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Shakuntala Devi v. Fourth Addl. District Judge Meerut
Structured Summary of Judicial Opinion (S.D. Agarwala, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The petition arises under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging a revisional order dated 3-5-1980 of the IVth Additional District Judge, Meerut. The petitioner (landlady) filed an application under Section 21 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 ("the Act") seeking eviction of opposite party No. 3 (tenant) on the ground of bona fide need for the premises (House No. 191, Rajendra Nagar, Nauchandi Ground, District Meerut). Opposite party No. 3 had earlier filed Suit No. 420 of 1977 seeking recovery of possession of a portion of the accommodation allegedly taken by the petitioner for her daughter's marriage on 24 March 1977; the petitioner denied those allegations. The trial Court decreed the suit and an appeal was pending before the Ist Civil Judge, Meerut.
While the petitioner's Section 21 application was pending before the prescribed authority, opposite party No. 3 applied to stay the Section 21 proceedings in view of the pending appeal in Suit No. 420 of 1977. The prescribed authority rejected that application by order dated 26 February 1980. Opposite party No. 3 filed a revision under the Code of Civil Procedure before the District Judge, Meerut; the revisional court allowed the revision and stayed the Section 21 proceedings by order dated 3-5-1980 under Section 131 C.P.C. The petitioner challenges that revisional order by the present writ petition.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) lies against an order passed by the prescribed authority under the Act (specifically, the order dated 26 February 1980) or whether such an order is beyond the revisional jurisdiction conferred by Section 115 CPC.
- Whether the prescribed authority under the Act is to be treated as a "civil court" (a constituted court) for the purposes of invoking the revisional power under Section 115 CPC, or whether it is a persona designata (an individual/official) such that Section 115 CPC is inapplicable.
- Whether the powers of the prescribed authority (including any exercise of inherent powers such as under Section 151 CPC of the CPC) make its orders amenable to revision under Section 115 CPC.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- No revision lies under Section 115 CPC against the order passed by the prescribed authority on 26 February 1980, even if that order was passed under its inherent powers; therefore, the revisional order dated 3-5-1980 is wholly without jurisdiction.
- The Act and the Rules framed thereunder constitute a complete code; only specific powers of the Code of Civil Procedure made applicable under the Act (via Section 34 and Rule 22) can be invoked, and Section 115 CPC is not among those made applicable.
- The prescribed authority, as defined by Section 3(e) of the Act, is an officer specially authorised by the District Judge (a persona designata) and not a civil court, so Section 115 CPC cannot be invoked.
Opposite Party No. 3's Arguments
- The prescribed authority had passed the order under Section 151 CPC (inherent powers), a power which the authority possessed under Rule 22 of the Act; consequently the order was revisable under Section 115 CPC.
- Relied upon authorities (Kalipada Dinda v. Kartick Chandra Hait and Noor Mohammad v. Suleman Khan) to support the proposition that the revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC could be invoked in such circumstances.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Asnew Drums (Private) Ltd. v. Maharashtra State Finance Corporation, 1971 3 SCC 602 | Interpretation of the expression "in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure" — that "manner" means method of procedure and that providing for an appeal is not providing a mode of procedure. | The Court distinguished the present Act because the legislature omitted the expression "in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure" and instead enumerated specific powers; relied on this to hold Section 115 CPC not applicable to proceedings under the Act. |
| Hira Lal v. Ranjit Singh, 1976 A.W.C. 396 | Held that the prescribed authority is not a Civil Court as contemplated under the Code of Civil Procedure and that a Section 21 proceeding cannot be treated as a "suit" for the purpose of invoking Section 115 CPC. | Relied upon as a Division Bench authority supporting the proposition that the prescribed authority is not a civil court and that orders under Section 21 are not revisable under Section 115 CPC. |
| Ram Chandra v. State of U.P. | Accepted the distinction between a persona designata and a legal tribunal (following the Full Bench in Chatur Mohan v. Ram Behari). | Used to analyze whether the prescribed authority is a persona designata or a constituted court; supported the conclusion that the prescribed authority is persona designata. |
| Chatur Mohan v. Ram Behari, 1964 All. L.J. 256 | Full Bench decision summarising cases on whether references are to a constituted Court or to a persona designata; relevant to the persona designata/legal tribunal distinction. | Referenced (through Ram Chandra) as background authority outlining the persona designata/legal tribunal distinction applied here. |
| Balkrishan Udayar v. Vasudeva Ayyar, 44 Ind. App. 261 | Explanation of the difference between a persona designata and a legal tribunal; determinations by a persona designata are not judgments of a legal tribunal. | Cited via Ram Chandra to support the proposition that determinations of a persona designata are not to be treated as judgments of a legal tribunal, reinforcing that Section 115 CPC does not apply. |
