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Lihazur Rehman Khan v. State Of Uttar Pradesh And Others
Judicial Summary — Opinion of G.P. Mathur, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner was appointed as a temporary Munsif by a State Government order dated August 9, 1985. The appointment expressly stated that it was to a temporary post and that until appointment in a substantive capacity he would be governed by a Government Notification (U.P. Government Servants (Termination of Service) Rules, 1975). The Full Court passed a resolution on July 23, 1994 recommending that, having regard to the petitioner’s work and conduct, his service be dispensed with in accordance with relevant service rules; this recommendation was sent to the Governor. The Governor, exercising powers under the 1975 Rules, passed an order on March 7, 1995 terminating the petitioner’s service with one month's pay in lieu of notice. The petitioner challenged that termination by filing the present writ petition. Parties exchanged affidavits and the writ petition was disposed of finally at the admission stage.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether an appointment of a Munsif made in a temporary capacity can be governed by the U.P. Temporary Government Servants (Termination of Service) Rules, 1975, permitting termination by notice under those Rules, notwithstanding the existence of Rules 23–25 of the U.P. Nyayak Sowa Niyamawali 1951 (the Rules) governing probation and confirmation for Members of the Service.
- Whether, by operation of Rules 23–25 of the Nyayak Sowa Niyamawali, a probationer (here, a Munsif) is automatically confirmed on expiry of a two-year probation period (or extended probation), so as to preclude termination under the 1975 Rules.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- Counsel for the petitioner relied on Rules 23 to 25 of the U.P. Nyayak Sowa Niyamawali 1951 framed under Article 224 and the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution and argued that those Rules apply to Munsifs and Civil Judges.
- It was submitted that Rule 23 provides for a two-year probation and that in the absence of any order extending probation, the petitioner should be treated as confirmed after expiry of two years; consequently his service could not be terminated by invoking the 1975 Rules.
- Reliance was placed on case law (State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh and Om Prakash Maurya v. U.P. Co-operative and Sugar Factories Federation) to support the contention that continuation beyond the probation period without express extension or confirmation does not by itself deny confirmation in certain contexts (as argued by the petitioner in this matter).
Respondent / High Court's Arguments (as reflected in the counter-affidavit)
- The High Court pointed out that the petitioner’s appointment order expressly stated that he was appointed to a temporary post and would be governed by the 1975 Rules until confirmed substantively.
- It was argued that the Nyayak Sowa Niyamawali contemplates appointments in temporary capacity (Rules permitting temporary/officiating posts and counting service in temporary capacity towards probation) and that therefore temporary appointments are permissible and distinct from substantive appointments.
- The High Court contended that Rule 3 of the 1975 Rules allows termination of temporary government servants by one month's notice (or immediate termination with payment in lieu of notice), and that the application of those Rules is independent of the length of service; therefore long service (about eight-and-a-half years) does not preclude termination under the 1975 Rules.
