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Prakash Dhobi And Anr. v. State Of U.P.

Allahabad High Court
Sep 13, 1993
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion arises from an application for bail by Prakash Dhobi and Kailash Dhobi, sons of Pyare, accused under Sections 147, 148, 307, 302/149 and 506, I.P.C., in Crime No. 117 of 1993 at P.S. Cantt., District Varanasi. The applicants seek bail primarily on the ground that they had requested test identification proceedings (identification parade) because they claimed that prosecution witnesses did not know them, but the prosecution (and the police) refused to arrange such identification. The Sessions Judge refused bail, accepting the prosecution's explanation that identification was unnecessary because the accused were named in the First Information Report (FIR). The accused again applied for identification while the bail application was pending before the Sessions Judge, but the prosecution again avoided conducting identification. The present application challenges that refusal and seeks bail.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the refusal by the police/prosecution to conduct test identification proceedings, when the accused claim that witnesses do not know them, affects the accused's right to a fair trial and is a factor relevant to grant of bail.
  2. Whether identification proceedings are solely a part of police investigation or whether they serve an evidentiary/cross-examination function important to the defence as well as prosecution.
  3. What duty the investigating officer/police has in arranging identification proceedings and whether refusal to arrange them raises adverse impressions about the prosecution's fairness.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicants' (Accused) Arguments

  • The applicants claimed that they were not known to the prosecution witnesses and therefore requested identification (test identification parade) to demonstrate that the witnesses did not know them.
  • They argued that denial of the opportunity to challenge the witnesses' claim of recognition by means of identification would prejudice their defence and the process of cross-examination, effectively destroying that line of defence if the accused are simply produced in court.

Prosecution's / State's Position

  • The prosecution (and the police station) declined to conduct identification proceedings on the ground that the accused were named in the First Information Report (FIR), and therefore identification was unnecessary.
  • The public prosecutor opposed the identification despite judicial authorities brought to the Sessions Judge's attention advocating for identification in appropriate circumstances; the Sessions Judge accepted the prosecution's contention.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
U.P. Criminal Cases 1992, p. 196 — Babu Singh v. State The decision was cited to the Sessions Judge as authority relevant to identification proceedings (specific text of the rule in that report is not reproduced in the opinion). The Court noted that this decision was brought to the Sessions Judge's notice, and elaborated the law reflected in that decision so that lower courts may follow it in proper perspective.
Sajjan Singh v. Emperor, AIR 1945 Lahore Observation (quoted and relied upon in subsequent decisions) that when witnesses claim to have known the accused previously while the accused denies it, the only practical test is an identification parade and it should not be refused on that ground. The Court relied on the Sajjan Singh observation (as approved in later authority) to support the proposition that identification parades should be permitted when challenged; it was used to reinforce the accused's right to test witnesses' claims of previous acquaintance.
State of U.P. v. Jagnoo, AIR 1968 Allahabad 333 The Lahore High Court's observations in Sajjan Singh were quoted with approval in this decision; those observations concern the propriety of holding identification parades when witnesses claim prior acquaintance. The Court relied on the approval in Jagnoo to demonstrate that higher fora have endorsed the view that identification parades serve an important evidentiary/corroborative role.
Case reported AIR 1951 Calcutta p. 475 (Division Bench of Calcutta High Court) Observation that identification in court is of little consequence where witnesses did not know the accused previously; corroborative value is supplied by a test identification parade. The Court reproduced this observation to show established authority that parade evidence, though not substantive, is important corroborative evidence of presence/identification.
Case reported AIR 1958 Madras 113 (unnamed in the opinion) This decision dissented from the position taken in the other authorities regarding the role or necessity of identification parades (the opinion records disagreement with that view). The Court expressly disagreed with the view in the Madras decision and stated inability to accept that identification belongs solely to police investigation or that it need not be available to the accused as a matter of defence.
Jadunath Singh and another v. State of U.P., AIR 1971 SC 363 The Supreme Court's principle (para 18) that if prosecution fails to hold identification on the plea that witnesses know the accused, and it transpires that witnesses did not know the accused, the prosecution would run the risk of losing its case; para 20 observed that reasons denying identification were not valid in that case. The Court considered this Supreme Court authority and noted that although in the peculiar facts of that case the trial was not vitiated, the principle enunciated supports the view that refusal to arrange identification can prejudice the prosecution and/or vitiate trial in appropriate circumstances.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court undertook a principled analysis of the purpose and legal significance of test identification (identification parades) drawing upon statutory evidence principles and prior authorities. The analysis proceeded through these steps, as set out in the opinion:

