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Balbhadra v. Board Of Revenue
Structured Summary of the Opinion by R.M. Sahai, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
This matter arises from a dispute over the character of an interest created by the will of Sheo Jatan. The testator purported to make Bhagwati Din (father of the petitioners) absolute owner of property but, by the same will, created a life interest (referred to in the opinion as "Heen Hyati") in favour of Deoki and a life interest in favour of his widow Smt. Ganesha. Deoki was childless and was the daughter of Ganesha, a wife of Sheo Jatan.
The petitioners are grandsons of Sheo Jatan from another wife, Smt. Jalewa. They sought a declaration under Section 229-B(1) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1 of 1951, but failed to obtain the relief sought from the Board of Revenue and the Additional Commissioner. Aggrieved, they approached the High Court by way of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The trial court had earlier decreed a suit for declaration in favour of the petitioners, but the Additional Commissioner and the Board of Revenue reversed that result. During pendency of the writ petition, Deoki died.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the life estate created by the Will (described as "Heen Hyati") continued or what its effect was after the enforcement of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (Z.A and L.R Act).
- Whether a life estate holder (here, Deoki) had such status on the date of vesting as to acquire bhumidhari or fixed-rate tenancy rights under Section 18 of the Z.A and L.R Act.
- Whether, under principles of succession and the Vesting provision (including reference to Section 119 of the Indian Succession Act as applied or analogized), Bhagwati Din became absolute owner on the death of the testator.
- Whether the petitioners had locus standi to bring the writ petition and whether the petitioners' rights were lost by adverse possession under Section 210 of the Z.A and L.R Act.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the will should be construed as creating an absolute interest in favour of Bhagwati Din (the father of the petitioners).
- The petitioners relied on the trial court's decree for declaration in their favour and sought redress after the reversal by the Additional Commissioner and the Board of Revenue by invoking Article 226 of the Constitution.
Opposite Parties' Arguments
- Learned counsel for opposite parties argued that, despite the use of the words "life interest" in the will, Deoki was a full-fledged owner (including rights such as mortgage) and hence should be treated as having ownership-like rights.
- Opposite parties relied on the decision in Bajai v. Thoki Bai (1979 3 SCC 300) to support the proposition that a limited owner under Hindu law is owner for life and can be treated as vested in certain circumstances.
- They further argued that the petitioners lacked locus standi, placing reliance on B. Sinha v. S. Lal and Co. (1973 2 SCC 696), and contended that petitioners were not entitled to maintain the proceeding because they lacked title or possession.
- It was also contended that opposite parties were in adverse possession as on the date of vesting the fixed rate tenancy had been extinguished and that petitioners, not being in possession, had lost rights under Section 210 of the Z.A and L.R Act.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Jamuna v. D.D.C., 1968 R.D. 391 | That restrictions in a will relating to proprietary rights may be extinguished and property may vest in the State upon acquisition under the Z.A Act; discussion on applicability of Z.A Act provisions to succession. | The court treated parts of the decision as obiter dicta on the narrower question and noted that the issue whether incidents of a will continue to govern property after vesting under the Z.A Act remained unresolved; therefore the court did not adopt Jamuna as conclusive on the present question. |
| Janki Amal v. Narayan Swami, 1961 43 Ind. App. 207 | Principle that a Hindu widow's right (widow's estate) is of the nature of ownership in the sense that her position is that of an owner during her life, though powers are limited. | The court used this authority to contrast a Hindu widow's estate with a life estate created by will, explaining that a life estate under a will is different because the ultimate title vests in heirs-at-law whereas a Hindu widow's estate vests in the widow. |
| Jai Shiv v. Raj Dewan, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 83 | Approval of the principle that a Hindu widow's interest is of the nature of ownership though limited in powers. | The court cited this Supreme Court approval to support the distinction between a Hindu widow's vested estate and a life estate created by will. |
| Bhagwati Barmaya v. Kali Charan Singh, 8 A.L.J. 433 | That in inheritance under Hindu law the reversionary heir is determined at the date of the widow's death; in case of a life estate under will vesting takes place immediately in favour of heir-at-law though possession remains with the life estate holder. | The court relied on this to explain the incident of a life estate: title vests in the ultimate successor (heir-at-law) while possession may remain with the life estate holder during her life. |
| A.I.R. 1929 Allahabad 102 (Division Bench) | Interpretation of vesting principles (analogous to Section 119 Indian Succession Act) as applied to life estates created by Hindus. | The court cited this decision for the proposition that where a Hindu creates a life estate by will, vesting of the ultimate interest operates in a particular way and should be considered when determining the status at date of vesting. |
| Bajai v. Thoki Bai, 1979 3 SCC 300 | Decision under Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act regarding the rights of a Hindu widow (context involved maintenance and execution of decree leading to possession). | The court distinguished Bajai on facts: in Bajai the widow obtained possession by execution of a maintenance decree and under those facts ownership-like status was held; the court found Bajai inapposite to the present facts where no such decree or execution occurred. |
| B. Sinha v. S. Lal and Co., 1973 2 SCC 696 | Authority relied upon by opposite parties for a contention regarding maintainability/locus standi. | The court rejected the application of this precedent to deny locus standi, explaining that petitioners had a litigation history (trial court decree) and had properly invoked Article 226 after administrative reversals, so the argument was misconceived. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded in identifiable steps focused on discerning the testator's intention in the Will and then determining the legal effect of that intention at the date of vesting under applicable succession and post-abolition law.
