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Agra University v. Ashok Kumar Arora
Written Reasons — Special Appeals Nos. 150, 151, 184 & 195 of 1975 (K.B. Asthana, C.J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
These four special appeals were consolidated for hearing because they involved similar subject-matter. The Court heard the appeals on 8 August 1975 and initially dismissed them without giving reasons; the opinion reproduced here contains those reasons.
In the B.S.A. College, Mathura centre for the Agra University B.Sc. Part II (1974) examinations, the results of several candidates (including the appellants and respondents in these consolidated appeals) were withheld. Those candidates were served with notices alleging the use of unfair means in a Mathematics paper, called upon to explain and to appear before a Sub‑Committee appointed by the University's Examinations Committee. The Examinations Committee found them guilty, cancelled their 1974 examinations and debarred them from appearing in the 1975 examinations.
Affected students filed writ petitions in this Court: Ashok Kumar Arora filed Writ Petition No. 134 of 1975; other affected candidates filed Writ Petitions Nos. 761 of 1975 and 195 of 1975. The petitioners sought quashing of the Examinations Committee's order and a mandamus for release of their 1974 results.
Before the Single Judge, counsel for the University made a statement that if the petitioners applied to the Vice‑Chancellor, he would reconsider the cases. Acting on that concession, the Single Judge did not grant the requested mandamus. The Single Judge accepted petitioners' contention that the Examinations Committee had no power to debar candidates from future examinations, and accordingly quashed the debarment portion of the punishment. The Single Judge also directed that if the petitioners applied within one week, the University would reconsider the matter within one month.
The University appealed the Single Judge's decision by filing three Special Appeals; Ashok Kumar Arora filed Special Appeal No. 195 of 1975 seeking a mandamus for declaration of his result.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Examinations Committee of the Agra University, under sub‑section (3) of Section 29 of the U.P. State Universities Act, 1973 (Act No. X of 1973), has the power to debar a candidate from appearing at future University examinations as a punishment for using unfair means.
- Whether the action of the Examinations Committee in cancelling the 1974 examination results and debarring candidates from the 1975 examination was valid (i.e., whether the Committee's punitive measures extended to debarment as used in these cases).
Arguments of the Parties
University's Arguments
- The Examinations Committee is an authority of the University and, by sub‑section (2) of Section 29, is empowered to "supervise all examinations of the University". The University argued that this general supervisory power over "all examinations" includes power to debar a candidate from future examinations when dealing with cases of unfair means under sub‑section (3).
- The University invoked the decision of a Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court in Bijan Behari Goswami v. University of Calcutta (A.I.R. 1967 Cal. 50) to support the proposition that a university body vested with authority to conduct examinations and publish results can debar an examinee for misconduct.
Petitioners' / Appellants (Students') Arguments
- The petitioners contended (a position accepted by the Single Judge) that the Examinations Committee did not have power under Section 29 to debar a candidate from appearing at future examinations; its jurisdiction was limited to matters relating to examinees in respect of the examination for that particular year.
- Implicit in their position was that an "examinee" is a student who has been admitted to the relevant examination, and debarring a student from a future examination would in substance be refusing future admission — a power not conferred on the Examinations Committee by Section 29.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Bijan Behari Goswami v. University of Calcutta, A.I.R. 1967 Cal. 50 | Interpreted powers of a university authority (syndicate under Calcutta University Act) to conduct examinations and publish results and, in that context, recognised a power to debar for misconduct (subject to the language of the statute and rules). | The Court noted the Calcutta decision had held a similar power could be inferred under that statute, but found it of limited assistance because it depended on the particular wording and rules of the Calcutta University enactment; the Calcutta decision did not aid construction of Section 29 of the U.P. Act. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court analyzed the text and scheme of Section 29 of the U.P. State Universities Act, 1973 (the "Act"). The Court's reasoning proceeded in the following steps:
-
Textual and functional reading of sub‑section (2) of Section 29:
- The Examinations Committee's supervisory functions listed in sub‑section (2) (appointing examiners and moderators, reviewing and submitting reports on results, scrutinizing examiners' lists, declaring results) are, the Court observed, functions exercised with respect to the examinations of a particular year. The phrase "all examinations" was read in the context of examinations conducted in that year rather than as a grant of perpetual power over all future examinations for the life of the University.