  • The court explained the core purpose of identification proceedings: where a person is not named in the FIR and is "worked out" by police from other information, the earliest practical test to verify the correctness of such working out is to show the person to the witnesses in a parade. Delay until trial can impair witness memory and destroy the effectiveness of the test.
  • The opinion distinguished the evidentiary character of identification proceedings: identification itself is not substantive evidence admissible in lieu of court testimony; rather, the conduct of witnesses during identification is a corroborative circumstance admissible under Section 9 of the Evidence Act (as an explanation/indication of the fact of presence or otherwise of a person at the occurrence).
  • The court emphasized that identification is a tool of testing memory and presence and serves both prosecution and defence: if the accused claims that witnesses do not know him, identification is the only practical method to gather evidence for this negative factual contention and to enable meaningful cross-examination. If the accused are simply produced in dock without a prior parade, the accused's opportunity to challenge the witnesses' claim of acquaintance is lost.
  • The court considered identification as effectively part of the defence's right to test evidence (a form of cross-examination that cannot be replicated after the witness has once seen the accused in court). Denial of identification at the proper stage may vitiate the trial or, at minimum, prejudice the accused's defence.
  • The court cited para 107 of the Police Regulations to outline the investigating officer's duty to be impartial, to seek truth rather than merely convictions, and to allow accused persons opportunities to produce defence evidence. The court found it improper that police/prosecution acted as mere prosecutors by refusing identification, contrary to these directions.
  • The court reviewed and applied prior judicial authorities (including Sajjan Singh, State v. Jagnoo, and Jadunath Singh) to show that higher courts have recognized the importance of identification parades and that refusal to hold them, on insufficient grounds, creates risk to a fair trial and to the prosecution's case.
  • On the facts before it, the court found that the prosecution's repeated refusal to arrange identification despite the applicants' claim that witnesses did not know them justified concern; such conduct gave rise to an impression that prosecution might not be playing fairly and thereby supported granting bail at the present stage.

The court expressly limited the effect of its observations: these are not to be treated as binding upon the Sessions Judge during trial, who remains free to appreciate evidence according to law.

Holding and Implications

APPLICATION ALLOWED; BAIL GRANTED.

Direct effect on the parties:

  • The applicants, Prakash Dhobi and Kailash Dhobi, are directed to be admitted to bail.
  • Each applicant must execute a personal bond and furnish two sureties each in the like amount to the satisfaction of the Magistrate concerned (the court ordered admission to bail on these conditions).

Broader implications:

  • The Court elaborated legal principles regarding the importance and role of test identification parades, emphasizing their corroborative role under Section 9 of the Evidence Act and their function in enabling effective cross-examination for both prosecution and defence.
  • The opinion criticizes prosecutorial/police refusal to arrange identification when legitimately requested and emphasizes the investigatory duty (para 107 of Police Regulations) to act impartially and seek truth rather than merely convictions.
  • At the same time, the Court clarified that its observations are not to be treated as binding on the Sessions Judge at trial; the Sessions Judge retains the right to appreciate evidence in accordance with law. Thus, while the decision authoritatively explains legal principles for guidance, it does not proclaim a binding new precedent that constrains trial courts beyond normal precedents cited.

Outcome: Application allowed; bail ordered on specified bond and surety conditions.

Show all summary ...

K. Narayan, J.-

This is an application for bail by Prakash Dhobi and Kailash Dhobi sons of Pyare said to be involved under Sections 147, 148, 307, 302/149 and 506,I.P.C., registered at Crime No. 117 of 1993, P. S. Cantt., District Varanasi.

1. The bail in this case is desired primarily on the ground that the appli­cants had claimed identification and the same has not been arranged and rather denied by the prosecution. In this behalf observations are there in the order of the Sessions Judge refusing bail to the effect that the applicants had applied for getting them identified by the prosecution witnesses but the same was refused by the police station concerned with a report that it was not needed since the accused persons were named in the first information report. It also appears that during the pendency of the bail application before the Sessions Judge, again accused persons had applied for getting identification proceedings conducted and again the prosecution had avoided it. It is the effect of this refusal which has to be considered in this bail application with some general principles of law.

3. It appears from a perusal if order dated 5-4-1993 of the Sessions Judge that decision of this Court reported in U. P. Criminal Cases 1992 page 196 in re ; Babu Singh v. State were brought to his knowledge, amongst other decision but it is strange that public prosecutor in the face of this judicial decision, again opposed the identification and still more strange is that the Sessions Judge accepted the contention. It is in these circumstances that I consider it necessary to elaborate further the law observed in the above mentioned decision, so that it may be followed by the courts below in proper perspective. I am afraid I feel constrained to say that the learned Sessions Judge has possibly avoided to understand the basic principles of criminal jurisprudence procedure and rights of the accused with the presumption of innocence and the principles for which identification proceedings arc taken.