- Construction of the Will: The court emphasized that the dominant consideration is the testator's intention. It found that although the testator expressed apprehension about Bhagwati Din and his heirs not maintaining the widow and daughter, the Will clearly provided that Smt. Ganesha and Deoki should have specified rights "except the right to transfer" and characterized their interest as a life interest ("Heen Hyati"). The Will also expressly barred transfer (mortgage, encumbrance, mutation) except (permissively) for mortgage or encumbrance to provide for maintenance. The court held that permissive provisions for mortgage do not negate the explicit creation of a life estate.
- Distinction between Hindu widow's estate and life estate under a Will: The court explained the legal distinction. A Hindu widow's estate is treated as vesting in the widow (her position is of an owner with limited powers), whereas a life estate created by Will results in the heir-at-law holding the title with the life estate holder in possession only. The court cited Janki Amal, Jai Shiv, and Bhagwati Barmaya to support these doctrinal distinctions.
- Vesting at date of succession and Section 119 analogy: The court considered Section 119 of the Indian Succession Act and related illustrations showing that, in some legacies, the future interest becomes vested on the testator's death. The court observed that Section 119 applies to legatees and that Bhagwati Din was not a legatee under the statute; however, by analogy and principle, where a life estate is created by a Hindu, title vests in heirs-at-law at the time succession opens while possession is deferred to the life tenant.
- Application to facts — status at date of vesting: Applying these principles, the court concluded that when the testator died the legal title vested in Bhagwati Din (or his heirs) but the possession and enjoyment were deferred to Deoki for life. Therefore Deoki was never an absolute owner nor a Hindu widow with a vested estate; she was a life estate holder only and not a fixed rate tenant, and she did not acquire bhumidhari rights under Section 18 of the Z.A and L.R Act.
- On precedents relied on by opposite parties: The court reviewed Bajai v. Thoki Bai and found it distinguishable because the facts there involved a maintenance decree executed, producing possession and effects on ownership not present in the instant case. Accordingly Bajai did not support the opposite parties' contention. The court also rejected the locus-standi and adverse-possession arguments based on B. Sinha and Section 210 of the Z.A and L.R Act, explaining that petitioners had a prior decree and only became aggrieved after administrative reversal; further, Deoki's possession as life tenant could not be equated with adverse possession conferring title to her.
- Procedural and factual note: The court noted that Deoki died during pendency of the writ petition and that until then the petitioners had no cause of action against opposite party No. 1 in respect of adverse possession claims; thus the adverse-possession contention failed.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The writ petition was allowed. The court quashed the orders passed by opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2 and awarded costs to the petitioner.
Implications:
- Direct effect: The immediate consequence is that the administrative orders (from the Additional Commissioner and the Board of Revenue) adverse to the petitioners are quashed and the petitioners are entitled to costs.
- On substantive law: The court held that Deoki was a life estate holder whose possession and enjoyment were limited to her life and that the title vested in Bhagwati Din (or his heirs) on the death of the testator; consequently Deoki did not acquire fixed-rate tenancy or bhumidhari rights under Section 18 of the Z.A and L.R Act.
- On precedent: The opinion distinguished and discussed prior authorities (including Jamuna v. D.D.C., Bajai v. Thoki Bai and others) but did not purport to lay down a new general rule beyond the application of established principles to these facts. The judgment resolves the dispute between the parties on the particular facts and legal characterizations present in this case.
