnecessary to decide.
Prem Lata v. [Respondent], (1970) 3 SCC 440 : AIR 1970 SC 1525 Principle: Section 48 CPC does not supersede the Limitation Act; an application for execution must satisfy the Limitation Act (Article 182) and an application for execution must normally be made within three years from the dates in Article 182; Section 48 only prescribes the maximum limit of time for execution. The Court relied on this Supreme Court decision to repulse the decree-holder's argument that filing an execution within twelve years under Section 48 alone rendered it valid. The Court held that an execution filed merely within twelve years does not absolve the decree-holder from the requirement of instituting it within the period prescribed by Article 182; the submission based on Section 48 was held to have "no substance."
Parmeshari Din v. Ram Charan, AIR 1937 PC 260 (Privy Council) Prinicple that a transferee pendente lite is a representative-in-interest of the mortgagor/judgment-debtor and is bound by the decree passed against the latter. The Court cited this decision to explain the legal position of a transferee pendente lite but distinguished the objectors' positions on the facts: since the transfers were made after the execution had become time-barred, the transferees could not be treated as bound by the decree for the interest they purchased and therefore were not judgment-debtor representatives for the purpose of constructive res judicata.
Gulzarilal v. Madho Ram, (1904) ILR 26 All 447 Interpretation that the word "representative" of a judgment-debtor includes representative-in-interest and purchasers of his interest (whether by private sale or court auction) so far as that interest is concerned. The Court used this authority to clarify that a purchaser of the judgment-debtor's interest may be a representative-in-interest and bound by the decree as to that interest; however, if a purchaser acquires an interest after satisfaction of the decree has become unobtainable by reason of limitation, such a purchaser cannot be termed the judgment-debtor's representative in relation to the interest he purchased and hence can claim title paramount and oppose sale.
Venkappa v. Lakshmikant Rao, AIR 1956 Hyderabad 7 (Full Bench) This Full Bench decision was cited by the parties as one of several Full Bench authorities touching on the same point (constructive res judicata / limitation in execution). The opinion records that attention was drawn to this Full Bench decision and that the learned single Judge felt difficulty in distinguishing these Full Bench authorities; the Court did not adopt or reject its ratio on the merits in this opinion because the facts made it unnecessary to decide the larger question.
Jagannath Ramanuj Rai Deb v. Lakshmi Narayan Tripathi, AIR 1960 Orissa 197 (Full Bench) Cited as a Full Bench authority relevant to the point in issue (constructive res judicata / limitation in execution). As with other Full Bench decisions mentioned, the Court recorded that this decision had been pressed and that there was difficulty reconciling the conflict; the Court did not resolve the abstract conflict here because the facts obviated the need.
Baijnath Prasad Sah v. Ramphal Sahni, AIR 1962 Pat 72 (Full Bench) Cited as another Full Bench decision on related questions of res judicata / execution limitation. Recorded among the Full Bench authorities the Court was asked to consider; no specific adoption or rejection of its ratio was made because the factual posture rendered the central legal question unnecessary to decide.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in two linked strands: (1) a preliminary procedural consideration about the appropriate Bench to consider the conflict among Full Bench and Supreme Court authorities; and (2) a careful factual and legal analysis of whether the objectors were judgment-debtors or their representatives and therefore whether constructive res judicata barred them from raising limitation.