- The power to make recommendations to the Academic Council for improving the examination system was identified as recommendatory in nature and not a supervisory power equivalent to appointing examiners or declaring future results.
-
On the scope of sub‑section (3) of Section 29:
- Sub‑section (3) empowers the Examinations Committee to deal with and decide cases relating to the use of unfair means by examinees, including by delegation. The Court emphasized the link between that power and the status of "examinee".
- The Court defined "examinee" (for these purposes) as a student who has been duly found eligible and admitted to an examination. A student not yet admitted to a particular examination is not an "examinee" in relation to that examination.
-
Jurisdictional limitation and nature of punishment:
- Debarring a student from a future examination equates to refusing admission to that future examination. The Court held that the Examinations Committee's jurisdiction under Section 29 relates to the conduct of examinees in respect of the examinations of a particular year; it does not extend to exercising control over admissions to future examinations.
- Consequently, the Court concluded that the Examinations Committee, in the guise of supervisory powers, cannot assume jurisdiction to debar an individual from future examinations nor treat a past examinee as an examinee for all future sittings of the same examination.
-
On statutory language and implication of punitive power:
- The Court characterized the wording of sub‑section (3) as inartistic and lacking directness; the phrase "to deal with and decide cases" does not expressly confer a power of punishment such as debarring, and any such power would have to be implied. The Court declined to read that broader punitive power into the provision.
-
Consideration of precedent invoked by the University:
- The Court examined the Calcutta High Court decision cited by the University but found it tied to peculiar provisions of the Calcutta University Act and rules; accordingly, it did not assist in interpreting Section 29 of the U.P. Act.
-
Ordinances and survivability:
- The Court observed that although it appeared the Single Judge thought existing Agra University Ordinances (which gave power to the Executive Council or Vice‑Chancellor to award punishments) might be inoperative as inconsistent with the Act, the Court reserved its opinion on that question. The Court indicated there was some tenability in the argument that existing Ordinances on punishment could survive until altered under the Act, but did not decide the point finally.
-
Practical conclusion drawn:
- It followed from the above statutory construction that the Examinations Committee could cancel the particular examination in which the use of unfair means was proved, but it did not have the power to debar a candidate from appearing at future examinations under the statutory provisions examined.
Holding and Implications
Core Holding: The Court held that the Examinations Committee of the Agra University, under sub‑section (3) of Section 29 of the U.P. State Universities Act, 1973, does not have the statutory power to debar a candidate from appearing at future University examinations as a punishment for using unfair means. It may cancel the particular examination in which the use of unfair means was proved, but it cannot impose debarment from future examinations under the provision construed.
Disposition of Appeals:
- The Court dismissed Special Appeal No. 195 of 1975 (Ashok Kumar Arora). The Court noted that at the Single Judge stage the parties had accepted the University's undertaking and thus the appellant could not be said to be an aggrieved party; the appeal was dismissed and no order as to costs was made in his case.
- The Court dismissed the three appeals filed by the University (arising from the three writ petitions) for the reasons given above, and ordered costs in favour of the respondents in those appeals.
Implications: The direct legal consequence is that the debarment orders imposed by the Examinations Committee in these cases were beyond its statutory power and were therefore set aside to that extent. The Court did not issue a final ruling on the related question whether pre‑existing University Ordinances permitting other authorities (e.g., Executive Council or Vice‑Chancellor) to award punishments survive the Act; the Court expressly reserved its opinion on that point. The opinion focuses on statutory construction rather than establishing a broad new doctrine beyond the interpretation of Section 29 as applied to the facts before the Court.
No other precedents or external authorities were cited in the provided opinion beyond the single Calcutta decision recorded in the Table of Precedents above.
K.B Asthana, C.J:— Special appeals Nos. 150 of 1975, 151 of 1975, 184 of 1975 and 195 of 1975 were consolidated for hearing as the subject-matter involved in these appeals is similar.
2. These appeals were heard by us on August 8, 1975 and we dismissed each one of them without giving our reasons, which we are pronouncing now.
3. B.S.A College, Mathura was one of the many Centres for holding of the examinations of B.Sc Part II of the year 1974 of the Agra University, hereinafter called the ‘University’.