- The counter-affidavit set out adverse character and performance remarks from District Judges and administrative authorities across several years, describing integrity as doubtful on multiple occasions and concluding an overall assessment of the petitioner as a poor officer; the Full Court twice considered the matter and resolved to recommend termination.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh, AIR 1968 SC 1210 | The principle that a probationer who continues in post after expiry of specified probationary period does not become confirmed in the absence of an express order of confirmation or contrary indication in the appointment order or service rules. | The Court relied on this Constitution Bench decision to hold that mere continuation beyond probation does not confer confirmed status; it supported the conclusion that Rule 23 does not produce automatic confirmation. |
| Om Prakash Maurya v. U.P. Co-operative and Sugar Factories Federation, 1986 Supp SCC 95 : AIR 1986 SC 1844 | Authority cited alongside Dharam Singh on issues of probation, extension limits and confirmation where relevant service rules prescribe a maximum permissible extension. | Used as supporting authority for the proposition that automatic confirmation may arise only where rules prohibit extension beyond a maximum period and the employee continued beyond that maximum; not applicable here since no maximum was prescribed. |
| State of Maharashtra v. V.R. Saboji, (1979) 4 SCC 466 : AIR 1986 SC 42 | Reiterates that there is no right to confirmation merely by completion of probation. | Cited as a reiteration of the settled law that confirmation requires exercise of judgment and an express order, supporting the court's view against automatic confirmation. |
| Dhanji Bhai v. State of Gujarat, (1985) 2 SCC 5 : AIR 1985 SC 605 | Authority supporting the position that a probationer has no automatic right to confirmation merely because probation has been completed. | Cited in support of the settled principle that confirmation is not automatic. |
| State of U.P. v. Kaushal Kishore Shukla, (1991) 1 SCC 691 : 1991 AIR SCW 793 | Holds that a temporary government servant has no right to hold the post and that services of a temporary government servant are liable to termination by one month's notice under the relevant rules. | Relied upon to support the applicability of the 1975 Rules and the validity of terminating a temporary Munsif by notice irrespective of length of service. |
| State of U.P. v. Prem Lata Misra, (1994) 4 SCC 189 : AIR 1994 SC 2411 | Affirms the principle that temporary government servants can be terminated under the statutory/contractual provisions applicable to temporary service. | Used to reinforce that long duration of service does not invalidate termination under the 1975 Rules. |
| Triveni Shanker Saxena v. State of U.P., 1992 Supp (1) SCC 524 : AIR 1992 SC 496 | Example of upholding termination of a temporary government servant even after a long period (more than eighteen years) of service. | Cited to show that prolonged service does not of itself preclude termination under rules governing temporary servants. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded by examining the text of the appointment order, the Nyayak Sowa Niyamawali (1951) and the U.P. Government Servants (Termination of Service) Rules, 1975 (promulgated under Article 309). Key steps in the analysis were:
- Characterisation of the appointment: The appointment order expressly stated that the petitioner was appointed to a temporary post of Munsif and that until substantive appointment he would be governed by the 1975 Rules. The court treated that contractual/service stipulation as determinative of the petitioner’s status.
- Construction of the Nyayak Sowa Niyamawali: The court observed that the Rules contemplate appointments both in substantive and in temporary/officiating capacities (Rules 4, 5 and 21 and Appendix A). Rule 23 provides for probation and Rule 23(3) allows service in temporary or officiating capacity to be taken into account for computing probation. Rule 24 permits reversion or dispensing with services during or at the end of probation. Rule 25 provides the statutory mechanism for confirmation — expressly requiring a recommendation by the Court and confirmation by the Governor, with notification in the Gazette.
- Interaction between the two sets of rules: Because the appointment was explicitly temporary and governed by the 1975 Rules, the court held that the 1975 Rules applied and empowered the appointing authority (via the Governor) to terminate services in accordance with those Rules. The 1975 Rules (Rule 3) permit termination of temporary government servants by one month's notice or forthwith with payment in lieu.
- On automatic confirmation: The court rejected the contention that Rule 23 results in automatic confirmation after two years. It noted that Rule 25 requires a specific recommendation by the Full Court and a specific confirmation order by the Governor (to be notified in the Gazette). The court pointed out that Rule 23 contains no maximum limit on extension of probation, so there is no barrier to extension and thus no automatic confirmation on lapse of a period.
- Reliance on authorities: The court relied on the constitutional jurisprudence in State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh (Constitution Bench) and subsequent authorities (including Om Prakash Maurya, State of Maharashtra v. V.R. Saboji, Dhanji Bhai) establishing the settled principle that mere continuance after expiry of probation does not confer substantive status in the absence of an express order of confirmation — except where service rules prescribe a maximum permissible extension which has been exceeded. The court concluded that that exception did not apply here because the relevant Rules contained no maximum limit on probation extension.
- Consideration of material on record: The court took into account the adverse entries, confidential communications and assessments recorded by district judges and administrative authorities over several years (integrity marked doubtful on occasions, overall assessment rated poor, and inquiries/complaints referenced). The Full Court considered the matter twice (initial recommendation of July 23, 1994 and reconsideration and reiteration on December 18, 1994) before reiterating the recommendation of termination to the Governor.