  1. Procedural/precedential posture:
    • The Court observed that a three-Judge Full Bench could not overrule an earlier Full Bench in Genda Lal; the matter therefore required consideration by a larger Bench, which is why a Full Bench of five Judges heard the matter.
    • Because neither the single Judge nor the three-Judge Full Bench had framed a precise question for the larger Bench, the Court first asked whether the disputed question actually arose on the facts of the present cases.
  2. Factual analysis bearing on constructive res judicata and limitation:
    • The Court emphasized the factual posture: Shyam Lal (the judgment-debtor) had been served under Order XXI, Rule 22 and did not appear or file any objection; after his death his heirs were substituted and likewise did not file objections. The Court concluded that the abstract question whether a judgment-debtor or his representative is precluded by constructive res judicata did not arise on these facts in relation to the judgment-debtor or his heirs.
    • Four separate objectors, however, claimed certain houses by sale deeds executed after the first execution had been dismissed. The decree-holder did not specifically controvert the factual allegations of purchase by several of these objectors. Consequently, Madhu Kamal and Bhuvanendu Arjaria were found not to claim title through the judgment-debtor; they were purchasers claiming title paramount and not representatives of the judgment-debtor.
    • The Court applied the doctrine of lis pendens codified in Section 52, Transfer of Property Act, explaining that the bar on transfer applies only during the pendency of a suit or proceeding and ceases where satisfaction or discharge of the decree has become unobtainable by reason of expiration of the period of limitation. The Court found that satisfaction of the decree had become unobtainable once the limitation period for execution expired on 24 August 1960 (three years from the final order on the first execution), and therefore transfers after that date were not subject to the lis pendens bar.
    • Relying on Parmeshari Din (Privy Council) and Gulzarilal (All India decisions) as background authorities, the Court distinguished transferees pendente lite (who are bound by the decree) from transferees who acquired title after the execution had become time-barred; the latter were not bound as representatives and could raise pleas (including limitation) to protect their independently acquired interest.
    • On the facts, the Court concluded that the four objectors were not judgment-debtor representatives for the properties they purchased after limitation had run; accordingly the doctrine of constructive res judicata could not be used to preclude them from raising limitation objections in execution proceedings. The execution court's finding that the execution was time-barred in respect of those objectors' properties was unchallenged on merits and accepted.
    • For properties for which no objections had been filed (houses Nos. 102–109 and the ice factory), the Court observed that once an auction-sale had been held and no application was made under the relevant rules to set aside the sale, the court was obliged to confirm the sale (citing Rule 92 of Order XXI, CPC and Rules 89–91). Therefore those sales had to be confirmed by the execution court.
  3. On the larger doctrinal conflict (Genda Lal vs later authorities):
    • Because none of the four objectors were the judgment-debtor or his representatives with respect to the interests they claimed, the central legal question whether a judgment-debtor (or his representative) is precluded by constructive res judicata did not arise for decision on the present facts. Consequently the Court expressly refrained from expressing any opinion on the correctness of the view taken in Genda Lal.

Holding and Implications

REVISIONS ALLOWED IN PART

Holding (direct effect on the parties):

  • The revisions succeed in part: Properties Nos. 110 to 128 of item No. 11 of the memorandum are released from sale proceedings in favour of the respective objectors who had established title independent of the judgment-debtor.
  • The execution court is directed to proceed to confirm the sale of the remaining properties (specifically houses Nos. 102 to 109 of item No. 11 and the ice factory described as item No. 10 of the memorandum) in accordance with law.
  • The parties are ordered to bear their own costs in the High Court and below.

Broader implications:

  • The Court did not decide the broader doctrinal conflict between Full Bench and subsequent Supreme Court authorities concerning the competence of a judgment-debtor to raise limitation pleas at any stage of execution when an earlier Order under Order XXI, Rule 23 has not been appealed; the Court expressly refrained from laying down a rule on that larger question because the facts did not require it.
  • Consequently, no new binding precedent on that abstract point was laid down by this opinion; the decision's precedential effect is primarily factual and procedural as applied to the particular properties and objectors in these cases.

Result recorded in the opinion: "Applications partly allowed."

Show all summary ...

Satish Chandra, C.J:— These are decree-holder's applications in revision, directed against the judgment of the learned Civil Judge, Jhansi, dismissing the execution application as barred by time.

2. When the revisions came up for hearing before a learned single Judge, it was submitted that the judgment-debtor was precluded by the doctrine of constructive res judicata from raising the objection that the execution was barred by limitation. It was argued that the Full Bench decision of this Court in Genda Lal's case (1935 All LJ 1189) : (AIR 1936 All 21) (FB) laying down the Proposition that the judgment-debtor was competent to raise the plea of limitation at any time during the pendency of the execution application was not the correct view of law in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Goenka's case (AIR 1953 SC 65) and Prem Lata's case ((1970) 3 SCC 440 : AIR 1970 SC 1525). The attention of the learned single Judge was drawn to three Full Bench decisions of the Hyderabad, Venkappa v. Lakshmikant Rao. (AIR 1956 Hyderabad 7), Orissa, Jagannath Ram anuj Rai Deb v. Lakshmi Narayan Tripathi, (AIR 1960 Orissa 197) and Patna High Courts Baijnath Prasad Sah v. Ramphal Sahni. (AIR 1962 Pat 72). The learned single Judge felt some difficulty in distinguishing the said cases or reconciling the conflict of opinion. He observed:

“As the only point in the instant cases relates to the decision of the objection relating to limitation of the execution. I refer these cases to a larger Bench for decision.”