4. Ashok Kumar Arora, who is appellant in Special Appeal No. 195 of 1975, and the respondents in Special Appeals Nos. 184 of 1975 and 151 of 1975 appeared in the said examination. Likewise the respondents in Special Appeals Nos. 150 of 1975 and 184 of 1975 were also examinees in the said examination. The results of the abovenamed candidates and of some other candidates who appeared at the B.S.A Centre were withheld—In due course the results of others were released but not of the abovenamed candidates. They were eventually served with notices charging them for having used unfair means in one of the papers of Mathematics. They were asked to submit their explanation and appear before a sub-Committee appointed by the Examinations Committee of the University. The Examinations Committee found them guilty of having used unfair means, cancelled their examination of 1974 and debarred them from appearing in the examination of 1975. Ashok Kumar Arora then filed writ petition No. 134 of 1975 in this Court, the respondents to Special Appeal No. 151 of 1975 filed writ petition No. 761 of 1975 and the respondents of Special Appeal No. 184 of 1975 filed writ petition No. 195 of 1975. The petitioners in all the three writ petitions questioned the validity of the action taken against them and sought for a mandamus for releasing their results of 1974 after quashing the order of the Examinations Committee. Two writ petitions were disposed of by a common judgment while the third was decided in terms of the common judgment. Before the learned Single Judge a statement was made on behalf of the University that if the petitioners applied again to the Vice Chancellor of the University, he was ready to have their cases reconsidered. The learned Single Judge acting upon this concession did not grant any mandamus as prayed for. However, the learned Single Judge accepted the contention raised on behalf of the petitioners that the Examinations Committee of the University had no power to debar the petitioners from appearing at any future examination and quashed to that extent the order of punishment passed by the Examinations Committee. The learned Single Judge further issued a direction that in case the petitioners made applications within one week for reconsideration of the matter, the University would reconsider the matter within one month thereof and do the needful. The petitioners of writ petition No. 761 of 1975 seem to have been satisfied with the result. However, the University feeling aggrieved filed three Special Appeals against the verdict of the learned Single Judge in each of the three writ petitions. Ashok Kumar Arora filed Special Appeal No. 195 of 1975 praying that a mandamus for declaration of his result be issued.
5. We do not think there is any substance in the appeal filed by Ashok Kumar Arora, when at the hearing before the learned Single Judge the parties accepted the undertaking given by the learned counsel for the University and being prepared to act upon it led the learned Single Judge to give an appropriate direction. We do not think the appellant can be said to be an aggrieved party so as to maintain this appeal.
6. We, accordingly, dismiss his appeal No. 195 of 1975 but make no order for costs.
7. Now coming to the three appeals filed by the University, we find ourselves in agreement with the learned Single Judge that the Examinations Committee of the University had no power to debar a candidate from appearing at future examinations in the exercise of its power under sub-section (3) of Section 29 of the U.P State Universities Act, 1973 (Act No. X of 1973) hereinafter called the ‘Act’.
8. No doubt the Examinations Committee under the said Act is an authority of the University and by sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Act is empowered to supervise all examinations of the University and by sub-section (3) of Section 39 of the Act is empowered to deal with and decide cases relating to the use of unfair means of the examinees either itself or through a delegate, or through an individual or sub-Committee. We do not think it is possible to spell out a power for debarring a candidate or an examinee from appearing at the future examinations when dealing and deciding his case relating to the use of unfair means. The Examinations Committee, according to the scheme of Section 29 of the Act, as we read and construe it, exercises general supervision of all examinations of the University for each particular year, that is to say, that all examinations conducted by the Agra University in 1974 were under its supervision. It would be seen from sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Act that the power of general supervision of the Examinations Committee includes appointing examiners and moderators and if necessary to remove them; reviewing from time to time the results of University Examinations and submit reports thereof to the Academic Council; scrutinizing, the list of examiners proposed by the Board of Studies, finalise the same and declare the result of the University. By the very nature of these functions it is clear that for the Examination of each year that the Examinations Committee performs its duties. It is not possible to read the provisions of that Section in a way that for all future examinations also the Examinations Committee at one particular time in a year can appoint examiners, moderators and declare results. There is, however, one function assigned to the Examinations Committee that is for making recommendations to the Academic Council for the improvement of the examination system. This function, however, would not mean supervising the examination or examinations and cannot be said to be supervisory function. It is a recommendatory function regarding the system of examinations in general. The function of recommendation for improving the system of examinations falls outside the pale of function of supervising an examination or examinations. Merely because the Examinations Committee can also suggest methods of improvement of examination system would not mean that it can also appoint examiners, moderators and declare results of all future examinations. We are unable to accept the submission of the learned counsel for the University that the function of dealing and deciding cases relating to the use of unfair means by the examinees will vest a power with the Examinations Committee not only to cancel the particular examination in the course of which the examinee has been found guilty of using unfair means but not to allow him to appear at any future examination of the University as it is vested with the power of general supervision of all examinations of the University. The fallacy in this argument is that the learned counsel imports a meaning in the words ‘all examination’ used in sub-section (2), which they cannot legitimately bear as meaning examinations to be held in future by the University so long as University exists.