- Conclusion from the legal and factual matrix: Given that the appointment was expressly temporary and governed by the 1975 Rules, that the Nyayak Sowa Niyamawali does not provide for automatic confirmation and requires a specific recommendation and confirmatory order, and having regard to the Full Court’s adverse assessment of the petitioner’s conduct, the court concluded there was no illegality in the Governor’s order terminating the petitioner’s service under the 1975 Rules.
Holding and Implications
DISPOSED OF / Petition dismissed
Direct effect: The writ petition challenging the Governor’s order (terminating the petitioner’s service under the U.P. Temporary Government Servants (Termination of Service) Rules, 1975) was dismissed and the termination was held to be lawful. The court specifically rejected the petitioner’s claim that he acquired confirmed status by mere lapse of the probationary period.
Broader implications: The opinion reiterates settled law that confirmation is not automatic on expiry of probation and that temporary appointments expressly governed by termination rules may be terminated under those rules even after several years of service. The court did not indicate that it was setting any new precedent beyond applying established principles; its decision follows and applies existing authorities and the specific terms of the appointment and statutory rules.
G.P Mathur, J.:— Parties have exchanged affidavits and therefore, the writ petition is being disposed of finally at the admission stage.
2. The petitioner was appointed as a temporary Munsif by the order of the State Government dated August 9, 1995. The appointment order (Annexure 1 to the writ petition) is a long one and towards the end some conditions were mentioned. One of those was that he had been appointed as a Munsif in a temporary capacity on the condition that till he was appointed as a Munsif in substantive capacity, he would be governed by Notification No. 2G 71-74-appointment-3 dated June 11, 1974 which are applicable to temporary employees. The Full Court passed a resolution on July 23, 1994 that having regard to the work and conduct of the petitioner his service be dispensed with in accordance with the relevant service rules and a recommendation to that effect be made to the Governor. Thereafter, the Governor of U.P exercising powers under U.P Temporary Government Servants (Termination of Service) Rules, 1975 passed an order on March 7, 1995 terminating the service of the petitioner w.e.f the date of receipt of notice. The order further mentions that the petitioner would be entitled to a sum equivalent to the amount of his pay and other allowances for one month in lieu of notice. This order is impugned in the present petition. The principal submission of S/Sri Sudhir Chandra and Ravi Kant, learned counsel for the petitioner, is based on Rules 23 to 25 of U.P Nyayak Sowa Niyamawali 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) which have been framed by the Governor in exercise or powers conferred by Article 224 and proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution and in consultation with U.P Public Service Commission and the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad and are applicable to Munsifs and Civil Judges. Rule 23 provides that oil candidates on appointment to the service shall be placed on probation for two years, provided that in the recommendations of the Court, the Governor may in special cases extend the period of probation. It further lays down that the order sanctioning any such extension of probation shall specify the exact date up to which extension is gran ted. Rule 24 provides that if it appears to the Governor at any time during or at the end of the period of probation or extended period of probation as the case may be that a probationer has not made sufficient use of his opportunities or has otherwise failed to give satisfaction, he may be reverted to his substantive post, if any, or if he does not hold a lien on any substantive post, his services may be dispensed with. It is urged that no order extending the period of probation was passed and therefore after expiry of period of two years, by operation of Rules 23 to 25 of the Rules, the petitioner acquired the status of a confirmed employee and his service could not be terminated by taking recourse to the power under U.P Temporary Government Servants (Termination of Service) Rules 1975. Reliance in support of this submission is placed upon State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh, AIR 1968 SC 1210 and Om Prakash Maurya v. U.P Co-operative and Sugar Factories Federation, 1986 Supp SCC 95 : AIR 1986 SC 1844.