3. The revisions were laid before a Full Bench of three Judges. The Full Bench held that it was not competent to overrule another Full Bench of three Judges in Genda Lal's case. It was hence desirable that the matter be considered by a larger Bench. That is how the matter has come up before this Full Bench of five Judges. Shyam Lal Kishan Lal and Kanhaiya Lal were three brothers. Shyam Lal on 25th June, 1944, took a loan from Sohanlal, the present applicant and deposited title deeds of some properties as security. Certain arbitration proceedings followed, in which an award was made on 10th March, 1954, allowing the claim of Sohan Lal for Rs. one lac with three per cent interest against Shyam lal. On 30th October, 1954, the award was made a rule of the court and a decree followed.

4. On 6th August, 1956. Sohan Lal, the decree-holder filed an execution application in the courts at Jhansi where the decree had been passed. In due course the decree was transferred to the courts at Mathura for execution. At Mathura the execution was dismissed for non-satisfaction on 24th August, 1957.

5. The decree-holder on 14th March, 1966, filed a second application for execution. This was registered as No. 14 of 1966. On 26th March, 1966, the court directed notice to issue to the judgment-debtor. On 30th April, 1966, the court passed the following order:—

“Case called out Sri Sanyal for decree-holder, present. Judgment-debtor absent despite service. Proceed ex parte. Property is under pledge by virtue of award. It amounts to a charge or mortgage. No fresh attachment is necessary. Now sale proceedings have to be taken. Decree-holder to take steps for service under Order XXI. Rule 66 C.P.C for 7-5-1966.”

6. On 16th July, 1966, the court passed the following order:—

“Notice served. No objection filed. Statement under Order XXI, Rule 66 is confirmed. Further steps by 23rd July, 1966.”

7. On 23rd July, 1966, the court directed issuance of the sale proclamation fixing 3rd October, 1966.

8. On 1st October, 1966, an objection was filed by one Madhu Kanal. Ho claimed ownership of a portion of the property, which was the subject-matter of sale, by transfer from Kanhaiya Lal one of the brothers of judgment-debtor Shyam Lal Madhu Kanal also filed an application for stay of sale. The court ordered—

“I see no sufficient reason to stay sale which is for 3-10-66. Confirmation of sale may be stayed to safeguard his interest.”

9. Notice was directed to be issued to the decree-holder.

10. On 3rd October, 1966, another objection was filed by one Bhuvanendu Arjaria. He claimed on the basis of a transfer from Kishan Lal the third brother of the judgment-debtor Shyam Lal On 8th October, 1966, two more objections were filed one was by H.K Sharma and another and the other was by B.K Gupta. These two sets of claimants claimed as transferees from the judgment-debtor Shyam Lal They also applied for stay of sale, but the court refused to stay the sale, but directed that the confirmation of sale shall remain stayed. On the same day namely. 8th October, the court, having found that the Amin had not properly certified the sale, directed that the sale may be held within thirty days. The matter was directed to be put up on 8-11-1966.

11. During the pendency of these objections the judgment-debtor died Proceedings to substitute his heirs were taken. The heirs were duly substituted. But they did not file any objection. The objections were heard by the execution court on 2nd December, 1967, By its judgment dated 18th December, 1967, the court held that the decree was not a nullity for lack of registration. The second point related to the plea of limitation, viz. that the second execution application was barred by limitation. The court held that the decree-holder's counsel concedes that the execution application was barred by limitation, because the first execution application was dismissed at Mathura on 24th August, 1957. The present application was filed more than six years later, on 14th March, 1966. It was clearly barred by limitation. On these findings the execution application was dismissed as barred by limitation. Aggrieved, the decree-holder has come up to this Court in revision.