9. In support of his proposition that the Examinations Committee having vested with the power of general supervision of all examinations can debar an examinee from future examinations, a reference was made to a decision of a learned Single Judge of Calcutta High Court in the case of Bijan Behari Goswami v. University of Calcutta . A.I.R 1967 Cal. 50.. In that case clause (o) of Section 21 of the Calcutta University Act, 1951 came up for consideration. That Section empowered the syndicate to conduct University examinations and approve and publish results thereof in accordance with the Statutes and Regulations. No doubt the learned Judge held that the power conferred by Section 21(o) will give a power to debar a candidate from appearing at an examination for misconduct but the learned Judge pointed out the defect in the actual language and the doubtful position created by the rules which did not expressly empower the University to debar an examinee from future examination. The reading of the case as a whole, to our mind, does not afford any assistance to us in construing and interpreting the provisions of Section 29 of the Act. The decision of the Calcutta High Court went on peculiar provisions of the Calcutta High Court went on peculiar provisions of the Calcutta University.
10. The matter can be considered from another angle. sub-section (3) of Section 29 of the Act confers power on the Examinations Committee to delegate its power to any one to deal with and decide cases relating to the use of unfair means by the examinees. An examinee would be a student who has been duly found eligible and admitted to an examination. A student of the University or affiliated College of the University who has not been admitted to an examination will not be an examinee. Now debarring a candidate from an examination which is to be held in future would amount to refusal to admit him to that examination. The Examinations Committee only gets jurisdiction regarding examinations to be held each particular year and it is empowered to deal with and decide cases of a student who has been duly admitted to the examination of each particular year. It will have no jurisdiction over any matter which does not relate to the conduct of an examinee. Since a student will be an examinee after he has then admitted to the examination, the Examinations Committee in the guise of exercising its supervisory power cannot assume jurisdiction to take action against a student who is not an examinee. The Examinations Committee has no power in our opinion to admit or not to admit a candidate to an examination. There is no such power conferred under Section 29 of the Act. The Examinations Committee cannot treat a student who once has been an examinee in an examination in a particular year as always an examinee for the same examination in future. It is clear, therefore, that as a matter of punishment even no such power can be assumed. Worded as sub-section (3) of Section 29 is, to say the least, it is very inartistic and lacks direcness. It does not in express terms confer a power on the Examinations Committee to punish unless that power of punishment is impliedly read in phrase ‘to deal with and decide cases’. It is unfortunate that though the Act has been in force for more than two years, no Ordinance has been framed as none has been brought to our notice. Thus we are driven to the conclusion that while it is within the power of the Examinations Committee to cancel the Examination relating to which use of unfair means by an examinee has been proved, it has no power to debar him from appearing at the future examination. We may observe in this connection that the learned Single Judge seems to be of the view that the Ordinances of the Agra University, an existing University within the meaning of the Act, which deal with matters relating to cases of use of unfair means by the examinees and constituted the Executive Council or the Vice Chancellor as the authority for awarding punishment to the guilty examinees, would cease to be operative as being inconsistent with the provisions of the Act. This is a question on which we reserve our opinion as we think with some tenability it can be argued that there being nothing in Section 29 of the Act conferring power of punishment to an delinquent examinee on the Examination Committee, all the existing Ordinances on the subject-matter of awarding punishment would survive till they are varied, modified or rescinded by new ‘Ordinances’ made under the Act.
11. For the above reasons, we do not find any merit in the appeals filed by the University and we dismiss each of them with costs.
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