| Central Talkies Ltd., Kanpur v. Dwarka Prasad, 1961-3 S.C.R. 495 | Accepted the meaning of "persona designata" (dictionary definition) and is cited in the context of distinguishing individual adjudicators from constituted courts. | Used to support the persona designata characterization of the prescribed authority under the Act. |
| Gur Narain Jagat Narain v. Motor and General Sales, 1977 U.P R.C.C. 58 | Held that the prescribed authority is not a Court and is only a persona designata. | Relied upon as a supporting authority for the conclusion that the prescribed authority is not a civil court and that CPC revisional power under Section 115 does not apply. |
| Kalipada Dinda v. Kartick Chandra Hait, A.I.R. 1977 Cal. 3 | Relied upon by opposite party to support the availability of revision under Section 115 CPC (as argued by opposite party). | The Court noted opposite party's reliance but held the principles of this case do not assist because Section 115 CPC is not applicable to orders under the Act. |
| Noor Mohammad v. Suleman Khan, A.I.R. 1943 Oudh 35 | Relied upon by opposite party to support revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC in the circumstances argued. | The Court observed the case was cited by the opposite party but rejected its applicability for the same reason that Section 115 CPC does not apply to the Act's proceedings. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis proceeds in a sequence tied closely to the statutory text of the Act and to the authorities interpreting the distinction between a constituted court and a persona designata:
- Statutory framework: The Act regulates letting, rent and eviction in specified urban areas and creates its own procedural code. The term "prescribed authority" is defined in Section 3(e) as a Civil Judicial Officer or Judicial Magistrate authorised by the District Judge to exercise powers under the Act (i.e., an officer specially authorised).
- Limited application of CPC provisions: Section 34(1) of the Act makes only specified provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to inquiries, appeals and revisions under the Act; Rule 22 (framed under Section 34(1)(g)) enumerates the powers of the District Magistrate, prescribed authority, appellate and revising authorities. The Court emphasized that the Act and Rules constitute a complete code and that only those CPC provisions specifically made applicable can be invoked.
- Constructional consequence: Because the legislature chose to enumerate specific CPC powers and omitted the phrase "in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure," the Court drew on Asnew Drums to say that the phrase would have had a particular meaning (method of procedure); its omission indicates the legislature did not intend to make Section 115 CPC generally available to challenge orders under the Act.
- Persona designata analysis: The Court then examined the persona designata doctrine. Citing Ram Chandra (which accepted the Full Bench in Chatur Mohan) and earlier authorities (Balkrishan Udayar, Central Talkies), the Court explained the distinction between a persona designata and a legal tribunal and held that the prescribed authority — being an officer specially authorized by the District Judge under Section 3(e) — is described as an individual (persona designata) rather than a constituted court.
- Precedential support: The Court relied on prior decisions, including Hira Lal v. Ranjit Singh and Gur Narain Jagat Narain, that had held the prescribed authority is not a Civil Court and that Section 21 proceedings cannot be treated as suits for Section 115 CPC purposes. Section 38 of the Act (non-obstante provision) further indicated that CPC provisions were not to be applied inconsistently to the Act.
- Rejection of opposing contention: The opposite party's submission that the order of the prescribed authority was passed under Section 151 CPC (a power claimed under Rule 22) and therefore revisable under Section 115 CPC was rejected. The Court concluded that even if inherent powers were exercised, Section 115 CPC is not made applicable by the Act and the authorities cited by opposite party (Kalipada Dinda and Noor Mohammad) did not assist.
- Conclusion of law applied to facts: Because Section 115 CPC does not apply to orders under the Act and the prescribed authority is a persona designata rather than a constituted civil court, the revision filed before the revisional Court under Section 115 CPC had no jurisdiction to quash the prescribed authority's order dated 26 February 1980.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The petition is allowed. The order of the IVth Additional District Judge, Meerut dated 3-5-1980 is quashed and the order of the prescribed authority dated 26 February 1980 is restored.
Immediate consequences:
- The revisional order (3-5-1980) that had stayed the Section 21 proceedings is quashed; the prescribed authority's decision of 26 February 1980 stands restored, meaning the stay is removed and the prescribed authority's proceedings may continue according to law.
- Parties are directed to bear their own costs.
Broader implications: The opinion reasons that the Act and its Rules constitute a self-contained code; only specified provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are applicable. It concludes that Section 115 CPC is not applicable to orders under the Act and that the prescribed authority should be treated as a persona designata rather than a constituted civil court for the purposes considered. The opinion does not purport to create a new precedent beyond the application of these principles to the facts of this case.