12. Mr. Prakash Gupta learned counsel for the decree-holder applicant, submitted that the execution application filed on 14th March, 1966, was made within twelve years of the decree dated 30th October, 1954, and so was within time under Section 48 C.P.C

13. This submission is squarely repelled by the decision of the Supreme Court in Prem Lata's case ((1970) 3 SCC 440 : AIR 1970 SC 1525) (supra). In para 17 their Lordships held:—

“It may however, be stated that the effect of Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not to supersede the law of limitation with regard to execution of decrees. The Limitation Act prescribes a period of limitation for execution of decrees. Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure dealt with the maximum limit of time provided for execution, but it did not prescribe the period within which each application for execution was to be made. An application for execution was to be made within three years from any of the dates mentioned in the third column of Article 182 of the Limitation Act, 1908. An application for execution of a decree would first have to satisfy Article 182 and it would also have to be found out as to whether Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure operated as a further bar.”

14. It is thus apparent that merely because an execution application has been filed within twelve years of the decree will not absolve the decree-holder of the requirement of instituting it within three years of the disposal of the last execution application as provided by Article 182 of the Limitation Act. This point has no substance.

15. Mr. Prakash Gupta, learned counsel for the decree-holder application, submitted, in fact the court issued notice under the provisions of Order XXI Rule 22. C.P.C The notice was actually served on the judgment-debtor but he did not appear. On 30th April, 1966, the court passed the order mentioned above, which was in substance an order directing the execution to proceed. This was an order provided for by Order XXI, Rule 23. C.P.C It had the force of a decree and was appealable as such. Admittedly no appeal was filed by the judgment-debtor. The judgment-debtor was hence precluded by the doctrine of constructive res judicata from raising the plea of limitation at a subsequent stage of the execution proceedings.

16. In these cases the civil revisions have been referred for decision to this Bench. Neither the learned single Judge nor the three-Judge Full Bench had framed or formulated any particular question for decision of this Full Bench. In the circumstances, it is pertinent to see whether the aforesaid Question does on the facts of the case, arise for decision.

17. Shyamlal was the judgment-debtor. He was served with notice under Order XXI, Rule 22, C.P.C He did not appear nor did he file any objection. After his death his personal heirs were substituted. They also did not file any objection. Therefore the Question whether the judgment-debtor is precluded from filing an objection by the doctrine of constructive res judicata does not on facts, arise.

18. In the present case, four sets of objections were filed. The preliminary question is whether the objectors could be said to be the judgment-debtors or his representative so as to be barred by the doctrine of constructive res judicata. In order to correctly appreciate the position, let us look at the facts a little more closely. The award which was made ride of the court and on which a decree was pronounced on March 10, 1954, stated:—

“The suit is decreed for Rs. 1,00,000/- with 3% per annum simple interest and all the moveable and immoveable properties of the judgment-debtor as detailed in the memorandum shall remain in pledge till the entire decree is satisfied either by payments in cash or by sale of pledged property at Agra. Mathura and Jhansi.”

19. The decree-holder filed an execution application in the court at Jhansi on August 6, 1956. This execution was, in due course, transferred to Mathura. On August 24, 1957, the courts at Mathura dismissed Hie execution for non-satisfaction.

20. Thereafter the decree-holder remained silent and inactive till June 13, 1965 when he filed the second execution application in the courts of Jhansi (Execution Case No. 15 of 1966) In this execution application the decree was sought to be executed by sale of properties mentioned at items 10 and 11 of the memorandum. The details of these properties as given in the execution application, are:—

“Item No. 10 — One ice factory known as ‘Bharat Ice Factory’ situate outside Khandar Gate, Jhansi.

Item No. 11 — Ahata Bhannilal, situate outside Sainyar Gate, Jhansi, in which houses Nos. 102 to 117 and 118 to 121 and 122 to 127 are situate.”