3. The question to be considered is whether every appointment of a Munsif will be governed by Rules 23 to 25 of the Rules or it is permissible to appoint a person on a purely temporary capacity to whom the aforesaid provisions will not apply. Rule 4 of the Rules gives the definitions and sub-rule (e) lays down that ‘Member of the Service’ means a person appointed in a substantive capacity under the provisions of these rules, or of the rules in force previous to the introduction of these rules, to a post in the cadre of the service. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 5 provides that the strength of the service and of each kind of posts shall be determined by the Governor from time to time in consultation with the High Court and sub-rule (2) provides that the permanent strength of service and each kind of posts therein shall be as specified in Appendix A. Sub-rule (3) of the same Rule lays down that the Governormay from time to time leave unfilled or hold in abeyance, any post, or may increase the cadre by the creation of additional permanent or temporary posts, as may be found necessary. Rule 21 deals with appointment and sub-rule (2) lays down that the Governor may make appointment in temporary or officiating vacancies prescribed under those rules. Rule 23 deals with probation and sub-rule (3) thereof lays down that service rendered in an officiating or temporary capacity shall be taken into account in computing the period of probation. These provisions show that the rules do contemplate making appointment in a temporary capacity and every appointment need not be made on a substantive capacity. Appendix shows that the sanctioned permanent strength of the service for the post of Munsif is only 161. The requirement of number of Munsifs in the State is many times more than the aforesaid figure. If no temporary appointments are made besides substantive appointment on permanent post, the judicial work will suffer greatly. Therefore, the Government makes appointment as temporary Munsifs which is also contemplated under the Rules. The appointment order of the petitioner, copy of which has been filed as Annexure 1 to the writ petition, clearly shows that the same was made on a temporary post of Munsif. Towards the end of the order it was clearly mentioned that he was being appointed on the post of Munsif in a temporary capacity with the condition that he will have to pass departmental examination in the Administrative Training College and till he was appointed on the post of Munsif in a substantive capacity, he would be governed by Notification No. 20/1-74, Appointments dated June 11, 1975. By means of the aforesaid Notification, the U.P Government Servants (Termination of Service) Rules, 1975 framed under Article 309 of the Constitution, have been promulgated. Rule 3 of these Rules provides that the services of a government servant in temporary service shall be liable to termination at any time by notice in writing given by the appointing authority to the Government servant and the period of notice shall be one month. The proviso lays down that the services of any such government servants may be terminated forthwith and on such termination, he shall be entitled to claim a sum equivalent to the amount of his pay and allowances for the period of notice. The appointment order of the petitioner clearly mentions that he was being appointed in a temporary capacity and on a temporary post and further till he was confirmed, he will be governed by the 1975 Rules. The contention that he stood automatically confirmed after expiry of a period of two years has thus no substance and cannot be accepted. In view of the fact that the petitioner was working in a temporary capacity, the 1975 Rules were applicable to him and the appointing authority had the power to terminate his services in accordance with the said Rules, once a recommendation to that effect had been made by the High Court.
4. The interpretation sought to be placed upon Rule 23 of the Rules that after expiry of period of two years, or the extended period of probation, as the case may be, the member of the service shall stand automatically confirmed, does not appear to be correct. Rule 25 specifically deals with confirmation and it lays down that if at the end of the period of probation or at the end of extended period of probation in any particular case, the Court recommends that a candidate is fit for confirmation, he shall be confirmed by the Governor in his appointment and that all confirmations under this rule shall be notified in the official Gazette. The High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in exercise of powers conferred by Article 225 of the Constitution and all other powers enabling it in that behalf has framed the Allahabad High Court Rules 1952 and Chapter III Rule 4(D)(ii) provides that the matter of confirmation of officers of the Subordinate Judiciary shall be considered by the Full Court. It is noteworthy that no maximum limit of extension of period of probation has been provided in Rule 23 and thus there is no embargo on the power of the Governor to extend the period of probation to any length of time. Secondly the rules contemplate a specific order of confirmation to be passed by the Governor and this can be done only after a recommendation to that effect has been made and in view of the provisions of the Allahabad High Court Rules such a recommendation can only be made by the Full Court. After an order of confirmation is passed the same has to be notified in the official Gazette. Therefore, a perusal of the rules will show that they do not contemplate an automatic confirmation of a Member of the Judicial Service merely on the ground of his having worked for a certain number of years. A member of service can be confirmed only if a recommendation to that effect is made after consideration of his case by the Full Court and the order passed by the Governor is notified in the official Gazette. It is well settled principle of law that if a person appointed on probation for a specific period is allowed to continue in service beyond the expiry of the period of probation, he does not acquire the status of a confirmed employee in absence of a specific order to that effect. This question has been examined in a considerable detail by a Constitution Bench in State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh, AIR 1968 SC 1210, whereafter noticing several earlier decisions, it was held as follows in para 3 of the report:
“This Court has consistently held that when a first appointment or promotion is made on probation for a specific period and the employee is allowed to continue in the post after the expiry of the period without any specific order of confirmation, he should be deemed to continue in his post as a probationer only, in the absence of any indication to the contrary in the original order of appointment or promotion or the service rules. In such a case, an express order of confirmation is necessary to give the employee a substantive right to the post and from the mere fact that he is allowed to continue in the post after the expiry of the specified period of probation it is not possible to hold that he should be deemed to have been confirmed.”