S.D Agarwala, J.:— This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India arising out of proceedings under Section 21 of the U.P Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, U.P Act XIII of 1972, hereinafter referred to as the Act. The petitioner is the landlady. The property in dispute is house No. 191, Rajendra Nagar, Nauchandi Ground, District Meerut. Opposite party No. 3 is a tenant. The petitioner filed an application under Section 21 of the Act for eviction of the opposite party No. 3 on the ground of bona fide need of the petitioner. In respect of the premises in dispute opposite party No. 3 filed a suit No. 420 of 1977 with the allegations that the petitioner had taken some portion of the accommodation in the tenancy of the opposite party No. 3 for the purposes of the marriage of the daughter of the petitioner on 24th March, 1977. After the completion of the marriage the said portion was not returned to the opposite party No. 3 and as such the suit was filed for recovery of possession of the accommodation which was taken by the petitioner in her daughter's marriage. The allegations in the said suit were, however, denied by the petitioner. The suit was decreed by the trial Court. Against the said judgment an appeal was filed before the District Judge, Meerut. The application under Section 21 of the Act filed by the petitioner was pending before the prescribed authority and in the said proceeding opposite party No. 3 filed an application to the effect that the proceedings in the case be stayed in view of the pendency of the appeal in suit No. 420 of 1977. This application was rejected by the prescribed authority by an order dated 26th February, 1980. Against the order of the prescribed authority dated 26th February, 1980 opposite party No. 3 filed a revision before the District Judge, Meerut. The revision was allowed by the IVth Additional District Judge, Meerut on 3-5-1980 and the proceedings in the application under Section 21 of the Act were stayed by the revisional Court under Section 131 C.P.C till the disposal of the appeal arising out of suit No. 420 of 1977 pending in the Court of Ist Civil judge, Meerut. The order dated 3-5-1980 has been challenged by the petitioner by means of the present petition.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that no revision lay under Section 115 C.P.C against the order passed by the prescribed authority on 26th February, 1980 under its inherent powers and as such the impugned order dated 3-5-1980 is wholly without jurisdiction. In order to consider this question it is necessary to consider certain relevant provisions of the Act. The Act provides for the regulation of letting, rent and eviction of tenants from certain classes of buildings situated in urban areas and in respect of matters connected therewith. The word ‘prescribed authority’ has been defined in Section 3(e) which means a Civil Judicial Officer, or Judicial Magistrate authorised by the District Judge to exercise, perform and discharge all or any of the powers, functions and duties of the prescribed authority under the Act. The prescribed authority is, therefore, an officer specially authorised by the District Judge. Section 18 of the Act provides cases where a revision would lie against an order passed by the District Magistrate under Sections 16 and 19 of the Act. Section 22 provides for an appeal by an aggrieved person against an order passed under Section 21 or Section 24 of the Act passed by the prescribed authority. The relevant portion of Section 34 sub-clause (1) of the Act is as follows:
“(1) The District Magistrate, the prescribed authority or any appellate or revising authority shall for the purposes of holding any inquiry or hearing any appeal or revision under this Act have the same powers as are vested in the Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act No. V of 1908), when trying a suit in respect of the following matters, namely,—
(a) …………………
(b) …………………
(c) …………………
(d) ……………….
(e) …………………
(f) ………………
(g) any other matter which may be prescribed.”
3. Sub-section (2) of the said section is as follows:
“The District Magistrate, the prescribed authority or appellate or revising authority, while holding an inquiry or hearing an appeal or revision under this Act, shall be deemed to be a Civil Court within the meaning of Sections 345 and 346 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and any proceedings before him or it to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of Section 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code (Act No. XLV of 1960).”
4. Rule 22 of the Rules framed under the Act has been made under Section 34(1)(g) of the Act and it enumerates the powers of the District Magistrate, the prescribed authority, appellate authority and the revising authority. From the above provisions, it is clear that the Act and Rules framed under the Act prescribe a complete code for the determination of matters provided under the Act. Only specific powers have been given to the authorities under the Act as prescribed by Section 34(1)(a) to (f) and under Rule 22 of the Act. Only specific provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure have been made applicable to the proceedings under the Act. Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be invoked to challenge the orders made under the Act.
5. The position, however, might have been different if the authorities concerned were directed by the Act and Rules to follow the procedure in a manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as was the case in Asnew Drums (Private) Ltd. v. Maharashtra State Finance Corporation . 1971 3 SCC 602. Where the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the expression’ in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure’. The Supreme Court held that the word “manner” means method of procedure and to provide for an appeal is not provide for a mode of procedure. In the instant case the legislature specifically omitted to use this expression and enumerated the specific powers of the authorities under the Act. In my opinion, therefore, the provisions of Section 115 Code of Civil Procedure cannot be made applicable to these proceedings. Wherever the legislature thought that the right of revision or appeal is to be granted to an aggrieved party, it has been provided under the Act.