4. It appears that the learned Sessions Judge has followed a simple impression that the identification proceedings are conducted for the pleasure of the prosecution when the accused are not named in the first information report. The real behind the test identification proceedings is different. When a person is not named in the first information report and if worked out by the police or by other agency it has to be seen whether the working out is correct or not and this can be done only at the earliest possible state by showing the person concerned to the witnesses. If this situation waits for the entire proceedings of enquiry and trial, the memory of the witnesses concerned may be lost. Further more, it has to be ascertained as to whether the person that has been worked out by the police through some other information which are not admissible in evidence, for the limitations in the Evinence Act, it has to be tested through the identification proceedings. The identification itself is not a basic evidence in itself. The conduct of the witnesses in pointing out to the accused in parade about 10 other persons as his test as to whether he can really place him or not and this is only used as a mtter of corroboration at the time of real trial when again the witness has to say that a particular individual pointed out by him in the court was present during occurrence. It is this statement in the court which is really admissible part of evidence while conduct of the witness during identification proceedings is only a cor­roboration to the above mentioned fact by showing that the man could be worked put even amongst 8 to 11 persons standing in the line up. If a witness identifies a person in the identification proceedings and is not later on examined in the court, the identification itself is not be read in evidence.

5. This conduct of pointing out to a person in a parade is relevant and that too only as a corroborate piece of evidence under Section 9 of the Evidence Act, as it explains as well as introduces the fact of presence or other­wise of a particular person in the occurrence not known by name but by pointing out to the individual i.e. an infact on memory.

6. The above mentioned factors with reference to Section 9 of the Evidence Act obtain conversely in the instant case and for that the real purpose of identification has to be explained. In the instant case, the accused appli­cants bad claimed identification on the basis that the witnesses do not know them. What else can be the method for these applicants to collect and produce evidence for this negative fact except to claim identification pro­ceedings ? If the accused persons are produced in court, which they are bound to be at the time of hearing and the witnesses point them out that they know them, the accused would stand denied their right to challenge the testimony of the witnesses for the aspect that they do pot know them. Once the accused are put in the dock the entire defence of the accuied that they are not known to the witnesses stands lost. As the prosecution has to seek corroboration through the identification proceedings when the accused are not known to the witnesses, so is the case when the accused who has to show through identification proceedings that, in fact, the witnesses do not know them, the denial of this opportunity, generally may vitiate the trial. A valuable aspect of cross-examination shall stand lost and nobody can say as to what would be the effect, of it on general consideration of evidence.

7. I will elaborate the aspect a little further even at the cost of possi­bility of miscarriage of justice in one case if it so happens. This test identi­fication, may it be for state or on the demand of accused is more a form of cross-examination which is admitted before the examination in chief itself as, it can not wait till that time. The test is arranged before as it is a test when cannot be put on after the witness has once seen the accused. Pointing out to a person from a parade is a challenge to the memory and the fact of having seen the accused by the witness. Equal is the position when an accused says that he has not been seen by the witnesses. If this identifica­tion is refused at proper stage, the valuable question of cross-axamlnation will be lost and though it may be that it may not in a particular case amount to mistrial, the chances are more for it and I fail to understand why the prosecution should take that risk at all. Specifically when it has to act as an independent and uninterested person.

8. Before proceeding further I would like to refer para 107 of the Police Regulations, which reads as under :

"An investigating Officer is not to regard himself as a mere clerk for the recording of statements. It is his duty to observe and to infer. In every case he must use his own expert observation of the scene of the offence and of the general circumstances to check the evidence of witnesses and in cases in which the culprits are unknown, to determine the direction in which he shall took for them. He must study the methods of local offenders who are un­known to the police with a view to recognizing their handiwork and he must be on his guard against accepting the suspicions of witness and complainants when they conflict with obvious in­ferences from facts. He must remember that it is his duty to find out the truth and not merely to obtain convictions. He must not prematurely commit himself to any view of the facts for or against any person and though he need not go out of his way to hunt up evidence for the defence in a case in which he has satisfactory grounds for believing that an accused person is guilty, he must always give accused persons an opportunity of producing defence evidence before him and must consider such evidence carefully if produced. Burglary investigations should be conducted in accordance with the special orders on the subject."

(Empahsis mine)

9. I will refer to some more parts of the above case. It appears that the observations of the Lahore High Court in Sajjan Singh v. Emperor, AIR 1945 Lahore, p. 43 and 50 were quoted with approval in the case State of U. P. v. Jagnoo, AIR 1968 Allahabad 333. The observations material for the present case were :

"If however the witnesses claim to have known the accused previously, while the accused himself denies this, the claim made by the witnesses cannot be used as a reason for refusing to allow their claim to be put to the only practical test of an identification prade. Even if the denial of the accused is false, no harm is done and the value of the evidence given by the witnesses may be increased."