5. This has been reiterated in State of Maharashtra v. V.R Saboji, (1979) 4 SCC 466 : AIR 1986 SC 42, which also related to a case of Civil Judge (Junior Division) and in Dhanji Bhai v. State of Gujarat, (1985) 2 SCC 5 : AIR 1985 SC 605. Therefore the law is well settled that there is is no right in the probationer to be confirmed merely because he had completed the period of probation. The function of confirmation implies the exercise of judgment by the confirming authority on the over all suitability of the employee for permanent absorption in service. An employee does not enjoy any greater right to confirmation if he is allowed to continue beyond the initial period of probation. The only exception to this principle is where the service rules prohibit extension of period of probation beyond a certain maximum period and the employee continues to work beyond the aforesaid maximum period. In such a case he may acquire the status of a confirmed employee. In Dharam Singh and Om Prakash Maurya (supra), the relevant service rules prescribed a maximum period beyond which the period of probation could not be extended and the employees concerned continued to workeven beyond the said period. Such is not the case here. The rules have not laid down any maximum period of extension of the period of probation.
6. Learned counsel has next submitted that the petitionee was appointed by the order dated August 9, 1985 had worked for nearly ten years and after such a long period termination of his service without affording him any opportunity of hearing is wholly illegal. It is averred in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the High Court that the petitioner joined as Munsif on December 17, 1985 and the Full Court while passing a resolution on July 23, 1994 that his services be dispensed with further resolved that all judicial work be immediately withdrawn from him. Thus he had actually worked for about eight and half years. The U.P Temporary Government Servants (Termination of Service) Rules 1975 are applicable to all such government servants who are in temporary service and ‘Temporary Service’ has been defined as an ‘officiating or substantive service on a temporary post or officiating service on a permanent post under U.P Government. The application of Rules is not dependent upon the period of service put in by a Government servant and therefore, the mere fact that the petitioner has worked as Munsif for about eight and half years cannot make the exercise of powers under the aforesaid rules invalid. In State of U.P v. Kaushal Kishore Shukla, (1991) 1 SCC 691 : (1991 AIR SCW 793), while considering the case of an employee governed by the same Rule it was held that the temporary government servant has no right to hold the post, his services are liable to be terminated by giving him one month's notice without assigning any reason either under the terms of the contract providing for such termination or under the relevant statutory rules regulating the terms and conditions of temporary Government Servants. This has been reiterated in State of U.P v. Prem Lata Misra, (1994) 4 SCC 189 : AIR 1994 SC 2411 and in Triveni Shanker Saxena v. State of U.P, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 524 : AIR 1992 SC 496 : (1992 All LJ 230), wherein termination of service of a temporary government servant who had put in more than eighteen years of service was upheld. Thus the mere fact that the petitioner had worked for more than eight years, cannot render the order invalid.