6. There is yet another aspect of the matter. Section 34 sub-clause (2) quoted above lays down that the authorities exercising powers under the Act shall be deemed to be a civil Court only for the purposes of Sections 345 and 346, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. This clause, therefore, makes it clear that the authorities under the Act were not to be deemed to be a civil Court for other purposes. In Hira Lal v. Ranjit Singh . 1976 A.W.C 396. a Division Bench of this Court has held that the prescibed authority is not a Civil Court as contemplated under the Code of Civil Procedure. The Division Bench further held that Section 21 of the Act cannot be deemed to be a suit within the meaning of the Code of Civil Procedure so as to make an order passed under Section 21 revisable under Section 115 of the Code.
7. In Ram Chandra v. State of U.P,3 the Hon'ble Supreme Court accepted the dictum of the Full Bench of our Court in Chatur Mohan v. Ram Behari . 1964 All. L.J 256 and laid down the distinction between a “persona designata and a legal tribunal. Madholkar, J. speaking for the Court opined as follows:
“3. In Balkrishan Udayar v. Vasudeva Ayyar . 44 Ind, App 261 Lord Atkinson has pointed out the difference between a persona designata and a legal tribunal. The difference is this that the “determinations of a persona designata are not to be treated as judgments of a legal tribunal”. In the Central Talkies Ltd., Kanpur v. Dwarka Prasad . 1961-3 S.C.R 495 at pp. 500-501 this Court has accepted the meaning given to the expression persona designata in Osborn's Concise Law Dictionary, 4th Edn., p. 263 as “a person who is pointed out or described as an individual, as opposed to a person ascertained as a member of a class, or as filling a particular character”. Section 146(1): Cr. P.C empowers a Magistrate to refer the question as to whether any, and if so, which of the parties was in possession of the subject-matter of dispute at the relevant point of time to a Civil Court of competent jurisdiction. The power is not to refer the matter to the presiding Judge of a particular Civil Court but to a Court. When a special or local law provides for an adjudication to be made by a constituted Court, that is, by a Court not created by a special or local law but to an existing Court—it in fact enlarges the ordinary jurisdiction of such a Court. Thus, where a special or local statute refers to a constituted Court as a Court and does not refer to the presiding officer of that Court the reference cannot be said to be to a persona designata. This question is well settled. It is, therefore, unnecessary to say anything more on this part of the case except that cases dealing with the point have been well summarised in the recent decision in Chatur Mohan v. Ram Behari (supra.).”
8. The question, therefore, which has to be determined in view of the dictum laid down by the Supreme Court is as to whether the prescribed authority is described as an individual, as opposed to a person ascertained as a member of a class or as filling a particular character. In the present Act the prescribed authority has been specially defined in Section 3(e) as I have already mentioned above. It means a Civil Judicial Officer, specially authorised by the District Judge to exercise, perform and discharge all or any of the powers, functions and duties of the prescribed authority under the Act. The legislature described the prescribed authority as an individual, as opposed to a member of a class because otherwise it was not necessary to provide for an authority by the District Judge. In view of the above specific provisions of this Act, therefore, in my opinion the prescribed authority is a persona designata. This view also finds support from the decision of D.N Jha, J. in Gur Narain Jagat Narain v. Motor and General Sales . 1977 U.P R.C.C 58. wherein it has been held that the prescribed authority is not a Court nor can it be deemed to be a Court and the authority is only a persona designata Section 38 of the Act also throws light on this question which clearly provides that the provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent contained in the Code of Civil Procedure The entire provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure were, therefore, not applicable to proceedings under the Act. Since the prescribed authority is a persona designata the revisional power prescribed under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure could not be invoked. In my opinion, therefore, the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner is well founded and no revision lay againts the order passed by the prescribed authority under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Learned counsel for the opposite party No. 3 has vehemently contended that the prescribed authority had passed the order under Section 151 Code of Civil Procedure which power it had under Rule 22 of the Act, and as such the order was revisable under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In support of this argument he has relied upon two cases, namely, Kalipada Dinda v. Kartick Chandra Hait . A.I.R 1977 Cal. 3. and Noor Mohammad v. Suleman Khan . A.I.R 1943 Oudh 35.. The principles laid down in these cases do not apply at all to the present case as I have already held that Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable to orders passed under the Act and as such no assistance can be taken by the opposite party No. 3 on the principles laid down in these cases.
9. In the result, the petition is allowed. The order of the IVth Additional District Judge, Meerut dated 3-5-1980 is quashed and that of the prescribed authority dated 26th February, 1980 is restored. In the circumstances of the case, parties are directed to bear their own costs.
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