10. This observation was of course disserted in AIR 19-58 Madras 113. I am afraid with profound respects to the Hon'ble brother of Madras High Court, I find myself unable to agree with them. It may not be correct to say that identification belongs to police investigation and further the investigation, in fact, as observed has to be fair and impartial. In fact, in my humble opinion, identification for eitber party is an opportunity of cross-examination the relevancy of which is contained in Section 9 of the Evidence Act and for the very nature of it, it has to be arranged in a different manner that is before the examination in chief. Where the claim it, it is a basis of the defence and should be denied, Even if the investigation is over and the charge-sheet submitted, the evidence has not been over and the defence as of right should be allowed to challenge the witnesses assertion and in the manner of identification proceeding. It will suffice to conclude this aspect by saying that Supreme Court also held that the fact that the Cr. P. C. had no provision enabling the accused to insist for identification parade is not material.

11. I will also with some use reproduce the observations of a Division Bench of Calcutta High Coutt in a case reported in AIR 1951 Calcutta p. 475 which has a so been relied upon in the above said decision the Supreme Court :

"The fact that the witnesses have identified in Court the accused is of very little consequence a prosecution under Section 384, Penal Code, when none of the witnesses know the accused from be­fore, the corroborative evidence which one is euiitled to expect in cases of this nature, is the evidence of tfie witnesses having pointed the accused whom they identified in Court from the midst of other persons with whom they were mixed up at a test identification parade. The evidence of their having identified such persons at a test i ientifiatlon parade has no substantive value, but is very important corroboration of their evidence in Court."

12. It is strange that the police generally act as mere prosecutor despite the fact that they have been desired by the above mentioned para not to act as such. There is clear-cut direction amongst others for the investigating officer he must always give accused person an opportunity of producing defence evidence before him and must consider such evidence carefully if pro­duced." "He roust remember that it is his duty to find out the truth and not merely to obtain conviction." Both these principles have been given in para 107 in consonance with the principle that a sub-inspector of police js primai illy a public servant. He has to act an independent person and not as a person interested putting noose around the neck of a particular individual irrespective of other facts. Any such interest shown by the investigating officer or any person concerned with the prosecution, will always bring blad name to the police and may render their testimony open to doubt. It will take leave here to say though of the place that the jurists of framing the Evidence Act, specially Section 27 have shown lack of fact in the police though it is there in the English. The police officials despite a direction in para 107 have been attempting to reduce the faith further instead of earning it by their good conduct.

13. The contention of the defence for their identification with aa allegation that they were not known to the witnesses is a part of their defence and if that part is denied, the trial in most of the cases is likely to be vitiated because, as already said above, once they and produced in court and directly or indirectly, introduced to the witnesses, their defence stands lost. Of course the learned counsel for the State has referred me to the decision in Jadunath Singh andanother v. State of U. P. reported in AIR 1971 SC 363 but a perusal of this decision as a whole simply indicates that the principle enuncitated by the Supreme Court has been the same as observed above though in peculiar facts of that case, it was held that the trial was not vitiated. The principle of law laid down in para 18 was as under :

"Of course if the prosecution fails to hold identification on the plea that the witnesses already knew the accused well and it transpires in the course of the trial that the witnesses did not know the accused previously, the prosecution would run the risk of losing its case."

At the present stage, it is too early to think as to whether they really know the accused or not but the conduct of the State or the police in arrauging for the test identification will carry its own value and may give rise to certain presumptions as purpose of test identification cannot be obtained later on. Further more, in para 20, the Supreme Court has observed:

"It appears to us that the reason given by the prosecutor in the report and the reason given by the district Magistrate Judicial in the order directing that the identification requested for be not held were not valid."

The reasons in the case before their Lordship were almost similar, that is, the charge-sheet has already been submitted, if a charge-sheet has been sub­mitted, does it mean that the accused would either wait behind the bars till the trial is over or lose of hia defence in the form that the witnesses do not know him. I think both the situations will be too much prejudicial to the accused persons. It may be that in facts of the case, the Supreme Court did not consider the omission to be material but naturally it was after considera­tion of the evidence led during the trial and where, in fact appellants had already lost method of challenging the prosecution witnesses through the identification proceedings. I need not go into all those detials but the me.e fact that the prosecution is feeling shy of getting the accused identified by the witnesses or to be more precise of getting the testimony of their witnesses challenged through identification proceedings before they are able to age the accused persons in the dock itself gives rise to an impression that for any reason the prosecution is not playing a fair play.

14. In the circumstances, the applicants are entitled to bail. How­ever, I would like to record that the observations made above, may not be considering as binding upon the Sessions Judge during trial and he shall be at liberty to appreciate evidence according to law in his own way.

15. Let the applicants ba admitted to bail on each of them executing a personal bond and furnishing two sureties each in the like amount to the satisfaction of the Magistrate concerned.

Application allowed.