21. As already mentioned, four sets of objections were filed in this execution case. They gave rise to miscellaneous case Nos. 30, 31, 32 and 33 of 1966. Miscellaneous Case No. 30 of 1966 arose out of the objection filed by one B.K Gupta. Sri Gupta prayed that houses Nos. 100 to 114 and 116 to 118 situate in Ahata Bhannilal, Jhansi, be released from the sale held in execution of the decree. He claimed to be the owner in possession of these houses. On basis of sale deeds executed by Shyamlal on 3-7-63, 21-12-64; 16-2-65 etc. it was stated that the execution had become barred by time and cannot validly proceed.

22. Miscellaneous Case No. 31 of 1966 arose out of an objection filed by Madhu Kamal. He claimed title in respect of houses Nos. 122 and 123 on the basis of a deed of sale dated January 20, 1965 and houses Nos. 124 to 127 on the basis of a deed of sale dated September 14, 1964. It was stated that both these sale deeds were executed by Sheel Chand son of Kanhaiyalal. He claimed to be the owner in possession of these houses. He alleged that the execution of the decree had become barred by time.

23. Miscellaneous Case No. 32 of 1966 related to the objections filed by H.K Sharma and R.K Sharma. They claimed title to house No. 115 which was purchased by them from Shyamlal, the judgment-debtor, by a deed of sale dated September 24, 1962. They claimed to be owners in possession of this house. It was stated that the execution of the decree has become barred by time.

24. Miscellaneous Case No. 33 of 1960 arose out of an objection filed by Bhuvanendu Arjaria. He claimed that he was owner in possession of houses Nos. 118 to 121 on the basis of a sale deed dated April 30, 1965 executed by Kishan Lal and his sons, who were claiming to be the exclusive owners under a family settlement of 1941 by which these houses were allotted exclusively to the share of Lala Kishanlal. He also pleaded that the execution was barred by time.

25. All these objectors prayed that the houses mentioned in their objections should be released from sale in favour of the objectors.

26. Thus the four objections related to some only of the properties which were sought to be sold by the decree-holder. The properties which were subject to the objections were 110 to 114, 115, 116 to 118, 118 to 121 and 122, 123 and 124 to 127. Thus houses Nos. 110 to 127 were the subject-matter of these objections. There was, however, no objection in respect of house Nos. 102 to 109 of item No. 11 and in respect of the ice factory which was item No. 10 of the memorandum.

27. The decree-holder contested these objections. The statement in the objections filed by Madhu Kamal that he had bought the houses from Sheet Chand son of Kanhaiya Lal or the statement in the objection filed by Bhuvanendu Arjaria that he had purchased the houses from Kishan lal and his sons were not specifically controverted by the decree-holder in his reply. Similarly, the statement in the objection filed by Sri H.K Sharma and Sri A.K Sharma that they purchased house No. 115 from Shyam Lal by a deed of sale dated September 24, 1962 was also not controverted. It is thus evident that Madhu Kamal and Bhuvanendu Arjaria did not claim title through the judgment-debtor. They are hence not the judgment-debtor's representative. They are in the position of holder of title paramount. As against them the doctrine of constructive res judicata under which the judgment-debtor is sought to be barred from raising any objection cannot be pressed in service. Their objections were treated to be under Section 151 C.P.C They brought to the notice of the execution court that the execution is barred by limitation and hence cannot validly proceed against them in relation to the properties owned by them. The Court held that the execution was time-barred Even if for any reason Section 151 C.P.C may not be attracted, yet owing to the factual situation, these are not fit cases for interference under Section 115 C.P.C This finding has not been questioned on the merits by the learned counsel for the decree-holder. The property covered by the objections of these two gentlemen was hence liable to be released from the sale proceedings.

28. The objection of Sharmas related to house No. 115. They purchased it from the judgment-debtor Shyam Lal on September 24, 1962. The objection of Gupta was based on sales of 1963, 1964 and 1965. The period of limitation for a second execution application is three years from the date of the final order on the first execution application (vide Art. 182 of the Limitation Act of 1908). The first execution application was dismissed on August 24, 1957. Limitation for the second execution application hence expired on August 24, 1960. The sale in favour of the Sharmas was on September 24, 1962 in favour of Gupta in 1963, 1964 and 1965.

29. Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act codifies the doctrine of lis pendens. It provides:—

“Transfer of Property pending suit relating thereto — Daring the pendency in any Court having authority within the limits of India excluding the State of Jammu and Kashmir or established beyond such limits by the Central Government of any suit or proceeding which is not collusive and in which any right to immoveable property is directly and specifically in Question, the property cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit or proceeding so as to affect the rights of any other party thereto under any decree or order which may be made therein except under the authority of the Court and on such terms as it may impose. Explanation — For the purposes of this section the pendency of a suit or proceeding shall be deemed to commence from the date of the presentation of the plaint or the institution of the proceeding in a court of competent jurisdiction, and to continue until the suit or proceeding has been disposed of by a final decree or order and complete satisfaction or discharge of such decree or order has been obtained, or has become unobtainable by reason of the expiration of any period of limitation prescribed for the execution thereof by any law for the time being in force.”

30. Transfer by any party to the suit during its pendency cannot affect the rights of any other party to the suit. A transferee pendente lite is bound by the decree, but this prohibition to transfer applies during the pendency of the suit. The pendency comes to an end inter alia, when complete satisfaction or discharge of any decree has inter alia, become unobtainable by reason of the expiration of the prescribed period of limitation for execution thereof by any law for the time being in force. As already seen, satisfaction or discharge of the decree which is under execution in the present case, became unobtainable by reason of the expiration of the prescribed period of limitation on August 24, 1960. From that date onwards, the bar against alienation imposed by Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act ceased to exist. A transferee from the judgment-debtor after the execution of the decree has become barred by time cannot be said to be bound by the decree. In Parmeshari Din v. Ram Charan. (AIR 1937 PC 260) the Privy Council held that a transferee pendente lite is a representative-in-interest of the mortgagor judgment-debtor and is bound by the decree passed against the latter. In Gulzarilal v. Madho Ram (1904) ILR 26 All 447 this Court held that the word ‘representative’ when taken with reference to the judgment-debtor, does not mean only his legal representative, that is his heir, executor or administrator, but means his representative-in-interest and includes a purchaser of his interest whether by private sale or court auction, but so far as his interest is concerned, he is bound by that decree. Ex. hypothesi, it seems evident that a purchaser of the judgment-debtor's interest who, so far as such interest is concerned, is not bound by the decree, cannot in law be termed as the representative of the judgment-debtor. In respect of the interest so purchased by him he claims independently of the judgment-debtor. His position is similar to that of a title paramount. The doctrine of constructive res judicata based on inaction by the judgment-debtor cannot preclude him from raising all available pleas to protect the interest so purchased by him. He can validly take all available pleas to oppose sale of his property.

31. On the facts the position is that all the four objectors were neither the judgment-debtor nor his representatives. The question of law whether the judgment-debtor or his representative will or will not be barred by the doctrine of constructive res judicata does not arise for consideration. We hence refrain from expressing any opinion on the correctness of the view taken in Genda Lal's case (AIR 1936 All 21) (FB).

32. As already seen, no objection was filed in respect of the sale of properties 102 to 109 of item No. 11 and in respect of the sale of the ice factory mentioned at Item No. 10 of the memorandum. These properties had in fact, been put to auction. The execution court had directed stay of confirmation of sale. Rule 92 of Order XXI, C.P.C reads:—

“Sale when to become absolute or be set aside:—

Where no application is made under Rule 89, Rule 90 or Rule 91, or where such application is made and disallowed, the Court shall make an order confirming the sale, and thereupon the sale shall become absolute.”

33. It is clear that after having ordered the auction of the properties and after auction-sale having been held the Court has no option but to confirm it where no objection has been filed. It is thus apparent that since no objection had been filed by any one in respect of the properties Nos. 102 to 109 as well as the ice factory, the court was liable to confirm their sale.

34. In the result, the revisions succeed and are allowed in part.

35. Properties Nos. 110 to 128 of item No. 11 of the memorandum are released from sale proceedings in favour of the respective objectors. The execution Court below is directed to proceed to confirm the sale of the rest of the properties in accordance with law. The parties may bear their own costs here and below.

36. Applications partly allowed.