Order pronounced:
The petition succeeds and is allowed; the orders of opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2 are quashed and the petitioner is entitled to costs.
R.M Sahai, J.:— Having failed to obtain declaration under Section 229-B(1) of U.P.Z.A and L.R Act 1 of 1951 from Board of Revenue and Additional Commissioner, the second and first appellate Court that Deoki, the childless widowed daughter of Ganesha one of the wives of Sheo Jatan and transferor of opposite party No. 1, was only an estate holder of the fixed rate tenancy bequeathed in her favour by her father on 18-7-1947 the petitioners' grandsons of Sheo Jatan from another wife Smt. Jalewa have come to this Court.
2. Before coming to real issue whether life estate created under U.P Tenancy Act continued even after enforcement of Z.A and L.R Act, it may be observed that the attempt of learned counsel for petitioner to construe the will as creating absolute interest, in favour of Bhagwati Din, father of petitioner is as remote and devoid of any substance as the argument of learned counsel for opposite parties that despite the use of word life interest (Heen Hyati) in the Will Deoki was full fledged owner as although she had no right to transfer the property yet the right to mortgage etc. was conferred on her. While construing the will the predominant consideration is the intention of testator. In the earlier part the testator no doubt mentioned his apprehension, that after his death his widow Ganesha and daughter Deoki may not be looked after by his son Bhagwati Din and his heirs but that was reason for bequeathing the property in their favour. What interest they acquired was disclosed in the latter part. It was stated that after testators' death, ladies i.e, Smt. Ganesha (her share is not in dispute) and Deoki shall have such rights as are mentioned except the right to transfer, i.e mortgage, encumber or construct and get their names mutated as life interest holder. The right to mortgage is no doubt a right which is available to full fledged owner but the use of word life estate (Heen Hyati) with absolute bar on transfer dispells any doubt about the intention of the testator. The anxiety of testator to provide for hard days by permitting the ladies to mortgage or encumber cannot be understood as nullifying the real intention expressed in unequivocal words. Having ascertained the intention what needs examination is if this was frustrated by subsequent event or change in law or any rule. In Jamuna v. D.D.C . 1968 R.D 391. Hon'ble Satish Chandra, J. as he then was, held:
“The principle enunciated by the Supreme Court would, in my opinion, be applicable to the case of a Will previously existing on the proprietary rights of an intermediary in Sir or Khudkasht lands. Though Suraj Kali acquired the share of Ram Mangal Rai, which included Sir and Khudkasht lands, under the Will, but the restrictions imposed on her by the Will, alongwith the rights themselves extinguished and the property vested in the State as a result of their acquisition under the Z.A Act. The pre-existing restrictions, namely, that she would have no right of alienation and that after her death the property would go in accordance with the line of succession provided in the Will, would vanish with the extinguishing of her rights and would not be attracted or applicable to the Bhumidhari rights conferred on her by the Zamindari Abolition Act.”
3. Any disagreement with this view should normally have resulted in reference to larger Bench but on the question that incidents and Provisions of Will under which Smt. Suraj Kali took the property, would continue to govern the property, the Hon'ble Judge held:
‘In my opinion the question really does not arise in view of the finding……’ ‘But since the question of the applicability of the provisions of the Z.A Act relating to succession was argued at length. I may express my opinion on this question as well.’
the decision becomes obiter dicta and the question whether a life estate holder held one or the other capacity mentioned in Section 18 of the Z.A Act on the date of vesting to entitle her to acquire bhumidhari rights is still at large.
4. The touch-stone on which this controversy has to be decided is the status of the life estate holder on date of vesting. It necessarily relates back to the date when succession opened as the life estate holder shall have the same status and interests on the date of vesting as she had when the property devolved on her. The question, therefore is, did property vest in Deoki who was life estate holder on the date when Sheo Jatan died? For this it is necessary to understand what a life estate is. The life estate under a Will is unlike Hindu widow's estate. In the latter the estate vests in widow. She is not a tenant for life. The estate vests in her completely. In Janki Amal v. Narayan Swami . 1961 43 Ind. App. 207., it was stated by the Privy Council that her right is “of the nature of a right of a property; her position is thus of owner; her powers in that character are, however, limited; but…………so long as she is alive, no one has any vested interest in succession.” These principles were approved by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, as well, in Jai Shiv v. Raj Dewan . A.I.R 1962 S.C 83..