7. In the counter-affidaavit filed on behalf of the High Court, details of the character roll entry and adverse remarks given by the Court to the petitioner are mentioned and some of them are as follows:
8. I-A: For the year 1987-88 the District Judge Etawah gave adverse remarks against which he made a representation to the High Court on which the Administrative Judge passed the following order:—
“The representation is rejected. The language used in this representation against the District Judge deserves to be condemned. As such the officer be warned not to use such language again against his superior officerfailing which the matter shall be taken up very seriously.”
9. B: The District Judge Etawah sent a confidential D.O letter on 10-3-1989 regarding misuse of powers by the petitioner and the result of inquiry made by him. The power to take cognizance to criminal matters was withdrawn. The Chief Justice passed an order on 25-4-89 to transfer the petitioner in annual chain and thereafter he was transferred to an outlying Court in district Lalitpur in May/June, 1989.
10. C: The petitioner made a reference for initiating contempt proceedings against the C.J.M and District Judge Etawah on which the Acting C.J passed the following order on 3-1-1990.
“I have considered the note prepared by the Joint Regi strar and have gone through the file. I find that the reference made by Sri Lihajur Rahman Khan-II Additional Munsif Etawah (since transferred to Lalitpur) for taking cognizance for drawing contempt proceedings against the District Judge Etawah and the Chief Judicial Magistrate is reckless and devoid of substance. The Chief Judicial Magistrate had the power to transfer a criminal case from one Court to another and if he did so, in consultation with the District Judge, there was nothing wrong in the same.
Let a notice be issued to Sri Lihazur Rehman Khan to show cause why he be not censured for his insubordinate and indiscreet allegations made against the District Judge and the Chief Judicial Magistrate Etawah. After receipt of the explanation, the matter be placed before the Administrative Committee.”
11. D: A notice was issued to the petitioner on which he made a representation which was rejected by the Administrative Committee on 15-5-1990 and warning was given to him not to give an occasion for similar complaint in future.
12. E: For the year 1988-89 the District Judge gave the following remarks Integrity — X Doubtful vide Annexure 1 Overall Assessment—Poor Representation against the said entry was rejected by the Administrative Judge.
13. II-A: For the year 1990-91 the District Judge Jalaun at Orai gave the following remarks;
Integrity:— He should zealously improve upon his reputation about integrity prevailing unsound.
If he is fair
and impartial — He should behave more fair and impartial in his dealing with public and bar.
Interim Order—Interim orders passed and injunction were granted mostly on unsound reasonings.
Overall Assessment — He is poor officer.
14. B: The High Court gave him adverse remarks and the representation against the same was rejected by the Administrative Committee.
15. III — For the year 1991-92 the District Judge, Jalaun at Orai gave the following remarks:—
Integrity — Doubtful. There is a lot of complaints against him. Some of these are being enquired into by the Special Officer (Vigilance) of the High Court
C.J.M Orai made complaint against him.
Overall Assessment — Poor.
16. IV — For the year 1993-94 the District Judge, Uttar Kashi gave following remarks:—
Integrity — So many oral and written complaints received against his integrity. One inquiry received from the Vigilance Bureau of the High Court.
17. B: The Administrative Judge did not certify his integrity and wrote that he had received serious complaints against him. The facts mentioned in the counter-affidavitshow that the District Judges of three different districts namely Etawah, Jalaun at Orai and Uttarkashi had given adverse reports against him. His intergrity was found to be doubtful and he was rated as a poor officer. It was on overall assessment of his work and conduct thatthe Full Cour tpassedaresolution on July 23, 1994 to dispense with his services. The petitioner made a representation to the Governor of U.P on which the recommendation was sent back to the High Court for reconsideration. In the Full Court Meeting held on December 18, 1994 after reconsideration, a resolution was passed that the recommendation already made regarding the termination of the services of the petitioner be reiterated. Thus the case of the petitioner was considered by the Full Court twice. It was thereafter that the impugned order terminating the services of the petitioner was passed by the Governor.
18. Having given our thoughtful consideration to the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner and to the materials on record, we are satisfied that there is no illegality in the impugned order. The writpetition accordingly fails and is hereby dismissed.
19. Petition dismissed.
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