5. But life estate holder enjoys the property and remains in possession only. The estate vests in heir-at-law. The property vests not in the life estate holder but in the ultimate successor. In Bhagwati Barmaya v. Kali Charan Singh . 8 A.L.J 433., the Privy Council approved the view taken, by Calcutta High Court that in case of inheritance under Hindu law, reversionary heir is determined at the date of widows' death and no one has any vested interest during her life time whereas in case of life estate holder vesting takes place immediately in favour of heir at law but the possession remains with the life estate holder. This is one of the incidents of life estate. On death of limited owner, the property reverts to testator's estate i.e it devolves on testator heirs. Mulla's Hindu Law, 14 Edition p. 457 (iii) Vol. 10.
6. Section 119 of Indian Succession Act, which deals with vesting of legacies provides:
“where by the terms of a bequest the legatee is not entitled to immediate possession of the thing bequeathed a right to receive it at the proper time, unless a contrary intention appears by the Will, become vested in the legatee on testator's death:
Explanation—………………………………………
Illustrations
(i) ……………………………………………………
(ii) ……………………………………………………
(iii) A fund is bequeathed to A for life, and after his death to ‘B’. On the testators's death the legacy to B becomes vested interest in B.
7. While interpreting this section in relation to life Estate created by a Hindu, a Division Bench of this Court in A.I.R 1929 Allahabad 102, held,
“Where a person bequeathed his property to his widow and after the death of surviving widow, to R………The widow took under a Hindu widow's interest but only a life interest under the Will.”
8. It was urged for petitioners that in view of these provisions Bhagwati Deen became an absolute owner on death of Sheo Jatan. Suffice it to mention that the section applies to legatees. Bhagwati Deen was not a legatee, therefore, he could not acquire any right by virtue of this section.
9. On principle, however, there appears to be little difference. In Hindu law a life estate holder only enjoys possession. If the title does not vest in her it must vest somewhere as there can be no vacuum in succession. Consequently it vests in heir at law exactly in the manner described in illustration (iii) to Section 119. What flows from this is that in case of a life estate created by a Hindu before the date of vesting the property on the death of testator vested in the heir at law but its immediate possession and enjoyment was deferred. In the Will it was mentioned that Bhagwati Deen was absolute owner of the property but as there was apprehension that he or his heirs would not maintain the ladies, a life estate was created in favour of Deoki i.e she was permitted to remain in possession and enjoy the property. But no ownership or title was created in her favour. It was not a Hindu widow's estate which vested in her. When the testator died the property vested in Bhagwati Deen or his heirs but its possession and enjoyment was deferred, till the life of Deoki. She was, therefore, not fixed rate tenant nor did she acquire Bhumidhari rights under Section 18 of the Z.A and L.R Act.
10. Reliance was placed by learned counsel for opposite parties on Bajai v. Thoki Bai . 1979 3 SCC 300 and it was urged that a limited owner under Hindu law is owner of property till her life time. The property, therefore, vests in her. The decision is on Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, What was held in this case was that right of maintenance of a Hindu widow is a pre-existing right. Then the widow in this case was permitted a right of maintenance and in default she was entitled to execute the decree for maintenance. In execution of the decree the property in dispute came into her possession. In these circumstances, it was held that she became owner of the property. The decision could not, therefore, be of any help to opposite parties.
11. Learned counsel for opposite parties further submitted that petitioners had no locus-standi to file this petition. It was urged that petitioners had no semblance of title and, therefore, they were not entitled to approach this Court; Reliance was placed on B. Sinha v. S. Lal and Co. . 1973 2 SCC 696. The argument is mis-conceived. The petitioner has filed a suit for declaration which was decreed by the trial Court but was dismissed by Additional Commissioner and the Board of Revenue. Aggrieved by these orders the petitioner has filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. How can the argument of non-maintainability be advanced is not easy to appreciate. It was then urged that opposite parties were in adverse possession because on the date of vesting fixed rate tenancy extinguished and the continuance of Deoki in possession was contrary to the provisions of law. In any case the petitioner being not in possession lost their rights under Section 210 of the Z.A and L.R Act, 1 of 1981. The argument is again misconceived, as on the view taken above Deoki was never a fixed rate tenant and there was no question of extinction of her right. She was only a life estate holder and she could not acquire any right by adverse possession. Admittedly Deoki died during pendency of the writ petition. Till then the petitioners had no cause of action against opposite party No. 1. She could not be deemed to be in adverse possession.
12. In the result, this petition succeeds and is allowed. The order passed by opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2 are quashed. The petitioner shall be entitled to its costs.
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